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You can Never Plan the Future By the Past 
(Edmund Burke) 
In the LONG RUN, MOST DYNAMIC SYSTEMS show NO DISCERNIBLE 
REGULARITY or REPETITIVE PATTERN. 
(Poincare) 
- A UNIQUE CHARACTERISTIC of LIFE is that it is an 
ORGANISED SYSTEM capable of CREATING MORE ORDER from LESS 
ORDER.-
(Litterer) 
-CHAOS seems to be RESPONSIBLE for MAINTAINING ORDER 
in the 
NATURAL WORLD-
( Percival I) 
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ABSTRACT. 
In spite of decades of intensive study of practically all 
aspects of management, it still seems to be almost 
impossible to complete large development projects according 
to originally predicted timescales and cost. Examples are 
the Concorde supersonic airliner, the Channel Tunnel, the 
Humber Bridge. 
This research started with the premise that the future is 
not predictable, and has concentrated on addressing the 
life-cycle dynamics of projects involved in the development 
of complex systems. It has also focused on the human 
characteristics of organisations with initial convergence 
to "open systems" concepts and the need to increase 
orderliness with increasing complexity i.e locally 
decreasing entropy. 
The theme that runs through the thesis is that of assessing 
the current risk, and the likely tendency that such risk 
will increase or decrease in the future, that the project 
will be completed according to claims made by the 
contractor in his Bid to the customer. 
An analysis of data from four actual projects together with 
various subjective appraisals by managers who were involved 
in them, and an assessment of the current state of related 
knowledge, has resulted in the formulation of a new type of 
management method. 
The "new" aspects of the method relate to its ability to 
take into account the dynamics of the project circumstances 
as the project products pass through the design, 
manufacturing, testing, and operating phases. This is done 
by "taking soundings" deep within the projects working 
infra-structure. 
During this development a number of conventional concepts 
have not been used. For example, the concept that a company 
exists within an environment that can be represented by 
hard-lined diagrams has been avoided. 
The method involves the use of static and dynamic risk 
indicators, open and closed loop systems, and the 
utilisation of patterns constructed from real time data to 
identify whether the project dynamics are in a steady 
state, turbulent or chaotic condition. 
The method also contains an "intervention" function as a 
necessary element to ensure that the project and 
corporation strategic aspects are adequately considered. 
The method has been developed in a pragmatic manner such 
that it can be implemented by a practising manager. 
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EXECJlTIYI SlDQIARX 
The prime objective of this research has been to identify 
why so many large development projects, world wide, 
significantly exceed their budgets and scheduled completion 
times; in spite of intensive analysis of the bids and 
comprehensive monitoring during the project lifespan. 
These discrepancies between prediction and achievement 
frequently result in impact at corporate levels and often 
cause strategic change to the companies concerned. 
The secondary objective of this research, as important as 
the first objective but naturally penultimate to it, since 
it derives from it, has been the definition of a pragmatic 
Method, which could be applied with currently available 
management resources and expertise, to enable the above 
overruns to be significantly alleviated. 
Both objectives have been achieved. 
The main problems have related to: 
- the presentation and processing of multi-dimensional 
data; 
- the definition and monitoring of project dynamics; and 
- the interaction of deterministic and behavioural aspects 
within a project. 
The main findings of the research are summarised in outline 
in the next chapter, entitled "The Research Results", and 
relate to the prime objective. 
The following chapter, entitled "The Dynamic Risk 
Management Method", relates to the second objective and is 
entirely based on the work done to resolve the problems 
related to the prime objective. 
The final chapter in this "Executive Sununary" addresses the 
application of the Method within an organisation. 
The USEAlCB RESULTS, 
The research was carried out in four main phases 
Initially over 200 references were reviewed to establish 
the state of the art world wide of 15 subjects which relate 
closely to this research. (chapter 3 and annex 4). 
The second phase involved a detailed examination of four 
multi-national projects involved in the design, 
manufacture, testing, launching and operation of European 
space vehicles. 
This work covered the period 1973 to 1992 and resulted in 
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interviews and documentation review. (chapters 4 and 5, and 
annexes 6, 7 and 8) . 
The third phase concerned the analysis of the complete data 
set collected during phases 1 and 2. The results of the 
research were established during this phase. (chapter 5) . 
The final phase was devoted to the definition of the method 
and its application. (chapters 6 and 7) . 
The main results are summarised as follows. 
1) Currently used management methods for prediction, review 
and monitoring do not, in general, consider the complex, 
interactive dynamics present in medium and large 
development projects. 
The methods typically in use do not consider data in the 
integrated form in which it occurs in real life e.g. 
resource utilisation together with manpower and cost 
exspenditure with project time advancement. 
In the planning domain, schedules are actually a series of 
static snapshots which are usually obsolescent at the time 
of print due to the long processing times. 
In spite of an upsurge in recent years of the importance of 
inter-personal and psychological relationships, these 
aspects are rarely seriously integrated into the overall 
management and decision making structures. 
They seem to be the root of many problems which are 
attributed to other causes. 
A remarkable aspect of risk analysis is the variation in 
its definition, application and the 
quantitative/qualitative data on which it is based. 
2) Projects consist of flows or streams(see fig.BS-l), they 
are defined as any activity which requires the expenditure 
of resources {money, manpower, time). These streams 
progressively bifurcate as problems arise and multiply, and 
workaround plans are implemented. 
The increase and interaction of these bifurcations, which 
are not predictable and involve deterministic and 
behavioural aspects, can cause the streams to move fram 
relatively steady state conditions through turbulence to 
conditions of chaos(see fig.BS-2) wherein the management do 
not know what to do to bring the situation under control 
i.e. to some form of predictability. 
3) The project streams relate to each person, individually 
and collectively, within the project. 
The problems that develop, assessments of their criticality 
and resource apportionment, are made by those persons. Each 
person and each committee to whom they report and each 
report that is generated by persons and committees form an 
information channel which EVENTUALLY reaches the executive 
decision makers e.g. the prime contractor. 
Not only is the information very late in arriving at the 
executive decision makers but it is often corrupted due to 
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the large number of persons who "review and 
approve" (filter/censor) it before passing it to the next 
level(see fig ES-3). Personal as well as professional 
influences can exist in this process. 
4) In order to obtain an "early warning" of possible change 
of project dynamics e.g. fram steady state to turbulence, 
it is necessary to "take soundings" of the lower level 
streams. This can be done by requiring, contractually, that 
lower level data is immediately fed into a computer network 
such that it is available to executive management in almost 
real time. The data will have to be carefully processed and 
expert judgement will be necessary. 
This data will form a pattern that will indicate the onset 
of a change in the dynamics. 
5) Four main patterns have been discovered which can be 
used to manage project dynamics. 
They are: 
a) relating to 4) above, the frequency with which 
particular subjects* are discussed at various levels 
of meetings e.g. at sub, co, and prime contractors(see 
fig.ES-4); 
b) the evolution and impact of particular problems as 
the project advances(see fig.ES-5) i 
c) the characteristics of the reduction of project 
turbulence due to intervention e.g. by the customer 
increasing resources or giving additional schedule 
time(see fig.ES-6); 
d) the structure of the initiation and growth of 
problems producing a progressive splitting or 
bifurcation of the streams involved. 
* The "particular subjects" are initially defined at the 
Bid review. 
6) In order to realistically assess the adequacy of the 
resources they should be presented, and maintained, in 3-
dimensional for.m to simultaneously include project 
timescale, manpower utilisation and financial 
expenditures(see fig.BS-7A) • 
7) Planning should primarily emphasize ·open loops· (aee 
fig.BS-8) . 
Open loops are defined as an activity or system in which 
the meaning or outcome of any of its elements either cannot 
be completely defined or cannot be directly linked with a 
previously experienced "similar" item which had a 
successful result. 
The 3-dimensional resource presentations should clearly 
indicate how open loops have been accommodated{see fig.ES-
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7B) . 
8) Risk indicators, both static and dynamic and covering 
behavioural as well as deter.ministic aspects, should be 
used. 
A static risk indicator is based purely on static or 
snapshot data whereas a dynamic risk indicator contains 
information concerning the increase or decrease of the flow 
rates (streams) within a project. 
Examples of risk indicators, in addition to those mentioned 
above, are; 
- lack of experience; 
- the need to VISIT companies to make assessments; 
- maintaining key people in post; 
- rate of utilisation of schedule slack; 
- the rate of reception of invoices and non-
conformances; 
- planners who do not understand the project subject 
matter. 
- cultural and educational differences. 
9) The role of -intervenor- should be established. 
Intervention is defined as the temporary application of 
influence or control to a project by a third party e.g. a 
corporate level manager other than the project manager. 
The intervenor primarily uses risk indicators, open loops, 
project phase close-out status and corporate strategy to 
perform his work function. 
The DYNAMIC RISK MANAGEMENT KBTlOD(DRKM) 
The DRMM overview is shown in fig.ES-9 and in detail in 
fig.ES-10, a) through e) . 
The fundamental objective of the DRMM is to identify and 
control those dynamic entities that could cause the project 
to move from steady state to turbulence. 
The DRMM is based on the function of intervention; via the 
intervenor. 
Two fundamental issues define the role of the intervenor; 
they are: 
1) perception, covering behaviouralistic 
aspects, and 
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2) the incremental approach, covering 
traceability and limitation of risk. 
These two issues are addressed in the two branches 
contained in figs.ES-10 and ES-11. 
The DRMM focuses primarily on the following aspects: 
a) the agreement of a statement of the projects mission and 
acceptable project risk, by the customer and contractor; 
b) cost, resources and performance data being presented and 
monitored in an integrated fashion; 
c) evaluation of the project documentation and plans, at 
project commencement and during the project life cycle, in 
such a way that open loop and negative entropy situations 
and static and dynamic risk indicators can be identified; 
d) characterisation of hard and soft aspects; 
e) identification of the role of intervention utilising the 
four patterns that have been identified during this 
research. 
APPLICATION of the DRMK. 
The prime reason for incorporating the DRMM into 
organisations, now, is to increase management performance, 
to the point of credibility, for complex, development 
projects. 
Not only would company strategies then become more 
achievable but society as a whole would benefit due to 
public utilities etc. becoming available on time and on 
cost; tax and social benefit schemes would thus be mutually 
more supportive and optimal. 
The application of the DRMM would require organisational 
and cultural changes in the majority of industrial, 
contractor and customer, organisations. 
The traditional polar role of project managers, or their 
immediate superiors, would be replaced by a team function 
at that level by the project manager and the intervenor. 
The current segregation between the project manager level 
and the Executive Director level to which it reports would 
again be replaced by a team function by the Director and 
the intervenor. 
The accountability of all parties would significantly 
increase with the utilisation of definitively defined risk 
indicators, open loops etc. 
The blurring of Project Phase and Action close-outs would 
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be outlawed and strict hierarchical project and corporate 
structures would be replaced by essential data sharing to 
enable the "interdependence-via-overlap" job functions to 
be achieved. 
The intervenors influence would be felt at all levels since 
his bailiwick would have wide vertical and horizontal 
dimensions. A risk indicator Fault Tree could be used by 
the intervenor as an aid to his decision making 
activities(see fig.ES-11). 
The central aspect of the DRMM is the access to low level 
data. 
This characteristic would enable the achievement of the 
above organisational changes but would, itself, need a new 
type of "general contracting" in which such visability was 
made available. 
Significant incentives, and penalties, would probably have 
to be written into the new style contracts. 
Possibly the greatest change would be the DRMM requirement 
to consider, executively, the behavioural aspects of 
project personnel. 
This would require attention to the inter-personal side of 
management, and industrial work in general, and would 
initially consume significant time and resources. 
The intervenor would figure very significantly in this 
activity. 
The result of implementing the DRMM would be the formation 
of an open type of organisation that functioned by knowing 
and working through its main strengths, per application, 
and minimising conflicts and risk situations. Such an 
organisation would be constantly reviewing its own 
competence due to the DRMM requirement for feedback and 
closed loops. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and Direction of the Research 
In spite of extensive research in the domain of 
organisational behaviour, decision making, strategic 
management etc. major organisations continue to experience 
catastrophes in their development projects. Originally 
forecast budgets and schedules are exceeded to the extent 
of causing local bankruptcy & threat to project completion; 
even though periodic updates are implemented. This 
phenomena is experienced in Space AND many other 
industries, both national & international e.g. the Humber 
Bridge, the Concorde airliner, British Railways High Speed 
Train, the Channel Tunnel, North Sea Oil Rigs, the Europa 
Launcher, and the ESA Hermes spaceplane. In government 
contracts the bankruptcies are often averted by additional 
funding. 
It is clear therefore that methods do not currently exist, 
or are being utilised, which enable programme risk to be 
identified and controlled. 
The focus of this research is the identification and 
control of total programme risk in a dynamic environment, 
relating to a development activity; the subject matter 
therefore relates to complex systems. 
A starting point of the research has been the postulate 
that the future cannot be predicted with a significant 
degree of certainty. Predictions which are made, based on 
present and historical data for example, seem to be 
dependent on a number of assumptions which are often 
questionable and ambiguous. The sensitivity to initial 
conditions is the key to understanding why determinism does 
not necessarily imply predictability (153) . 
The above points have converged the research towards: 
a) the development of a system which enables progress, or 
lack of it, to be measured incrementally in the case 
of "linear" activities; and, 
b) the search for, and definition of, certain patterns to 
enable the anticipation of non-linear activities and 
their possible consequences. 
A fundamental HYPOTHESIS relating to the research has been 
defined as follows: 
" A development project, which is a complex, open system, 
commences from a perceived steady state, equilibrium 
condition. The planning representation of this condition 
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consists typically of a number of interfacing static 
diagrams; strategic objectives are shown to be achievable 
within stated cost and schedule constraints; with margins 
in the technical domain and reserves in the cost area. An 
essentially closed loop situation is thus assumed as 
reflected by the majority of contracts being fixed price. 
Even the cost reimbursement and cost plus contracts have a 
maximum ceiling price so nothing is considered to be open 
loop. 
As activity increases, the steady state is upset by 
problems which occur, unpredictably, here and there; their 
origins are within, or external to, the project authority 
and responsibility boundaries. An interplay of hard and 
soft aspects exists within these scenarios. 
Due to the multiple, complex, and many common, interfaces, 
and the different perceptions by the involved parties, the 
problems generate other problems in a dynamic but still 
unpredictable fashion. The steady state condition thus 
becomes non-linear with many open loop situations. 
Without risk indicators and intervention the project 
objectives will become increasingly vulnerable to the 
proliferation of problems; with resources being used in a 
fire-fighting mode but the basic causes of the problems 
remaining obscure. The achievement of the strategic 
objectives is not now definable nor predictable; the 
project is going out of control and constitutes a high risk 
element. 
The above perceived increasingly unstable evolution is 
analogous to a flow condition moving from steady state to a 
state of turbulence and ultimately to a state of chaos as 
the flow rate is increased. 
The inter-state movement takes place due to bifurcations 
which increasingly multiply if their reactions are allowed 
to proceed unchecked. 
The high risk consequences can be avoided if the 
bifurcation patterns, involving both hard and soft aspects, 
can be identified thus permitting the restriction of 
excursions to the turbulent and chaotic states by utilising 
risk indicators and intervention. This constitutes the 
role of intervention in strategic change." 
In summary, the study has focused on the definition of a 
mechanism of "intervention" and "risk indication" which, 
when applied incrementally and in conjunction with the 
pattern recognition aspect mentioned above should enable 
the changing risk, due to excursions from a strategic plan, 
to be limited. 
In general the study has concentrated on the identification 
of the "risk related" systems and mechanisms that exist 
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within companies, projects,and their "environments"; and 
how to use them in dynamic situations to contain the 
divergence of risk within certain limits. 
The study has addressed, in particular, the European Space 
Agency development programmes. The space industry in 
general is characterised by the manufacture of a very small 
number of space vehicles of particular types. Single item 
or small batch production techniques apply; duration 
production scenarios do not apply. 
Programme risk is considered with respect to the 
aChievement, or not, of a-priori formally defined 
objectives. For a Space programme the objectives are 
usually stated in terms of the space vehicle(the product} 
obtaining a certain orbit operational performance, with 
specified reliability and safety requirements, and within 
declared cost and schedule limits. These objectives are in 
fact applicable, in a general sense, to most industries; 
not just Space. 
Space activities have tended to have a 
"pioneering/adventurous" aspect in their image. This aspect 
has often conveyed the impression that Space development is 
different and not subject to normal business risks; the 
space shuttle "Challenger" accident, which resulted in the 
death of seven persons and practically reduced NASA(the 
U.S. Space Agency) to a standstill for two years, has 
largely dispelled that concept! 
European Space Agency projects consist of a large number of 
technologically, culturally and linguistically differing 
companies brought together, usually as a result of 
political influence, to solve major technical and logistics 
problems with severe budget and schedule constraints. A 
lead contractor, usually referred to as the prime 
contractor, forms a consortium of the companies concerned 
and unilaterally represents those companies, contractually, 
with the customer; in this case the customer is the 
European Space Agency (ESA) . The work is financed by the 
ESA member states, consisting of fourteen countries. In 
general they require contracts to be placed in their 
respective countries equivalent in value to their 
contributions; financially balanced on a programme by 
programme basis. 
The organisations and methods used to manage European Space 
programmes are rather classical; mainly matrix type 
organisations utilizing typical project plans, reports, 
meetings and reviews. An unusual element is the generation 
of "critical items" from technical, hazard (safety) and 
reliability analyses. Unfortunately hundreds of critical 
items are generated and, with an inadequate system for 
prioritising or ranking them, they tend to be ineffective 
as a method of defining and controlling project risk. 
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A major element of the study is an analysis of the complete 
organisation including "hard"(technical, contractual) and 
"soft"(behavioural) problems. 
1.2 Objectives of the Research. 
The main aim of the research has been to determine a 
rationale defining why, when and how intervention should 
take place in a (European space) development programme in 
order to minimise the chances of failing to meet the 
objectives. 
The objectives of the research can be summarised as: 
1. extending currently available "fragmented" management 
methods, and data, to form an integrated Method which 
will also cover non-linear and "soft" aspects; 
2. defining a system of intervention and risk indicators, 
with warning and control limits; including the aspects 
of perception, subjective judgement, qualitative data, 
etc. 
3. determining the interrelationship of programmes, 
companies and their environments. 
1.3 Scope and Limitations of Research. 
The scope of the research subject matter is believed to be 
general however the Method and hypothesis have been derived 
and commented using data from the European Space Agency 
projects. 
In the context of the above comment it is clear that the 
programme parameters being monitored in a different 
industry would be different and therefore the risk 
sensitivity of the programme objectives to them would have 
to be determined. This point does not address the method 
but only its application. 
One of the basic reasons for the research i.e. the 
inability to predict the future, has resulted in scoping 
the study towards the identification and understanding of 
patterns; and their utilisation for risk identification and 
monitoring of the dynamic project life cycle. 
The research has been directed at producing a general 
Method for applying intervention to a typical (Space) 
development programme; production manufacturing aspects 
have not been addressed. 
The scope of the data collected during the study has been 
mainly related to the European Space industry. 
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The organisations, project methods and the authors own 
experience relate only to the European Space business. 
A limitation of the research is due to the lack of recorded 
data on the subject matter. This observation has been made 
by many researchers e.g. N.Nelson et al.(70). This has 
resulted in the use of expert opinion and judgement; a 
subject matter which has generated some controversy e.g.at 
the 1981 Society for Risk Analysis Workshop. The various 
aspects of the above debates are not considered in this 
study however caution needs to be taken in extrapolating 
the findings of a group of experts to be "representative" 
of, for example, a group of general managers. Attempts have 
been made in this study to minimise this distortion by 
distinguishing between expert opinion based on "the experts 
actual experience" and "extrapolations" of his actual 
experience. 
A major aspect of the study is that it has, to the extent 
possible, been based on the actual working environment in 
which projects "succeed or fail". 
For example, assumptions concerning the availability and 
utilisation of sophisticated data collection, processing 
and presentation systems have not been made. Assumptions 
have also not been made concerning similarity of management 
styles nor the lack of effect of hierarchy on individuals; 
where there can be a strong cultural influences. 
1.4. Outline of the Thesis. 
1.4.1. General. 
The following sections give a short summary of the research 
in terms of the content of the chapters of this thesis. 
The numbers in parenthesis refer to "references" from the 
bibliographic review and this authors "notes" compiled from 
those references. The combined references and notes are 
contained in annex 5; a particular reference and its 
associated note carry the same reference number. 
A number of terms used have a specific meaning for the 
subject matter of this thesis. The definition of such terms 
is given in annex 9. Examples of terms which have such 
specific meanings and for which the reader should become 
informed by consulting annex 9 are: 
- open loops; 
- negative entropy; 
- open systems; 
- non-linear. 
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The bibliographic listing is contained in annex 4. 
1.4.2. The Aspect of Risk. (chapter 2). 
This chapter presents an overview of risk, including 
quantitative versus qualitative issues and "hard" and 
"soft" aspects. It also discusses the impossibility of 
predicting the future and the attendant difficulty of 
assessing long term risk; and putting a cost on it! The 
overview addresses the three main areas of risk 
identification, analysis, and management. 
1.4.3. An Assessment of the current wState of Knowledge W 
(chap.3) • 
In order to be aware of current thinking and practise in 
this area of research 240 references were reviewed; the 
detail results are contained in the "notes" in annex 5 and 
summarised in chapter 3. 
The objective of this assessment was to identify definitive 
connections with the hypothesis and thus to provide 
correlation from the previous work of other researchers. 
Hence the following were established: 
a} extensions to existing research, and 
b} new initiatives where previous work does not exist. 
The assessment was carried out using the following fifteen 
sub-headings: 
- strategic definition; 
- strategic planning; 
- decision making; 
- organisation; 
interventions - increments - feedback; 
- risk and risk indicators; 
- culture; 
- perception; 
dynamic environment; 
- systems approach; 
- living systems; 
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- closed loop systems; 
- open loop systems; 
- open (self organising) systems; 
- chaos; 
1.4.4. The Environment the Method. (chapter 4) 
The general circumstances in which the Intervention Method 
has to be used are outlined in this chapter. The manner in 
which the ESA space business is conducted is explained with 
identification of a number of shortcomings. 
The European "Space" industrial infra- structure is also 
outlined together with infringements of contractor 
responsibilities often initiated by the customers. It is 
noted that ESA, with its dominating political pressures, 
has some dis-similarities compared with the purely 
commercial domain. 
1.4.5. Knowledge and Data Collection and Utilisation 
(chapter 5) 
1.4.5.1 Knowledge and Data Collection. 
The knowledge and data which have been collected, and the 
location(in parenthesis) of that knowledge and data, in 
this thesis are as follows: 
a) the current research status (annex 5 with a summary in 
chapter 3) ; 
b} the current European methods of doing space business 
(chapter 4) ; 
c) the evaluation of four projects; including orbit 
performance (annex 6) ; 
d} the results of interviews of eight project and 
corporate managers (annex 7) . 
e} The authors experience, which covers interfacing with 
or working on all ESA projects, and a number of 
non-ESA projects, over the past twenty years. 
Each of the above five locations contain "local" 
conclusions which constitute the starting point of the 
knowledge utilisation given below. 
1.4.5.2 Knowledge and Data Utilisation. 
The knowledge and data collected from the five sources 
outlined above has been utilised to establish support, or 
not, for the hypothesis. This work has included the 
following: 
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1) an analysis of the current status of relevant research 
and practices, under the 15 sub-headings listed in 1.4.3 
above, to derive the following information. 
a) Latest situation of each of the 15 sub-headings; 
b) Supportive links with the thesis e.g.quantitative 
methods are inadequate. 
c) Identification of problems, conflicts, and areas 
of lack of data. 
d) Difficulties to define certain aspects in terms 
of "what they actually are" e.g. the dynamic 
environment, decision making ( due to perception 
definition problems etc.). 
e) Interconnections e.g. between patterns, risk, and 
resources. 
f) Central concerns e.g. with perception. 
g) Modelling concepts e.g. the physiology of 
perception. 
h) New areas addressed by the thesis e.g. open and 
closed systems, open systems, non-linear aspects, 
risk indicators cf. points b), c), d), and f) 
above; 
The above has produced 240 knowledge references. 
2) an analysis of the results of the interviews with key 
project and corporate managers, see annex 7;. 
3) an analysis of the "life cycle" documentation of four 
major development projects; see chapter 5. The 
following aspects were covered: 
a) availability and authority of risk statements; 
b) hard and soft risk indicators e.g. technology 
risk assessment, conflict situations, margins 
used in non-linear situations; 
c) negative entropy aspects e.g. provision of 
appropriate data at the right time; 
d) causes for orbit problems. 
4) utilization of the 20 years personal experience of the 
author concerning such aspects as: 
a) being involved in decision making at 
progressively higher levels; 
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b) witnessing project and corporate management in 
operation both at ESA and in industry, world 
wide; 
c) noting the role of ambition, insecurity, ego, 
ignorance, etc. 
d) noting planning assumptions such as static 
situations, linear future developments, blind 
acceptance of quantification. 
e) recording the occurrence, propagation, monitoring 
and control of problems (1200 data points); 
5) an analysis of the problems which have occurred on 
orbiting space vehicles(900 data points). 
1.4.6. The Method. (chapter 6) 
This chapter presents the Intervention Method which has 
been developed to enable analysis of actual project 
situations and thence to define the role of intervention in 
the presence of strategic change; the major characteristics 
of the model are summarised, very briefly, below. 
The Method initially requires an assessment of the likely 
efficiency of the project, and its interfacing partners, to 
utilize data and resources such that increasing complexity, 
e.g. work load, problems, etc., will result in increasing 
orderliness i.e. an increasing ability to remain fully 
informed with clear definition and ranking of critical 
issues and appropriate use of resources. 
This process establishes the "open system" characteristics 
of the project. 
The Method then requires the classification of all the 
activities of the project(s) into closed loop and open loop 
systems; with margins being permitted only in the closed 
loop systems, and expert systems and pattern recognition 
being used in the open loop, non-linear, systems. The 
latter enables the "unknown risk" aspects of an open loop 
system to be enveloped and emphasises that knowledge 
transfer will probably dominate data availability. 
It is further required that the "margins" and the "unknown 
risk" envelopes are defined in terms of the resources 
required to achieve the particular task and to solve the 
related problems. 
The Method depends on a clear understanding of the project 
elements and critical support items. 
The term element is used in the context of "a datum or 
value necessary to be taken into consideration in making a 
calculation or coming to a conclusion; as an example the 
elements of an orbit, in astronomy, are the quantities 
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whose determination defines the path of a planet or 
celestial body, and enables us to compute the place of such 
a body at any past or future epoch."(206). In this thesis 
the astronomical example is rather appropriate since it 
addresses a dynamic situation and even has the commonality 
of "trajectory". 
Nine "hard" and "soft" project elements have been 
identified; they are as follows. 
Hard elements: 
- margins 
- closed loop systems 
- engineering data 
Soft elements: 
- open systems 
decision making processes, 
complexity, 
trajectories, 
interventions, 
project supports 
A project support is analogous to its namesake in a 
structure but in this case refers to those aspects of the 
project that are essential in order that the main 
objectives are achieved. They relate to the stability of 
the dynamic equilibrium of open systems. 
The use of risk indicators and pattern recognition 
combined with an incremental approach constitutes a central 
aspect of the Method in order to enable its pragmatic 
application to minimize deviation from the strategic plan 
and risk statement. 
This chapter contains criteria to enable a project to be 
assessed vis-a-vis the application of the Method. 
1.4.7. Advantages gained by Using the Method. 
This chapter outlines the advantages to be gained, and the 
currently experienced problems which can be avoided, by 
using the Method. 
The utilisation described in this chapter makes no 
assumptions concerning the availability of very 
sophisticated tools or data and knowledge. 
1.4.8. Summary & Conclusions. (chapter 8) 
A summary of the main elements researched is covered 
including an explanation of how proper application of the 
Method would avoid many of the problems experienced in the 
past. 
Conclusions are given and the main contributions of this 
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work to research. 
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Chapter 2. The Aspect of Risk. 
2.1 The Definition of Risk. 
Risk is typically considered in terms of uncertainty, 
hazards, threats, unknowns, lack of success, failure, 
relative merit, etc. 
These considerations are applied to the whole spectrum of 
challenges ranging from Mega-projects, involving billions 
of pounds, thousands of personnel and many years of work, 
to relatively small single product projects. 
Risk fundamentally addresses man's concern with unknowns; 
the greatest of which is the future. 
Definitions of risk vary from qualitative to purely 
quantitative; the latter relating to a numeric risk 
requirement. A number of researchers have evolved the 
following definition of risk: 
"risk is a probability-weighted, non-decreasing function of 
payoff dispersion below a specified target". 
This definition implies a quantitative approach. 
An example of a qualitative risk requirement is that "no 
single failure at any point in the system shall cause the 
overall objectives not to be met." 
The definition of risk, by the author, used in this thesis 
is as follows: 
" risk is a function of the perceived probability of the 
occurrence of a known hazard(s), the perceived severity of 
the consequence(s) of that hazard, and the associated 
assumptions" 
This definition states that risk is limited by perceptual 
capabilities; the latter are a function of the human 
analyst and the system and organisation in which the 
analyst is situated. Hence absolute risk is considered to 
be a fictional entity; pragmatically it is used on a 
comparative basis. 
It is necessary to define the -thing- that is being 
considered when referring to risk, or increments etc.; the 
risk to "what" and the increment of "what", etc.? 
The definition used in this thesis is that the "thing" is 
considered to be: 
-the capability of certain resources to create a 
product or service with a certain reliability and 
safety- • 
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In the above definition it is important to understand that: 
reliability includes the probability that a certain 
performance will be achieved for a specified time, and 
that 
safety embraces the risk that: 
life, 
the system, and 
the mission(project 
objectives) , 
will not be destroyed nor degraded beyond a specified 
limit. 
2.2 The Analysis of Risk. 
As indicated above, "perception" and therefore 
"subjectivity" playa dominant role in the definition of 
risk. In fact man's perceptual limitations are considered 
to be a major driver in requiring intervention in the 
project affairs as the project "apparently" progresses on 
its strategic path. The word "apparent" has been used to 
emphasise that the project managers "perception" of the 
projects strategic congruence may not conform with the 
perception of his superiors. 
An immediate problem facing the project manager and risk 
analyst is that knowledge and data are often available in a 
rather incomplete manner with respect to the total system. 
The total system is considered to consist of hardware and 
software elements and the interface with, and the 
involvement of, man. At this time, in the development of 
engineering and the natural and behavioural sciences, 
quantitative data is inadequate to model the "hardware/ 
software/ man" aspects of a typical development project. 
Recourse must therefore be made to qualitative assessments 
which must be able to combine judgemental(perceptual) 
knowledge with quantitative data. 
A commensurate problem with the above is the impossibility 
to predict the future even though the project manager is 
required to "predict" that the project objectives will be 
achieved within certain resource and time constraints. This 
"prediction" is often required for a 5 to 10 year period 
after the Bid submission date. 
There are a number of dimensions to the aspect of risk. For 
example, one can refer to the risk of the technology 
failing; reliability analysis attempts to cover this aspect 
but adequate data and methods exist only for electronics. 
One can also refer to the risk to man; either in, or 
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adjacent to, the vehicle or in overflown popul~ted areas. 
Safety and hazard analyses attempt to cover th~s aspect. 
Once again this is data and method limited. 
A major issue, in the opinion of the author, is that 
neither reliability nor safety analyses are used 
concurrently with the engineering design process. They are, 
partially, used after the initial design has been . 
established. This practise often results in severe confl~ct 
situations between designers, product assurance 
personnel{responsible for reliability, safety and quality 
aspects}, and managers. The overall result is increased 
risk due to lack of optimal resources for: 
reasons. 
Postulate 1: 
- territorial, 
- subjective, 
- non-integrated, 
- inadequate problem 
orientation, 
The degree by which the reliability and 
safety/hazard analyses are not concurrently 
used in the design process needs to be 
represented by a risk indicator. 
In addition to the above one can also refer to cost and 
schedule risk; both being tied to the technical{reliability 
and safety) dimensions but involving other inputs such as 
management, and efficient use and availability of 
resources. 
This introduces the concept of HARD and SOFT aspects; the 
former referring to engineering rules, dimensions, 
quantities and laws; etc. and the latter to behavioural 
aspects such as beliefs, culture, experience, personality 
and traits. 
The definition, role, effects, extent and interactive 
influence of soft aspects is not significantly addressed in 
current project and corporate management from the risk 
identification viewpoint. 
Postulate 2: Soft aspects can constitute major potential 
risk generators and must be assigned risk 
indicators. The interface between hard and 
soft aspects must be addressed in the 
definition of the risk indicator. 
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2.3 The Management of Risk. 
The management of risk is generally based on the following 
steps: 
1) the elimination of the hazard; 
2) the minimisation of consequences of the hazard; 
3) the control and containment of the consequences of 
the hazard. 
Risk management thus requires a clear identification and 
understanding of the hazards themselves, the consequences 
of their propagation, and a detailed technical and 
behavioural understanding of how the system functions; the 
role of man is particularly important, and constitutes a 
special area of vulnerability for the system. 
The modelling and analysis of the system is essential for 
risk management and criteria must be established by which 
hazardous conditions can be classified as acceptable or 
not. In the risk analysis environment great attention is 
given to the existence of common mode and common cause 
failures. For example, an aircraft with four engines being 
supplied from a single fuel tank would have a common cause 
failure for all engines if the fuel tank ruptured. If all 
turbines failed after 10,000 hours operation due to 
design-fatigue problems then a common mode failure would 
have occurred. 
Comprehensive risk analysis and management are rarely 
implemented due to the complexity of the models and the 
large amount of data and computing power. There is also a 
high dependence on subjective aspects and knowledge bases; 
both of which are generally unavailable. 
The situation at this time is that general analysis of risk 
is carried out at the system level and, as part of the risk 
management function, certain highly vulnerable areas are 
subjected to detailed analysis and management. 
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Chapter 3. An Assessment of the -Current State of 
Knowledge-
3.0 General 
This chapter contains a selected summary of an extensive 
bibliographical review; the bibliographic reference(annex 
4) is given in parenthesis. The various statements and 
conclusions summarised herein are: 
a) used to help substantiate the work in this thesis, or 
b) disputed, with justification, due to the current work 
not being supportive of them. 
The results of a) and b) have been used to validate the 
hypothesis; see chapter 5, Knowledge and Data Collection 
and Utilization 
A complete set of notes per reviewed item is attached to 
this thesis as annex 5. 
Many of the headings used in this chapter correspond to 
those used for the model in chapter 6. This has been done 
to facilitate correlation. 
The model has been developed from an analysis of the 
bibliographic review, the authors experience, the project 
studies, the interviews, and in-orbit experience. 
3.1 Strategic Definition 
The definition of strategy is variously described in the 
research as: 
a) the set of basic characteristics of the match an 
organisation achieves with its environment (11) ; 
b) the actions & resources necessary to achieve long term 
goals(4) ; 
c) the definition of what business the company is really 
in (4) ; 
d) having only corporate, business and functional 
levels(S) ; 
e) referring to information flow and decision making 
hierarchy (6) ; 
f) the results of "purposeful social units" 
(organisations) co-ordinated to contribute to 
goals(?); 
g) the array of options and priorities with which one 
elects to compete and to survive (10) . 
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h) operational data is more concerned with measuring 
internal performance and has predominantly a cost 
control function. Tactical and strategic data begin to 
look outwards towards markets and how the organisation 
is going to position itself in those markets. (76) . 
The differences of the above definitions are indicative of 
the difficulties that have been experienced by researchers 
and company management and strategists in defining the role 
or function of the company and its dynamic environment; the 
latter is specifically addressed in chapter 3.9. The 
differences are indicative that different people perceive 
strategy in a different way. Relating to the hypothesis 
this indicates that the perceived steady states, or 
whatever various people conclude a particular state to be, 
may be different because of the different perceptions of 
both the state and the applicability of the criteria they 
are using. 
This is a major point. Since strategy is defined in 
different ways one cannot directly compare programmes and 
these different strategic perceptions could occur in the 
same project, company or consortium. 
This thesis has essentially adopted the definition of Hofer 
& Schendel (11) whereby the strategy of an organisation is 
defined as: 
lithe means of coping with both the external and internal 
changes; the path charted for the organisation being linked 
to the organisational goals & objectives which are to be 
achieved. II 
3.2 Strategic Planning. 
The concepts of what strategic planning is, and what it 
entails, do not vary widely but some significant 
differences do exist; the main points are summarised below. 
a) Since we are still in an industrial revolution the 
Japanese will continue to lead because they have the 
characteristics that Europe and the USA had at the 
time of the commencement of their industrial 
revolutions (8) . 
b) Forecasting consists of the identification, 
translation and development of objectives and 
resources (9) ; strategies can form as well as being 
formed (18) . 
c) Strategic planning is a journey and probes the need 
for change (lO) ; it often emerges rather than being 
separately formally defined(49). Its management 
relates to the implementation of modifications in the 
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fundamentals of how one competes and survives (10) ; and 
to the crafting of thought and action, control and 
learning, and stability and change (18) . 
d) A strategic plan should include risk, audit and 
prioritisation functions (11) ; the three planning 
horizons of cyclical« Syrs), architype( < lSyrs), & 
exploratory ( > 20yrs) apply (IS) . 
e) Strategic goal setting provides a means of reducing 
environmental turbulence and controversy(12) and 
relates to the socio-political(involving scanning and 
solicitation) nature of the organisation, to 
perception(13,lS,SS) and to upper level management 
interpreting unanticipated environmental events (13) ; 
it is a step-by-step process involving trends and 
options (14) . 
It is not known how to measure success or failure and 
debate appears to have negative connotations for 
executives; most managers seem to understand the complexity 
of the strategic problem formulation process(13) . 
f) Technological strategy is institution building, 
political, and positioning (39) . 
g) Benchmarking of competition is used to define and 
modify strategic plans. (64) 
h) Many strategies develop not through any formal 
strategy formulation process but through the emergence 
of a pattern, often unintended, in a stream of 
decisions made by an organisation. (SS) . 
i) A power-strategy model containing external 
environment, departmental capability, organisational 
tradition, operational procedure, departmental power, 
managerial perception of the environment, personal 
preference, strategy formulation and implemmention, 
realized strategy, and emergent strategy elements has 
been defined(55) . 
j) the morality of planning & management is covered under 
three definitions relating to: 
1) exploitation { defines co-operative behaviour by 
comparing the effectiveness of my best action 
with and without the presence of your behaviour; 
2) the application of Kants moral law ( the ultimate 
justification of a principle for assigning 
benefits costs is that it must be capable of 
becoming general law) (68); 
3) it is immoral to treat people like machines (75) . 
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The statement by Denning(16) that "strategic change still 
appears to happen largely as a result of crisis or from the 
impact of a key individual" supports the raison d'etre of 
this research work. 
Strategic planning seems to include goal setting, risk, 
resources, external and internal influences, capabilities, 
and morals. Although there appears to be a common thread 
because the subject matter relates to the definition of 
strategy since the latter has significant variations, the 
strategic planning process is also likely to be different. 
Maybe the result would be more a matter of different 
emphasis but these differences could prove major because 
resources and decision making would follow those different 
emphases. 
The references, sometimes rather oblique, to living 
systems, incrementalism and perception are significant and 
constitute important links with three of the main thrusts 
of this thesis. 
3.3 Decision Making 
Many different techniques are discussed ranging from purely 
subjective to, almost, entirely quantitative. A number of 
important points are summarised below. 
a) Managers: 
work at an unrelenting pace; their activities are 
characterised by brevity, variety and discontinuity; 
they are action orientated and favour oral media. They 
handle exceptions and regular work; and process soft 
information that links the organisation with its 
environment. The managers' programmes relating to 
decision making, information processing etc. remain 
locked inside their brains (18) . 
spend as much time with peers outside their 
organisations as with subordinates and through such 
interpersonal contacts they emerge as the nerve 
centres of their organisations (18) . 
at CEO level, decisions are made in small steps; 
particularly very complex ones to allow time to 
understand the problem(16,55). 
b) The risk(R) relating to the decision making process in 
a technological programme is given by the following 
formulae. 
R = P * E where P = probability of failure/ partial 
success 
E = expenditure. 
Note: 
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P = B * C * F * T where B = technology barriers 
competition C 
F 
T 
= 
= 
= 
fit with resources 
transition difficulty 
Also, Impact(of technology programme under 
consideration) is given by: 
I = M * G * K * S where M = market size($) 
G = market growth 
K = market share 
1) 
2) 
3) 
S = sensitivity to 
technology. 
the sign "*" means multiplication; 
the factors B, C, F, T, and S are all 
subjectively defined and could have values 
from 0 to 1.0; 
the results were plotted using semilog 
scales. 
Risk is the "moving away" from an existing situation in 
technology, product and market directions (19) . 
c) Decision making in high velocity environments e.g. 
where the rate of change of product life cycles is 
high, is characterised by: 
- analytical, rational, comprehensive, short term & 
fast processes; 
- assessment of innovative, risky strategic 
alternatives with "decision execution-II and 
"implementation-" triggers; 
- centralised power in the CEO but with high 
delegation to trigger points/ executives (21) . 
d) Strategy and the related decision making include the 
collection of objective and perceptual organisational 
data at multiple points in time as the strategy 
unfolds. The board of directors(an external coalition) 
may be dominated, divided or passive; in the two 
latter cases the lower management levels will get the 
opportunity to intervene and influence to their own 
ends. CEOs must respond to departmental power which 
can be direct; external environmental impact is seldom 
direct and the cause-effect relationship often 
unclear. Although CEOs often interpret their 
environment as it is perceived to exist, they may also 
create or enact an environment that is different from 
the one they have been experiencing (22) . 
e) Multiple goal behaviour of men & organisations has 
traditionally been approximated by single, unchanging, 
and technically manageable criteria; the results of 
Page 37 
psychologists and social scientists concerning 
multi (non-mutually destructive) goals has been 
ignored. These goals are not independent of the means 
used to pursue them. Dealing with such 
"incommensurable" as quality of life, education, etc .. 
can no longer be avoided. Many researchers are 
sceptical about mans ability to choose among 
multi-attributed alternatives- suggesting an 
interaction (23) . 
f) A multi attribute utility measurement rating scale 
exists to identify the values of each participant in 
the management through "decision by consensus" 
approach. Druckers decision making process requires 
definition of the question, discussion of dissenting 
opinions, focus on alternatives, and determination of 
who should take the final decision. 
The Japanese differ from this process by not including 
the discussion as a result of dissent. The Delphi 
method requires four phases in the decision making 
process viz. exploration, understanding, 
reconciliation, evaluation. Lateral thinking (DeBono) : 
simple, non-verbal images for management situations; 
is used in the horizontal organisation together with 
the horizontal network and shared decision 
premises,and an incremental strategic approach (25, 26) . 
g) In a field study of a single organisation the main 
components of the decision making process were found 
to be goals, expectations, and choice; four relational 
concepts were declared to be: organisational learning, 
conflict resolution, problemistic research, & 
uncertainty avoidance. Points emphasised relate to the 
relative ignorance of superior to subordinate, and 
different perceptions ... of uncertainty for 
example. (28,29) . 
h) The public definition becomes an integral part of the 
situation(30) and cognitive dissonance, relating to 
the reordering of goals, is defined as being a direct 
function of the number of items the person knows are 
inconsistent with the decision(31) . 
i) If-Then rules can serve as a structure of a decision 
making process. (91) . 
Some limitations of current decision making processes 
are noted e.g. the representation of multiple goal 
behaviour of man and organisations being approximated 
by a single unchanging and technically manageable 
criteria. Some quantitative methods are extremely 
complex and rely on well defined input data and in 
general do not take account of the soft aspects nor 
the dynamics of the situation. "Rules of thumb" abound 
but are often coined for different situations as they 
arise and are, in any case, very general and dangerous 
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due to undefined assumptions. The utilization of these 
methods for "real life" prediction could not be 
recommended with any confidence and are in fact 
rejected by a number of researchers due to their 
ambiguity (160, 159) . 
A major problem, in this and other areas, is the lack of 
definition of all assumptions and the likely consequences 
of those assumptions being incorrect. In other words what 
is the sensitivity of the conclusions, from using the 
various techniques, to the assumptions? No positive answer 
has been found to this question. The conclusions of many 
different researchers are different. It is concluded that 
there is no single universal method that has been selected 
to define the decision making process. Quantitative methods 
are rejected by a large number of the researchers. 
Consideration of soft aspects is very small. 
The research addressed above refers to the problems 
currently in existence due to the multi-facetted nature of 
decisions, perception differences, the avoidance, or tacit 
acceptance (e.g. due to the "possible" weight of public 
opinion) of "soft" aspects, and the numerous and different 
decision making rationales; the latter encompassing 
organisational, checklist, and formulative approaches. The 
research has also recorded that decisions are often made in 
small steps and intervention is frequently present. 
The current status is fragmented and often contradictory. 
The need to find a more realistic and useable approach is 
self evident. 
3.4 Organisation 
A number of models of organisations and their growth 
characteristics are contained in the research; the main 
elements are outlined below. 
a) The organisation is defined as a domain which exists 
in an environment in terms of two dimensions, 
stability & homogeneity. It is assumed to act 
rationallY,upon which its growth depends, and to have 
the reduction of uncertainty as its goal. High 
efficiency functions are placed within a technological 
core to protect them from uncertainty. Boundary 
spanning units are used to interact with the 
environment. Later work specified four types of 
organisation, defender, reactor, analyzer, and 
prospector. It is noted that it is difficult to 
separate organisations from their environments and 
that the organisation generates its environment more 
than is generally appreciated; the only reality is the 
environment which is perceived by the organisation. 
Earlier work indicated two polar types of 
organisation: mechanistic,governed by rules, and 
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organic, adaptable to a fluid environment (32) . 
b) Metamorphosis models: growth is not smooth but 
involves discontinuities when the degree of change is 
too large for the existing structure. Age, size, 
complexity are regarded as driving forces for the 
metamorphological changes (33, 182) . 
c) Research & development can be classified as academic, 
governmental, independent, or industrial; also as 
offensive or defensive, and basic, applied or 
experimental (34) . Innovation can be demand- or supply-
induced; the latter is more risky. The most critical 
factors are: market orientation, relevance to 
corporate objectives, an effective selection and 
evaluation system, project management, a source of 
creative ideas, an organisation receptive to 
innovation, and commitment by one or two individuals. 
Ideas can be interventions. Opportunity criterion 
depend on the relationship between the "value-in-use" 
and the projected project price. Another approach uses 
project profile reports to measure R&D effectiveness 
looking at such aspects as the type and nature of the 
project, the probability of success and the cost and 
estimated income; the ratio of offensive to defensive 
research is also considered(34,35}. 
d) Technological research faces two conflicting attitudes 
from management due to a) declining profit and b) 
growing social conscience. A major reason for failure 
is the isolation of R&D from other corporate 
functions. Decision making depends on the 
organisational structure; resource allocation has 
three levels, viz. definition, impetus, and approval. 
Diversity and uncertainty will push decision making 
down the organisation. In mUlti-national corporations 
five different management styles are identified: 
centralised, participative centralised, co-operative, 
supervised freedom, & total freedom(36,}. From a 1991 
survey involving 12,000 managers,business boundaries 
have not been detected but are believed to be on their 
way(115) . 
A number of organisational types are defined but it is also 
stated that organisations can move through phases of being 
related to one type or another. For example, the 
metamorphosis models, in which growth is not smooth but 
involves discontinuities when the degree of change is too 
large for the existing structure, probably applies at the 
macro and microlevel of every organisation at some time or 
another. The real point is whether the organisation adjusts 
itself to adequately handle the new situation in time to 
avert failure to meet strategic objectives or not. This 
seems to connect with the bifurcation principle since 
failure to amend the organisation to meet changed 
environments or even changed objectives could result in 
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bifurcations and thus possibly lead to cr1s1si or chaos! 
There are many different definitions and descriptions of 
the so-called environment; it seems not to be definable in 
a specific manner. 
This review indicates the difficulty of defining the 
environment and the conflicts that can be generated within 
a company working in the development field; the latter 
evidenced by the number of different systems which have 
been devised to measure performance and risk. The need to 
limit progress to "small" finite steps and the concept of 
intervention is concluded. These aspects are addressed in 
some detail in the current work which constitutes a 
continuation of the research summarised above. 
3.5 Intervention - increment- feedback 
The classical concept of intervention is essentially 
related to some form of programme reviews, usually 
scheduled at the commencement of, and during, the 
programme. Additionally, special reviews may be held 
"following" a problem or crisis. These aspects are 
addressed by such authors as Drucker, Crosby, Juran etc. In 
general, however, the principles and actual application of 
intervention seems not to be well documented as such. 
Feedback is mentioned in the research but mostly in the 
manner of "it must be present"(48}. 
The works of E.DeBono(38}, concerning lateral and creative 
thinking, are innovative but fit well with the authors 
experience and have formed important stepping stones in the 
development of this thesis. 
A number of relevant abstracts from the bibliographical 
review are listed below. 
a} The cutting edge of any particular technology 
represents the accumulation of incremental 
improvements (39) . 
b} Product changes are stabilised as dominant designs 
emerge & become the basis for both incremental changes 
in the product and for process improvements (39) . 
c} The nature of strategy must fit the environment (39) . 
d} The firm must position itself to participate in & 
benefit from the process of technological change 
supported by the infrastructure. Viewing technological 
change as a series of discrete choices or decisions 
obscures its strategic nature (39) . 
e) Feedback inhibition, which occurs in all living 
things, consists of an enzyme being blocked by a 
product many steps removed from it(40). 
f) 
g) 
h) 
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Successful organisations tend to have a traceability 
"back" to previous work which had some similarity with 
the current work; monitoring & feedback must be built 
in(44) . 
From a survey of 12,000 managers, world wide, oriented 
to define "business boundaries" the following main 
points were noted: cultural perceptions shape 
managers; the borderless company is on its way; each 
company is but one point in an extended network of 
equals; hierarchy still rules industrial organisations 
because companies are reluctant to embrace the logic 
of the technology and dismantle the walls that 
separate levels of management (115) . 
The General Electric task force, for the CEO, 
generated the following key performance measures: 
profitability; market share; productivity; employee 
attitudes; public responsibility; balance between 
short and long term goals. The writer prefers to link 
incentives strongly to performance but leave managers 
free to determine their subordinates rewards (46) . 
There are clear statements in the research which indicate 
that where an incremental approach has been used success 
has resulted; also that the strategy must fit the latter 
statement is very ambiguous since definitions of 
"strategy" and "environment" are not well agreed. 
The issue of incrementalism, traceability and feedback is 
mentioned increasingly and related to successful projects. 
Correlation is not made with linear, non-linear, closed or 
open loops. There is also the point that the borderless 
company is on its way; this conclusion is made from a 
survey, world wide, of 12000 managers. This is interpreted 
to support the contention in this thesis that the border 
between a company and its "environment" is not 
representable by hard lines; in this thesis it is defined 
as the locus of the perceptions of the managers within that 
company. 
As can be seen, previous research has identified a 
connection between "incrementalism and traceability" and 
"success". This is an important support for the incremental 
approach which is one of the main thrusts of this thesis. 
3.6 Risk & Risk Indicators. 
The subject of "risk indicators" as such has not been found 
in any of the research reviewed to date; it has been 
alluded to by implication. 
Risk is mentioned in various references, as indicated 
below, but the definitions are not clear and certainly not 
standardised. 
The following summary covers a wide spectrum of research 
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and observation. Once again the listing has been selected 
to provide direct correlation with the work of this thesis. 
a} Organisations tend to be blind to the importance of 
events that could signal disaster(36) . 
b) The level of safety in a complex technological system 
is usually not directly observable except when 
accidents occur(36) . 
c) Ideally, feedback mechanisms should be based on 
indicators which are tightly coupled to safety but 
which do not themselves reflect an immediate hazard; 
this ensures that a-priori lessons, from risk 
analysis, will be learnt (36) . 
d) Management must appreciate the subjective assessment 
of probability (49) . 
e) Risk measures are: 
probability of missing the target; 
- probability of not breaking even; 
- expected loss; 
- loss potential (49) . 
Management must understand the relationship between 
the measurements and their concerns. 
f) Subjects appear to reconstruct the meaning of 
inconsistent labels so that they fit the "learned" 
relations (50) . 
g) When two functions were learned under different 
conditions, subjects erred in the direction of 
allocating more resources to the subject learned under 
less uncertain conditions (50) . 
h) Risk is associated with the possibility of loss or 
failure to reach a certain target (51) . 
i) We have to live with uncertainty because the future is 
unknown; societies are either "weak uncertainty 
avoidance" .ie. they tend to accept uncertainty or 
they are "strong uncertainty avoidance". The former 
produces managers more involved in strategy. (53) . 
j) In the Viable System Model (VSM; by Beer et al) the 
whole structure is seen as an organised set of 
interlocking controllers. Viability requires each 
controllers criterion to be satisfied. Each level was 
so preoccupied with the operations below it, 
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particularly so as to detect deviations from the 
budgetary plan, that the proper tasks at each 
level (formulating adaptive strategies and identifying 
synergistic opportunities for the level below) were 
being neglected(84) . 
k) Behaviour in organisations was seen, by Checkland et 
al, as following from human intentions and only to be 
understood in terms of the perceptions and meanings 
that correspond to them. The interest of the 
intervenors was in the phenomenology of the situation; 
less in the cybernetics of control. 
What is important in the VSM is that the model is 
distinct from the modelled(the map is not the 
territory). The model can and should be completely 
defined; the reality it is intended to represent, 
cannot (103) . 
1) Techniques of analysis for organisations have to be 
compatible with the level at which they are 
applied(56) . 
m) The likelihood of a socio-technical system failure is 
a function of the number of "resident pathogens"; the 
problem is defining a pathogen (56) . 
n) Risk is the probability multiplied by the severity, or 
known unknowns; uncertainty is about unknown 
unknowns (57) . 
0) Nothing should be frozen until a decision on that 
particular element is required in order to proceed 
with the work(57) . 
p) The voice of the customer flows through all activities 
& quality control becomes a design led rather than a 
production led process. This approach is more a 
process of evolution & continual improvement than a 
series of irregular quantum jumps(58) . 
q) Taguchi concepts involve inner noise(controlled by 
standard process control methods) and outer noise( 
relates to variation imposed by circumstances which 
occur after the product leaves the producer) (58) . 
r) Major contractor issues are: 
- 1} lack of responsiveness of the customer to 
the changing environment, and, 
- 2) failure of the customer to give the 
contractor more autonomy as maturity is 
gained (59) . 
s) The following thirteen factors, referred to as the 
Project Implementation Profile(PIP), are stated to 
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account for the variance of project success: 
1) clearly defined project mission; 
2) top management support; 
3) project schedule/ plan; 
4) client consultation; 
5) personnel; recruitment/ training; 
6) availability of required technology & 
expertise; ( top performers have technology 
on tap but are not obsessed with it e.g. 
less Information Technology means simpler 
production lines(64». . 
7) client acceptance; 
8) monitoring & feedback; 
9) communication; 
10) trouble shooting; 
11) implementation process; 
12) perceived quality; 
13) client satisfaction. 
The perceived value of the project, by the project manager, 
to the user has a significant effect on early failure. (88) . 
t) Continuing with factors that cause projects to fail; 
mathematical models are rejected due to: data 
relevance, basis, currency, financial health of 
organisation, & timewise prediction inabilities. (81) . 
Three reasons submitted for failure of organisations 
to appreciate and alter pervasive and prevailing 
assumptions are: 
1) structures & processes designed to monitor 
selectively; 
2) potentially disruptive changes must be 
delayed to an optimal point ref. the "cost 
of not restructuring"; 
3) organisations are not hierarchically ordered 
machines but are political systems composed 
of constituencies of interests. (75) . 
Three approaches to analyze corporate collapse: 
Page 45 
1) management or trajectory models; three types 
of trajectories relating to: 
small, single, owner 
companies (high gearing 
plus early launch of a 
large project) ; 
companies which survived 
a) but have charismatic 
(salesman) type 
proprietor; 
mature organisations 
with "one-man" ruler 
syndrone. (81) . 
2) financial prediction models; 
3) case studies. 
u) From 157 German firms 70\ stated it was not possible 
to reliably predict the political future of the 
country. Enterprises prefer unstructured/ unsystematic 
evaluation methods. Trade avoidance, diversification, 
establishment of global markets stated as active 
strategy to overcome political risk(124). 
v) risk conversion factors, relating to factors that 
effect peoples willingness to accept risk that has the 
consequence of death(cost and benefit data NOT 
included), show for example that: 
1) voluntary risk is 100 times more acceptable 
than involuntary risk; 
2) natural risk is 10 to 20 times more 
acceptable than man-made risk; 
3) ordinary risk is 30 to 50 times more 
acceptable than catastrophic risk. (129) . 
w) Concerning the use of expert judgement in risk 
assessment three models are discussed viz. classical, 
Bayesian(recommended), and paired comparison. (66)). 
Engineering is stated to be an art because it depends 
so heavily on judgement. A heuristic device is defined 
as "anything which provides a plausible aid or 
direction in the solution of a problem but is in the 
final analysis unjustified". (130). 
x) The information revolution is effecting competition in 
three vital ways: 
1) changes industry structure and alters 
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competition rules; 
2) creates new ways to achieve competitive 
advantage; 
3) spawns whole new businesses. (140,142). 
Only one reference has been found that actually mentions 
feedback mechanisms being based on indicators; this is 
stated to be an ideal case(49). 
There are many references concerning the subjective 
appraisal or perception of risk and the fact that allowance 
must be made for such differences. This is rated as a 
positive support of the hypothesis. 
There is also the strong support that when two functions 
were learned under different conditions the subject erred 
in the direction of allocating more resources to the 
subject learned under less uncertain conditions. This 
supports the brain - chaos theory where we always try to 
relate something to a familiar aspect i.e. something we 
have experienced before. A point is made here that the 
interest of the intervenors was more in the phenomenolgy of 
the situation than in the cybernetics of control. In saying 
this, Checkland et al reject many types of modelling 
including VSM. 
In the Project Implementation Profile method thirteen 
factors were written down which account for the variation 
of project success. At the top is a "clearly defined 
project mission" or, in the terms of this thesis, the 
"statement of risk". Lower down in the list are "monitoring 
and feedback", "communication", and "perceived quality". 
These points all support the hypothesis and the thesis in 
general. 
There are a number of references to perception; emphasising 
that one must take account of perception and that it is a 
major element in early failure. 
There are also a number of comments relating to the 
unpredictability of the future. 
The above notes indicate the concern of a number of 
researchers with the lack of understanding, and 
consideration, of what organisations, and their 
environments, are and hence what risk actually means e.g. 
organisational safety is only apparent after an accident. 
Some researchers have clearly referred to the need to 
advance incrementally with a brief mention of indicators 
and feedback. Uncertainty is defined as the "unknown 
unknowns" which is congruent with the thinking in this 
thesis. There are a number of references relating to 
"perception" and behavioural aspects, and in particular 
the main contributors to project failures are stated to be: 
1) perception ambiguities; 
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2) communication & feedback problems; 
3) planning & phenomenological (158) issues. 
It is also interesting to note the occasional analogy to 
some aspect of "living systems" e.g resident pathogens. In 
general this synopsis indicates that this thesis represents 
a "natural advance" of a number of research directions that 
have already been identified and to some extent initiated 
and substantiated. 
3.7 Culture 
The word "culture" is used extensively in management 
textbooks and articles; it refers mainly to such aspects as 
the Japanese culture, the U.S culture, the European 
culture, etc. Each of these "cultural designations" are 
typified by management styles, company and worker 
relationships, company and worker objectives, constraints, 
strengths and weaknesses and so on. 
In this thesis culture is considered as a system which 
includes concepts and objects; hence it is directly related 
to perception. 
The author refers to the customer and contractor cultures 
as being different. The former being based on, in the case 
of ESA, rather altruistic objectives whilst the latter is 
almost entirely profit motivated. It is emphasised that in 
many commercial cases the customer and contractor 
objectives are very similar i.e. profit. 
An interesting "definition" change has been formulated by 
Kristian Kreiner(note 71,annex 4) in which he expands the 
sphere of culture from: 
to 
the underlying, often subconscious, 
foundation for people's thinking and 
acting(the traditional approach); 
the surface and manifestations of such 
thinking and acting in organisations. 
This latter definition is utilised in this thesis. 
As with environment it is not clearly defined; there are a 
number of descriptors including the one finally selected 
and reproduced above. 
3.8 Perctption 
The reliance, and vulnerability, of many aspects of 
decision making and risk assessment on the subjective 
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perception of the individuals directly, and indirectly, 
involved is becoming a central concern in the related 
research. 
(28,31,38,45,47,50,54,56,59,60,61,65,66,67,88,91,240) 
It has been well documented that the process of defining 
the nature of a problem is dependent upon the histories and 
backgrounds of those responsible for defining the 
problem. (41,240; plus, Bruner and Kresch 1950; Hayes and 
Simon 1977; Herden and Lyles 1981). 
In a similar fashion perception and culture "colour" the 
way a child, and therefore an adult, develops; there is a 
continuous interaction between the developing trajectory of 
the brain, perception and the dimensioning effects of 
culture. 
perception is affected by the presence of a distorting 
medium and is processed by something which has certain 
limited capabilities. A general uniformity of nature is 
both necessary and sufficient to justify inductive 
reasoning. (74,240). 
Perception is considered to involve the following "set": 
context, instructions, expectations, motivation, emotion, 
past experience, individual differences, cultural factors, 
reward and punishment (240) . 
The association of perception with the brain is considered 
to be axiomatic. 
From the work of W.J.Freeman et al(91) it is apparent that 
chaos exists in the brain, and in fact is an essential 
factor in enabling the brain to cope with the enormous 
amounts of information presented to, or perceived by, it. 
Perception is defined as a step in a trajectory by which 
brains grow, reorganise themselves, and reach into their 
own environment to change it to their own advantage. 
(authors comment: This "own advantage" point is important; 
it implies that the brain will "convince itself" in order 
to satisfy e.g. hunger, thirst, sex acts ..... which is 
clearly correct. The relationship between executives 
decision making and their "needs" (from psychological, 
material, moral aspects/ conflicts) thus becomes 
clear(er)). Perception is not the copying of an incoming 
stimulus. 
The similarity, at a different level, with de Bonos' 
work(50) is clear. 
Hence, in terms of modelling there now appears to be a 
"physiology" that can be used to depict perception. 
It s7ems that the Freeman model is applicable to this 
thesls. If one substitutes the word "intervention" for the 
words "odour molecules" that strike the receptor neurons in 
the nose (and by similarity and the comment of Freeman, the 
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eyes & ears .. ) then a link is established with the thesis. 
Hence there is now an established scientifically accepted 
model of brain perception; which involves experience and 
familiarity and a constant conflict between out of balances 
primarily due to the existence of experiencal knowledge 
resident in the brain. Therefore the brain will always 
relate every new or different perception to a previous 
experience; even if the relationship is not correct. In 
other words the reinforcement given by experience to a 
stimulus enables a selection and identification, of that 
particular stimulus to be made. In the absence of 
experience no selection is possible. 
Society, the public etc., is generally classified under 
technocentricism or ecocentricism; the former further 
divides to cornucopias (who believe in the infinite 
ingenuity of mankind to solve problems) and accommodators 
(who believe the structure of the bureaucracies will not 
fundamentally change but mankind will always adjust to 
change). ( 88) . 
From the above, and returning to the pragmatic management 
and decision making scene where decisions and selections 
must be made, it is clear that the executive must find a 
piece of his experience that his brain can manipulate, in 
the stepwise growth process mentioned above, to relate to 
the "new" input so that he can "handle it"! 
This thus explains the finance man interpreting high 
technology in terms of cash, and the engineer construing 
the balance sheet as a mathematical equation, etc. 
Hence in terms of risk and decision making bias it is 
necessary to review the experience of the decision makers (selectors) . 
As mentioned earlier, the concept of entropy is considered 
indigenous to the Intervention and Strategic change 
problem. 
The complete world of commerce, business, technology, 
science, engineering, economics, micro - macro politics is 
seemingly chaotic. However, in every "local" area there is 
a perceptible order and purpose ..... by the perceiver! (91) 
The basis of the Strategic Contingencies Theory(3) is that 
power is a function of a departments capacity to cope with 
uncertainty, its non-substitutability, and its centrality 
in the organisations flow of work. A power perspective 
resolves much of the conflict between the three competing 
environment-strategy approaches: 
1) the predominant rational-economic view; 
2) strategic decisions based not on the environment 
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itself but on perceptions of environmental 
realities; 
3) interpretive or enacted view: organisations 
create or enact their environment by the 
decisions they make; they thus create their own 
opportunities and threats. 
Hence, if one assumes the "complete world ll to be the 
environment and the company; and its Ilimmediate interfaces II 
to be lithe programme ll then the programme will appear non -
chaotic to the executives involved until there is a 
mismatch in somebodies brain concerning an input they 
receive (perceive) and trajectory position of the growth 
function of their brain at that point in time (see 2) 
above) . 
Similarly the chaos of the environment will be rationalised 
vis-a-vis the brain experience at that time{the trajectory 
position once again) and certain conclusions{selections) 
drawn. This latter activity would relate to Ilintervenors ll . 
In attempting to understand the chaos of the environment 
the intervenor would consider such aspects as II influences II , 
traceability, and increments. 
An interesting aspect is that the original definition of 
risk would be subjected to the same Ilbrain - perception 
process ll ; with consequent bias & limitations. 
This whole discussion is of course simply another way of 
defining Ilsubjectivityll! 
The above also means that a risk indicator must be tailored 
according to the experience of the user of that indicator. 
It must not contain data that would be translatable in a 
certain biased direction due to the attempt of II a brain II 
to relate it to its "limitedll knowledge, or particular 
Ilgreed ll ; unless the "greed" coincides with the strategic 
aim. 
Many references refer to perception. It is becoming a 
central theme in the research. A model of "brain 
perception" has been devised and is adopted in this thesis. 
It fundamentally states that the brain will always relate 
every new or different perception to a previous experience 
even if the resulting relationship is not correct. It seems 
clear therefore that a bifurcation may, or may not, be 
recognised by someone or it may even be invented where it 
does not exist simply because experience in the brain does 
not exist to indicate otherwise. Risk indicators are not 
mentioned significantly in the research this is therefore 
essentially a new concept. 
3.9 Dynamic Environment 
The dynamics of the Ilenvironment" relates generally to the 
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changes of data, situations, interactions etc. with time. 
However, chaotic behaviour has been defined as a dynamic 
aspect (71) . The following points have been extracted from 
the research. 
a) In most cases change was found to consist of the 
adjustment of structures and systems to secure 
consistency & coherence within an architype(75) . 
b) For many middle managers personal aspirations have 
more powerful influence over decisions concerning 
technological change than organisational 
objectives (56) . 
c) Two dimensions define the environment: 
1) simple/ complex; 
2) static/ dynamic. (14) . 
d) Major challenge facing firms with intermediate rates 
of technological change is the problem of changing 
from a product to a process focus in the engineering 
and R&D activities. (29) 
e) Company technological profile has five factors: 
1) R&D balance; 
2) product life cycle; 
3) R&D coupling; 
4) proximity to state of the art; 
5) R&D investment ratio. (29) 
f) Business occurs along three co-ordinate axes labelled: 
1) customer groups; 
2) customer functions; 
3) alternative technologies. (29) 
g) In high velocity environments, firms have higher 
performance if they: 
1) use rational decision making; 
2) implement more analysis in decision 
making; 
3) try new things; 
4) use strategic alternatives that are 
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more innovative and risky; 
5) make quick strategic decisions; 
6) vest power to implement strategy in the 
top management team; 
7) delegate the "execution triggers" to 
the top team; 
8) have greater power centralisation in 
the CEO; 
9) do not have great political behaviour 
among top management teams. (21) . 
The outstanding aspect of the research to date is its 
inability to consistently define what the dynamic 
environment is, how it is characterised, and how it 
interacts with the company; the latter definition is 
similarly difficult. The VSM(viable system model) of Beer, 
which attempts to embrace both the company and its 
environment, is severely criticised(84) on the grounds of 
the unrealism of expecting that the "multiple control 
elements" have almost unlimited powers of perception, 
computation and action. 
The above status demonstrates the problems and, in the 
writers view, indicates that an alternative approach is 
necessary. 
This thesis has adopted the approach that the company and 
environment boundary, if there is such a thing, is 
generated by the limit of individual perception. 
The dynamics of the environment are defined in many 
different ways involving different numbers of factors and 
different types of factors. The inability to agree or 
define the dynamic environment, the static environment and 
the strategy constitute imponderables that support the 
contention that what is being done today is inadequate; 
that we cannot make hard line models and that we cannot 
usefully predict. 
Many of the points referenced in the research seem not to 
be realistic because they appear to be based on premises 
which are not firm e.g. "high velocity environments" 
without explaining what is moving at high velocity, and 
"rational decision making" should be used in high velocity 
environments ... what is a rational decision? 
3.10 Systems Approach 
The word "system" occurs repeatable in the research and in 
this thesis; it is important to understand precisely what 
it means and its scope. The following related points have 
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been extracted from the literature. 
a) A system is an assembly of components, connected 
together in an organised way. (54). An assemblage of 
things forming a regular and connected whole is a 
system. (66) . 
b) The first steps in the systems approach entail: 
- awareness 
- commitment 
- detection 
- separation 
- selection 
- description. (54) 
c) Failure is the production of undesirable events. (84) 
d) Four key tests of a system are: 
- organised connectedness 
- essentiality 
- interest 
- behaviour. (54) 
e) The typical relationship between the parts of a system 
is defined as follows: 
"when organ A shifts from state ml to state m2, & 
organ B shifts from state nl to state n2 after k 
days(weeks etc.), organ C will change its state from 
ql to q2 with probability p."(66). 
f) A firm which stays in the same business has a finite 
life span; an organisation must do four things to 
survive viz. produce, administer, be entrepreneurial, 
and integrate. (29) . 
g) R&D must lie at the edge of the organisations domain 
& is in a powerful position if it can demonstrate that 
it can reduce uncertainty. (29) . 
h) An organisation has three main systems: marketing; 
econo-technical; scientific. (29) . 
i) Technical profile is a function of rate of change of 
environment and distance of technology from the state 
of the art. (29) . 
j) A firms life cycle should be portrayed in terms of the 
"product class" life cycle with emphasis on 
"significant increments of innovation". (29) . 
k) Three R&D strategic policy dimensions( from 11 
Swedish companies) are: 
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- concentrated versus diversified; 
- technology or market oriented; 
- offensive versus defensive. (29) . 
As indicated above, the literature has explored and 
established some definition and relationship of various 
functions of organisations which have then been delineated 
as a "systems approach". The systems approach has some 
consistency in the research and discussion also takes place 
concerning the life cycle, or the finite life span, of an 
organisation. 
In general this status has been utilised as an input and no 
significant conflict has been detected. 
There are differences concerning where R&D must be 
positioned in an organisation and in the systems approach. 
3.11 Living Systems 
Life has been described as "a phenomena almost impossible 
to define or to explain in all its varying aspects"(150). 
A unique characteristic of life is that it is an organised 
system capable of creating more order from less order. (63) . 
In this thesis, companies and organisations are considered 
to incorporate some of the characteristics of human living 
systems i.e. man. The company is not considered to be a 
separate entity to the people in it although such a 
separation is often used in a legal sense e.g. the 
liability of a company is limited to the shareholders stake 
in the company. The rational of this approach is contained 
in chapter 6.5.1. 
In the literature, comparisons between organisations and 
aspects of living systems are frequent e.g. life cycle(86) , 
resident pathogens(56), neural networks(92), metamorphosis-
age(33), conflict (28,29), multiple goal behaviour (23) , the 
participation of the firm(39) ,the company is a cumbersome 
dinosaur whose first goal is survival (111) , and each 
organisation, like a human individual, has three dimensions 
to its activity; namely intelligence, sentiment, and 
volition(185) . 
Living systems are considered to be open systems; the 
latter are discussed in detail in section 3.14. 
Phenomenology is significant to this subject (151) . 
This thesis considers all organisations as living systems 
simp~y because they fundamently are controlled by, and 
conS1st of, human beings; and therefore human brains. The 
usefulness of this aspect to the thesis is that a unique 
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characteristic of life is that it is an organised system, a 
living system, capable of creating more order from less 
order. The rational therefore is that companies and 
organisations can create more order from less order. 
3.12 Closed Loop Systems 
Closed loop systems have been extensively explained in, for 
example, automated systems. 
Closed loop systems depend on feedback; a closed loop 
feedback system contains the following five elements (97) : 
1) Programme elements: they determine what the automated 
system shall do and how the parts of the system must 
function in order to accomplish the desired result. 
2) Action elements; they are generally of two kinds: 
- energy application, 
- transfer & positioning. 
3) Sensing elements: to detect and measure a specific 
property of the processed item and present that 
measurement in a form upon which the automated system 
can act. 
4) Decision elements; use information from sensors that 
measure how the system is operating and compare these 
data with information from the process program that 
describes how the operation should proceed. 
5) Control elements; the mechanisms by which decisions 
are carried out. 
The whole feedback loop, input-system-output-controller, 
has a very special behaviour; it manifests "purpose". (97). 
Since feedback is an essential element in a closed loop 
system, margins can be used to monitor a decreasing or 
increasing risk profile. 
Closed loop systems are mentioned in the organisation and 
management research; particularly in the cybernetics 
domain. 
3.13 Open Loop Systems 
Open loop. systems are generally defined as systems in which 
feedback ~s not present, nor possible because the output 
of the system is unknown. ' 
In detail, the definition of an open loop system which is 
used in this thesis is: 
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a system in which the meaning or outcome of any of its 
elements either, 
1} 
2} 
cannot be completely defined, or, 
cannot be directly linked with a previously 
experienced "similar" item which had a successful 
result. 
This definition naturally excludes closed loop systems 
since both the conditions 1} and 2} are not applicable. 
Using the same rational, "margins" cannot be used in open 
loop systems. 
It seems that critical elements of open loop systems are 
knowledge as well as data based. 
It is considered to be axiomatic that a "total and complete 
dynamic system" can be defined solely in terms of open loop 
and closed loop systems. 
Open loop systems, as defined above, have not been directly 
addressed in the literature reviewed by the author. Hence 
the research review has centred on the concepts and 
techniques that seem to be necessary to be able to "manage" 
open loop systems. The following points have been extracted 
from this review. 
a} Pieces of knowledge in the form of rules can be 
chained in an inference process i.e from some premises 
one can obtain a conclusion. If the internalised 
premises (rules) match the external premises(facts from 
users}, the inference process is started and the 
machine exhibits intelligence. (116). The above is 
called forward chaining; backward chaining(or goal 
driven inference) is based on matching an initial 
goal (assertion) with rule conclusions. The conditions 
of the rules with matching conclusions then become 
input to the backward chaining process. (122) . 
b) Theorem of Representation: a fuzzy set can be 
represented by a family of crisp sets, which we call 
level sets; and any subjective evaluation defined on 
any support is equivalent to a family of 
intervals. (116) . 
c) Aristotelian logic needs to be replaced by dialectic 
(critical analysis of mental processes) logic which 
assumes that A and non-A do not exclude each other as 
predicates of X. 
d) The system is observable whenever two distinct states 
yield observably different responses; observability is 
a vague predicate. Vague can be given a precise 
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meaning; vague input (0, 1) , vague output (0, 1) . (116). 
e) Complexity is a property of a system arising from 
interactions of the system with its observer-regulator 
rather than being an intrinsic property of the system 
itself. Linguistic models can be used to avoid 
complexity. (116) . 
f) Most managers have decided to use heuristic rather 
than mathematical models i.e. problem solving by 
inductive reasoning. Four basic approaches to 
scientific truth: Liebnitzian; Lockean; Kantian; 
Hegelian. (116) . 
g) Quantitative model representation of complex systems 
is questionable. Language expresses ideas and beliefs. 
Formalism errs on the side of sameness and seeks to 
exorcise vagueness; functionalism errs on the side of 
difference and encourages us to look at the uses of 
vagueness. Silence may communicate what is beneath or 
beyond words. (116) . 
h) Probability theory studies statistical inexactness, 
due to the occurrence of random events, and fuzzy set 
theory studies inexactness due to human 
judgement. (116) . 
i) An important element of sensory & motor systems is the 
existence of topological maps in the brain which tend 
to dedicate greater area to activity that is utilised 
more. (116) . 
j) The LS-1 learning paradigm is composed of three 
interacting components: 
1) the problem solving component; 
2) the critic; 
3) the learning component. (118) . 
k) Basic elements of an expert system are: user terminal, 
experts terminal, inference engine, knowledge base 
results. (96) . 
1) expert systems and A.I techniques are characterised by 
the combination numerical and symbolic computation. 
m) Knowledge Specification Formalism: to facilitate the 
communication between knowledge engineers and domain 
experts. The current "deterministic" management 
approach, using predefined procedures, is less and 
less able to ~erify w~th respect to growing complexity 
of new satell~te requ~rements with respect to 
autonomy, reliability and performance. Modellistic 
knowledge representations allow combination of 
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mathematics, forward and backward rules, and high 
level programmes. (122) . 
The above elements give a general impression of current 
thinking with respect to possible methods of "dealing with" 
actual real life open loop situations; the latter 
containing, by definition, behavioural (soft) and 
engineering (hard) aspects. The clear conclusions from the 
research that quantitative methods are not adequate is a 
solid foundation block for the "direction" of this thesis 
i.e. the only valid approach that can be made to encompass 
programmatic dynamics, non-linearities, and hard and soft 
aspects is qualitative. 
As with closed loop systems relating to complex systems, 
open loop systems have also not been directly mentioned. 
References in this research assessment again refer to the 
inadequateness of mathematical models. Most of the research 
on open loop systems deals with fuzzy mathematics, 
probability theory applications, and expert systems. There 
is a clear conclusion, made a number of times, that 
quantitative methods are inadequate. In fact, most of the 
open loop statements deal with definitions and the 
possibility of this or that method being applicable to 
different situations. In this area a significant amount of 
philosophical discussion is taking place and informatics 
modelling techniques using fuzzy algebra, subjective 
judgement etc. are under consideration. 
3.14 Open Systems(self-organising) 
The notes on Chaos in chapter 3.15, with their frequent 
references to the brain and other living systems, should be 
consulted in conjunction with these notes on Open Systems. 
Fundamental to the research of this thesis is the concept 
that organisations can be self organising i.e. they can 
become more orderly. This apparent violation of the second 
law of thermodynamics is only possible with the injection 
of negative entropy. 
This thesis submits the achievement of a reducing entropy* 
situation in the following manner. If data, hard and soft, 
received by a programme is valid and current i.e. relevant 
and timely, and the programme has, and uses, the capability 
to apply the data, then the programme problem solving 
ability will increase, the problems will decrease, the risk 
will decrease, the orderliness will increase, the 
complexity will decrease; therefore the entropy will 
decrease. It is thus an essential feature of defining 
intervention that the entropy reduction capability, 
qualitatively and relatively, is known; an increasing or 
decreasing entropy can thus be deduced. The criticality of 
'the right data at the right time" is thus paramount. 
* The entropy reduction is a local phenomena; globally it 
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is increasing and hence the second law of thermodynamics is 
not violated with reference to the total system. 
The following points have been selected from the 
bibliographical reviews as key elements in support of the 
hypothesis. 
a) An open system is where the stability is in dynamic 
equilibrium; in which continuous change occurs yet 
relatively uniform conditions prevail, like the 
conditions in a pool beneath a waterfall. (65) 
b) Both negative and positive feedback, in the form of 
individual and species behavioural patterns, are 
involved in maintaining the overall dynamic 
equilibrium of the community. (65) . 
c) The objective of everything is survival; feedback is 
involved everywhere. (93) . 
d) Cognitive functions have to be learned: 
"Seeing" has to learned during a critical period of 
post natal development. (93) . 
e) The developing brain ought to be considered as a 
highly active and primarily self containing system 
which, when born, already possesses substantial 
knowledge about the structure of the world into which 
it is going to adapt itself. Thus when the brain is 
born and confronted with a dramatic expansion of 
accessible environment, it poses a number of precise 
questions to this environment with the purpose of 
optimising and adapting its internal structure to 
reality. (109,110). 
f) The brain and its environment appear as components of 
a closed, highly interactive system. (109,110) 
g) The cause of developmental errors is suggested by the 
particularities of the self - organisation process. 
The possibility must be considered that the brain does 
not formulate the right questions or does not ask with 
sufficient insistency to obtain answers. (93) . 
h) The character of a sociobiophysical system may be 
strongly affected by sudden changes in its subsystems 
or the systems environment e.g. the advent of new 
technology. (104) . 
i) Self organising systems are concerned with 
circularity, recursiveness, and self-reference. (92) . 
j) Memory and consciousness can be readily 
separated. (138) . 
k) 
1) 
m) 
n) 
0) 
p) 
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Learning is not how people feel, but how they 
think. (139) . 
Information is not only produced by dissipating the 
degrees of freedom in a system, but also by increasing 
resolution in systems with few degrees of 
freedom. (140) . 
The large scale behaviour of complex systems, often 
hidden by fluctuations, can be interpretated in terms 
of an organisational scheme for all underlying 
events. (152) . 
The presence of periodic solutions implies the 
presence of steady states. (152) . 
A chaotic system can be locally unpredictable, 
globally stable. (153) . 
A complex system can give rise to turbulence and 
coherence at the same time. (153) . 
The above statements clearly identify the predominating 
role of feedback, the learning process, the dynamics of the 
situation, and environmental interaction with the brain. 
These characteristics are key elements in the thesis. 
All of the points that have been extracted from the 
research are considered to be supportive of the hypothesis 
and the thesis in general. 
3.15 Chaos 
The aspect of chaos is central to this thesis. 
Chaos could be described as an artistic science since it 
encompasses mathematical concepts and beautiful, complex 
pictorial presentations; possibly like life itself. 
The functioning of living systems according to the 
principles of chaos is documented, although not extensively 
proven, by numerous authors. (152, 153, 180). The 
involvement of chaos in the functioning of the brain has 
been substantially commented in this thesis e.g. chapters 
3.11, 3.14 and 6.5.4. 
The concept of bifurcation whereby "changing one parameter 
can cause the system to move from steady state(equilibrium) 
to a point where the equilibrium splits in two, these 
bifurcations then come faster and faster, and then the 
system becomes chaotic(152, 153)" seems to fit the 
actuality of business, and projects, very well. 
The observation has been made (152) that "chaotic dynamics 
discovered that the disorderly behaviour of simple systems 
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acted as a creative process. It generated complexity; 
richly organised patterns, sometimes stable and sometimes 
unstable, sometimes finite, but always with the fascination 
of living things." 
The above, from the experience of this author and as shown 
in chapter 5, describes project situations. Life can be 
tranquil, steady state and apparently linearly 
extrapolatable for a certain period and then suddenly, 
often from an "apparently insignificant" source, everything 
becomes turmoil with "tiger teams" being formed to deal 
with potentially catastrophic problems. The situation has 
become non-linear. Panic situations frequently develop and 
managers "throw money at the problem" on the basis of solve 
quickly now and thus avoid more serious impacts later in 
the progranune. 
This approach can be very damaging since the turmoil may 
actually spread due to the predatorial effect of the "throw 
money at the problem" approach depriving other areas of 
necessary resources. 
The documented statement(152) that "dynamical instability 
is the average of a measure of the rate of growth of small 
deviations" seems to be very appropriate. 
For this author the science of chaos has provided the only 
realistic conceptualisation of project and business life as 
they really are. 
The notes 124 through 130 (annex 5) provide a telegraphic 
summary of the status of the science of chaos at the time 
of writing this thesis. 
These notes provide a strong foundation to the developments 
made in this thesis. 
3.16 Negative Entropy. 
Historically negative entropy, in relation to Information 
Theory(222), seems to have been formalised by Leon 
Brillouin; he coined the term "negentropy". (209,214). 
The work of Brillouin et al(180,209,214) stands as a 
reference (104) in this subject matter and is used as such 
in this thesis. 
The following notes, designated a), b) etc., have been 
extracted from the above references to provide a basis for 
the negative entropy aspects of this research. 
It is important to realise that the following notes only 
address the quantity of information and DO NOT address the 
"value" nor the "meaning" of the information being 
transmitted; nor the aspect of the significance of its 
timing. 
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In this thesis the meaning and value of the information, 
and the timeliness of its arrival at the receiver, are 
considered to be of prime importance in the increase or 
decrease of risk and hence on the role of the intervenor. 
a) A definition of information, derived statistically, 
considers a situation in which there are pI different 
possible cases or events of equal a priori 
probability. This is considered to be the initial 
situation when there is no special information about 
the system undergoing review. If more information is 
obtained about the problem then it may be possible to 
specify that only one out of the pI outcomes is 
actually realised. The greater the uncertainty in the 
initial problem, the greater pI will be and the larger 
will be the amount of information required to make the 
selection. If the final information state is 
represented by I", then it is stated that: 
I" =KlnP I 
where K is a constant. (209) 
b) The relation between Information and entropy is given 
by the expression: 
Ib" = k(lnPI- lnP") = SI- S" 
S" = S' - Ib" 
where SI and S" represent the entropy at the initial 
and final states, and 
Ib" represents the "bound*" information at the 
initial state. 
* Two classes of information are distinguished: 
1) Free information, If, which occurs when the possible 
cases are regarded as abstract and have no special 
physical significance; 
2) Bound information, Ib, which occurs when the possible 
cases can be interpreted as complexions of a physical 
system. Bound information is thus a special case of 
free information. 
In the above expression, Ibn appears as a negative term in 
the total entropy of the physical system and hence it is 
concluded that: 
bound information = decrease in entropy S 
= increase in negentropy N. 
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Evidently, in this scheme, the system is not isolated: t~e 
entropy is decreased when information is obtained, reduc~ng 
the number of complexions { from the Planck usage of the 
term to define the discrete configurations formed when an 
atomic system jumps from one structure to another one while 
absorbing or emitting energy, and here considered to be the 
same as the equally probable causes PI), and this 
information must be furnished by some external agent whose 
entropy will increase. Hence the second law of 
thermodynamics is not violated. 
In the case of free information, it is considered that 
there is no connection between information and entropy, 
since the relation between entropy and the number of cases 
is defined only if the cases are complexions of a physical 
system. (209) . 
c) Entropy is usually described as measuring the amount 
of disorder in a physical system. A more precise 
statement is that: 
"entropy measures the lack of information about the 
actual structure of the system". 
This lack of information introduces the possibility of a 
great variety of microscopically distinct structures, which 
we are, in practice, unable to distinguish from one 
another. Since anyone of these different microstructure 
can actually be realised at any given time, the lack of 
information corresponds to actual disorder in the hidden 
degrees of freedom. (209) . 
d) Entropy suggests that organisms, societies, machines 
and so on, will rapidly deteriorate into disorder and 
"death". The reason they do not is because animate 
things can self-organise and inanimate things may be 
serviced by man. These are negentropic activities 
which require energy. Energy however can only be made 
available by further degradation. Ultimately, 
therefore, entropy wins the day and the attempts to 
create order can seem rather a daunting task in the 
entropic scheme of things. (124) 
The above notes indicate the origin and concept of negative 
entropy and its relation to Information. They also 
emphasize the purely statistical derivation of the theory 
and its limitation in that it does not address the quality 
nor interpretation of information. This work is considered 
to be an adequate basis for the utilisation of negative 
entropy concepts, in connection with self organising 
systems and the indication of risk, in this thesis. . 
3.17. Conclusions. 
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In addition to the conclusions which are implicit in the 
preceding sections the overriding conclusions of this 
assessment of the status of current knowledge are: 
1) the methodologies and modelling techniques do not, in 
many areas, represent the IIreal world ll ; they are only 
stated to be lIuseable ll providing certain, very 
significant assumptions are made. In many cases, the 
author submits, those assumptions cannot be made 
whilst still retaining the hard pragmatism of 
day-to-day business life. 
2) the application of the above models would be almost 
impossible, in the real world, due to the 
unavailability of the required data, at the required 
times and with the required detail, and computational 
expertise; 
3) the IIsoft' or behavioural aspects are spasmodically 
addressed and very rarely in conjunction with the 
IIhard ll aspects. This lack of a total system approach 
when addressing, by definition and without choice, the 
overall system is considered to be a serious flaw. 
This point has been made by a number of researchers. 
4) the qualitative versus quantitative aspects do not 
seem to be converging and seem to be rather irrelevant 
considering the increasingly recognised prime function 
of behavioural aspects. 
The result is a rather fragmented situation with no clear 
concept concerning the direction that "applied ll research 
should take in order to be credible and provide, therefore, 
outputs that can actually be used by the average manager in 
the average working environment. 
It is submitted that this thesis may provide a trigger for 
a new approach or direction i.e. based on a detailed 
development, expansion and utilisation of the Intervention 
Method, see chapters 6 and 7, together with the collection 
of more real field data converging at the system level. 
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Chapter 4) The ENVIRONMENT of the Method. 
4.1) INTRODUCTION. 
Before defining the Intervention Method it is necessary to 
describe its purpose and function and, prior to those 
descriptions, to explain the environment in which the 
Method must function and "why" this work is necessary. 
The latter points are addressed by outlining the current 
state of application, fundamentally in the European Space 
industry, of the various aspects involved and formulating a 
number of statements to envelope the shortcomings; thus 
covering the "why" aspect. 
A term which is used extensively in this thesis is risk 
indicator. This is used to fundamentally refer to a signal 
that is received by: 
.. 1) the project manager, and 
2) the intervener, 
indicating that a significant risk contributing element is 
present which "could" prevent the "programmatic and, or, 
strategic objectives" being achieved. (Refer to annex 3) . 
4.2 CURRENT PRACTICE in the European Space business. 
4.2.1 GENERAL. 
As mentioned above this section describes the project 
management methods currently being practised by some space 
industries in their development activities. From 
discussions and bibliographic reviews (1, 2, 6, 17, 18, 39, 
58, 101) the Aerospace business appears to be more 
structured reference project planning, data flow and 
decision making, and more sensitive to ensuring some form 
of independent element in the Review process, than many 
other industries e.g. chemical, civil engineering. 
Prime amongst the Aerospace industries, Space seems to 
predominate in these aspects; particularly the desire to 
"appear" to be open to external accountability. During an 
interview with an ex-director of an advanced civil aircraft 
development programme the remark was made, "an aircraft 
chief designer would not tolerate his work being questioned 
to the extent that designs, and designers, are interrogated 
in the European Space Agency business". It would thus 
appear that the Space industry may represent the "best 
case" . 
4.2.2 The DEVELOPMENT PROJECT. 
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The development project is characterised by the necessity 
to produce a small number of products requiring the 
solution of "engineering"* problems, which are often 
technologically severe, with limited funds and within a 
stipulated timescale. 
* Although "engineering" problems are stated it 
is often the case, for space projects, that new 
concepts are also implemented for the first time 
in a development vehicle; albeit with some 
a-priori ground testing. Hence the general use of 
the term "engineering" also tends to 
obscure( .. limit the perception of ... ) the 
inclusion of research type activities. As 
technologies and systems develop the terminology 
must be re-assessed for possible ambiguities and 
change of scope. This would avoid the 
mis-application of classical practise. 
postulate 3: The terminology generalisations 
progressively being used are considered to 
be significant contributors to the 
difficulties concerning the definition and 
control of risk. A risk indicator needs to 
be assigned to this area. 
The development problems are usually categorised as not 
fundamental in nature; this being the realm of "pure" 
research. However, the transition from "pure" to "applied" 
research and thence to "development" is rather fuzzy and 
becoming even more so with the increasing automation and 
compression of the so-called "development and production" 
environments; for example: CADCAM, software domination, 
miniaturised custom built technology, shorter "technology" 
generations(life cycles), etc. 
The development problems actually encountered are often 
different and more difficult than those that had been 
identified in the planning and financial definition and 
commitment stages. Soft aspects are not ignificantly 
addressed. 
The result is that the development projects often contain 
-embedded research- elements but the majority of managers 
refuse to categorise them as such. A possible explanation 
for this attitude is that "research" is construed to be 
driven by the data that emerges as the research continues. 
Such a situation, whose direction & end point( ... & risk ... ) 
are relatively unpredictable, would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to define contractually such that it formally 
interfaced with, and properly contributed to, the total 
"system" contract. According to current methods the 
situation would be "unmanageable"!! 
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The use of "quantum jump" technology and compressed 
schedules often results in the acceptability of the 
technology being established during final assembly of the 
space vehicle. This often results in significant problems 
occurring at this time and interventions which have not 
been planned but have been FORCED by the circumstances due, 
significantly, to the lack of risk indicators. 
Postulate 4: 
postulate 5: 
The use of technology which has been 
developed in well defined, and traceable, 
incrementally advancing steps would avoid 
the inherent risk of the "quantum jump" 
approach. 
The failure to identify, and the lack of 
proper definition of, embedded research, in 
development programmes is a major risk 
contributor. 
4.2.3 The QUALIFICATION MANDATE. 
In the Space business hardware, software and man-machine 
aspects must be "qualified", and "flight approved", prior 
to use. This essentially means that they must demonstrate 
their ability to do the job required, with "margins". Until 
this "verification" is achieved the product will not be 
accepted by the customer. 
The development project manager and his team must therefore 
not only solve all problems within a tight cost and budget 
but they must also demonstrate their technical solutions, 
with confidence (margins) . 
The existence of this latter mandate seems to satisfy many 
of the risk management requirements; however its 
implementation is not so simple. It requires, for example, 
statistically significant data samples. Such data is very 
often not available and hence "qualification by 
similarity", with "other hardware", techniques are used; 
these are often very questionable, distorted and truncated 
for cost and schedule reasons. Also, the simulation of the 
operating environment concerning all stress levels and 
complete durations(acceleration testing is often not 
representative), with comprehensive instrumentation to 
provide static and dynamic status, is essential; this is 
usually not possible so more assumptions have to made. 
The end result is that the qualification process does 
ensure that margins do exist for possibly 80\ of space 
vehicle parameters but in the more critical areas e.g. high 
density technology, software, advanced R.F. equipment, 
deployable mechanisms, solid fuel engines, man-machine 
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interfaces, etc., margins are often not demonstrated. Also, 
in this system, the demonstration of margins occurs towards 
the end of the project; hence negative results are almost 
impossible to rectify without substantial hardware impact. 
It is also unfortunately still true that designers are 
almost totally success orientated i.e. the consideration of 
all design failure modes, and their consequences, is not an 
intrinsic part of the design process. Failure aspects 
relate directly to risk and hence constitute, when 
presented and used appropriately, a form of risk indicator. 
Postulate 6: The outputs of "failure mode and hazard 
analyses" constitute risk indicators. 
4.2.4. The PROJECT PHASES. 
A space project is divided into phases; with particular 
objectives and functions per phase, viz. 
- phase A: 
- phase B: 
- phase C: 
- phase D: 
- phase E: 
system definition from baseline design 
supplied by the customer. 
sub-system trade-offs plus optimisation of 
system design; preparation of bid for phase 
C-D. 
audits, detailed design, final system 
optimisation, design freeze and manufacture; 
component & equipment qualification. 
assembly, integration, testing, system 
qualification and delivery; milestone and 
delivery incentives(large} and 
penalties(small}*. 
commissioning & operation; orbit incentive/ 
penalties(both small}*. 
In spite of the existence of phases A & B, and prior 
definition work by the customers "future projects" teams, 
it is typical for major problems to occur during phases C,D 
& B which require significant additional funding, and time; 
and sometimes can even result in the loss of the vehicle. 
* The parentheses refer to ESA projects. 
4.2.5 CRITICAL ITEMS 
Critical items are defined as those aspects of design, 
hardware, software etc. that could cause loss of: 
life, 
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the system i.e. the investment(e.g.the vehicle 
itself) or, 
the mission i.e. what the space vehicle or crew 
have to do. 
The latter refers to the orbit function of the space 
vehicle e.g. to carry out earth resource measurements. 
Although a "CRITICAL ITEMS LIST" does exist there is no 
established method of prioritising or ranking the critical 
items such that the most critical, say, top ten can be 
given top management attention. Hundreds of critical items 
can be identified during the course of a project. 
Postulate 7: the definition and implementation of a 
"RANKING" system for critical items would 
enable them to be used effectively as RISK 
INDICATORS. 
In the context of the definition of critical items it 
should be noted that currently there is NO METHOD of 
DEFINING the RELATIVE IMPORTANCE of such aspects as: 
commercial utility; 
resilience(capability of an organisation to 
survive a major accident); 
politics; 
geographic distribution(individual country 
financial returns must be proportional to their 
contribution to ESA); 
technical performance degradation. 
4.2.6. INVESTMENT MAGNITUDE 
As an indication of size of the investments involved in the 
projects referred to in this thesis the following general 
statements are presented. 
For a communications satellite phases A and B would cost of 
the order of 50 - 100 million dollars each whilst phases C 
and D, awarded as a single contract, would cost between 300 
and 600 million dollars. For a manned vehicle the costs 
would be approximately one order of magnitude higher. 
The phase C-D contract is thus the sought after "prize". 
4.2.7 The CONTRACTOR SELECTION PROCESS. 
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The phase C-D contract is awarded after assessment of the 
competitive bids by customer technical, managerial {inc. 
resources}, financial and contractual review panels using 
standardised criteria. 
Final reports are submitted by the review panel chairmen to 
top management (customer) Boards who finally decide the 
contract winner. This latter process significantly 
addresses political issues e.g. in the case of the ESA the 
contract value awarded to the member countries must be 
proportional to the contributions made by those countries 
to the ESA budgets. 
There are often, during this phase C-D evaluation, cost 
cutting activities but rarely a significant reduction in 
the scope of work; the Board members concerned tend not to 
be commercially experienced nor orientated. 
The dimensioning of the project technological, schedule and 
cost problems, by ESA at the contractor selection point, is 
carried out with very little involvement of expert 
engineers; a new method is needed. 
During the selection process the interface between the 
contractor and the customer is maintained. The predominant 
contractor thrust is clearly to win the contract and 
important decisions concerning the definition and resources 
have to be made at this time, in a competitive mode. 
The author has never seen a risk analysis presented during 
these negotiations. Risk indicators, as such, do not exist. 
Risk is fundamentally defined by the Review panels in terms 
of: 
technical non-compliancies with the customers 
requirements, 
non-credible aspects based on panel members 
experience, and 
knowledge, 
and omissions. 
The technical and financial parts of the bids are carefully 
segregated to avoid "corrupting the technical assessment 
with cost aspects"! 
The technical and financial aspects come together only at 
the Board level. A Board meeting may last a few hours or a 
couple of days. Actions can be placed by the Board for 
later close-out; usually under the responsibility of the 
project teams! 
The correlation of the various technical deficiencies and 
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the impact on the financial inputs is a matter for the 
Board. In other words the customers(mission) objectives and 
the contractors(financial and profit) objectives come 
together at this point for the first time; and then in a 
very shallow fashion. 
The complete review process is based on a numeric marking 
system related to the acceptance and rejection criteria 
used to assess the bids. 
No attempt has been made to relate the marking results with 
risk, nor to carry out a "lessons learned" activity to 
determine the actual versus predicted(from the Review 
results) performance of the companies involved; and thence 
to estimate the predicted versus actually experienced risk. 
In other words the veracity of the bid review system is not 
known. The same comment applies to the project system 
reviews mentioned later in this section. 
4.2.8 The CONTRACTOR MONITORING PROCESS. 
Once the contracts have been awarded, the selected 
contractor proceeds to implement the negotiated "statement 
of work". The customer then enters into a monitoring role 
which is effected via progress meetings, e.g. quarterly, 
based on progress reports which have been submitted by the 
contractor. The progress reports are written to an agreed 
format and the meetings usually follow a similar pattern; 
identified problems, essentially by the contractor, will 
predominate the meetings attention. 
The author has attended many(hundreds!) progress meetings 
and reviewed even more progress reports, during the past 15 
years, and has rarely seen RISK mentioned. 
The problems that are identified are, as mentioned above, 
defined by the contractor or, by "happen-chance ", by the 
customer. The contractor will endeavour only to expose 
those problems which he considers not to be his liability. 
The system is thus not rigorous and may even be 
self-effacing to the extent of prolonging the 
identification of a problem such that the risk becomes 
programme threatening. 
Postulate 8: A properly structured problem definition 
system requiring intervention when problem 
consequences a certain, a-priori defined, 
magnitude would enable risk profiles to be 
defined; and, with additional measures, to 
be controlled. RISK INDICATORS need to 
assigned as necessary. 
4.2.9 The REVIEW PROCESS. 
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At certain points in the overall project timescale, the 
customer convenes System level reviews. These reviews are 
based on data packages produced by the contractor(s) ~nd 
the customer assessment of that data. The contractor 1S 
also required to make a verbal, with viewgraphs etc., 
presentation to the customer. The cost and time dedicated 
to these reviews is considerable. For a medium sized space 
vehicle a data package could run to 25 volumes, each volume 
containing approximately 400 pages. The reviews could last 
for one to five weeks and involve approximately 200 
persons. It is actually on record that for the 
Inmarsat-3 satellite, the five competitive proposals 
generated 11 tons of paper and necessitated a team of 80 
persons working three months to assess them! 
The review structure is similar to the bid review outlined 
above; with panels per major discipline and a review board 
to finally declare the conclusion of the customer. The 
project manager would be a secretary to the Board, but not 
a voting member. All panel chairmen would be either non-
ESA staff or, at least, not a member of the project. Hence 
a certain independence is achieved. The main shortcoming of 
this latter system is that, in the time available, it is 
almost impossible for the "external" members to become 
sufficiently familiar with the project status. The major 
problems (risk) lie at the detail level; not in the system 
level descriptive(voluminous) prose as presented by the 
contractor! 
Postulate 9: The ability of the panel members and panels 
chairmen to become familiar with the review 
material is critical to defining programme 
risk. A RISK INDICATOR must be assigned to 
this area. 
The system reviews are supported by contractor (prime) and 
sub-contractor reviews at the lower levels. Such reviews 
may be attended by the customer as observers; customers may 
only comment in writing, after the event, or at the next 
progress meeting. 
The opportunity for filibuster tactics is present; time 
intervals between the event/problem and a customer response 
to the related report, with clarifications, verifications 
etc., can render the whole process ineffective. 
In general, the system reviews are as follows: 
- phase C: - Requirements Review(continuing 
appropriateness, coherency of the total 
requirements set) . 
- Conceptual Design Review 
- Critical Design Review(design freeze/ 
manufacturing go-ahead) 
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- phase D: - Qualification Review 
- Flight Acceptance Review 
- Launch Readiness Review 
- phase E: - Commissioning Review 
It should be noted that NO PRIORITISATION of the major 
DESIGN OBJECTIVES is provided by the customer and no 
permitted degradation of those objectives. Thus when 
failures occur in the vehicle, methods of utilising this 
degraded state are not available. In other words the risk 
profile related to the gradual transition of system state 
from perfect functioning to complete failure is not 
addressed. 
postulate 10: 
4.2.10 MARGINS 
An assessment of the risk involved in 
the progressive loss of the vehicle 
performance would enable a better cost/ 
schedule optimisation during the design 
and operational phases and more 
realistic RISK MANAGEMENT to be 
implemented. 
At the commencement of a project certain parameters are 
given margins. For a space vehicle such parameters 
typically are: 
- mass(kg) 
- power (watts) 
- memory capacity(bits) 
- etc. 
Margins are also applied to the schedule (days) . 
As the project proceeds it is the intention to permit these 
margins to be gradually eroded in such a way that the 
actual values needed will be aChieved. The principle is 
that since unpredictable problems will occur, the margins 
will enable their solution whilst maintaining the 
parametric and schedule performance according to 
specification and delivery dates, respectively. 
The problem is that since the relationship between the 
parameters, including their margins, and the project 
resources is unknown it is practically impossible to 
monitor the effect of parameter degradation on RISK i.e. of 
achieving the project objectives on time within cost. 
Page 74 
Similarly, the criteria for fixing the size of th~ 
parametric margins are unrelated to any form of r1sk 
definition and, in fact, seem to be established by 
some (unspecified) rule of thumb .... apparently based, by 
someone (???) on experience (undefined) !!! Justification,for 
using these, relatively unchanged , margins on succeed1ng 
projects and technologies is missing. 
Postulate 11: If the total resources are calculated 
on the basis of producing parametric 
performance (inc. the associated 
margins) and similar relationships are 
established relating to performance and 
profit (including incentive/ penalty 
effects) then the parametric margins 
could be used as RISK INDICATORS. It 
should be noted that the "resources/ 
parameter calculation" would involve 
ALL contributing ACTIVITIES to the 
achievement of the performance e.g. 
design, qualification, testing, etc.; 
hard and soft aspects and the 
interactive effects of different 
margins would also have to be included. 
The above signifies that the programmatic and risk 
relationship of parameters to objectives and profit is 
unknown. 
4.3 STRATEGIC VULNERABILITY 
4.3.1 General 
Due to the relatively long duration of the space vehicle 
projects, which can last from 3 to 12 years, the strategic 
planning and associated decision making is vulnerable to 
utilization, political and international aspects that may 
significantly change during the above timescales. 
The annual accountability could be considered as an 
"increment" bounded by financial interventions. 
4.3.2 Utilization Aspects. 
The objectives and applications of the projects when 
initially defined are often at a fairly general level. This 
has the political advantage that funding can be made 
available in order to commence the programme, which results 
in jobs for constituency members etc., but has the 
technical and programmatic disadvantage that the design 
requirements have to be defined in detail as the programme 
develops. This can result in the final product being 
significantly different than the current needs; such 
divergences have actually occurred. 
Another aspect of the vulnerability of the projects is the 
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increasingly shortening technology generation life c~cles. 
An obvious example of this aspect is the 8, 16, 32 b1t 
computer technologies associated with the 8086,80286 & 
80386 microprocessor developments; these technologies 
lasted approx. 10, 5 and 3 years respectively. 
With the increased performance from the newer technology, 
and its attendant mass and power advantages, the risk of 
obsolescence of the precursor technology is high. 
One must not forget that not all technology increases 
produce improvements. sometimes the newer technology is 
unreliable or exhibits unknown reactions in certain 
circumstances; it is then stated that the validation, or 
qualification, of the technology was not properly carried 
out. 
There is also the aspect that with the inception of a newer 
technology, the older technology may not continue to be 
supported by the manufacturers; serious maintenance 
problems may thus arise. 
Whatever the impact the newer technologies may have it is 
clear that either a relatively undefined risk must be 
taken, in selecting an advanced but relatively unproven 
technology thus relying on a successful qualification 
programme, or relatively little risk is taken by adopting 
an existing well tried technology with its performance 
limitations and obsolescence problems. 
Postulate 12: If the strategic plans of the product 
user community and the technology 
developers are monitored by the related 
corporate management 
and, 
the project is defined for technology 
insertion, and a wide range of possible 
applications of the product are kept 
open as long as possible 
and, 
the "critical supports"(see section 
5.1) are established and maintained for 
the project life cycle, 
then, 
risk in this area would be minimised. 
4.3.3. Political & International Aspects 
The justification for many, possibly all, budget 
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allocations is, ultimately, political. The political 
drivers change, often dramatically, and occasionally 
quickly. 
In the Space business, the main drivers ten years ago were: 
to establish telecommunications & broadcast links via 
satellite; 
to establish space laboratories for material & life 
science research; 
to utilize the US space shuttle as much as possible; 
to establish an European autonomy in space, even at 
very high cost. 
Today those drivers have been significantly changed and may 
be presented as follows: 
to improve cost effectiveness of space projects; 
to limit the use of manned space vehicles to only 
those missions that really need man on board; 
to concentrate on science & earth resource missions; 
to support commercial exploitation of the space 
segment e.g. telecommunications; 
to support major space developments such as a space 
station and space transportation vehicle providing 
they can be funded by a conservatively increasing 
budget. 
Postulate 13: 
Postulate 14: 
If political and economic trends, at 
the macro level, are monitored and 
utilised in the compilation and update 
of Space strategic plans then overall 
risk will be reduced. 
The absence of direct executive 
authority, on the project, by a design 
review board is considered to seriously 
diminish the effectiveness of the 
design review. 
A listing of postulates is given in Annex 1. 
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4.4 Summary Conclusions on Current Situation 
Concerning the "role of intervention in strategic change" 
as currently practised the following summary, based on the 
authors experience and discussions with colleagues, is 
presented: 
a) strategic planning is implemented at the macro level 
in the European Space business but with the 
undermentioned limitations: 
at the ESA level the strategic planning is 
programme rather than (Space) industry 
related; at the programme level it is 
variable in structure, content, objectives 
definition, resource identification and 
duration. Some programmes plan 15 years 
ahead, others 3 to 5 years. In some cases 
the operational phase is not addressed. The 
ESA directorates are vertically organised 
which tends to significantly limit lateral 
communication and co-operation; programmes 
and R&D are sometimes integrated into 
programme directorates and sometimes 
contained in a separate R&D directorate. 
in the area of ESA research and 
development(R & D) strategic planning is 
based on programme(projects) needs, but this 
requires the agreement of the programme 
management and that agreement may tacitly 
admit the existence of embedded research 
(see section 3.2.2), and the independently 
perceived needs from the R&D organisation 
(brains) viewpoint. The latter point 
presents a conflict situation since all 
budgets are programme orientated and the 
independent perceptions may not converge to 
be (seen to be .. ) useful to programmes for a 
number of annual budget reviews. In many 
cases this planning is short term (1 to 3 
years) and is driven to a large extent by 
annual budgeting. In general the programme 
planning, on which the R&D planning is 
based, is not queried by the R&D planners, 
due to lack of opportunity as a consequence 
of vertical ("water-tight") directorates; 
they are also not involved in each others 
strategic efforts. 
European space industry strategic planning 
seems to be significantly based on the ESA 
planning. 
it is thus clear that any deficiencies in 
the ESA programme planning will tend to be 
Page 78 
promulgated at the R&D levels and 
industry. . . 
the ESA planning is based on establ~sh~ng 
certain "milestone achievements for Europe", 
such as a space plane, a space station, a 
Saturn probe etc. In many cases these . 
objectives are driven by national prest~ge, 
or territorial survival or expansion reasons 
within ESA; both aspects result in the 
related strategic planning data being 
questionable with the risk of causing severe 
under-estimation of budget and schedule 
needs. 
the industrial planning is based on return 
on investment and profit i.e. return to 
shareholders, dividend payment and hence 
increasing opportunity for recapitalisation. 
the failure to meet strategic objectives 
thus has very different implications for ESA 
& industry; for the latter it may even 
involve survivability! 
many directors seem to associate themselves 
more with day to day events than strategic 
and macro issues. 
the "soft ll aspects are not significantly 
considered. 
there is almost no 'lessons learned ll 
activity i.e. other than purely local. 
b) Intervention is implemented in a rather rigid fashion 
through a "review ll system that is not driven by risk 
divergence but according to loosely defined milestones 
related to programme status. The review procedure 
depends on the review honestly and completely 
presenting all problems in an easily understandable 
form. In many cases it is not in the contractors 
financial interest nor his human exposure, ego, 
credibility,etc. inclination to do so. It is also 
often not possible for the reviewer to do a thorough 
job due to inadequate time to become familiar with the 
complete review documentation. 
c) risk indicators, as such, have never been identified 
and the concept has not been addressed. 
In conclusion, the "role of intervention in strategic 
change ll in the European space business is perceived to be 
vague and rather ineffective. The latter is evidenced by 
project cost and schedule increases and space vehicle 
failures and degradations; insurance premiums have 
oscillated around 20% for the past decade. 
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Annex 7 contains the results from an analysis of space-, 
and space related-, problems that occurred during the past 
10 years. This shows that, although a number of the orbit 
problems were identified in design reviews, they still 
remained to cause major problems in orbit. This situation 
is analyzed in chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5. Knowledge and Data Collection. Analysis and 
Utilisation. 
5.1 Knowledge and Data Collection. 
The knowledge and data collected to enable and support the 
research has been derived from seven main sources. These 
are listed below together with the chapter and, where 
relevant, the number in which the knowledge and data 
resides. 
1) An Overview of Risk; see chapter 2. 
2) A Description of the ESA-European industry working 
environment; see chapter 4. 
3) A Review of the knowledge status of research and 
practices to date: 
approximately 180 references have been reviewed; 
see chapter 3 and annex 4. 
4) Interviews with key project personnel: 
eight key personnel, at the project and corporate 
management levels, have been interviewed; details 
of these interviews are contained in annex 6. 
5} Documentation of two projects, involving the key 
personnel mentioned in 3} above, have been examined; 
see section 5.2.2. 
6} Personal experience of the author over a 20 year 
period: 
this experience knowledge, which triggered the 
need for such research from the authors 
viewpoint, has been used to converge the research 
to explore the actuality of the risk situation in 
the ESA space development business. 
This exercise provided over 1200 data points. 
7} Problems which have occurred on orbiting space 
vehicles have been analyzed to determine if they could 
have been caused by management, interface control, 
technology etc. issues or prevented by intervention; 
the basic histogram data is contained in annex 7. 
Approximately 900 data points were used. 
The availability of knowledge and data was different for 
each of the four projects, as shown in table 1, but was 
adequate for comparative and absolute assessments in a 
number of significant areas e.g. occurrence, propagation 
and management of problems at most levels by the, 
extensive, ESA project teams. The project documentation 
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variously included the Invitation To Tender from ESA to ~he 
bidder, The Bid, the Project Progress Reports, the Plann1ng 
and Resource assessments, and the authors fifty eight daily 
record books covering the period January 1973 until the 
present time. 
TABLE 1. 
Thtt Availabili~ of Kngwl.~g. ADd DAta 
Interviews 
Customer 
proj. proj. 
PROJ. 
mngr. contr. 
A n y 
B y Y 
C Y Y 
D n n 
n = not available; 
y = available. 
Contractor 
corp. proj. 
mngr. mngr. 
y n 
Y Y 
Y Y 
n n 
Project Project Ground 
Documen- Daily and 
tat ion Records orbit 
analysis 
n y n 
Y Y Y 
Y Y Y 
n y n 
In total over 140 specific knowledge points and over 1200 
specific data points have been collected and utilised in 
this research; the latter are considered to be real "field 
data". These numbers exclude the knowledge and data derived 
from the interviews and project examinations. 
5.2 Knowledge and Data Analysis. 
5.2.1 Introduction. 
The analysis of the knowledge and data collected during 
this research is analyzed in this section. The "knowledge" 
chapters 2 (Risk) , 3 (CUrrent State of Knowledge), and 
4 (Situation of the Model) are not included here since the 
respective subject matter has already been analyzed in 
those chapters. The outputs from these chapters are 
incorporated into section 5.3. entitled Knowledge and Data 
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5.2.2 Project Documentation Analysis. 
5.2.2.1 General 
This section contains some general comments plus a limited 
project management documentation analysis for project B, 
and a detailed analysis of the ITT, Bid, and Project 
Management documentation for project C. The project 
documentation for projects A and D was not available. 
5.2.2.2 Space Project B. 
5.2.2.2.1 General 
This space project followed the general structure contained 
in chapter 4 of this thesis. 
The project was not competitive. 
Four of the interviews which are contained in annex 7 
relate to this project; they involved the managing director 
and project manager from the prime contractor, and the 
deputy project manager/ systems engineering manager and 
project controller from ESA. 
The project was heavily dominated by ESA; both in terms of 
the detailed design constraints imposed on the contractor 
in the ITT, and concerning the decision-making role of ESA 
as the project progressed. This occurred in spite of the 
ESA systems manager being very aware of this problem, from 
the previous project, and really attempting to avoid it. 
In fact the intervention by ESA, as on most ESA projects, 
was almost continuous and, due to this mode of management, 
much of the decision making and risk devolved from the 
contractor to ESA. This aspect is quite apparent from the 
interviews. 
The contract required the delivery of five satellites over 
a seven year period. The first satellite was originally 
scheduled, in the Prime contractors Bid of July 1976, to be 
ready for launch in mid-1980; it was actually accepted for 
launch in December 1982 and could have been launched, if 
the Ariane launcher had been ready, in February 1983. 
For this work ESA was the customer. The industrial 
consortium had established its qualification for this 
contract by competitively winning the previous, and first, 
European communications satellite contract; project A in 
this thesis. The industrial consortium contained companies 
from Italy, Sweden, UK, Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, 
Holland and the USA. Most of the contracts between the 
prime contractor and the co-contractors were firm fixed 
price. The contract between ESA and the prime contractor 
had fixed price and cost plus elements. Under the 
contractual rules of ESA, and most commercial 
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organisations, cost data cannot be required from a 
contractor on a fixed price contract. 
Even where ESA required cost data it was not included in 
the quarterly reports since it was considered to be 
proprietary to the prime contractor and not for public 
view; except to the ESA project office. The writer has had 
limited access to this data. In order to explore the 
effectiveness of the ESA cost control the writer reviewed 
the ESA cost control system(ECOS). The most important 
aspect of this review was that a form on which bidders were 
required to state the risk basis of their financial inputs 
was never submitted; and ESA never insisted on it being 
completed! This comment applies to all ESA projects! 
A not un-typical method, used by contractors, of avoiding 
payment for changes was to establish that they were out of 
scope of the contract, or that ESA had made, or had 
majority involvement in, a decision which then resulted in 
the change. ESA would then be obliged to pay if it was 
considered that the item was essential for project success. 
The interview with the ESA Systems manager shows his clear, 
moral, acceptance of this abrogation of responsibility ( see 
section 5.2.4). The almost "autonomic" overlapping of ESA 
requirements and activities with those properly reserved 
for the contractor was suicidal in this respect. 
On the contractor side the project manager and his 
immediate superior, the executive director, have been 
interviewed as part of this research. On the customer, ESA, 
side the systems manager has been interviewed. It is not 
considered to be a problem that the ESA project manager was 
not interviewed since he was largely a public relations 
figurehead; the project was essentially run by the systems 
manager. 
The writer held an ECS customer managerial position for a 
short time at the commencement of the project. 
5.2.2.2.2 The Quarterly Report 
The report was divided into four main sections, with 
sub-sections as indicated: 
1 . Management 
- overall project management 
- programme problems 
- technical problems 
- ECS export programme 
2. Technical Status 
- system 
- repeater* 
- all subsystems individually addressed 
* the repeater is the satellite "payload" and is named 
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thus to indicate that the uplink signal(telephone or 
television} is "repeated" as a downlink signal after 
appropriate amplification and frequency adjustment. 
3. Schedule Status 
4. Product Assurance Report. 
- reliability 
- quality assurance 
- materials & processes/ future activities 
- parts 
- parts procurement. 
This content was used throughout the project; changes were 
sometimes made to include specific comment on particular 
problems. 
The report was used as the input to, and the agenda of, a 
quarterly top level ESA/ prime contractor meeting; 
co-contractors were present as required by the prime 
contractor. These meetings often included detailed 
technical and schedule discussions. 
5.2.2.2.3 Conclusions 
No programme risk analysis nor contingency planning was 
supplied to support the bid. The resource allocation and 
planning seems to have been based on total success oriented 
tasks with no identified resources for working problems 
that might have occurred due to, for example, "known" 
specification inadequacies and difficult qualification 
activities. 
For the Bid the cost, manpower and schedule data were 
supplied in different documentation packages and as such 
were not capable of evaluation in an integrated fashion 
i.e. as they relate in practise. In fact, as verified from 
the interviews, it was not possible to make complete 
evaluations of any of the three areas at all. It was, also, 
thus not possible to assess the resource and planning 
impacts of the various technical issues. 
During the project, the status reporting documentation did 
not refer systematically to the utilisation of resources or 
possible increasing risk situations at the various 
contractual levels. The layout of the reports provides a 
detailed chronology, from one report to the next, of 
practically every equipment and service area involved in 
the project. There is no prioritised list of problems, with 
their overall resource and schedule impacts, nor a rational 
concerning intervention by the prime or co-contractors. 
In many parts of the reports the situations are reported as 
straight accounts of events as they have occurred with no 
judgement or "value added" interpretation. For example, an 
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audit is reported with no mention of its success or failure 
or problems exposed. Also, analyses were carried out with 
no comment concerning the conclusions. This lack of 
reported judgement by the prime contractor, the author of 
the reports, seems to reflect a passive prime contractor 
role due to the abrogation of his responsibility and 
authority by the customer, ESA. This point has been 
confirmed in the interviews. In fact it appears that the 
attitude has been to give the "facts" to ESA, wait for a 
response and the commitment of effort from the (large) ESA 
project teams, and then react in the most economic manner. 
The data provided in the project progress reports (PPRs) 
"could" be labelled as "risk indicators" and "open loops"; 
this has never been done during this, or any other ESA 
project. The result has been that the perceptions of the 
key players in the project have probably never been given 
the opportunity, in a timely manner, to converge. From the 
interviews it is clear, for example, that the perception of 
the accountability of the work-package managers was quite 
different by the project manager and the corporate manager, 
his "boss"! The entire project, from inception to launch, 
was dominated, and continuously intervened by ESA; even 
major decision making devolved to ESA. 
The general management style, from the documentation 
submitted to ESA, seems to be one of generally "expecting" 
the co-contractors to progress as planned and "waiting for 
something to happen". 
In general it is interesting to note that the QPRs did not 
contain any specific reporting on resources. Schedule slips 
were frequently mentioned and it is clear that additional 
resources must then automatically be involved but their 
criticality was never mentioned. It is also interesting 
that "risk" was never specifically mentioned although it 
was alluded to in a rather conversational manner e.g. 
"great concern over the ability to make the Eurobeam 
antenna meet the specification". 
5.2.2.3 Space Project C. 
5.2.2.3.1 General. 
This project was much bigger, in terms of the space vehicle 
size, its technical complexity, and the number of companies 
and monies involved, than project B. 
The general scenario described in chapter 4 also applied to 
this project. 
The eight interviewees, see annex 7 for the related 
reports, worked on this project but not continuously. 
The entire undertaking was based on a market analysis 
report issued by ESA; supported by a rather shallow 
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re-assessment of the market survey by the future 
contractor. As with project B, this project was not 
competitive. 
5.2.2.3.2 The Invitation To Tender(ITT). 
The project risk was defined in the ITT in terms of: 
a) the reliability to be achieved by the satellite 
i.e. the probability of meeting the specified 
performance for the design lifetime of the 
spacecraft. 
b) the outages, or downtime, permitted during the 
spacecraft operation. 
The above had to be achieved within the following 
constraints: 
1) a certain amount of time and money being 
available under certain contractual conditions 
e.g. fixed price etc. 
2) the contractor successfully completing, according 
to ESA subjective judgements, certain design 
reviews which were defined in the initial 
contract. 
3) the successful achievement of "qualification" for 
the entire spacecraft, down to and including each 
electrical component, prior to launch. 
The letter to the Bidder from ESA did not mention risk; it 
commented only on dates to be met, project phase 
definitions, open actions from the contractor pre-view of 
the draft ITT, and documents not yet ready from the 
contractors pre-view. On the latter aspect ESA stated that 
since the documents were late the ITT could be changed if 
ESA deemed it necessary after reading the late documents. 
5.2.2.3.3 The System Perfor.mance Specification (ITT) • 
In the System Performance Specification, which was part of 
the ITT, ESA stated that the objectives of the programme 
were to develop the spacecraft platform and demonstrate the 
payload capability in orbit. 
A very interesting point was that the "outage" requirement 
did not apply to the payload but only to the platform. Thus 
this very important risk indicator, in the view of this 
author, did not exist for the payload. The payload 
performance is of paramount importance to the customer who 
procures the spacecraft services. 
The reliability requirements were stipulated for every mode 
of operation of the spacecraft. 
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Certain design requirements were specified in great detail 
for the payload but very briefly for the platform by the 
customer even though the contractor was declared to be the 
design authority. 
The above points indicate a large involvement of ESA in the 
contractors business. 
5.2.2.3.4 The Project Management Plan (ITT) • 
This ITT document outlined the main project management 
requirements and provided the content of the project 
Progress Reports(PPR) and the Quarterly Executive 
Reports (QER) . 
The PPR required the status to be provided to ESA under the 
headings: 
- management; 
- technical; 
- Actions; 
- parts procurement, sub-contractors & suppliers. 
Risk was only alluded to in: 
a) the "management", and 
b) the "schedule" areas, 
in the following manner. 
Under management: "a concise description of the important 
programme problem areas, their critically and anticipated 
impact e.g. delays in schedule or non-conformance with 
contract requirements shall be provided." 
Under schedule: "it is required that the latest prediction 
of completion dates of identified milestones shall be made 
taking trends and problem areas into account". 
The purpose of the QER is stated to be to enable ESA to 
inform interested third parties, particularly potential 
users of the spacecraft system, of the status and progress 
of work with the following constraint: 
"The information contained in this report shall 
comprise that which is suitable for unlimited 
distribution." 
The above is unlikely to be useful to an intervenor or a 
third party attempting to assess the programme risk. 
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A section on "critical items" embraces almost everything 
and does not provide, or require, a ranking system. The 
amount of detail is very great in some instances. 
5.2.2.3.5 The Executive Summary{the BID). 
The above document, supplied by the bidder in his response 
to the ITT, discussed only positive aspects of the project. 
Risk is not mentioned and the only occasion when some 
doubt, or concern, is addressed is at the end of the 
report, under "management policy", where it states that" 
the bidder recognises the LARGE DEVELOPMENT NATURE (this 
authors capitals) of the programme". This comment is made 
in the context of the bidder considering that he has not 
been given adequate independent, of ESA, authority and 
responsibility. Nothing is said about the consequences of 
the above statement!! The planning presented in this 
document shows no margins, nor slack, and the presentation 
of the main design drivers per platform subsystem is not 
applied to the payloads. Hence it is also not possible to 
gauge a coherent risk, or design problems, picture. 
The usefulness of the above documents to assess project 
risk, or likelihood of success, is marginal. 
5.2.2.3.6 The Bid Evaluation 
5.2.2.3.6.1 General 
This exercise, carried out by the customer, involved 
approximately 100 persons and a period of about three 
months; between October and September 1981. 
The evaluation commenced with a detailed assessment of the 
various subsystems and management and administration 
aspects by Panels of technical experts; and culminated with 
summaries of the detailed assessments being presented to an 
Evaluation Board. The Board then made recommendations to 
the Project who implemented "to the best of their ability 
within the prevailing constraints and top management 
instructions". 
This section addresses the Panel Evaluation reports and 
then the Board report. 
Wherever a -Hote- occurs it indicates a comment by the 
author. 
5.2.2.3.6.2 Sub-Systems Bvaluation 
a) llanag81llent and Contractual Panel 
The average marks per criteria were as follows*; 
1. Organisation and management 30 
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2. Contractual ........... not marked 
3. Policy and Adequacy of Plans for Marketing .. 40(actual 
marks varied from 30 to 45) . 
* In the general marking criteria 40 is ranked as barely 
acceptable, 50 as fair, 60 as good, less than 40 as 
unacceptable: 
The main points from the report were as follows. 
The low marks were attributed to missing information in the 
Bid; two of the five panel members refused to mark because 
of missing information. The other members did mark because 
their previous involvement had given them a-priori 
knowledge and they considered they had sufficient "total 
information" to make a valid judgement. This is actually in 
contravention of the rules of Bid evaluation whereby it is 
required that only the data presented in the Bid is 
reviewed. 
There still remained a serious lack of credibility to the 
payload aspects of the management proposals. The main 
problem with the overall management approach was that the 
procedure to be adopted for resolving conflicts between the 
prime contractor and its sub-contractors, which could not 
be settled at project level, was not described. 
Note: This effectively relates to intervention. 
It is stated that interface management problems with the 
Prime and sub-contractors(subs) had been resolved. It was 
also noted that the management team would have to be 
supplemented by additional resources and people. 
Under "industrial structure and marketing" it was noted 
that a number of equipment level sub-contractors had not 
been identified or the commitments had not been made. The 
statement on the fairness and correctness of the 
competition was not provided. No visibility was given of 
the commercial agreements between the Prime and its 
subcontractor although it was stated that considerable 
progress had been made. 
Under "company experience and resources, and work load 
projections" the information required regarding the work 
load projections had not been provided and in general it 
had not been demonstrated that the necessary experience and 
manpower was available in all areas to undertake this 
complex project. With reference to the payload contractor 
in particular the panel considered that there would be 
considerable difficulty in manning up in time to the 
proposed levels and even if a fixed price contract was 
applied, as was currently foreseen, the customer should 
seek to impose an obligation on the contractor to submit 
regular manning levels reports which should be monitored 
closely by the project. 
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Under "organisation and key personnel" sub-contractor 
monitoring and supervision, project control and parts 
procurement were designated as unsatisfactory. 
Under "contract conditions" an explicit statement of 
acceptance of the contract was not provided. The payment 
profiles also were not received but it was foreseen that 
significant negotiations would be necessary due to the 
customers limited availability of monies in the early 
years. There was some feeling in the panel that a fixed 
price contract was not the most appropriate price basis for 
the payload contractors in-house activities and a cost 
reimbursement type with a cost sharing arrangement as 
foreseen for the Prime, system level activities, was 
preferred. 
Note: This latter statement seems to reflect a doubt that 
the payload contractor could do the work, for the stated 
price; in later panels the technical capability of this 
contractor was also doubted and the interview with A) and 
B) clearly stated the primes opposition to this contractor. 
A number of serious open loops are apparent which at this 
stage of the contract seems unlikely to be a recipe for 
success! 
b) Planning and Cost Panel. 
The overall marks awarded averaged at about 50. Although 
this rather good mark was awarded the report noted that 
there were still many omissions and inconsistencies some 
which would have to be resolved as a matter of urgency in 
order to make possible the preparation of a formal 
contract. 
Note: This seems to be a major inconsistency! 
The major areas requiring immediate attention were stated 
to be the overall prices, the payment profile, and 
commitment to launch date. It was noted that the chairmen 
of the Technical panels gave a verbal briefing of their 
findings in particular highlighting where possible areas of 
weakness in design could lead to cost and/or schedule 
impact. 
Under the "credibility and acceptability of schedule and 
planning and the adequacy of supporting details" it was 
stated that the comparison of the required delivery dates 
and the current prediction was difficult to verify and the 
overall payload schedule was rather imprecise. A glib 
statement was given that the Prime recognised the 
inconsistencies and problem areas but expected confidently 
to launch in March 1986 following contract start in 
December (1981) . 
On the subject of task definitions it was apparently 
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satisfactory but there were a number of serious omissions 
and inconsistencies with lack of clarity in the equipment 
level hardware matrix e.g. whether there will only be 
provision of parts or completely integrated equipments. 
There was a wide discrepancy between the Prime and the 
payload contractor concerning the quality of the planning 
documentation; but the marking method obscured these 
problems! The chairman of the Mechanical panel drew 
attention to the criticality of the Structure model and the 
necessity to determine current status. 
Note: It seems extraordinary that this status was not 
known. 
The payment profile was incomplete and was incompatible 
with resources available from member states. 
Geographic distribution was not taken into account in the 
evaluation. 
In the cost breakdown the Prime stated they were not 
satisfied with the Payload contractors input; some of the 
major omissions being the subcontractors cost plans, parts 
costs analysis sheets, and facility costs. An attempt to 
correlate the detailed and summary cost sheets failed! The 
final comment in the report stated that in the time 
available the surface had only been scratched nevertheless 
providing the omissions and inconsistencies could be 
rectified in an appropriate timescale the panel judged the 
submission acceptable. 
Note: The above statements represent major platitudes that 
brands the report as rather meaningless; a major risk 
indicator. 
C) Product Assurance Panel 
The differences in the Bid submissions by the prime and the 
payload contractor were considered so great that two marks 
were given; one for the complete satellite and one for the 
payload. For a number of the criteria the payload received 
zero marks! 
The report indicates an inadequate management organisation, 
expertise and resources. It also indicates that a dynamic, 
well integrated and technically competent prime and sub. 
teams are necessary but the bid indicates that the converse 
is likely to occur. 
A number of previous show stoppers have been removed e.g. 
lack of fusing and derating policy, software controls etc. 
Technical requirements at the prime level were considered 
to be compliant but a software manual was considered 
mandatory to complete the definition and control compliance 
for software and firmware. 
A list of many areas requiring rectification was given 
which included FMECA of interfaces, failure propagation, 
configuration control of analyses and interfaces, etc. The 
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sub-contractor P.A. plans were substantially non~compliant 
with the prime having made very little progress ~n 
negotiations during the past four months. 
The report states that the bid could not be accepted or the 
phase C/D contract committed until the sub-contractor 
status was significantly improved. 
Under the "quality of analyses" criteria the bid was ranked 
as barely acceptable and totally unacceptable if the 
payload contractor was considered. It was noted that the 
payload contained a large number of unqualified, advanced 
technology parts; this constituted a high risk area of 
design definition, schedule and cost. It was also 
emphasised that no defined qualification existed at that 
point in time. 
Under "optimization of design" the bid was rated to be 
non-compliant. No system level trade-off was performed and 
many fundamental optimization tasks probably would not be 
done since they would now be overtaken by events. 
Under "suitability and adequacy of the development test 
plan" it was considered satisfactory but with unrealistic 
equipment operating temperatures in many areas; a major 
cause of concern with respect to technical risk. 
The bid was unacceptable in the area of "work task 
descriptions" with major omissions and inconsistencies. The 
definition of organigrams, personnel functions,task and 
responsibilities and methods of monitoring and control 
emphasized the general weakness of the prime in this area. 
d) Mechanical Subsystem Panel 
The panel considered the time available was inadequate and 
the report lists a number of significant issues that should 
be resolved before the start of phase C/D; including 
significant design changes required before the performance 
specification could be met. 
The structural analysis demonstrated that the mass and 
alignment budgets could not be met. Many analyses were 
obsolete and many interfaces incompatible. 
The structural and thermal sub-systems were considered 
non-compliant with the technical requirements of the RFQ. 
In spite of this major problem the bid was considered 
compliant concerning the understanding of the customers 
requirements and the analyses were also considered 
satisfactory; except in the thermal area. This latter 
non-compliance was very serious since thermal control is a 
particularly critical, and difficult, arae for space 
vehicles. Overall optimisation was satisfactory except in 
the thermal area. 
Note: Significant negative entropy problems exist. 
e) Attitude and Orbit Control System (AOCS) Panel. 
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The report begins with the statement that the AOeS was 
non-compliant concerning mass, power, outage, an~ 
reliability. Note: the latter were eventually maJor 
problems in orbit. 
It was also stated that "fine pointing" did not appear to 
be solvable with the current design baseline of solar 
arrays and thrusters but that mass and power requirements 
may be achievable when the detailed design phase was 
reached. 
Note: This is a very interesting comment since these two 
requirements usually become harder to achieve as the detail 
design proceeds. 
Testing of the failure detection and reconfiguration system 
was missing. Note: This was a major problem later on. 
There was also no adequate trade-off and recommendation of 
options of the AOeS closed loop performance and functional 
test and verification; including computer analysis and 
simulation with real hardware. 
Note: These issues became major problems during the 
programme and finally the system became so complex that 
only one or two people fully understood how it worked. 
In spite of the above problems the compliance with 
technical requirements, the correctness of interpretation 
of the requirements, the lower level sUb-system and 
equipment level requirements, and the quality, depth and 
consistency of the analyses were all considered to be 
generally acceptable. There were however important 
deficiencies in the analytical area. 
Note: Subjective elements are at work here. The 
"essentially compliant" reports were written due to higher 
level management attitudes developing a culture wherein 
career advancement became a function of the smoothness by 
which the ESA side of activities could proceed. 
f) Propulsion Panel. 
The propulsion sub-system(PSS), in general, received quite 
a good mark but there were many TBDs in the PSS 
specification and a number of serious problems were 
identified including plume impingement and no detailed 
qualification plan for equipments. 
g) Electrical Sub-System(ESS) Panel. 
In summary the ESS report contained a number of 
unsatisfactory features e.g. the absence of satisfactory 
power sub-system protection, payload distribution design, 
the absence of a complete proposal for the Telemetry and 
TeleCommand(TTC) sub-system, and the selection of an 
unacceptable contractor for the S-band transponder. Also 
Page 94 
the resources at the prime for the power, TT&C and harness 
sUb-systems were declared inadequate. Severe doubt ~s . 
raised in the report about the capability of the pr~me ~n 
the TT&C area. 
New technologies were identified including the On Board 
Data Handling Unit (OBDH) design. It was mentioned that a 
detailed evaluation of the resulting schedule risk from the 
above problems must be made. Also the refusal of the prime 
contract, which was also the TT&C sub-contractor, to fail 
to appoint a technical assistance contractor. 
Note: Surprisingly the marks were about 40 except that the 
"definition of tasks" was significantly down. The depth of 
analysis in TT & C was considered low and a cost 
reimbursement contract for the TT & C sub-system was 
rejected. Most of the work packages and task descriptions 
were missing! 
h) Payload Panel 
The payload was stated to be "not yet acceptable". It was 
stated that only after the planned Baseline Design 
Review (BDR) and the negotiations of major items leading to 
further descoping of the payload performance could an 
acceptable status be reached. This would thus enable the 
gap between requirements and the proposal to be closed; and 
allow clear commitments. For the overall payload low marks 
were given against each criteria. 
The following major points were identified. The very large 
reliability non-compliancies were ignored. Many technical 
aspects were not discussed. A short overall specification, 
only, existed. the overall layout and design were not 
optimised; particularly for thermal and OBDH interfaces and 
utilization. 
Practically no analysis was provided. 
From the task descriptions and planning aspects there was 
low confidence and a disproportion existed between the 
manpower available and the cost proposals. Major 
non-conformances existed for practically all technical 
outputs. 
i) Assembly, Integration and Test Panel 
No significant problems were identified in any area except 
for the aspect of software task descriptions. 
j) System Level Panel 
Surprisingly this panel considered that the proposal 
reflected a sound basis for the start of phase C/D even 
though the sub-system inputs did not fully reflect the 
system definition. New mass budgets were presented but no 
attempt was made to justify the changes and the data 
~resented in the system budgets was not supported by data 
~n the sUb-system level documentation. Similar comments 
applied to the system pointing budgets and the thermal 
budgets. 
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The report was written in rather a politic~lly accept~ble 
manner. The general statements seem to ind1cate co~pl1ance 
but detailed review revealed major problems that d1d not 
support the top level statement. 
5.2.2.3.6.3 Technical Evaluation Board(TEB. 
The TEB report was compiled after panel report summaries 
had been presented to the TEB. 
The conclusion of the TEB was that the proposal was not yet 
acceptable but it was capable of being rendered acceptable 
and would require about three months for that process. 
Also that the BDR should be delayed although a preliminary 
session should be maintained. 
The TEB stated that the normal outcome of the present 
situation would be an extension of the bridging phase but 
if for programmatic or other reasons a decision was taken 
by the project management to start phase C/D activities 
then the TEB recommended three steps. 
Note: This statement of course opened the door to project 
management to start phase C/D; once it was started it would 
be practically impossible to stop. A mass of open loops 
clearly exist and yet the top evaluation authority 
essentially gives the go-ahead! 
The three steps were: 
1) to hold a review meeting at the end of the bridging 
phase to review the list of problems; 
2) continue negotiations on the contract during the 
following month i.e. in parallel with the above 
meeting, in order to finalise as many areas as 
possible prior to the start of phase C/D. 
3) give an initial limited release for phase C/D 
sufficient only to maintain the validity of the offer 
in terms of price and schedule and to furnish the 
means for further work to resolve the above problems. 
The TEB further considered that special measures were 
necessary to deal with the payload contractor manpower and 
organisation and recommended that top level customer, prime 
and payload contractor meetings take place to ensure 
implementation of those extra measures. 
The payload contractor also to be informed that its role at 
the overall payload level could be descoped. Also there 
should be introduced a strong customer, and prime, presence 
at the payload contractors site to ensure close 
supervision. 
Note: This is very interesting since it shows the customer 
positioning itself above the prime contractor over the main 
co-contractor; the main contract was between the prime and 
the customer only. This payload contractor was selected by 
the customer under the geographic distribution rules. 
Following this selection the prime forced additional cost 
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plus contractual coverage on the customer i.e. some fixed 
price areas were eliminated. 
Finally, the payload contractor was obliged to accept a 
cost reimbursement with ceiling price arrangement, thus 
forcing cost and manpower reporting, with a view to 
subsequent conversion to a cost sharing or fixed price 
agreement. 
5.2.2.3.7 The Project Progress Reports. 
This section relates to the PPRs supplied to ESA during the 
project. 
As with project B the reports are mainly a collection of 
problems which currently beset the project. There is no 
classification nor grading of the problems and the only 
indication of impact is the effect on schedule. However the 
reasoning behind schedule impact is not given. In the 
Product Assurance(PA) area, which is where risk would 
normally be considered, the report is very complacent. The 
PA report is limited to statements of status with 
practically no interpretation of the impact. For example, 
"an audit was carried out" and "a reliability analysis has 
been completed" etc. The result of the audit and 
reliability analysis are not given; hence possible risk or 
problem areas are not exposed. 
As mentioned by the ESA manager in the interview, the most 
useful information to ESA was gleaned at sub contractor 
meetings; where ESA had observer status only but 
nevertheless often intervened, usually indirectly, see 
annex 2. 
A number of examples exist demonstrating the 
unpredictability of project life. For example, "In spite of 
uncertainties in other areas it is clear that the Special 
Services payload needs improving. The related antenna farm 
testing is constrained by the APME delivery which is held 
by industrial action at company X." 
The reports are notorious concerning the lack of 
interpretation of the consequences of the presented status; 
in the short and long term.A recommendation, of this 
thesis, is that Risk Identification, Assessment and 
Management are introduced as continuous functions in the 
project management role. This is covered by dynamic risk 
indicators in the model; see section 6.8. 
Technical problems are discussed extensively in many areas 
with finally a conclusion of the effect on schedule. The 
methods used to arrive at these results are usually very 
subjective and for their effectiveness depend on the 
alertness, experience, knowledge, memory and communication 
abilities of a few involved persons i.e. project supports, 
see section 7.6. A methodical approach using established 
principles is not used and "apparently small" issues can 
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escape attention simply due to lack of understanding. 
An example of this latter point concerns "software". Many 
engineers and managers do not understand the potential for 
error in software, nor the difficulties involved in its 
validation. In this project, software problems were being 
briefly listed, but were ignored due to other more 
important problems, even in the early years. Some years 
later software problems "suddenly erupted" and caused very 
large cost and schedule overruns. The early risk indicators 
could have reduced the seriousness of the eventual 
consequences. 
This is an example of turbulence developing unnoticed even 
though many sUb-systems relied on software functioning 
correctly. Hence the bifurcation possibilities were 
documented. 
5.2.2.3.7.1 Comments. 
Unless the reader was very well informed it was impossible 
to judge the importance of the "statements of doubt" in the 
PPRs. Even for the informed reader, the relative risk of 
this or that problem was not indicated. In fact the PPR 
almost seems to be an invitation to the customer to ask 
certain questions, in certain pre-selected areas, where the 
contractor probably has an answer "on hold". This is of 
course a rather cynical statement. It is probable that the 
contractor does not use this as a deliberate tactical ploy 
but rather adopts this style of behaviour because it has 
typically "always been done like that." Having made this 
"disclaimer" the author has known project managers who have 
always done their best to delude or confuse the customer to 
cover up their own intentions or errors .... or insecurities. 
Such project managers have also had the tendency to 
restrict, or share, information with their own project 
management! This indicates the need for an intervention 
mechanism based on independently supplied information. The 
QER contains practically no information concerning risk; it 
having been specially prepared for "unlimited distribution" 
and particularly to possible future customers. Hence 
corporate reliance on such a report as an input to another 
strategic plan would probably be a waste of time. 
It is clear from the above and the interview inputs that a 
more rigorous method of reporting is required. The orbit 
problems of project C were extensive and can, in hindsight 
it is true, be traced to brief references in the reports, 
which were not prioritised concerning their possible 
consequences. 
It is recommended that the risk indicators, which have been 
defined as part of this research, are constructed in the 
form of trees(see Fig.O) for the ITT, the Bid, and for the 
duration of the project. The trees, which could be analyzed 
using a Fault Tree Approach(see Fig.OO), should be based 
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spacecraft functions such as guidance, 
navigation; 
interfacing hardware and software; 
contractually linked companies, with their 
products; 
financial aspects; essentially penalties & 
incentives. 
Each risk indicator node should also be identified 
according to: 
its location in an open loop system; 
whether it has multiple interfaces, with 
other equipments for example; 
its consequences on the spacecraft mission, 
finances, schedule; 
the resources required to reduce or contain 
it. 
As a final note in this conclusion the following statement 
is reproduced from the Bid volume entitled the "System 
Design and Development Plan": 
"The elements of the trade-off involve Risk/Cost/Schedule 
implications. The schedule element is in itself complex; 
involving design/development feedback, the availability of 
parts, manufactured and developed items, the phasing of the 
study/design portion of the programme. In the more 
qualitative/ quantitative areas of risk/cost, the 
considerations of risk may be analyzed by converting the 
implications of "failure" or "what ifs" into schedule 
extension costs which can then be compared with the cost 
differences between the models, model standards, apparent 
schedule savings and the advantages which could be gained 
on follow-on commercial satellites." 
It can thus be seen that there was, at least by the writer 
of this particular statement, an awareness of the need to 
assess risk. The problem is that the risk analysis was 
never done! 
5.2.2.3.8 Conclusions 
The analysis of the project documentation for projects B 
and C indicates a continuum of open loop situations, a 
serious lack of adequate information commencing from the 
bid submission, and perceptual issues that effectively 
:esulted in the first two issues being camouflaged and then 
~gnored. It could thus be predicted that the organisational 
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orderliness would decrease i.e. inadequate negative entropy 
injected, and turbulent conditions would develop. 
The reporting system addressed the project conditions as if 
they were static; no method existed to report or probe the 
multi-dimensioned dynamic situations. In this seriously 
undefined, non-linear and complex condition, margins were 
still applied as if linear, incremental conditions existed! 
This research has emphasized the prime importance, in the 
identification and management of risk, of the project 
supports; the latter being managers and engineers who were 
perceived to be "very competent, trustworthy and 
supportive" to their immediate superiors. The documentation 
review reveals that the contract was commenced with a 
significant absence of project supports in several critical 
project areas e.g. the payload contractor. 
It is clear that the intervention (review) system did not 
function in a strategically protective manner; if at all! 
Many of the problems identified during the Bid evaluation 
later caused cost and delivery problems during the 
procurement phases and then problems in orbit. These 
problems became strategic since they effected the 
availability of resources for, and the planning of, other 
space vehicle systems and the implementation of space 
vehicle dependent services i.e. telecommunications. 
Effective intervention would have avoided those strategic 
changes. 
5.2.3 Analysis of Interviews. 
5.2.3.1 General. 
Eight interviews were carried out to support this research. 
They covered Corporate and Project managers from the prime 
contractors of projects A, B, and C, and Project, System 
and Project Control managers from the customer i.e. ESA. 
The detailed interview notes are contained in annex 6. 
Analyses of the interviews, based on the main elements 
developed from this research, are given below. The 
following analyses contain the authors comments from 
experience on all the projects concerned; such comments are 
provided as "Notes. 
5.2.3.2 Prtme Contractor Corporate lanaqer for Projects 
A,B,i C. 
a) lxperience - Perception Profile. 
This manager has a background of a degree in physics and 
moved into corporate management from head of a "Systems 
Dynamics" department. A generally analytical attitude 
prevailed with a good knowledge of how engineers ordered 
their priorities. This resulted in a bias towards the view 
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that technical problems, for the engineers and their 
immediate managers, were very predominantly more important 
than cost and schedule. A fundamental problem was thus 
construed as that of ensuring the accountability of the 
engineering responsible. 
A clear perception was that if the customer directs a 
company then it assumes financial responsibility. 
b) Strategy. 
Macro strategy was established by following the strategy 
adopted by ESA and then bidding for the relevant 
programmes. Short term strategy, for example at the project 
level, was dominated by the conviction that ESA would 
assist industry if major problems occurred; to the extent 
of preventing the escalation threat to the programme or to 
the industrials concerned. By complying with the ESA formal 
and informal modus operand an ambience of security was 
established. As stated very clearly by a number of 
interviewees this was not enhancing the competitive 
abilities of European industry in the international 
marketplace. 
Note: The result seems to have been that this industry did 
not establish its own strategic plans but did decide the 
strategic objective of working compliantly, and passively, 
with ESA in order to establish a relatively risk free 
profit; and build up of a large, experienced workforce. 
The European consortia followed the ESA lead and met the 
available budgets, and budget profiles, often by 
implementing company and consortia investments; contractual 
clauses covered the recoverability of these investments. 
At the project manager level there was no awareness of a 
company strategic plan; this statement was made in the 
interview covered in a para.S.2.3.3 
C) Intervention. 
Within the project it was noted that the fact that the 
corporate manager involved himself in project meetings, 
rather than just behaving as an observer, was perceived by 
the project management staff as intervention and the 
assumption of responsibility; thus relieving them of their 
responsibility. 
Note: The overall responsibility thus devolved to the 
corporate manager and, due to the continuous intervention 
by ESA, to ESA. 
d) IDvironment. 
The environment was considered to be international and 
dynamic; with the main inputs coming from discussions with 
people in key positions. 
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e) Risk. 
Risk analysis, with options and contingencies, was not 
carried out. 
The main risk was considered to be technical. This aspect 
of the work completely eclipsed cost and schedule elements; 
optimisation rarely included the latter. The technique of 
negotiating a "bogey" price, with no clear definition of 
the risk thus being incurred, would not be feasible in the 
open market. 
It is very interesting that risk with the co-contractors 
was, attempted to be, avoided by placing fixed price 
contracts; particularly where the contractor was involved 
in advanced technology. Of course, the same ESA "soft" 
contract conditions also applied, eventually, to the 
contractor so the risk was also probably perceived to be 
small. This latter point is very clear in the interview 
covered in para.5.2.3.5 where ESA actually employed high 
level experts to work for a contractor in order to "save 
the programme". 
This manager believed in applying hard pressure to lower 
level managers to "put them on the spot" reference being 
responsible for the risk in their areas. (An interesting 
perceptual difference is that from the view of the lower 
level managers this aspect was not "hard"; see 
para.5.2.3.3) . 
f) Risk Indicators. 
These were clearly stated as the ESA requirements and 
milestones. Cost, and cash flow, were also considered as 
elements to be given careful attention. 
g) Open loops. 
The defined concept of open loops had not been used but, 
after it had been explained by this author, it was stated 
that attempts were made to have as few as possible between 
the customer and the contractor; where they existed time 
and material contracts were sought. 
When significant, unpredicted problems occurred massive 
resources were poured into the project to maintain 
milestones. 
Rate: It will be recalled that these milestones were 
defined by ESA and constituted payment points. As far as 
the industrial project was concerned the strategic value of 
the milestones was not established. The effect on the 
overall risk of the project of applying massive resources 
to problems as they occurred was not known and usually not 
significantly discussed. The organisation was not 
particularly designed for these concentrated efforts; 
lateral negative effects were often considerable. 
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h) Incremental Approach. 
The financial analysis was incremental such that previous 
project costs were considered and independent assessors 
were used to gauge the realism of the extrapolations being 
made. 
Note: It has never been clear how the differences between 
succeeding projects were defined from the risk-cost aspect. 
i) Critical Supports. 
For all the interviews these were stated to be a few 
trusted colleagues in key positions. 
j) Margins. 
Nothing was stated of substance regarding the criteria used 
to originally define margins nor their monitoring during 
the project. The concept, from this research, of relating 
margins with resources was received with enthusiasm. 
k) Soft and Hard Aspects. 
Major problems between project and line department staff: 
on the same issues disagreements could occur due only to 
territorial and organisational problems with no technical 
basis. 
Note: Another example of significant behavioural impact. 
1) Living Systems. 
Organisations are like families. 
5.2.3.3 Prime Contractor Project Manager for Project B and 
Project C. 
a) Experience - Perception Profile. 
The background of this manager is a degree in mechanical 
engineering, the attendance of a two year management 
course, part time, and movement to project management via 
technical engineering positions. As with the interviewee in 
para.5.3.3.4 the management course had a major effect. A 
belief is held that management must be an analytical 
process involving team work, sharing of information, and 
involving intuition. 
The interviewee is now a Managing Director of a medium 
sized microwave electronics company; involved in the Space 
business in the open international market. This interview 
primarily addressed the project Band C experience. 
b) Strategy. 
There was no awareness of a company nor ESA strategic plan. 
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Now, in the international business domain, a strategic 
plan, for five years with annual updates, is maintained. 
Contingency planning, in the event of problems, are 
prepared. Research and development investment is driven 
from the strategic plan. 
For research activities the feedback loop reference 
financial return from investments is probably of the order 
of 5 to 10 years. 
c) Intervention. 
In general defined as necessary when an area is detected as 
diverging from an expected situation; the problem was often 
because something was not happening. Organisational inertia 
can cause the right questions not to be asked. 
Note: A similar comment appears in the state of knowledge 
review concerning the brain not asking the right questions. 
Continuous assessment of managerial performance is 
necessary. 
ESA decided the direction of ESA programmes was practically 
immoveable once that decision had been made. 
Note: This constituted a passive or psychological 
intervention since it effectively blocked the contractors 
ability to "do something else". 
The industrial company often gives up trying to achieve the 
best technical solution or contractor selection due to ESA 
politics. 
Technical risk can be assessed more accurately and in more 
detail at the lower levels. 
Note: Bifurcation aspect!. 
d) Enviromnent. 
The environment is perceived to be something that has to 
built and maintained current concerning its information 
content; the local and world wide situation needs to be 
taken into account. 
e) Risk. 
Financial and schedule matters were very secondary to 
technical aspects in the Bid preparation work. Putting 
lower level managers "on the spot" to make them accountable 
for the risk in their areas was very soft. For the "correct 
information" on a situation it is necessary to have 
"eye-to-eye" meetings; this can be culturally sensitive 
e.g. it is difficult between Swedish and Italians. 
Risk must be addressed at the start of a programme and 
consists in general of: 
- things which are undefined; 
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- things which have not been done by the company before; 
- things for which the output is not sure. 
The above three points constitute open loops. 
The expert that is known to have previously produced good 
results is trusted. 
The initial assessment of resources required must be from a 
bottom up detailed analysis. 
f) Risk Indicators. 
Schedule lateness is more serious than slight technical 
deficiencies; waivers are usually possible for the latter. 
g) Open Loops. 
See e) above. 
h) Incremental Approach. 
This approach is growth limiting; an entrepreneurial jump 
is necessary for significant growth but the jump must have 
a solid basis; information for the latter may come from 
another company. 
The most efficient research is done under pressure; for 
example of meeting a commercial deadline. 
i) Critical Supports. 
The following critical supports were identified: 
people; the quality of the people are the main 
resource of the company; 
attention to detail; 
balance between managerial control and freedom for 
innovation. 
j) Margins. 
Usually defined from experience and rules of thumb. 
k) Soft and Bard Aspects. 
No specific comment but the cultural perceptions in a) 
above relate. 
1) Living Systems. 
No comments. 
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m) Culture. 
Germany and Sweden are perceived to be tough negotiators 
but then to work well. With Italy the negotiations are 
fairly easy but then there are constant questions. 
It is considered that individual grow into the company 
culture; in fact they have to if they wish to make 
progress. A large company may have many cultures and a 
local culture can be formed by an individual. The culture 
can be a strong driving force within the company. There is 
more fear in large organisations. 
5.2.3.4 Customer Project Manager for Project B. and Systems 
MaDager for Project C. 
a) Experience - Perception profile. 
This manager had a degree in physics and moved into project 
management via hands-on design activities and lower level 
management tasks. A major element was the attendance of a 
management course, of two years duration, part time. This 
experience introduced management techniques and behavioural 
aspects which were then applied in the industrial 
situation. ESAs role was perceived to be that of accepting, 
or not, the contractors status as presented at reviews. 
ESA personnel perceive that they are better than their 
industrial counterparts; in many cases this is not the 
case. Also many ESA personnel do not appreciate that 
industries fundamental aim is to make a profit. These 
perceptions must be changed. 
Note: They constitute a risk indicators. 
The ESA -industry relationship deteriorated during the 
project possibly due to increasing scarcity of resources 
due to massive resources being expended on early problems 
and associated management problems. 
b) Strategy. 
The interviewee had experienced the over-specification of 
requirements and involvement by ESA, both as a member of 
industry and of ESA. As a strategic measure he attempted to 
correct this aspect for this project and introduced a 
"System Performance Specification" which contained all the 
spacecraft parameters that were applicable to the 
contractor and which would be monitored by ESA. This 
specification is now used on many ESA projects but the 
over-involvement of ESA continued. 
The number of ESA reviews was reduced. 
c) Intervention. 
No direct interventions by ESA corporate management on the 
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ESA project team recalled. 
Italian corporate intervention seemed to be significant. 
The ESA intervention was often of the form of saying to the 
contractor "if you do so-and so then ESA will oppose you at 
the next major review and it will then cost YOU a great 
deal of money to change back". This usually had the effect 
of establishing the ESA position. 
d) Environment. 
The environment was not competitive. The prime contractor 
bid for a price but they previously knew how much money was 
available from ESA. The current situation with ESA 
supplying the launch vehicle (note: there is no reason why 
this could not be negotiated by industry) and the political 
domination of ESA means that it is not possible for 
ESA-industry contracts to emulate the open marketplace. 
The main sources of information were the ESA engineers who 
attended contractor meetings and industrial visits; not the 
formal reports from the prime contractor. 
e) Risk. 
Only during the Bid evaluation were the resources 
considered; they were not monitored during the project. 
Great dependence was placed on the contractor BID statement 
that he would "put adequate resources on the project". 
The judgement of risk was carried out using experts with 
this manager making the final decision. An expert with whom 
the manager had previous experience or knowledge was 
trusted more. 
A significant contributor to the lateness of the project 
was that a number of ESA requirements, having a major 
impact on the design, were changed after the project 
started. The contractor then claimed that all schedule 
delays and cost overruns were due to these changes. ESA 
thus accommodated the contractors risk and inefficiencies. 
The assessment of the validity of an industrial situation 
when presented is very difficult. There is a heavy reliance 
on experts. 
f) Risk Indicators. 
The imposition of several contractors on the prime by ESA, 
due to delayed budgetary release, by ESA, resulted in the 
prime coming to ESA for financial assistance very often for 
those particular contractors. For the contractors selected 
by the prime this rarely occurred. 
Changing of personnel was considered to be risk increasing. 
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Weak penalty clauses in ESA contracts were considered to be 
a major source of risk; more severe contracts poaching good 
people from ESA contracts, and so on. 
Note: Risk indicators was a new concept to this interviewee 
who preferred the terminology lIunforeseen problem area ll ; 
even so the principles were not applied. 
g) Open Loops. 
They were not addressed as such on this project. 
h) Incremental Approach. 
This manager believed in this concept. 
i) Critical Supports. 
Key people were considered to be critical supports. 
j) Margins. 
They were defined based on experience and were often larger 
than necessary to provide additional protection for the 
prime. 
Note: Margins-on-margins was a problem and on project A 
required a dedicated effort to a) determine exactly what 
margins were being used and where, and b) to establish and 
implement an overall margin policy. The margins-on-margins 
approach was actually increasing risk because design 
envelopes became too tight. 
Resources per margin was never considered. 
k) Soft and Bard Aspects. 
Both hard and soft aspects were considered to be based on 
experience. Examples given related to the solution of 
project technical problems, where there is a dependency on 
expert judgement, and to the selection of staff. 
1) Living Systems. 
No comment was forthcoming on this aspect. 
m) Culture 
He perceived clear cultural characteristics. Italians would 
need extra support and their industrial stability was low. 
The French were politically difficult but technically 
sound. The Swedish and Germans were difficult negotiators 
but hen good workers and straight forward. 
5.2.3.5 Customer Project lanaser for Project C. 
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a) Experience - Perception Profile. 
The background of the interviewee was a degree in physics, 
industrial experience in the European space industry at the 
design and management levels and corporate management 
experience with an American company in the Service 
industry. 
The interviewee initially stated that the ESA(customer) 
project manager must have at least the experience and 
qualification of his industrial counterpart; otherwise 
serious errors of judgement could be made by ESA and 
respect, as well as money and schedule, will be lost. 
Mutual respect is one of the most important aspects of 
management. It is vital that an engineer or manager has 
actually had hardware experience. 
b) Strategy. 
At the Bid phase the resources must be very carefully 
checked; this will require visits and discussions with 
contractors. The strategic situation seems to be that 
industry expects ESA to help them if they get into trouble 
and ESA accepts that role by establishing large monitoring 
teams per project; and maintaining them current on all 
aspects of the project. 
c) Intervention. 
ESA frequently does the job of the contractor, often due to 
its political responsibilities. This intervention, which 
can be regarded as training, has improved the efficiency of 
some companies. 
The corporate management should be ready and available to 
intervene at the request, and only at the request, of the 
project manager. When the ESA project manager wishes to 
intervene in the industrial business it must be via the 
industrial project manager. 
ESA imposed external managers on the payload contractor 
into the key positions; this probably saved the project. 
d) Rnvirozmaent. 
This interviewee considered his environment to be very 
general but primarily management; the latter aspect 
dominated his reading selection and assessment of general 
situations. This appreciation was the result of his 
experience . 
• ) Risk 
P~RT can be useful for overseeing the project but it is 
d1fficult to maintain it current due to the vast amount of 
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input data update required. The only really reliable way to 
assess the realism of resource allocation is to visit the 
companies concerned and spend time understanding the 
problems and their situation. 
The future is unpredictable. 
A team of very competent engineers that can be moved to the 
problem area very quickly is required if risk containment 
is to succeed. 
Some areas are predictable from the point of view of being 
"almost certain to give problems". Advanced technology is 
such an area and on this project most of the eventual 
technical problems were identified at the start of the 
project. The reason there was so much delay and overspend 
on this project is that after the payload problems were 
solved, by ESA inserting some high level managers from the 
U.S.A. into critical management positions at the payload 
contractor, serious problems at the prime contractor 
suddenly became apparent. The payload situation initially 
obscured the prime contractor problems. 
In some of the high technology areas ESA placed back-up 
contracts because,at a certain time, failure seemed 
certain. 
Note: This degenerating situation is clear from the daily 
records analysis; see para.5.2.5. 
f) Risk Indicators. 
Lack of experience is a major risk indicator; such persons 
would have to be monitored very thoroughly. This aspect 
could be detected initially by interview and Curriculum 
vitae perusal. All key people must be known. 
Most technical problems are identifiable at the 
commencement of a project. Its very difficult to estimate 
if the resources are adequate; company visits are the only 
way. 
Company maturity and maintaining the key persons in post, 
not permitting the company to move them to another project, 
is fundamental to the control of risk. 
g) Open Loops. 
There were only very short periods when the project 
environment was in a steady state. Most of the time there 
were problems here and there; when one was solved another 
would arise. Major crises did develop and there was one 
particularly major crises(chaos!) when the prime contractor 
declared things were too complex to understand and control 
and ESA was asked to assist. 
Notes This was a requested intervention due to a 
crisis (chaos?) !. 
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The cycle time from the project being reasonably tranquil 
to approaching, and reaching crisis conditions, was very 
short. This tended to be the case for most areas; even 
those that were originally thought to be benign. 
The theory that problems start at a low level and emanate, 
or branch away, from that point is supported by the 
experience on this project. 
Using PERT charts it would not be possible to identify open 
loops; there is also the problem that they are permanently 
obsolete due to the data, manpower and time needed to 
update them. 
h) Incremental Approach. 
Not specifically commented. 
i) Critical Supports. 
Very definitely stated to be experienced persons. 
j) Margins. 
Margins were not used in a linear fashion; they were based 
on experience. The margins can only really be assessed for 
their true value when hardware is being built. The margins 
are actually only monitorable in steps; for example, after 
initial build, qualification, engineering model. 
k) Soft and Bard Aspects. 
The aspect of mutual respect is very important; experience 
is the main attribute by which respect is judged. 
1) Living Systems. 
No comment on this point. 
5.2.3.6. Customer Proiect Control Managers for Proiects B 
aDd C. 
This analysis considers the inputs from four project 
control managers. The classification of the information is 
different since these managers are not involved in decision 
making but provide a service to the project managers and 
engineers. They are intimately involved in the analysis of 
schedules and resources. 
a) Strategy. 
Large companies can be run by a few, very detached 
executive e.g. Brown Boveri from a small Swiss town. 
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Planning provides a static envelope of time and resources. 
b) Risk. 
The planning documents do not indicate risk, they do not 
adequately cover resources, and open loops are not apparent 
and are not addressed. 
Many phase C - D contracts are started based on underpriced 
bids; this is generally realised but insufficient detail 
prevents substantial comment. There is often the intention 
to look at the details later but this is rarely done. 
The Bid documentation does not permit correlation of 
schedule and cost; nor consideration of technical impacts. 
Many Bid evaluations are restricted to Master Bar charts 
and sub-system reviews; this is insufficient. 
Many phase C - D problems are caused by lack of completion 
of phase B. 
Many problems are due to top level specifications being 
incomplete; particularly from the customer. 
c) Intervention. 
To much intervention can cause crises to continue; detailed 
intervention is counterproductive. 
The responsibility of the prime is reduced by constant ESA 
involvement 
d) Critical Supports. 
The tendency is to introduce many young people into 
projects. This results in freer thinking but loss of 
experience; this is proving expensive and very demanding on 
the time of the experienced staff. 
e) Turbulence. 
There does seem to be a pattern relating to the evolution 
of problems resembling some sort of transition from a 
relatively steady states to a crises. 
f) Margins. 
They are popular because they are simple and therefore 
everyone thinks they understands them; they are rarely 
communicated with respect to risk. 
g) Perception. 
Different cultural aspects are very important e.g. Germans 
manage differently than Italians. 
Fixed price contracts impose large pressures on the company 
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internally. 
A lessons-learned culture is essential. 
h) Risk Indicators. 
Planners must be technically qualified; they are usually 
detached from the engineers which generates risk. 
Very few project management tools are capable of 
integrating cost and schedule. 
A major risk indicator is that the project personnel are 
too far from the hardware and testing action. 
Payloads, historically, tend to be more risky. 
The rate of disappearance of project slack could be a good 
risk indicator. 
The monitoring of invoices sent to the customer, at all 
levels, is a good risk indicator. 
The superimposition of manpower and cost on PERT charts 
would be very useful. 
5.2.3.6 Conclusions. 
The interview comments represent various perceptions of the 
project conditions. These have very good agreement with 
relevant conclusions from the documentation analysis. 
It is interesting to note that in general the comments of 
the managers did not seem to be customer or contractor 
dependent. 
Financial, including schedule, risk was willingly shared or 
passed, and often unknowingly or unwittingly taken, from 
one level to the next even if loss of authority and 
responsibility resulted. Examples are corporate management 
involvement, rather than observation, in middle management 
meetings and customer involvement in contractor meetings. 
This usually resulted in more delays and expense since the 
information base and key persons influences often 
disadvantageously changed. 
Strategic planning was almost totally absent but one 
manager did consider the limitation of customer involvement 
in the contractors business as a strategic issue. 
Perception was a major issue. For example good data was 
considered to be only possible by "eye-to-eye" discussions 
with the involved parties. Also, the "hardness" of a 
particular managers approach from his perception, and that 
of his staff, were often very different. Another example 
was the decision not to monitor resource spending but to 
"rely on the contractors statement in the bid that he would 
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make adequate resources available". 
The environment was considered to be dynamic, defined by 
the information known at a particular time which had to 
built and maintained, and to contain clear cultural 
characteristics. 
Risk indicators were considered to be: 
- lack of experience; 
- the need to visit companies to make assessments; 
- maintaining key people in post; 
planners who did not understand engineering 
- successful projects dependency on phase B; 
- planners being too far from the hardware; 
- the rate of disappearance of schedule slack; 
- the rate of reception of invoices and non-conformances; 
- weak customer penalty clauses. 
Open loop situations were only contracted on a "time and 
material" basis but planning generally only indicated 
static envelopes and not risk. Advanced technology was 
considered in this area. It was also stated that major 
problems could obscure other developing problems which then 
became visible when the "smoke cleared" from the big 
problem. 
There was usually a lack of detail when needed and lack of 
time to properly evaluate when the data became available; 
this is supported from the documentation review. 
It was considered that relatively steady state, turbulent, 
and crisis, conditions did exist but that the steady state 
conditions were usually very short. 
The definition of margins was generally considered to be by 
"rule of thumb" and they were thought to be popular because 
they were simple even though not fully understood; 
applicability only during the hardware phase was mentioned 
once, to try to limit the non-linear problems. 
The future was considered to be unpredictable. 
5.2.4 Project Ground and Orbit Failures Analysis. 
5.2.4.1 General. 
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The objective of this analysis was to identify if, and to 
what extent, actual failures related to such aspects as 
inadequate risk definition, risk indicators, the 
propagation of problems etc. This would then give an 
indication of the criticality potential of the those 
aspects when they were detected during a programme; for 
example, during a review of Bid documentation. 
This analysis was carried using a database conceived and 
designed by the author but not implemented by him. The 
database utilises RBASE and a front end software package 
that enables 2- and 3-dimensional histograms to 
constructed, according to the choice of the analyst, of the 
main parametric classifications. 
The data covers the period 1981 to 1991 and includes a high 
percentage of all the published information concerning 
Failures, Non-Conformances and Accidents (FANCS) that 
occurred on space vehicles during ground testing and launch 
to, and operation in, orbit during that time frame; FANCs 
are referred as "problems" for the remainder of this 
chapter. Hence the data covers space vehicles world wide, 
not just European.It is considered that there are 
significant common aspects to data appertaining to space 
vehicles designed and built by different procurement 
organisations. One reason for this is that many 
qualification and management methods originated in the 
USA (NASA) ; another is that much of the technology is 
similar with annual seminars world wide to disseminate 
results and discuss problems. Yet another reason is that 
many customers use similar ITTs and methods of evaluating 
bids; see chapter 4. 
A total of approximately 900 data points, or problems, were 
collected and classified ~n the database. Histograms of the 
parameter combinations used in this thesis are contained in 
annex 7. 
5.2.4.2 Analysis. 
Certain groupings of "causes of problems", and 
"interpretations of events" in terms of the concepts 
introduced in this thesis form the basis of this analysis. 
These grouping and interpretations are now presented; the 
numbers in parenthesis refer to the number of problems. 
a) Risk. 
Programme risk not properly understood or adequately 
quantified(22) . 
30 propulsion sub-system(s/s) problems caused direct 
loss; 
3S propulsion sIs problems caused mission loss; 
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10 system engineering level problems caused mission 
loss; 
5 mechanical and structure sis problems caused mission 
loss. 
b) Open loop aspects. 
undetected/ ignored quality trends e.g. parts (10) ; 
qualification invalidated (32) ; 
inadequate failure mode consideration (47) ; 
design margin violations(13); 
inability to test or simulate (3) ; 
failure scenarios poorly understood (5) . 
c) Propagation of failure effects (bifurcations) . 
problem effects spread to the next level (130) ; 
(component to equipment level) 
problem effects spread two levels (260) ; 
(component to sub-system level) 
problem effects spread three levels(190); 
(component to system level) . 
d) Propagation of failure effects by sub-system{risk 
indicators and bifurcations) • 
- propulsion sis; 
- one level (38) ; 
- two levels (46); 
- three levels (50) . 
on board data processing sis; 
- one level (10) ; 
- two levels (15); 
- three levels (10) . 
mechanical and structure sis; 
- one level (13) ; 
- two levels (16); 
- three levels (18) . 
attitude and orbit control sIs; 
- two levels (10); 
- three levels (17) ; 
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power s/s; 
- two levels (13); 
- three levels (14) . 
e) Problems which could have been prevented with improved 
practices (perception; open loops, soft issues). 
propulsion s/s{llO); 
mechanical and structure s/s(35); 
on board data handling s/s(30); 
attitude and orbit control s/s(20); 
power s/s{lO) . 
f) Problems per technology or equipment type. 
(risk indicators). 
propulsion s/s(220); 
mechanical and structure s/s(70); 
valves/ leaks (62) ; 
on board data handling s/s(60); 
attitude and orbit control s/s(52); 
power s/s(45); 
software (27) ; 
deployment (25) i 
turbopumps (23) i 
gyros(9) . 
g) Interface failures. 
(trajectories; risk indicators). 
between project phases (7) ; 
between equipment and sub-systems (11) ; 
between SUb-systems and system(7) . 
5.2.4.3. Conclusions. 
The risk has been defined in the very pragmatic terms of 
loss of space vehicle, the mission, and money. The mission 
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is what the space vehicle and the crew have to do in the 
operational domain. 
Also, specific open loop causes have been identified with 
respect to space vehicles. A similar exercise concerning 
the products from any other organisation i.e. not concerned 
with Space, should reveal particular causes of open loops. 
The progressive interactive effects of failures which 
originated at the lowest detectable level i.e. the space 
vehicle equipment, are clearly shown as impacting the two 
"higher" levels of sub-system and system. These are 
submitted as examples of "bifurcation". These effects are 
taking place within a designed hardware and software system 
with minimal human interface; the problems being addressed 
therefore relate primarily to "hard" aspects. 
The value of this exercise is that the results indicate 
that particular sub-systems, and particular interfaces, are 
more prone than others to cause higher level failure 
effects; they should therefore be considered in the a 
priori definition of risk indicators. 
5.2.5 Analysis of Daily Records. 
5.2.5.1 General. 
The daily records of the author covering the period 1973 to 
the present and containing details of all meetings, 
problems, investigations etc. in which the author was 
involved have been analyzed. This analysis required the 
consideration of the interview, documentation and in-or~it 
results and hence this section contains a final, collective 
analysis of all data. 
It is emphasised that these analyses are based only on 
actual, -real project-, data. 
The above period was spent at ESA and during that period 
the authors work moved from engineering design to 
management of a technical division; project management 
activities took place en route. The author has been 
directly and heavily involved in projects A, B, C, and D. 
The objectives of the analyses were to; 
1) search for dynamic risk indicators, and, 
2) try to identify a pattern(s) or structure(s) which 
would enable an intervenor to function in a 
preventative manner concerning the degradation of 
strategic objectives. 
It is submitted that significant contributions have been 
made towards the achievement of both objectives. 
5.2.5.1.1 Dynamic Risk Indicators 
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As mentioned earlier a project is considered to consist of 
a number of linear and non-linear activities which 
respectively form closed and open loop systems; 
interactions can be numerous and complex. These activities 
constitute the flows which course through the project and 
which establish its dynamic nature. The function of a 
dynamic risk indicator is to provide, in as real time as 
possible, information of what is happening within the flows 
themselves. 
An analogy with a climatic weather system has a certain 
relevance. In order to assess the developing non-linear 
dynamics of a storm front the meteorologist probes the 
atmospheric air flows with instruments that indicate to him 
the actual status at a particular time. When all the 
indicated information is placed on a chart certain patterns 
are identified that enable experts to predict the onset of 
turbulent and chaotic conditions which could lead to high 
risk consequences for involved persons. 
In a project the sensors providing flow information are the 
people involved. When their perceptions are placed on a 
chart certain areas are revealed where a number of grave 
concerns exist; some occurring simultaneously. It is 
submitted that the perceptions of the people involved 
constitute dynamic risk indicators since they are 
essentially registering a particular situation at a 
particular time with respect to the acceptability of the 
consequential risk. Charts of these dynamic risk indicators 
are given for the four projects in Figs.7, 12, 17 and 22. 
Scaling factors have been used in these 3-dimensional 
computer plots to indicate the relative significance of the 
meetings which took place at three managerial levels viz. 
top, middle and lower. 
The factors are related to the lowest level meeting and are 
based on a subjective assessment by the author. The scaling 
chosen is such that the top level management meeting is 
considered to have three times the impact, on the 
contractor if such an output is produced, as the middle 
management meeting; the latter is considered to have five 
times the impact of the lower level management meeting. 
This scaling is considered to be proportional to the 
criticality of the problem in terms of its possible effect 
on project success. The scaling factors thus present, in 
the computerised plots, one top level management meeting as 
equivalent to three middle level and fifteen lower level 
management meetings. Thus if a detailed technology item is 
discussed at the top level meeting then it is assumed that 
the managers at levels two and three have been unable to 
satisfactorily deal with it and it has been referred up. 
The scaling indicates that: 
1) the level three and two managers consider the 
criticality of an issue to be so significant at system 
level that it must be referred directly to the level 
one meeting; or, 
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2} the level three managers would typically make five 
unsuccessful attempts to resolve an issue before 
referring it to level two; the latter would make three 
unsuccessful attempts before referring it to level 
one. 
The size of the scaling factors is not significant with 
respect to the conclusions of this research but they do 
emphasize the peaks on the charts. 
5.2.5.1.2 Patterns. 
The search for patterns has utilised top-down and bottom-up 
approaches; commencing with the former. 
Current theories of pattern recognition centralise on three 
main approaches namely: 
I} template matching: 
in which comparison of information which has just 
stimulated the sense organs (retained in sensory memory) is 
made with the relatively permanent information acquired 
during a lifetime; 
2} prototyping; 
in which abstract forms, instead of templates, represent 
the basic elements of a set of stimuli; 
3} feature selection; 
the most influential theory in which each stimulus pattern 
can be thought of as a configuration of elementary 
features. Letters of the alphabet for example are composed 
of combinations of about twelve basic features. 
The main problems with the above theories are; 
- difficult to recognise the unfamiliar; 
- they do not take account of context and expectation; 
- prototypes have not yet been successfully defined(240} . 
The starting point in this thesis has been the 
3-dimensional charts of the dynamic risk indicators 
mentioned above. It is important to recall that these 
charts have been constructed from the 1200 data points 
relating to the four projects analyzed, over a period of 
twenty years; see Annex 8. 
5.2.5.1.2.1 Pattern 1. 
The first pattern that emerged was on the 3-dimensional 
charts and consisted of increases in the density, and 
heights, of the "meeting frequency" peaks at various times. 
These clusters correlated well with statements of problems 
from the interviewees, as shown on the raw data charts in 
annex 8. These patterns of clusters have been further 
analyzed resulting in the identification of areas of 
turbulence and chaos in the following manner. 
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For each 3-dimensional chart of dynamic risk indicators two 
related charts have been constructed identifying areas of 
turbulence, chaos and intervention; see, for example, 
Figs.8 and 9. These identifications also used data from the 
interviews, the documentation analysis and the in-orbit 
analysis. 
The two charts identify the following aspects. 
1st chart: 
2nd chart: 
The interactions of technology, 
equipment and system problems which 
caused turbulent and chaotic conditions 
to develop. Intervention by the 
customer is also shown and its 
occurrence seems to correlate well with 
the turbulent and chaos conditions. 
This description relates to 
Figs.8,13,18 and 23. 
The time between turbulent states is 
shown together with the growth of the 
consequences of lower level problems 
due to their being "built" deeper and 
deeper into the system as the project 
develops. Hence a technology problem 
may have limited impact at the 
technology level but can have enormous 
consequences if it occurs when built 
into a system due to the equipment and 
sub-system interfaces that might have 
to changed to accommodate the 
rectification of the problem This 
description relates to Figs.9, 14, 19 
and 24. 
An area has been identified as turbulent if six or more 
problems and/or problems of a certain significance e.g. 
middle management involved, occurred simultaneously at two 
project levels or more. An example of the latter are 
problems occurring at the technology and equipment build 
levels. In addition the perceptions of the managers 
involved at that time were considered and also whether 
adequate data was available to the managers concerned. 
Turbulence is denoted in the dynamic risk indicator charts 
by clustering of the "peaks". 
The state of chaos has been defined by areas of turbulence 
increasing, and by higher peak densities, on the dynamic 
risk indicator charts. Chaotic conditions were identified 
by a number of interviewees, e.g. in project C at one point 
the prime contractor was faced with so many problems he did 
not know what to do next, and correlated well with the 
development of clusters. 
It is submitted that the clusters represent turbulent and 
chaotic conditions and that the build up of the clusters 
Page 121 
can be used to indicate and predict, in a dynamic 
environment, the onset of turbulence and chaos. 
5.2.5.1.2.2 Pattern 2. 
The second pattern related to the continuation of certain 
problems throughout the project life cycle. In each project 
there were approximately twelve problems that remained 
active for a significant part of the project and dominated 
the development of turbulence and chaos. The domination 
process appears to be analogous to a positive feedback 
system whereby small effects grow into bigger and bigger 
effects as the system is transported along the project 
development cycle. The objective would be to replace the 
positive feedback with a negative feedback type system such 
that the small effects die away. 
5.2.5.1.2.3 Pattern 3. 
The third pattern shows that although intervention by the 
customer occurred after the turbulence had been established 
it did reduce the turbulence in most cases. This 
"intervention after the act" mode was clearly not cost nor 
schedule effective since cost and schedule overruns still 
occurred. The complementary pattern to this failure 
circumstance,i.e. intervening "after" the turbulence, is 
the association of the turbulence with open loop systems; 
it is the latter pattern which is significant for the 
intervenor working in a preventative mode. All critical 
items which have been analyzed in this section were 
basically open loop systems and were identifiable as such 
prior to the commencement of phase C-D. This static risk 
indicator approach, with its consequent patterns, was not 
applied by the management of this project. 
5.2.5.1.2.4 Pattern 4. 
The fourth pattern relates to the actual structure of the 
growth of problems which finally produces the turbulence 
and chaos. Specifically it relates to problem solving and 
consists of a low-level or bottom-up assessment of the 
project situation. The value of this pattern is that it can 
give advance warning of possible combinatorial effects 
which, emanating from small changes at the problem source 
level, could cause major problems at the system level. The 
initiating event at the lower level need not be the 
occurrence of a problem; it could equally be a slight 
change in a rule e.g. the truncation of a life test 
programme. 
In fact the rules of the project should drive the various 
and non-linear tendencies, at all levels, to converge to 
achieve the project objectives. A change in the rules could 
cause a different objective to be sought, often 
unwittingly, by project management. Awareness of the 
significance of the project rules and their mutual 
criticality falls also within the domain of the intervenor. 
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The pattern that has emerged has been based on the authors 
experience and a wide spectrum of bibliographic review 
(5,10,13,23,36,42,58,62,104,177,185,186,188,191,193) . 
The pattern is that when a problem is encountered by an 
engineer, or a group of persons, within the schedule and 
cost constraints of a typical project environment, then a 
number of alternative solutions are identified. Generally 
the alternative solutions are ranked according to their 
perceived probability of success, which is usually mainly 
subjective, and the "best" solution selected and translated 
into a work-around plan to be implemented in parallel with 
the on-going work. It has also been noted that as the life 
cycle progresses the number of pragmatic options to resolve 
a problem decrease i.e. there is increasingly less 
opportunity for work around plans that are significantly 
different, or require significantly more resources, to the 
baseline plan. This tends to make the persistence of 
problems more critical and their, potential and actual, 
propagation effects are perceived to be faster. Current 
research on the subject of problem-solving is supportive of 
the above and is broadly represented by the findings of 
Newell and Simon(196) and Klien et al(197,198). The former 
state that a problem space approach reproduces human style 
reasoning and that it involves a step-by-step mental search 
through a vast "problem space" of possibilities, with each 
step guided by a heuristic rule of thumb; "if this is the 
situation, then that step is worth taking". This is 
complimented by Klein et al who have concluded that 
experienced decision makers can usually recognise ways that 
situations are typical, including typical responses, and 
that relatively few decisions are made using analytical 
processes such as generation of a variety of options. They 
also stated however that as the situations increased in 
complexity then verification and eventually conscious 
deliberation including consideration of alternative 
hypotheses took place. It is also interesting to note that 
Flood and Carson in their work on Complexity(62, p.21) 
actually show a bifurcation type diagram indicating the 
"disassembly of complexity" over a three level process. 
In view of the positive feedback potential to produce a 
growth of the initial small effects of problems, such that 
they could become dominating influences on the entire 
project, it is submitted that if the intervenor is be 
effective in the achievement of the strategic objectives 
these open loop and feedback mechanism patterns must be 
identified at the commencement of the project and monitored 
continuously. 
If the combination of all the project flows are termed the 
"stream" which they take to achieve the project objectives 
then it can be interpreted that the stream, or part of it, 
will divide into two stream when a problem occurs, see 
Figs. 1 through 6. 
It is also submitted that if another problem occurs, on 
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either the on-going or the back-up stream, then another 
division or branching will occur. It is emphasized that the 
above characterisation is based on the final result of the 
multitude of complex forces at work in problem definition, 
analysis, resolution and rectification process. From the 
bibliographical review mentioned above, and personnel 
experience, the author shares the rejection, by Klein(186), 
of the Deweyian, Gestalt(perceptual restructuring of 
problems) and Information Processing{step wise method) 
based problem solving models (240) and finds more acceptable 
the concept, also by Klein et aI, that: 
" problem solving consists of two interacting 
processes; the on-going identification of needs, and 
the search for procedures to satisfy these needs. The 
needs (rules) constitute criteria for the adequacy of 
the solution i.e. a solution should bring about the 
satisfaction of the needs ... needs must enter into an 
account of the problem. The needs, of an objective 
situation, stay constant (or else the entire problem 
changes); it is their psychological representation 
that changes. A limited number of alternatives can be 
generated and evaluated before the confusion produced 
offsets the information gained. For ill-defined 
problems, there are often several adequate ways to 
identify a problem. Any identification is valid that 
produces a procedure that alleviates the need. 
Misidentification is marked by a persistence of needs 
after procedures are implemented. An adequate 
identification of a problem includes auxiliary 
solution properties, such as environmental 
characteristics and personal needs. Evaluation 
consists of matching the solution criteria to the 
properties and inferred consequences of each 
alternative procedure."(186). 
The parenthesis "(rules)" has been added by this author. 
This conceptualisation of the problem solving process by 
Klein contains a number of points already derived in this 
research e.g. the allusion to confusion, and the 
significance of the psychological {perceptual} aspects as 
the main variables in the problem solving process, A number 
of additional observations are pertinent to the definition 
of the fourth pattern. 
All organisations are trying to grow; quantitatively and/or 
qualitatively(63,187}. This includes both the contractor 
and the customer and since they are working together they 
will either grow on a co-operative or predatorial basis. 
The co-operative basis can be exemplified by heavy customer 
involvement accompanied by light penalties and restrictions 
against going bankrupt together with good incentives. In 
this scenario there is almost a tit-for-tat liaison whereby 
the contractor "exposes all" and permits massive 
penetration into his work areas in return for the customers 
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"forbearance" and money when schedule slippage occur or 
extra resources are needed. This is the ESA approach. 
The predatorial basis is where both the customer and 
contractor are continually trying to "win points" off each 
other, by ingenious tactical and strategic interpretation 
of the contract rules if necessary, in order to establish a 
dominating position and increase their corporate strength. 
The general environment is very competitive with the self 
organising and adaptive capabilities of the contractor 
being critical aspects in his growth or survival. 
In both cases there are losers. In the former it is a 
particular part of a large organisation, or the tax-payer, 
and in the latter it could be the contractor or the 
customer; usually the former. In assessing the problem 
solving patterns it is important that the intervenor 
interprets which of the above scenarios, completely or 
partially, apply. 
Also, it has been submitted that a project is a self 
organising system. This means it is adaptive and therefore 
tends to turn events to its own advantage. The project, 
like most human organisms, will thus try to avoid problems 
because their existence will disadvantage the system due to 
the loss of positive feedback to provide self 
reinforcement. This avoidance process is a direct function 
of the perception of the project executives; in many cases 
their careers depend on their ability to demonstrate that 
everything, including the problems, is under control. There 
is often, regrettably, only a tenuous connection between 
the "demonstrated satisfactory status" and the actual 
factual situation; see chapter 5.2.2 and 5.2.3. The 
tendency therefore is to report that the situation is 
"steady state" until it degenerates to such an extent that 
the turbulence it is creating is self evident. 
The result of the above process is that according to the 
project reports problems seem to suddenly erupt, almost 
from nowhere! However the picture according to the dynamic 
risk indicators, see Figs. 7 through 24, clearly shows a 
gradual build up of most problems i.e. an awareness which 
initiated discussions was present before the problem 
erupted to effect more than "its own local territory". 
This gradual build up, which involves a similar increase in 
resources, is essentially a steady state process since the 
involved parties are convinced they can contain and solve 
the problem; it is probably not being communicated anyway. 
At a certain point the problem seems to assume a different 
identity. This could be due to interface effects, too rapid 
depletion of resources, a failed test result, or slow 
progress due to industrial strife etc. This new identity is 
often perceived to be immediately threatening because it is 
considered that a rapid propagation of the problem 
consequences across the project may result with a runaway 
situation concerning resource utilisation. Intervention 
then takes place and resources may be "thrown at the 
problem"(see chapter 5.2.3) in order to avoid the above 
propagation. 
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At this point, with the submission that the research 
indicates that real life project situations require the 
application of the science of chaos in order to represent 
and understand them, it is interesting to hypothesise that 
the propagation of problems via a problem branching process 
as outlined above replicates the period doubling processes 
identified by Feigenbaum(152,153) as a prelude to chaos. 
The authors conclusion is that based on personal 
observation and experience it does appear that some kind of 
problem propagation process does take place. It seems, 
subjectively from the experience of being immersed in 
project business for many years, that the speed of problem 
propagation increases as the number of problems increase. 
It also seems to be the case that as the problems increase 
the resource utilisation becomes disproportionately high; 
both deliberately as a result of management instruction and 
involuntarily as a result of inadequate attention being 
given to control of resources in the increasingly turbulent 
conditions. These subjective conclusions of the author have 
been supported, subjectively, by many colleagues and by the 
interviewees; see chapter 5.2.3 and Annex 8. 
The fourth pattern is summarised as follows. 
It is submitted that the solution of project problems 
involves a branching process with respect to the stream of 
flows involved. The stream includes the technical and 
organisational direction, resources utilisation, and 
scheduling. 
It is submitted that this branching occurs after an 
apparently steady state activity and can rapidly propagate 
if the initially identified problem solution is not 
successful. It is further submitted that the problem 
propagation is perceived to be rapid due mainly to its 
potential, in the presence of positive feedback mechanisms, 
to deleteriously effect other areas of the system; this 
latter perception is based on previous project experience 
and is subjectively interpreted as a real threat. It is 
submitted that a number of problems simultaneously 
propagating, particularly if they are at different project 
levels, will create intricate situations which will be 
perceived as very complicated, or turbulent, and, in the 
limit, chaotic by the project executives. It is also 
submitted that a single problem can cause a chaotic project 
situation to develop if: 
a) it occurs in the technology; and 
b) it is used in a number of system elements; and 
c) its proper functioning is critical for system 
success; 
and d) it persists as the project life cycle proceeds. 
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From the above it is submitted that the occurrence and 
propagation of particular problems in a project can 
neutralise the adaptive and self organising characteristics 
of the project such that it passes from an essentially 
predictable, linear mode into a non-linear and 
turbulent/chaotic mode in which prediction is not possible. 
A significant point being made here is that the projects 
ability to respond in a positive, resilient, confident and 
motivated manner when faced with problematic scenarios such 
that it adapts in a way which is most beneficial to itself 
may diminish or even be lost. It is submitted that this 
reduction in the projects ability to maintain its 
self-organising capabilities is itself part of a positive 
feedback loop which can cause local turbulence to grow to 
local and even general chaos. These characteristics are 
clearly shown in the analysis of project C; see Figs. 17, 
18 and 19. 
It is submitted that this situation may be appropriate for 
the use of Feigenbaum Diagrams but at this time 
insufficient data exists concerning the doubling, or 
halving, of resources, schedule time, or cost. It is clear 
that the resources, for example, increase very much faster, 
but not as a step function, when problems are present and 
they "seem" to be of power law magnitude; this however has 
not been demonstrated. A dedicated "problem 
propagation-resource, schedule and cost measurement" 
research programme needs to be implemented. 
However by combining the problem propagation process, 
described above, with the pattern of problem evolution from 
the "frequency of meetings" charts, see annex 8, the 
pattern that emerges can be interpreted as being very 
similar to a Feigenbaum Diagram. It is submitted that the 
development of turbulence and chaos moves through phases of 
very similar configuration, or shape, to Feigenbaum 
Diagrams. It is not submitted that predictions can be made 
using the Feigenbaum Constant or the Feigenbaum Point; it 
is hypothesised that such predictions will be possible 
after more research. 
In view of this conclusion an explanation of the Feigenbaum 
Diagram is given; see Fig.l. Figs. 2 through 6 have been 
produced to show the branching effects of problem 
propagation in the areas of technology, equipment build, 
SUb-system build and system integration presented in the 
general manner of Feigenbaum Diagrams but omitting the 
predictability scaling factor, the Feigenbaum constant. It 
is emphasised that, in the authors experience, the actual 
development of problem scenarios is as indicated on these 
Figures. 
In more detail Figs. 1 through 6 show: 
a) the clear demarcation of the long term behaviour of a 
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development activity into relatively steady state and 
chaotic regions, 
b) that once problems begin then they accumulate 
relatively quickly; this has been the authors 
experience; 
c) the development of an equipment(Fig.3) e.g. a 
transmitter, where the occurrence of technology 
problems and supply problems can quickly deplete the 
limited resources available and cause complex 
technical and logistic situations to occur; 
d) sUb-system development (Fig.4) where equipment 
interface problems and continuing technology problems 
can generate turbulent conditions; 
e) system integration and development(Fig.5) where 
unresolved problems at the technology and equipment 
levels have a much stronger impact due to their being 
situated much "deeper" within the system, and can 
combine to cause turbulent and chaotic conditions. 
f) the complete project cycle(Fig.6) showing the manner 
in which turbulence at the technology level for 
example can, in conjunction with problems and 
turbulence at the equipment and sub-system levels, 
produce a very complex, chaotic, situation at the 
system level. 
The analysis of three of the four projects has included a 
problem propagation simulation, see Fig.10, and the 
actually experienced problem propagation, see Figs.l1, 15, 
and 20. The latter figures represent simplifications of the 
raw data plots contained in annex 8. These figures 
demonstrate the dangers of technology and equipment 
developments overlapping; indicating the great complexity 
that can arise when multi-parallel problem propagation 
exists. Also demonstrated is the rapid growth of some 
problems whereas others seem to be dormant for months and 
even years before becoming manifest. It seems that the 
problems that erupt later in the project seem to persist 
longest and have the most significant effect i.e. cause 
more turbulence. 
The four patterns cover top-down to bottom-up assessments 
of the project risk situations to identify the optimum 
intervention rationales such that dominating turbulent 
conditions can be avoided. 
Due to the importance of Feigenbaums work and the authors 
view that it may contribute to the prediction of non-linear 
situations, an essential attribute for project management 
and corporate intervention strategies, a short overview of 
Feigenbaums, and others, work in this domain is now given 
to explain its evolution and context. 
Page 128 
5.2.5.1.3 The Peigenbaum Diagram. 
Mitchell Feigenbaums work, initially at Los Alamos in the 
1970's, concerned attempts to construct methods for solving 
non-linear equations; using classical mathematics he 
concluded it was impossible. 
Prior to this work Edward Lorenz, in the 1960's whilst 
working on dynamical systems, had addressed the question: 
"does any measurable behaviour, however it fluctuates, 
have an average"? 
He asked not only whether continual feedback would produce 
periodic behaviour, but also what the average output would 
be. He recognised that the answer was that the average, 
too, fluctuated unstably. This led him to conclude that 
hiding within a particular dynamic system could be more 
than one stable solution. An observer might see one kind of 
behaviour over a very long time, yet a completely different 
kind of behaviour could be just as natural for the system. 
Such a system he called "intransitive". An intransitive 
system can stay in one state of equilibrium or another, but 
not both. Only a -kick- from outside can force it to change 
states. (153) . 
Unconnected with the work of Lorenz but still addressing 
non-linear equations Feigenbaum decided to further explore, 
or map, the mathematical qualities of quadratic difference 
equations; particularly the boundary region at which the 
mapping changed from periodic and chaotic. He also became 
aware of the population work of biologist Robert May 
concerning the cascading of period doubling, the splitting 
of two cycles into four cycles and so on, en route to 
chaotic population growth conditions. 
Feigenbaum noticed that the period doubling process 
exhibited a geometric convergence. In other words the 
period doubling was occurring faster and faster at a 
constant rate; see Fig.1. The ratio of one period to the 
next period in the doubling process is termed the 
Feigenbaum constant and is approximately equal to 4.67. 
Feigenbaums theory expressed a natural law about systems at 
the point of transition between orderly and turbulent. 
Hence it was discovered that there were structures in 
non-linear systems that are always the same if looked at in 
the right way(153) . 
The Feigenbaum constant is a universal constant; that is, 
it is applicable to many different types of non-linear 
systems. A wide variety of extremely sophisticated 
experiments in hydrodynamics, electronics, laser physics 
and acoustics has produced a remarkable degree of agreement 
with Feigenbaums constant (181) . 
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In this thesis it is submitted that the dominating systems 
in projects are non-linear. It is also submitted that the 
Lorenzian "Kick", referred to above, can be provided by an 
external intervention to a project thus reducing for 
example the state of turbulence present within the project. 
It is further assumed that chaos will be present after the 
second propagation or bifurcation state due to the limited 
problem solving capability of man(195); that is, problems 
will be increasing from four to eight. 
In Figs. 7 through 24 the above definitions have been used 
to label certain areas as turbulent and chaotic. 
The results of the analyses in this chapter are submitted 
as evidence of the existence of patterns indicating 
relatively steady, turbulent and chaotic states in 
projects. It is felt that the resemblance is no mere 
accident but clearly more detailed work needs to be done to 
fully benefit its application. 
5.2.5.2 Project A Results. 
Figs.7 through 11 have been produced from the authors 
recorded data contained, in its original "rough notes" form 
in appendix 8. 
Fig.7 shows a plot of the frequency of meetings, scaled as 
explained above, for the most critical items which occurred 
during the project. All abbreviations are explained in 
annex 10. 
As an example the Bapta, the Bearing And Power Transfer 
Assembly enabling electrical power from the rotating solar 
arrays to be conducted to the spacecraft main power 
sub-system, was a subject of relatively great concern every 
year throughout the project life cycle. 
Fig.S indicates those regions during the project when a 
relatively large number of issues were under intensive 
discussion at the various management levels. These regions 
have been annotated "T" indicating turbulence. The 
relationship between the turbulence and the customers 
intervention is shown and where regions of extreme 
turbulence, annotated "chaos", developed. The sub-system 
applicable to the various technologies and equipments is 
also indicated on this chart. 
The major problems encountered on this project related to 
the development of lower level technology; the pattern of 
which is clearly shown by the frequency of meetings for the 
varactor, impact and unitrode diodes, and the TWT, EPC, 
Bapta and FMW slip rings; see fig.7. The high, and 
prolonged, meeting density indicates embedded research 
is~ues with the consequences of open loops; under fixed 
prlce contracts! The varactor diode problems were so 
threatening to the success of the project that a very early 
(fJ 
(Jl 
C 
+-' 
<!) 
(J) 
:2 
~ 
o 
o 
z 
> 
:J 
IT 
W 
20 
15 
10 
5 
o 
Fig. / ~_I r 0 j e c t /'\ : ~v/1 e e t i' n g s F- r e que n c i e s . 
Dynornic Risk Indic:otor,( 1974/77). 
( { I I { \-L--L----l \f~\~ / / / / Lj FMW 
\ \ I I i rIi NIle 
-1' i 
')TTjThF 
f I I 1 I I I I i I I I I I I I I r I t I I I I r r r r r I r i r r I I r I I r I I r-r.,-j 
ND7~MAMJJASOND7~MAMJJASON~7~MAMJJASON~7FMAMJJA 
Pr 0 jec t Tinlesc ale; months. 
Res 
Vl 
.-
, 
(]) 
+-' 
o 
u 
+-' 
\., 
( I 
r--f---l. r----T----l '-----f---l1 II Q ant J I 
: ...i I: !: ! ! !: U a ump prOject I 
DE~IGN + 9QUIPM~NT BUILD $UB-SYSTFM + SYS~EM BUILD. 
: . I' I: . I I: 
i (lit1~,1 II~;:;R \i;NT'Nl I INT'N: Ilrr:::::::==:====================::=:;-] RESOURC~~_i~~~~~!~ ___ uu____ _ _______ --' _________ ~ -- __ Lu_u __________ L_~ ____ l L • 1 1111 MAJOR INTERVENTION II 
SYSTEM r .: I: -. ----- -u----r--u-------r------------- h - A ----------_ I .. I . .. 
j : ! ~ i ! r 
~~. : I:j 1 I: 
lXXX>11 un[> III(> ~ i ! , '. i : L~:I ! !: 
EQUIPMENTS ! I: Iii ! i: 
FMW 
-------------------- ------r------ --~ -----c----------------I----------r-~ - ----~Ii?;?-;-j-j;f';;/1--~----·-------------
j :! !" ,-----"'.'----
Bapta .: : I f . .;.;.;. f ';i c:::f MAJOR 
TWTA . ott-- n;!1)I : . Dr(> I r RECTIFICATION 
~~./l3! ~ ~ '! & LAUNCH 
TECHNOLOGIES i I) wL.L.LV i . i I IA£~~ •. ;:""': ~~A~ ,...--'-____ _ ~~6 DIode nn""' ___ "n ""---t" , .'ipX;;",nn"---"'+n"" , '1' ___ '" mS m'nn' GonsKW::sources 
I : : I 
Thick Film j !: 1 ! . .: 
MIC i I; iE1Yvv'm:(> . .: 
V t d' de I. . IITlnN !~X)9 I I: arac or 10 : C$xxx)4IUJUV;: i ~ I: 
lfTl)att ide 197;X\l5l~ I 1 ;974! r> ;9~2':2'jJxZX;9ra----t 1977 
Parts Proc't. 
LEGEND j 'LI ______________________________________ __ 
*f-----f-----, = Area of Perceived * II = Turbulence resutts in INTERVENTION * ! INT'N.I= INTERVENTION by the customer. 
i.... ____ • ___ ._.~ Turbulence & the addition of RESOURCES. ... ................................................................ ............................. : 
*Subsystems effected: * ............................................................ ~ ....... : .......................................... · ....·'ntervention to another and ultimately to : 
HI(> = Problem continuing from one CHAOS due to larger number of interfaces(BIFURCATIONS) ~ ~n "turbulence reduction by resource incr~~~~~ .. whjqb .. tb~.t~Q.hnQI.Qgy .. Pr.9.P.'~m$ .. G~.V$.~ .. ~tb~h~d.w..w.~..i~J;~uiJt . 
.... , I 
_ 1A,9¢.$.:/ Fig.8 PROJECT "A" 
AREAS/DURATIONS/INTERACTIONS and TURBULENCE/CHAOS of MAJOR PROBLEMS 
CUSTOMER INTERVENTION 
RESOURCES increased 
a 972t------
1973 1974 1975 1976 
I ~ 27mnths. .. r--15mnths. ~~ 12mnths. ~I 
LEGEND 
~ = area of perceived turbulence 
IINT'N./= INTERVENTION by the customer. 
Fig.9 
* ~ = Interfaces causing Problem Growth 
* mor"-..... = Problems continuing through 
V Proiect ute Cvcle 
/1 Quanta Jump project 1/ 
MAJOR 
RECTIFICATION 
& LAUNCH 
Considerable 
Resources Added 
1977 
ACTUAL GROWTH of PROBLEM CONSEQUENCES due to INCREASE in NUMBER of INTERFACES as VEHICLE BUILD moves from 
TECHNOLOGY through EQUIPMENT & SUB-SYSTEM to SYSTEM LEVEL. 
6 TECHNOLOGICAL PP 
I 
! 
i 
! 
! , 
! , 
! , 
, 
, 
! 
! 
! 
;--
i--
i 
L 
LEGEND: 
25mnths .. i 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
i 
i 
T Int 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
! 
I 2 EQUIPMENT PP 
! 3 TECHNOLOGICAL PP 
! 
! 
! 
! , 
! , ResV 
i 
i 
.. Bmnths .. 
! 
! 
i 
, I I , 
I 'T Int iResl 
I , 
, I I , 
, I I , 
, , 
! 
T = TURBULENCE. 
Int = INTERVENTION. 
Res = RESOURCES ADDED( BY CUSTOMER). 
C = CHAOS. 
mnths = months of project life cycle. PP = Problem Propagation paths. 
Res 
1 SYSTEM PP , 
2 EQUIPMENT PPi 
3 TECH'L.PP 
... 6mnths .. 
TIC 
Fig.10: Project A; PROBLEM PROPAGATION SIMULATION. 
SAPTA 
lWTA 
MIC 
RESOURCES 
I I 
• i i 
i 
.............. . .... 1 ...... . 
......................•.•.....••........ ..•.........••.. 
....... 
i 
.. I 
I I I I "" 
I 
.. I· . 
. . . .. . . 
. , .' . .:'. .' . · · ~ l.· 
.'.: jl.' •• \ .. : ,. 
, I 
I ' 
, I 
~ . . 
............ 'W' .••. ~ .. : •. !I.. . , •. : ~ r.~".... . .......•. ~.~ ... ~ ...... .+. .... !t ... : .. 
• • II. : 1 • 
~ .. ~.~..... .. . ......... ~.~. . ........ ~.~ 
. : 
! . I 
• I ,. i 
.~ .. ~ .. ~ .. ~ ..• ~. ·,t o -
i 
• T I • 
i 
.i. 
Ii 
. . ; 
...... ~ ......... !I .. ~ ...... ~ .. 
THICKFILM ....................................... . ..................... + ..... .... ,t ................ . : :. 
PARTS PROCT. 
PAAAMP/2SCl336 
PARAMPNARACTOR 
BEACON/CRYSTAL 
BEACONIIMPATI 
EPCIUNlTRODE 
LEGEND: 
. .: 
.. .. 
• 
. ....••.....••....•• ~...... . ... -•.................•.. 
. ........................................ -:- ............ ······~~· ... ···~···.·t····· .... ;.................... ................... ··t··! .............. . 
.. I 
........................................... , ........... , .• ~ .•• ~.L ........ l.. ..........•.. :..:,.~......... ................ • :.,,0 k·: ... ! ................ I· .............•. , .. ~ .. ~.~ .... ~ .................... . 
• : .' .. •• ~ •• ' • II. II: .... 1,1 ... • • .:. . 
• ..: " i " : I ,,::, • I -: i 
......................... ~ .... ~ .. ·· ...... L ............................. 1... ................... _ .... ~ ...•... _ .. J~ ....... L ............................. ~ ..... ·.: ..... t ........................ . 
: !. • • • • I:. i·: ! 
• . • ••• 1. : I • •••. I. . I 
':::':'J:;::','[:':':'::"':::,[',1,,:( ;:',:r 
• • ~ ." ,I .. ' : I' .:1:. ! 
1973 1974i 1975 T 1976 T 
1977 
T 
. = OCCURANCE OF A MEETING. PROJECT A 
T = TURBULENCE 
Fig.11: ACTUAL PROBLEM PROPAGATION 
IMAGING SERVICES NORTH 
Boston Spa, Wetherby 
West Yorkshire, LS23 7BQ 
www.bl.uk 
BEST COpy AVAILABLE. 
VARIABLE PRI NT QUALITY 
I 
l ~- , 
~ 1 - - -
V 
III 
h 
o 
r;£ 
(>-
-
-----i - ----
: 
, . 
~- --r-- - ---
. ', ~ 
- '- ~ 
---L\ .s 
_____ ______ \:.1;) ____ _ 
-
- ... 
I 
, \ 
\ \ 
., 
, , 
--- - --r-· . 
" 
_ --. 1 
- --- to . . --
! 
.. 
Il. 
• \I. 
.. 
9 .. ~"­
. ~~ "Q 
~ '- 1 
.. -~-~ .. ; -.--
._---~ --
\ . \ 1: .: 
11 'I' l' -- '. ---r-;-L----l-----L/~ ... 
" 
\ 
- . . .:::< 
I . " ' - ,---: 
\ - I. ~ --
._.:_+_ 10" -
ill .. I ~: 
~'<'!'- i'" • ..,.. 
~.:.!~~! ... 
;" ,!: .... P"~~ 
.. 
. \ t~" 4 
-, ----.-- -r ~ 
. I ~ . 
i' 
" 
-_ . ---- ----..:.------ ~~:. ; 
G! .\i." . : 
0 · : :, .. 
' J. t 
, . I'" +-'--~~ ., . . -----
.'. 
" 
~ I 
. -- . \ 
. . 
Page 130 
decision declared that unlimited resources were to be made 
available to solve the problems. From the "frequency of 
meetings" indicator that decision should have also involved 
the EPC and the impact diode; the latter eventually proved 
to be the main problem! Another major risk indicator is the 
heavy overspend on parts procurement and the MIC technology 
at a relatively early point in the project. It should be 
recalled that ESA effectively shared the prime management 
of this project since it was the first such programme in 
Europe. 
The general appearance of fig.7 gives the impression of a 
reasonably balanced project but with some areas of high 
concern occurring near the launch campaign; in fact 
conditions were turbulent at that time. 
There is also a large concern that the resources will be 
adequate at a point approximately 20% after the start of 
phase C-D! 
This project was more of a joint ESA-industry business due 
to it being the first European telecommunication satellite; 
it was a test and demonstration satellite. Hence all 
problems were shared, the ESA team was very large, and when 
extra resources were needed they were supplied by ESA. 
Note: for example, the ESA decision to allocate "unlimited 
resources" to the varactor diode problem. 
Fig.7 does not indicate any rapid movements into crisis or 
chaotic conditions. The analysis is continued in Figs.S and 
9 where growth, or propagation, of the problems is 
indicated with respect to the increasing number of 
interfaces concerned as the technology is built into an 
equipment and thence via SUb-system build to become part of 
the system itself. This chart also indicates the main 
turbulence, and chaos, drivers and the life cycle duration 
of some of the problems. 
There was a significant amount of "embedded research" in 
this project and it finally created a chaotic situation 
during a turbulent period in 1976; the situation was 
resolved by the injection of considerable expertise and 
money by the customer. The figures also show the occurrence 
of major intervention, in spite of the day-to-day presence 
of the customer at the contractors premises, after the 
turbulence had established itself. However the 
interventions did result in periods of relatively steady 
state conditions of long durations. In the above charts the 
design phase, and the equipment, SUb-system and system 
build phases are shown. Also provided is the classification 
of the project as: 
a) involving either a "quanta" jump in the technologies 
involved, or, 
b) being a relatively continuous, or incremental, 
development of previous work. 
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The above explanation applies also to Figs. 10 through 24 
in total. 
Due to the fact that Project A was a "quanta jump" project 
and it was the first of its kind in Europe, it was regarded 
as critically important, strategically, to the customer and 
the industry. 
During phases A and B three consortia were in a highly 
competitive mode; the winner gained the lucrative phase C/D 
contract. 
The perception of the customer was that his strategic 
future could only be safeguarded if he formed a large 
highly qualified project team to intimately monitor the 
contractor i.e. to enable, at his discretion, constant 
intervention. This was done. The result was that the 
customer effectively managed the project, took all the 
major decisions, and deployed his staff at all locations, 
world wide, to ensure that "he knew all things at all 
times". Hence whenever more resources, money, manpower or 
facilities, were needed they were supplied by the customer; 
often initiated by the latter. 
There is no doubt that this project formed a significant 
"learning step" for European industry. It is also clear 
that the project was under-resourced for the large number 
of open loops involved. All of the critical items in Fig.7 
were open loop since it was not clear whether they would 
finally successfully function. 
The constant presence, and awareness, of the customer 
constituted a constant threat to the contractor; 
particularly since the customers expertise, which had been 
"bought in" from the U.S etc., was often superior to that 
of the contractor. The result was an adversial but tolerant 
relationship; the latter due to the customers "open cheque" 
approach. This modus operandi of the customer indicates 
little faith in the contractor selection process nor in the 
communication and management systems that had been 
established to keep him informed. 
The issues involved in abrogating the contractors role were 
ignored; pride and independence of contractor authority 
were considered to be small sacrifices to pay for the 
customer accepting practically all the risk. As mentioned 
in the interviews, even if the contractor was convinced a 
customer decision was wrong it was almost impossible to 
reverse it due to the resistance of the established 
customer-contractor bureaucracy. 
It is concluded that the customer plus contractor teaming 
approach did work in this instance but the subsidisation 
was very high and the contractors learning in the area of 
project-consortia management was low. This latter point is 
evi~enced by the fundamental problems that occurred in 
proJect B. The launch date predictions were remarkably 
accurate. December 1776 was predicted in 1973; the 
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satellite was launched in 1977. However, the resources to 
aChieve this and the supporting technology programme was 
very considerable. 
The main project "flows" were ruthlessly tracked by the 
customer and reaction was immediate when a divergence was 
perceived. It constituted almost the perfect management 
scenario with the top customer manager able to extend his 
perception outside the project whilst being informed of the 
actual real time status within the project without being 
formally directly involved. He could thus steer the project 
to adapt to changing strategic objectives as they occurred; 
this happened on a number of occasions. 
The cost and schedule overruns were significant but the 
project was considered to be a success; particularly 
strategically. Project C was comparable to this project 
concerning the quanta jump involved; the results were very 
significantly worse! The respective charts show 
significantly different problem profiles and considerably 
more turbulence and chaos. 
For both projects an intervenor using the meeting 
frequency, and other "flow", information would have 
performed quite differently. 
The significance of the timewise occurrence of the regions 
of turbulence is that intervention delayed the "natural" 
branching of the problems, and hence the amount of 
turbulence, that might have occurred. 
5.2.5.3 Project B Results. 
This project followed on directly from project A; with the 
same team of industrialists and the same ESA persons. The 
analysis is presented in Figs. 12 through 16. The patterns 
that emerge as the project develops is of ESA top 
management involvement from the beginning and the late 
recognition of basic technology problems i.e. open loops. 
Problems at equipment level are indicated as receiving 
early and considerable attention; see the region 1977/1978 
in Figs. 13 and 14. This was not a shared project, between 
ESA and industry, as in the case of project Ai normal ESA 
contract conditions applied. 
The industrial performance is indicated as being somewhat 
lacking, from the CDR low incentive payments, even after 
ESA intervened with "tiger teams" to rectify certain 
technical issues. The repeated launch predictions, starting 
with a 1980 predicted launch date in 1976, were repeatedly 
incorrect; the satellite was finally launched in 1983. The 
TWTs, EPes, and ABM(apogee boost motor) seem to be embedded 
research from the frequency of meetings pattern i.e. 
starting early with many meetings at all management levels. 
An aspect of the dynamics of the project is shown in 
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Fig.12. The general appearance is very busy with domains of 
increasing activity indicating increasing concern. These 
areas have been labelled as increasing turbulence and 
eventually chaos. Just prior to the middle of the project 
conditions were so complex, and the way ahead so difficult 
to define, that specially convened ESA plus industry teams, 
called "tiger teams", were formed: conditions were chaotic. 
Fig.12 through 16 illustrates the growth of this condition 
from an initial rather steady, tranquil state. Once again 
the adequacy of the resources were of great concern very 
early in the project. The author links this circumstance 
with the unresolved problems remaining after phases A and 
B; see section 5.2.2.2. 
The classification of this project as a follow-on project 
based on project A, and therefore assuming that the main 
problems were technological and had been resolved proved to 
be both optimistic and naive. As stated frequently in this 
thesis, the research indicates that the dominating problems 
tend to be organisational and managerial in nature. 
5.2.5.4 Project C Results. 
The general pattern of this project was quite different 
than project B; a comparison is not made with project A 
since that was essentially an ESA-industry collaborative 
programme. For this project the characteristics were of 
steady state- turbulence cycles working up to states of 
chaos; then relaxing back to the turbulent state only to 
evolve again to chaos. Clear patterns emerge from the plot 
of frequency of meetings and the occurrence of problems, 
crises, and chaos; the latter terms were actually used 
without prompting by interviewees, and were recorded many 
years ago in the authors daily record books. The analysis 
is presented in Figs.17 through 21. 
The TWTs, EPCs, dual gate FETs, and CEU and software items 
gave so many problems and dominated the project to such an 
extent that they were clearly examples of "embedded risk" 
and "embedded research". As such they constituted open loop 
activities. 
The situation was so serious that a director recommended a 
one year delay in the programme in 1977, see Fig.18. This 
was not implemented but such an intervention would probably 
have avoided the significant strategic failure due to the 
very late, and hence very expensive, launch. 
The risk indicators, for high level intervention, are there 
and can be identified by: 
a) the accelerating frequency of meetings in some areas; 
b) comments referring to chaotic conditions; 
c) prime management admitting major mistakes, see Fig.19; 
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d) prime management admitting to ESA that it didn't know 
how to proceed since it was besieged by problems from 
all sides; 
e) the repeatedly inadequate bid evaluations; 
f) the high rate of increase of meeting frequencies at 
about the same time; circa mid-1980. 
g) the high divergence of the dualgate FET problems 
realising that these components are essential for the 
payload and must be built into the equipments at a 
very early point in the schedule. 
The above illustrates that the basic issues were very 
serious and that was realised early in the life cycle of 
each issue; also that the interface effects were equally 
serious thus the delays were propagated across the project 
and the consortium. 
In this project it is clear that chaotic situations did 
evolve and that the evolution was due to a simultaneous 
occurrence of major issues in the technical, managerial, 
resource expenditure and political areas. It also seems 
that the magnitude of these issues was due to: 
- their interaction, 
- starting the phase C-D with many open problems, and, 
- very late intervention. 
It is known that serious "soft" issues existed on this 
project from the start; not least of which was the prime 
contractors contention that ESA was too much involved in 
the day-to-day management of the project. This caused a 
very adversial relationship which permeated the entire 
industrial consortium. Proper intervention could have 
reduced if not eliminated this risk element. 
Concerning an attempt to predict where the turbulence and 
chaos could be expected to occur, using the Feigenbaum 
constant and Figs.17, 18 and 19, the following aspects have 
to be considered: 
1) the information available covers the definition phase, 
phase B and the commencement of phase C/D; 
2) in 1978 a launch date of July 1982 was predicted; this 
was based on a 3 year development and procurement 
period commencing in late 1978; 
3) the spacecraft was finally launched in July, 1989; 
4) a significant amount of the technology used on this 
; 
L 
~ 
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space vehicle was close to the state of the art; 
5) the survival of the customers telecommunication 
satellite department was strongly linked to the rapid 
commencement of this project; 
6) the project commenced with a customer shortage of 
funding which was accommodated almost unconditionally 
by the contractor, no major risk areas were 
identified; 
7) the phase C/D bid evaluations by the customer produced 
an impressive and daunting list of major problems, 
concerns, lack of visibility and lack of definition ( 
see chapter 5.2.2.3) but, with many issues still open 
the phase C/D contract was initiated in late 1982; 
8) the customer project manager declared in his interview 
that there were very few tranquil or steady state 
periods but most of the time conditions were very 
turbulent; 
9) the project commenced with a very adverbial 
relationship between the customer and the prime 
contractor due to the latter contention that a 
customer commitment not to continuously interfere with 
the contractors role was not being honoured. 
Many of the above aspects are addressed in the Model, see 
chapter 6, as items which must be eliminated or defined as 
risk indicators prior to the commencement of phase C/D. 
This project took nearly thirteen years to complete. Both 
the ESA and industrial areas concerned with this project 
were in survival conditions at times during the project. 
Figs. 18 and 19 show that an intervenor, using meeting 
frequency as a dynamic risk indicator, would probably have 
intervened very strenuously approximately 30% into the 
project. 
5.2.5.5 Project D Results. 
Project D was a first time experience for the customer 
since it involved the design and procurement of a manned 
space plane. The analysis is presented in Figs. 22, 23 and 
24. From the commencement of the project the decision 
making processes inadequately involved the manned safety 
constraints with the result that major conflicts developed 
and ultimately the programme was terminated. The general 
culture was of concealment; rather than open debate and 
exposure of problems as they occurred. The underlying cause 
of this condition was politic-budgetary. 
The author was a member of a Director General safety 
committee (WD) and the chart, see Fig.22, for this project 
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primarily reflects that activity. The main problems, as 
indicated by the frequency of meetings related to: 
1) the definition and harmonisation of safety 
requirements, 
2) the design and implementation of escape, and 
caution and warning, systems, and, 
3) mans role on board. 
This programme used confidentiality intensively, which had 
not been a previous customer practice, and thus restricted 
the flow of information, awareness and intervention. From 
this experience the author would now classify such a 
situation as a risk enhancing and negative entropy 
limiting. 
The general appearance of fig.16 is of intensive and 
irregular activity; the frequency and concern of many major 
issues seems to be continuously high. This truly reflects 
the actual situation which finally forced cancellation of 
the project even though certain political elements were 
insistent that there were no significant problems! The 
financial loss was in terms of billions of dollars and the 
time to complete the project was being continuously 
extended. 
This project required the customer to move into a 
completely new area of technology and operations with the 
result that expertise had to be bought-in. A similar 
situation also existed for the contractors so there was a 
significant element of "the blind leading the blind". The 
project thus required a major quanta jump in technological, 
and organisational and management areas. 
A unique aspect of this project in comparison with all 
other projects conducted by the customer over a 25 year 
period was the inception of a speCial "watchdog" committee, 
reporting directly to the customer Director General (DG) , to 
monitor on a non-executive basis all aspects relating to 
human safety; referred to as "WD" in Fig.22. The author of 
this research was the only customer employed person on this 
committee; the other members were not employed in the space 
industry but were directors of industrial establishments or 
university professors. This committee constituted an 
independent intervention presence and its influence 
resulted from its facility in being able to report directly 
to the customer DG. 
For this project, as with project C, it is noted that the 
customer Directors proposal to delay the project, in this 
case for 3 years, was not implemented. 
In hindsight it would appear that if this intervention had 
been successful then the project might not have been 
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cancelled; this is a subjective judgement by the author but 
based on first hand experience. 
The time frame represented by Figs. 22, 23 and 24 formally 
includes the start of the phase C/D but in reality the 
definition phase was never satisfactorily completed. This 
latter point is reflected in the repetitively bad design 
reviews during the years 1989 through 1991 and the large 
interactive effects of lack of definition occurring in 
other areas e.g. margins, factors of safety and 
aerothermodynamics scaling; see Figs.23 and 24. 
It seems extraordinary that a 1994 launch could be 
predicted in 1986; followed by project cancellation 
occurring in 1992. 
5.2.5.6 Conclusions. 
From the analysis of the 20 years of data covering four 
major projects it is concluded that risk indicators can be 
identified which give information concerning the dynamics, 
as well as the statics, of a project life cycle. 
A number of dynamic risk indicators have been identified, 
see section 5.2.3.6 for example, but the one used in this 
analysis related to the number of times a particular 
subject matter was discussed at low, middle and top 
management levels. The underlying assumptions are that 
people working intensively on complex systems will 
primarily discuss problematic issues and that the slow 
resolution of such issues, with increasing project damage 
potential as time elapses, will cause increasing higher 
management involvement. 
Using the conclusions which have been made from: 
the documentation, interview, and orbit analyses, 
the assessment of the current" state of knowledge, 
the research on problem identification and resolution, 
and 
work relating to steady state, turbulent and chaotic 
conditions, 
in conjunction with static and dynamic risk indicators, 
four patterns have been identified. 
From this work it is also concluded that apparently small 
and insignificant open loop situations can be influenced by 
positive feedback mechanisms such that they eventually 
dominate a project life cycle. An example could be a 
technology problem which increases as certain aspects of 
~he pro~lem remain unsolved and it thereby impacts an 
lncreaslng number of equipments as they reach the need date 
to use it. 
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The four patterns enable a static and dynamic 
characterisation of a particular project to be made such 
that the existence and significance of strategic change 
drivers can be assessed. 
The four patterns are summarised as follows: 
1) a clustering, consisting of varying densities and 
heights of the plotted data, of the number of times 
problems on a particular technology or sub-system etc. 
are discussed; 
2) a continuation of certain problems through various 
phases and periods of the project life cycle; 
3) a reduction of turbulence after customer intervention 
in a contractors business; 
4) a splitting of the main project "route" caused by the 
need to re-deploy and increase resources for the 
resolution of problems. The "route" is simply a 
symbolic way, i.e. a line on a sheet of paper, of 
portraying the general manner in which the project 
resources are being spent. One could say that the 
lines on a resource planning document also indicate 
routes. 
It is concluded that if information is collected, in real 
time, such that static and dynamic risk indicators can be 
presented in the manner shown in this thesis then 
turbulence can probably be limited and significant 
strategic effects avoided. 
Finally it is concluded that an intervention protocol is 
necessary in order to ensure timely and accountable 
utilisation of the risk indicators. 
5.3 Knowledge and Data Utilisation 
5.3.1 Introduction. 
The objective of analysing the collected knowledge and data 
was to utilise it to validate, or not, the hypothesis. 
This has been done by identifying knowledge and data which 
supported, or not, the various points contained in the 
hypothesis. During this work a number of points have been 
identified that seem to be obvious risk initiators if they 
were permitted to remain in a project; these have been 
recorded as postulates in annex 1. These postulates can be 
considered as being to complimentary to, and a consequence 
of, the hypothesis. 
The following two sections contain 
a) the hypothesis(S.3.2), and 
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b) a list of the "major points" (5.3.3) in the 
hypothec. 
The remaining sections(5.3.4 and 5.3.5) contain the main 
discourse of the thesis concerning the validation, or not, 
of the hypothesis. 
5.3.2 The Hypothesis. 
The hypothesis on which this thesis is based is as follows. 
HYPOTHESIS: 
" A development project, which is a complex, open system, 
commences from a perceived steady state, equilibrium 
condition. The planning representation of this condition 
consists typically of a number of interfacing static 
diagrams. Strategic objectives are shown to be achievable 
within stated cost and schedule constraints; with margins 
in the technical domain and reserves in the cost area. An 
essentially closed loop situation is thus assumed as 
reflected by the majority of contracts being fixed price. 
Even the cost reimbursement and cost plus contracts have a 
maximum ceiling price so nothing is really considered to be 
open loop. 
As activity increases, the steady state is upset by 
problems which occur, unpredictably, here and there; their 
origins are within, or external to, the project authority 
and responsibility boundaries. An interplay of hard and 
soft aspects exists within these scenarios. 
Due to the multiple, complex, and many common, interfaces, 
and the different perceptioDs by the involved parties, the 
problems generate other problems in a dynamic but still 
unpredictable fashion. The steady state condition thus 
becomes non-linear with many open loop situations. 
without risk indicators and intervention the project 
objectives will become increasingly vulnerable to the 
proliferation of problems; with resources being used in a 
fire-fighting mode but the basic causes of the problems 
remaining obscure. The aChievement of the strategic 
objectives is not now definable nor predictable; the 
project is going out of control and constitutes a high risk 
element. 
The above "perceived" increasingly unstable evolution is 
analogous to a flow condition moving from steady state to a 
state of turbulence and ultimately to a state of chaos as 
the flow rate is increased. 
The inter-state movement takes place due to bifurcatioDs 
which increasingly multiply if their reactions are allowed 
to proceed unhindered. 
The high risk consequences can be avoided if the 
bifurcation patterns, involving both hard and soft aspects, 
can be co~tinuously identified; thus permitting restriction 
of.e~c~rs~o~s t~ t~e turbulent and chaotic states by 
ut1l1s1ng r1sk ~nd1cators and intervention. For example, 
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very often a single problem at low contractual level can 
effect the entire project. This constitutes the role of 
intervention in strategic change" 
5.3.3 The Main Points in the Hypothesis. 
The main points are listed below. 
a} A development project, which is a complex, open 
system, commences with a perceived steady state, 
equilibrium; 
b} the planning presents situations in the form of static 
representations; 
c} the planning presents situations as closed loops with 
linear margins and fixed reserves to cover all 
{including unanticipated} eventualities; 
d} the project steady state is upset by unpredictable, 
hard and soft, problems; 
e} the problems generate other, unpredictable, problems 
due to the complex, multiple, and many common 
interfaces, and the different perceptions of the 
involved parties; 
f} the steady state becomes non-linear with many open 
loops; 
g} without risk indicators and intervention the 
achievement of the project strategic objectives will 
not be definable nor predictable; 
h} the perceived unstable project evolution is analogous 
to a flow condition moving from steady state to a 
state of turbulence and ultimately to a state of chaos 
as the flow rate is increased; 
i} the movement from steady state through turbulence to 
chaos occurs due to bifurcations which increasingly 
mUltiply if their reactions are allowed to proceed 
unhindered; 
j) the high risk consequences can be avoided if the 
bifurcation patterns, involving both hard and soft 
aspects, can be initially identified, and maintained 
current, thus permitting restriction of excursions to 
the turbulent and chaotic states by utilising risk 
indicators and intervention. 
5.3.4 Knowledge and Data Supporting the Bypothesis. 
The above ten points are now addressed individually with 
respect to the knowledge and data collected. 
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5.3.4.1 RA Development Project, which is a Complex, Open 
System, Commences with a Perceived Steady StateR. 
This point contains the issues of: 
complex systems, 
open systems, 
strategy, by implication from a development project 
commencing with a perceived steady state, 
perception, and 
steady state. 
A typical European Space Agency development project 
consists of approximately thirty contractors, one thousand 
personnel, eight different languages, seven different types 
of technology, eight different sub-systems, ten thousand 
documents, and three thousand changes during the five to 
fourteen years procurement cycle. Such a project is 
therefore considered to be complex. 
The subject of "open systems" is addressed in sections 
3.14, 6.5.4, 6.7, and 6.10.4. An open system is self 
organising and has the characteristic that its stability is 
in dynamic equilibrium; in which continuous change occurs 
yet relatively uniform conditions prevail. 
The following statements from existing research support the 
statements in the hypothesis relating to open systems and 
existence of feedback loops, "soft" aspects and chaos. 
a) An open system is where the stability is in dynamic 
equilibrium; in which continuous change occurs yet 
relatively uniform conditions prevail, like the 
conditions in a pool beneath a waterfall. (102) 
b) Both negative and positive feedback, in the form of 
individual and species behavioural patterns, are 
involved in maintaining the overall dynamic 
equilibrium of the community. (102) . 
c) The developing brain ought to be considered as a 
highly active and primarily self containing system 
which, when born, already possesses substantial 
knowledge about the structure of the world into which 
it is going to adapt itself. Thus when the brain is 
born and confronted with a dramatic expansion of 
accessible environment, it poses a number of precise 
questions to this environment with the purpose of 
optimising and adapting its internal structure to 
reality. (93, 109, 110). 
d) The brain and its environment appear as components of 
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a closed, highly interactive system. (109, 110, 93) 
e) The cause of developmental errors is suggested by the 
particularities of the self - organisation process. 
The possibility must be considered that the brain does 
not formulate the right questions or does not ask with 
sufficient insistency to obtain answers. (109, 110). 
f) The large scale behaviour of complex systems, often 
hidden by fluctuations, can be interpretated in terms 
of an organisational scheme for all underlying 
events. (110) . 
g) The presence of periodic solutions implies the 
presence of steady states. (130) . 
h) A chaotic system can be locally unpredictable, 
globally stable. (153) . 
i) A complex system can give rise to turbulence and 
coherence at the same time. (153) . 
An open system will attain a steady state in which its 
composition remains constant, but in contrast to 
conventional equilibria, this constancy is maintained in a 
continuous exchange and flow of component material. The 
steady state of open systems is characterised by the 
principle of equifinalitYi that is, in contrast to 
equilibrium states in closed systems which are determined 
by initial conditions, the open system may attain a 
time-independent state independent of initial conditions 
and determined only by the system parameters. Also, in open 
systems, with transport of matter import of "negative 
entropy" is possible. Hence such systems can maintain 
themselves at a high level, and even evolve toward an 
increase of order and complexity; as is indeed one of the 
most important characteristics of life processes. (63) . 
Basically, the development project is considered to be an 
open system simply because it is fundamentally composed of 
human beings; and human beings, life, are open systems (63) . 
The project studies show that projects are capable of 
maintaining a degree of order as the data rate entering the 
project increases. However the extent of "creating more 
order from less order" varies and examples of projects 
going out of control, or out of order, abound. From the 
authors viewpoint a project CAN behave like an open system 
providing it is properly designed and structured to do so; 
the latter requires a defined intervention system. 
The different interpretations given to the definition of 
"strategy" in the research, see chapter 3.1, are indicative 
of the difficulties that have been experienced by 
researchers and managers in defining the role or function 
of the company and its dynamic environment; the latter is 
specifically addressed in chapter 3.9. As an example, one 
definition states that "strategic definition refers to 
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information flow"(6). This is fully supportive of the 
"flow" concept introduced in this research and finally 
linked to dynamic risk indicators. The differences 
demonstrate that different people perceive strategy in a 
different way. Relating to the hypothesis this indicates 
that the perceived steady states, or whatever various 
people conclude a particular state to be, may be different 
because of the different perceptions of both the state and 
the applicability of the criteria they are using. 
This is a major point. Since strategy is defined in 
different ways one cannot directly compare programmes and 
these different strategic perceptions could occur in the 
same project, company and consortium. This could account, 
partially, for the adverbial relationships that often exist 
between co-contractors and even more between customers and 
contractors. 
This thesis has adopted the definition given by Hofer & 
Schendel (11) whereby the strategy of an organisation is 
defined as: 
"the means of coping with both the external and internal 
changes; the path charted for the organisation being linked 
to the organisational goals & objectives which are to be 
achieved." 
In a similar manner strategic planning as defined in the 
research seems to, variously, include goal setting, risk, 
resources, external and internal influences, capabilities, 
and morals; see chapter 3.2. There are thus significant 
differences in the interpretation of both "strategy" and 
"strategic planning"; these differences could have major 
effects on resource allocation and decision making. 
One area of research has concluded that "strategic goal 
setting provides a means of reducing environmental 
turbulence and controversy" (12) ; this constitutes a strong 
support to a main theme in the hypothesis. 
In annex 6, the Bids of projects A and B are clearly 
identified as having significant problems with important 
data inputs missing and glaring inconsistencies. However in 
spite of these traumatic circumstances the ESA final report 
indicates that the perception of the ESA top managers is 
that within a period of about three months the majority of 
the shortcomings will be rectified and the project may 
proceed. 
In the same annex similar situations have arisen, with 
similar rather open conditions attached, for the System 
Review Boards conclusions. Hence in most cases the 
programme continues with the problems, which should have 
been solved previously, being worked during the succeeding 
~hase; often causing delays and resource depletions that 
~ncrease the overall risk rather than diminishing it. In 
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the authors view these are possible bifurcation initiation 
points. 
Analysis of the data from the project studies indicates 
that moving from one phase to another with open problems 
provokes the onset of turbulent conditions. 
This effect is particularly noticeable with projects C and 
D. It is clear that the objectives of phases A and B should 
be completely achieved before commencing phases C and D. 
This is rarely done in practise. In the case of project C 
phases c and D were started with many open problems. In 
July, 1978 the ESA top management announced that the 
satellite would be ready for launch in July, 1982; it was 
finally launched in July,1989! Nevertheless, since so much 
funding had been committed the budget was continued for 
seven years after the its planned completion! 
The above statements were made by managers "doing their 
best". However the term "steady state" needs some 
discussion. It is the authors view that, in general, a 
manager considers a situation to be steady state if he can 
understand and control, cope with, the problems as they 
occur without too much doubt, stress, or conflict. 
For a major development project such a situation rarely 
exists. There are so many dimensions to the project; from 
technical, planning, personnel, political, to 
inter-personal and cultural. Steady state, in the real 
business world, is thus a period when the turbulence is 
relatively low. 
In all the projects being researched the top managers 
usually had to decide whether to proceed with a project 
with many open problems, or, not too proceed at all. The 
reason such dilemmas exist is due to annual budgeting; 
commit budget annually or lose it to some other predator. 
Since the very existence of the managers staff and 
department also often depend on the commitment of project 
budget it can be seen that the pressures to commit are very 
great; and constitute the relative steady state. 
From the interviews the following points are noted: 
a) even though a "bogey" price was used by the 
contractor, which represented less than the addition 
of all the SUb-system minimum prices, he decided that 
all the incentives and profits would be realised! 
b) the contractor often considered cost and financial 
aspects as secondary and concentrated on technical 
options to meet the customers technical requirements 
but even so he perceived that he would be successful; 
c) many contractors perceived the situation as "steady 
state" due to a conviction that, because the customer 
frequently interfered in the contractors business and 
often changed the requirements, he could blame the 
customer for the major problems that were likely to 
occur; hence the customer would pay and the financial 
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risk loops were closed! 
d} in project C it was stated that although relatively 
steady states did exist they were very short and the 
cycle time from steady state to a mini or major crisis 
was fast. It was also stated that a number of such 
cycles seemed to be present simultaneously thus making 
the overall situation more complex. 
It is the conclusion of this thesis that application of the 
Method, see chapter 6, would have resulted in early 
intervention in the above mentioned examples and the 
avoidance of such strategic disasters. 
5.3.4.2 -The Planning presents Situations in the for.m of 
Static Representations-. 
This point addresses the issues of: 
- project and environment dynamics, 
- planning. 
The summary of the research presented in chapter 3.9 
indicates a wide divergence on the definition of the 
dynamics of a company and its environment. It is clear 
however that a dynamic situation is considered to exist. 
This thesis has adopted the approach that the company and 
environment boundary, if there is such a thing, is formed 
by the limit of individual perception; this is a variable 
entity. 
The dynamics of the environment are defined in many 
different ways involving different numbers of factors and 
different types of factors. The following conclusions have 
been extracted from the current state of knowledge to 
indicate the strong subjective(soft) content, and very wide 
definition, of the environment. 
a) The dynamics of the "environment" relates generally to 
the changes of data, situations, interactions etc. 
with time. However, chaotic behaviour has been defined 
as a dynamic aspect (91) . 
b) In most cases change was found to consist of the 
adjustment of structures and systems to secure 
consistency and coherence within an architype(75) . 
c) For many middle managers personal aspirations have 
more powerful influence over decisions concerning 
technological change than organisational 
objectives (79) . 
d) Two dimensions define the environment: 
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1) simple or complex; and 
2) static or dynamic. (14) . 
The inability to agree or closely define the dynami~ 
environment, the static environment, whatever that 1S, and 
strategy, constitute areas of research that are still in 
their infancy. This situation seems not to support many of 
the assumptions that are made today e.g. hard line 
modelling and future prediction models. 
By default it is contended by the author that the theory of 
steady state - turbulence - chaos, with an incremental 
approach being applicable to linear aspects, is supported 
because actual situations, or patterns, are addressed and 
the implementation does not rely on limited definitions and 
undimensioned assumptions. 
Many of the points referenced in the research seem to be 
rather indefinite since they are based on premises which 
are not firm. Examples are references to high velocity 
environments without explaining what is moving at high 
velocity, and statements that rational decision making 
should be used in high velocity environments without 
explaining what constitutes a rational decision! 
Most space companies use a simplified PERT planning system. 
This is essentially a longitudinal bar chart of task 
durations using Boolean logic to compute schedule 
criticalities and completion dates. 
Each chart is a static representation based on data which 
often rapidly becomes obsolescent. The planning does not 
specifically identify aspects which can become very 
dynamic; the system does not have the capability to present 
the dynamic potential of particular events. An example of 
the latter is "embedded research"; see chapter 4.2.2. 
Another example of the static limitation of the current 
methods is that the planning is mostly success oriented; 
contingency planning is implemented but usually when the 
problem has occurred. Extensive consideration of failure 
consequences is rare; see chapter 4.2.3. The planning also 
does not attempt to incorporate the dynamics of strategic 
change. This is particularly significant for some space 
projects due to their long duration and international 
membership; see chapter 4.3. 
During one of the interviews it was stated that in private 
business, as opposed to government business, contingency 
planning was prepared in parallel with the main project 
planning. This could accommodate some dynamic aspects. In 
other interviews it was stated that the PERT plans did not 
adequately represent the project and it was almost 
impossible to maintain them current due to the dynamics of 
the project and the large amount of time and manpower 
needed for updating. The conclusion here is that static 
situations do not exist. If a "static snapshot" must be 
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used then priority consideration should be given to its 
sensitivity, in a limiting sense, to the dynamics of the 
situation. 
5.3.4.3 RThe planning presents situations as closed loops 
with linear margins and fixed reserves to cover all 
(including unanticipated) eventualities R. 
The following issues are addressed in this point: 
- systems, 
- closed lOOps, 
- margins, reserves. 
The literature has explored and established some 
definitions and relationships of various functions of 
organisations which have then been delineated as a 
"systems approach". The systems approach has some 
consistency in the research and discussion has also 
occurred concerning the life cycle, or the finite life 
span, of an organisation. 
In general this status, concerning what a system is and 
what it does, has been utilised in this thesis and no 
significant conflict has been detected; see chapter 3.10. 
There are differences concerning where R&D must be 
positioned in an organisation and in the systems approach. 
In the research closed loop systems have been extensively 
explained in, for example, automated systems. 
It is also stated that since feedback is an essential 
element in a closed loop system, margins can be used to 
monitor a decreasing or increasing risk profile; the closed 
loop implies a linear situation. 
Closed loop systems are infrequently mentioned in the 
research in connection with management situations. No 
reference has been found addressing the manner in which 
closed loops are proposed in this thesis. 
In many cases loops or feedback are not specifically shown 
on the planning but the feedback is assumed to exist via 
the management and monitoring activities of the project 
teams; of the contractor and the customer. The planning 
charts thus show a network of interconnecting, and in many 
cases interdependent, lines from commencement to 
t~rmination of the project. This overall planning together 
wl.th the "work breakdown documentation", giving details of 
~very task, and the curriculum vitae of the key staff 
l.nvolved constitutes the entire planning submission. 
Where, historically, difficulties have been encountered in 
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meeting certain technical or performance requir~m~nts 
margins are allocated to absorb future, unant1c1pated 
problems; see chapter 4.2.10. From the interviews it has 
been stated that these margins are dimensioned arbitrarily! 
The margins are interpreted linearly i.e. it is assumed 
that the margin will decrease to zero by the completion of 
the project. The analysis of orbit results revealed that 
approximately 20% of all design related problems were due 
to design margin violations! 
The perceived industrial risk, of not meeting the customers 
requirements on time and within cost, is covered by a fixed 
financial reserve which is agreed at the commencement of 
the project. Once again it is assumed that the reserve 
will, in the worst case, decrease to zero by the end of the 
project. By definition, therefore, the margins and reserve 
are assumed to cover all unanticipated events. The 
financial reserve has been insufficient on all ESA 
projects. This has not resulted in the contractor losing 
money due to the overlap of contractor and customer 
liabilities; promulgated by ESAs involvement in the 
contractors activities and responsibilities. The "openness" 
of the financial reserve loop is thus closed, as far as the 
contractor is concerned, by the availability of 
"alternative funding" from ESA. It should be noted that the 
ESA convention requires that ESA develop a successfully 
competitive, world wide, European Space industry. It is 
perceived to be counter productive to that objective to 
allow companies to suffer financially. That is not the view 
of this author. 
There thus seems to be a confusion between the properties 
of open and closed systems resulting in their inappropriate 
application. Hence the representation of all eventualities 
by closed loop systems is not accepted. 
In the interviews it was clearly stated that open loops are 
not addressed and the PERT planning would not facilitate 
such analysis or presentation. 
A conclusion from the above, concerning the customer and 
contractor relationship, and from the interviews, 
concerning the corporate and project manager relationship, 
is that: 
·continuous intervention will not support the accommodation 
of strategic change". 
5.3.4.4 "The project steady state is upset by 
unpredictable, hard and soft, problems". 
This statement involves decision making and project 
planning. 
In the research some limitations of current decision making 
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processes are noted e.g. the representation of multiple 
goal behaviour of man and organisations being approximated 
by a single unchanging and technically manageable criteria. 
Some quantitative methods are extremely complex and rely on 
finite well defined input data and in general do not take 
account of the soft aspects nor the dynamics of the 
situation. Decision making models have been constructed but 
they rely on significant assumptions and generally are only 
applicable to the particular situation for which they were 
formulated. The utilization of these models for "real life" 
situations could not be recommended with any confidence. A 
major problem, in this and other areas, is the lack of 
definition of all assumptions and the likely consequences 
of those assumptions being incorrect. In other words what 
is the sensitivity of the conclusions, from using the 
various techniques, to the assumptions? No answer has been 
found to this question. The conclusions of many different 
researchers are different. It is concluded that there is no 
single universal method that has been selected to define 
the decision making process. Quantitative methods are 
rejected by a large number of the researchers. 
Consideration of soft aspects is very small. 
The research addressed above refers to the problems 
currently in existence due to the multi-facetted nature of 
decisions, perception differences, the avoidance, or tacit 
acceptance (e.g. due to the "possible" weight of public 
opinion) of "soft" aspects, and the numerous and different 
decision making rationales; the latter encompassing 
organisational, checklist and formulative approaches. The 
research has also recorded that decisions are often made in 
small steps and intervention is frequently present. 
The current status is fragmented and often contradictory; 
see section 3.3. 
A typical answer when discussing decision making with 
managers is frequently that, after assimilating all the 
available data and knowledge, the final "go/no go" is made 
from gut-feeling or seat-of-the-pants directing. 
The interviewees supported the above response but stated 
that they typically relied on a few "trustworthy 
colleagues"; which they also referred to as project 
supports. 
The need to find a more realistic and useable approach 
seems to be self evident. 
On t~e s~bject of planning it is considered that 
exam~nat~on of any complex project would immediately reveal 
that the original plan had not been followed. Numerous 
case~ exist and are reported monthly in the British 
Inst~tute of Management journal, and in the Harvard 
Business Review, for example. 
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General instances of hard and soft problems which were not 
predicted are: 
icing problems on the Britannia Proteus engines (hard) ; 
fatigue problems on the Comet{hard}; 
geological problems with the Humber Bridge 
support s (hard) ; 
embedded research problems in the Concorde 
project {hard} ; 
industrial action in the British Weaving and Ship 
Building industries (soft) ; 
secondary effects with the Thalidomide drug (hard and 
soft} ; 
many bankruptcies due to currency changes (soft) ; 
problems with the British coal industry due to the 
environmental impact of "dirty coal" (soft) . 
From the interviews it was stated by two project managers 
that it is essential that all interfacing managers know 
each other personally; this would enable behavioural 
idiosyncrasies to be ascertained. 
On project C for example it was known that serious "soft" 
problems existed from the start; not least of which was the 
adversial relationship between ESA and industry due to the 
formers over-involvement. 
The conclusion on this hypothesis point is that the status 
of the project will be upset by unanticipated problems 
since no realistic method, from the decision making and 
planning aspects, exists to accommodate them. 
5.3.4.5 -The problems generate other, unpredictable, 
problems due to the complex, multiple, and many common 
interfaces, and the different perceptions of the involved 
parties-. 
This point embraces the following issues: 
- organisation, culture, 
- perception, 
- problem generation. 
The complexity of the interfaces is, at least partially, a 
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function of the type of organisations involved. Also, the 
degree by which individuals "perceive" and operate is a 
function of the degree by which the organisation constrains 
or permits such attributes. 
In the research, see chapter 3.4, a number of 
organisational types are defined but it is also stated that 
organisations can move through phases of being related to 
one type or another. For example, the metamorphosis models, 
in which growth is not smooth but involves discontinuities 
when the degree of change is too large for the existing 
structure, probably applies at the macro and micro level of 
every organisation at some time or another. The real point 
is whether the organisation adjusts itself to adequately 
handle the new situation in time to avert failure to meet 
strategic objectives or not. This seems to connect with the 
bifurcation principle since failure to amend the 
organisation to meet changed environments or even changed 
objectives could result in an increasing number of problems 
with an increasing "inability" to solve them. Hence the 
situation could be expected to progressively degenerate; 
possibly to chaotic consequences. 
An integral aspect of an organisation is the culture in 
which it resides, or which it creates, and the cultures 
with which it interfaces; these are soft aspects. It is 
therefore important to define culture and to try to 
accommodate to accommodate it. 
An interesting definition change has been formulated by 
Kristian Kreiner(71) in which he expands the sphere of 
culture from: 
to 
the underlying, often subconscious, 
foundation for peoples thinking and 
acting(the traditional approach) ; 
the surface and manifestations of such 
thinking and acting in organisations. 
This latter definition has been utilised in this thesis in 
the sense that cultural characteristics are considered to 
be perceivable. It is therefore assumed that the pattern 
recognition approach and subjective characterisations will 
include significant cultural contributors. 
As with environment it is not clearly defined; there are a 
number of descriptors including the one finally selected 
and reproduced above. 
The research indicates the difficulty of defining the 
environment and the conflicts that can be generated within 
a company working in the development field; the latter 
evidenced by the number of different systems which have 
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been devised to measure performance and risk. The need to 
limit progress to "small" finite steps and the concept of 
intervention is concluded. It is interesting to note that 
one of the interviewees stated that the best R&D results 
were obtained in a commercial environment due to the sense 
of urgency that was prevalent. He also stated that real 
progress did not take place in small steps but in the odd 
"jump"; he acknowledged that preparation for the "jump" had 
been well established in those cases that were successful. 
As mentioned above the overall project planning consists of 
sequential events many of which are inter-dependent. In 
fact to meet the timescale many events are carried out in 
parallel thus receiving inputs as they proceed rather than 
at their commencement which would be the ideal, lowest 
risk, case. Hence the number of interfaces, and their 
criticality, are increased. 
An example of "problems generating other problems" is as 
follows. During one of the projects discussed in annex 6 a 
critical high frequency payload diode failed to pass the 
qualification test programme. This meant another 
manufacturer had to be selected and the ten month programme 
restarted. The impact was enormous since the total payload 
and the satellite platform integrations were delayed. Due 
to the multiple and complex interfaces the entire project 
end date slipped. The rework situation introduced even more 
criticalalities into the programme due to the increased 
implementation of parallel activities to "strain" to meet 
the project planned, and contractually incentivised, 
completion dates. The perception of a number of managers 
during the qualification programme of the original diode 
was that "everything would ultimately be ok because the 
product comes from Japan"! The European competitor had 
failed to convince several managers even though the 
Japanese gave carte blanc agreement to meet all 
requirements without full justification. A number of 
managers felt very uneasy about this but their perceptions 
were not heeded. The whole issue fundamentally relied on 
the perceptions of one or two managers that the Japanese 
product would succeed; finally it failed and the European 
product succeeded. This affair was a kaleidoscope of "soft" 
controversies. 
The above example is submitted as being rather typical of 
events that occur in many projects. 
It is also submitted that the Law of Requisite variety, 
proposed by R.Ashby(84), is applicable. This states that 
anything interacting in the world is subject to 
disturbances tending to upset its recognisable features. 
They can only be distinguished if a compensating response 
can be generated for each disturbance nullifying the change 
that would otherwise result. Hence it is concluded that 
"only variety can absorb variety". The variety of the 
controller must match the variety of the controlled. 
, • ..t.,,:: o. ..... -; ~ '. .' 
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It is thus contended that since the total possible variety 
of a situation will rarely if ever be matched, or agreed, 
by the managers experience, knowledge and perception it is 
likely that additional problems will be generated due to 
the evolution of unrecognisable features. This situation is 
compounded by organisational, cultural, and soft issues in 
general. 
5.3.4.6 wThe steady state becomes non-linear with many open 
loopsw. 
This point basically refers to the difficulties of knowing 
what the actual status is in a complex system due to the 
large number of interfaces, the limitations of standard 
reporting mechanisms, and. the dynamics of the overall 
project scenario. 
With the proliferation of problems as mentioned in 5.2.4.5 
and the, erroneous, representation of the project by static 
networks it is considered self evident that many areas of 
unknown will exist. Unknown or undefinable situations can 
only be open loop, non-linear in nature concerning the 
amount of time and resources needed to complete them. 
From the analysis of the project documentation, see section 
5.2.2., the following conclusions have been made. 
"Unless the reader is very well informed it is impossible 
to judge the importance of the "statements of doubt" in the 
Project Progress reports (PPR) . Even for the informed 
reader, the relative risk of this or that problem is not 
indicated. In fact the PPR almost seems to be an invitation 
to the customer to ask certain questions, in certain 
pre-selected areas, where the contractor probably has an 
answer "on hold". 
This is of course a rather serious statement. It is 
probable that the contractor does not use this as a 
deliberate tactical ploy but rather adopts this style of 
behaviour because it has typically "always been done like 
that." Having made this "disclaimer" the author has known 
project managers who have always done their best to delude 
or confuse the customer to cover up their own intentions or 
errors .... or insecurities. Such project managers have also 
had the tendency to restrict, or share, information with 
their own corporate management, and their teams! The 
Quarterly Executive Report(QER) contains practically no 
information concerning risk; it having been specially 
prepared for "unlimited distribution" and particularly to 
possible future customers. Hence corporate reliance on such 
a report, possibly to use it also as an input to another 
~trategic plan, would probably be a waste of time; or very 
~llusionary. It is clear from the above and the interview 
inpu~s that a more rigorous method of reporting is 
requlred. The orbit problems of project B were extensive 
and can, in hindsight, be traced to early brief references 
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in the reports." 
The above indicates the inadequacies of the reporting and 
information distribution systems. This could have serious 
consequences on the decision making and general management 
processes and, it is submitted, would contribute to the 
increase of unknowns, and therefore non-linearities, in the 
project. 
The definition of an open loop system which is relevant to 
this thesis is: 
a system in which the definition or outcome of any of 
its elements either, 
1) cannot be completely defined, or, 
2) cannot be directly linked with a previously 
experienced "similar" item which had a 
successful result. 
This definition naturally excludes closed loop systems 
since both the conditions 1) and 2) are not applicable. 
Using the same rational, "margins" cannot be used in open 
loop systems. 
It seems that critical elements of open loop systems are 
knowledge as well as data based. 
The following points present some examples from current 
research. 
a) Complexity is a property of a system ar~s~ng from 
interactions of the system with its observer-regulator 
rather than being an intrinsic property of the system 
itself. Linguistic models can be used to avoid 
complexity. (90) . 
b) Most managers have decided to use heuristic rather 
than mathematical models i.e. problem solving by 
inductive reasoning. Four basic approaches to 
scientific truth: Liebnitzian; Lockean; Kantian; 
Hegelian. (90) . 
c) Quantitative model representation of complex systems 
is questionable. Language expresses ideas and beliefs. 
Formalism errs on the side of sameness and seeks to 
exorcise vagueness; functionalism errs on the side of 
difference and encourages us to look at the uses of 
vagueness. Silence may communicate what is beneath or 
beyond words. (91) . 
d) Probability theory studies statistical inexactness, 
due to the occurrence of random events, and fuzzy set 
theory studies inexactness due to human 
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judgement. (91) . 
Once again the domination of behavioural, soft, issues has 
been indicated. 
In the "Analysis of Daily Records", see chapter S.2.S, all 
the critical items that caused turbulent and chaotic 
conditions were identifiable as open loop systems prior to 
commencement of phase C-D i.e. they were either embedded 
research or inadequately defined managerial systems. 
5.3.4.7 -Without risk indicators and intervention the 
achievement of the project strategic objectives will not be 
definable nor predictable.-
This point relates to the issues of: 
- risk indicators, 
- decision making, 
- intervention, and 
- project failure/success. 
The Space business is predominately success orientated; 
risk indicators, as such, do not exist. 
As described in chapter 4 the main indicators of "success" 
used in a Space projects are: 
a) the maintenance of the schedule; 
b) the number of Change Notices by which the contractors 
request more money or time, or both; 
c) the parametric margins e.g. for power and mass; 
d) the results of System level reviews; 
e) the achievement of successful qualification; 
f) the delivery of hardware and software; 
g) the successful completion of tests; 
During the past ten years the attitude of ignoring certain 
risk and failure aspects has gradually changed in the 
~ec~ic~l domain. It is unfortunate, and perhaps an 
1nd1cat1on of the magnitude of the inertia to change, that 
such changes have often been forced into effect only after 
the occurrence of accidents e.g. the failure of the shuttle 
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Challenger. 
A number of methods, tools, criteria and requirements now 
exist to define, evaluate and control technical, and to 
some extent programmatic, risk. They are still very weak in 
the man-machine interface, software, knowledge and data 
utilisation areas but progress has been made. The author 
has initiated some related research addressing risk and 
hazard analysis utilising data and knowledge bases, 
subjective judgement and expert systems. It is interesting 
to observe that every part of every electronic circuit is 
analyzed for all possible consequences of all possible 
failure modes (FMECA), at significant cost and time. An 
equivalent activity in the management and programmatic area 
has never been seriously considered to the knowledge of the 
author even though the "effective implementation" of the 
FMECA depends on the existence of such a system; hence one 
of the main drivers for this research work. 
It is extremely surprising, to the author, that this 
in-balance is apparently not perceived to be paradoxical by 
the customer and contractor managements involved; in spite 
of the fact, from the orbit analysis(see annex 8), that 70% 
of all design related problems have been due to "inadequate 
failure mode consideration and the inability to test or 
simulate completely certain systems prior to launch". 
It is suspected that the above orbit statistics were not 
known to the project personnel. This seems to be an example 
where relevant data was not available to the right people 
at the right time. This "open system" and "negative 
entropy" characteristic whereby decreasing the "local" 
entropy, i.e. by injecting the right data, in order to be 
able to increase order in a situation in which the 
complexity is increasing, would not therefore have been 
present. In these circumstances the projects can be 
predicted to become less successful. 
The following extracts from the current research status 
indicates the major role of subjectivity and informal 
communication (soft aspects) in the way in which managers 
actually work and make decisions. 
a) Managers: 
work at an unrelenting pace; their activities are 
characterised by brevity, variety and 
discontinuity; they are action orientated and 
favour oral media. They handle exceptions and 
regular work; and process soft information that 
links the organisation with its environment. The 
managers' programmes relating to decision making, 
information processing etc. remain locked inside 
their brains (18) . 
spend as much time with peers outside their 
organisations as with subordinates and through 
such interpersonal contacts they emerge as the 
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nerve centres of their organisations (18) . 
at CEO level, decisions are made in small steps; 
particularly very complex ones to allow time to 
understand the problem(16,72). 
b) Decision making in high velocity environments e.g. 
where the rate of change of product life cycles is 
high, is characterised by: 
analytical, rational, comprehensive, short term & 
fast processes; 
assessment of innovative, risky strategic 
alternatives with "decision execution-" and 
"implementation-" triggers; 
centralised power in the CEO but with high 
delegation to trigger points/ executives (21) . 
c) Strategy and the related decision making include the 
collection of objective and perceptual organisational 
data at multiple points in time as the strategy 
unfolds. The board of directors(an external coalition) 
may be dominated, divided or passive; in the two 
latter cases the lower management levels will get the 
opportunity to intervene and influence to their own 
ends. CEOs must respond to departmental power which 
can be direct; external environmental impact is seldom 
direct and the cause-effect relationship often 
unclear. Although CEOs often interpret their 
environment as it is perceived to exist, they may also 
create or enact an environment that is different from 
the one they have been experiencing (22) . 
d) Multiple goal behaviour of men and organisations has 
traditionally been approximated by single, unchanging, 
and technically manageable criteria; the results of 
psychologists and social scientists concerning 
multi (non-mutually destructive) goals has been 
ignored. These goals are not independent of the means 
used to pursue them. Dealing with such 
"incommensurables" as quality of life, education, 
etc .. can no longer be avoided. Many researchers are 
sceptical about mans ability to choose among 
multi-attributed alternatives- suggesting an 
interaction (23) . 
e) T~e public definition becomes an integral part of the 
s~tuation(30) and cognitive dissonance, relating to 
the reordering of goals, is defined as being a direct 
function of the number of items the person knows are 
inconsistent with the decision(31) . 
Some of the principles relating to the above have been used 
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in this thesis e.g. expert judgement and fault tree 
analysis. Part of the intervenors role would be to ensure 
the implementation and utilisation of lessons learned. 
There are clear statements in the research which indicate 
that where an incremental approach has been used success 
has resulted. This point is acknowledged by one of the 
interviewees but he made the additional observation that to 
succeed significantly with respect to others major jumps 
were necessary. These major jumps far exceeded an 
incremental step. The same person made the comment that 
really successful R&D should be performed under 
conditions of stress e.g. something must be achieved by a 
certain date. There are also a number of statements that 
the strategy must fit the environment. This rather 
ambiguous since, as mentioned above, definitions of 
"strategy" and "environment" are not well agreed. The issue 
of incrementalism, traceability and feedback is mentioned 
increasingly and related to successful organisations. 
Correlation is not made with linear, non-linear, closed or 
open loop systems as has been done in this thesis. There is 
also the point that the borderless company is on its way; 
this conclusion was made from a survey, world wide, of 
12,000 managers. This is interpreted to support the 
contention in this thesis that the border between a company 
and its "environment" is not representable by hard lines. 
In this thesis it is defined as the locus of the 
perceptions of the managers within that company. 
Previous research has identified a connection between 
"incrementalism and traceability" and "success". This is an 
important support for the incremental approach which is one 
of the thrusts of this thesis. 
Only one reference has been found that actually mentions 
feedback mechanisms being based on indicators; this is 
stated to be an ideal case(36) . 
There are many references concerning the subjective 
appraisal or perception of risk and the fact that allowance 
must be made for such differences. This is rated as a 
positive support of the hypothesis. 
There is also the strong support that when two functions 
were learned under different conditions the subject erred 
in the direction of allocating more resources to the 
subject learned under less uncertain conditions. This 
supports the brain - chaos theory where we always try to 
relate something to a familiar aspect i.e. something we 
~ave experienced ,before. A point is made here that the 
1nterest of the 1ntervenors was more in the phenomenolgy of 
th~ situation than in the cybernetics of control. In saying 
th1S, Checkland et al reject many types of modelling 
including VSM. 
In the Project Implementation Profile method thirteen 
factors were written down which account for the variation 
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of project success. At the top is a "clearly defined 
project mission" or, in the terms of this thesis, the 
"statement of risk". Lower down in the list are "monitoring 
and feedback", "communication", and "perceived quality". 
These points all support the hypothesis and the thesis in 
general. 
There are a number of references to perception; emphasising 
that one must take account of perception and that it is a 
major element in early failure. 
There are also a number of comments relating to the 
unpredictability of the future. 
The above notes indicate the concern of a number of 
researchers with the lack of understanding, and 
consideration, of what organisations, and their 
environments, are and hence what risk actually means e.g. 
organisational safety is only apparent after an accident. 
Some researchers have clearly referred to the need to 
advance incrementally with a brief mention of indicators 
and feedback. Uncertainty is defined as the "unknown 
unknowns" which is congruent with the thinking in this 
thesis. There are a number of references relating to 
"perception" and behavioural aspects, and in particular 
the main contributors to project failures are stated to be: 
perception ambiguities; 
communication and feedback problems; 
planning and phenomenological (150) issues. 
It is also interesting to note the occasional analogy to 
some aspect of "living systems" e.g resident pathogens. In 
general this synopsis indicates that this thesis represents 
a "natural advance" of a number of research directions that 
have already been identified and to some extent initiated 
and substantiated. 
The necessity for intervention was demonstrated in projects 
C and D. In the former case, ESAs intervention was actually 
requested when the prime contractors perception of the 
situation was that a major crisis, beyond his powers of 
resolution, existed. This seems to clearly indicate a 
situation of chaos i.e. systematic relationships existed 
but only randomness was perceived. 
For project D the intervention occurred on a regular basis 
due to the convention of an independent ESA Director 
General "oversight" conunittee. The effect of this 
int~rvention was, finally, to expose the high risk of this 
pro1ect and it was finally redefined. This particular 
proJect commenced as an European national project with a 
very.high "national prestige" profile. The resources 
r7qu1red then became too high for a single country to 
f1nance and ESA adopted the programme, with multi-national 
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participation and funding. The unwritten strategic 
objective still seemed to be the national prestige and 
deluded the perception concerning the magnitude of the 
technical problems and the corresponding lack of resources. 
The written strategic objectives only were used by the 
oversight committee. 
The above examples illustrate two quite different 
situations where intervention was necessary in order to 
maintain, or protect, the strategic objectives. The 
problems in both cases was that the interventions came too 
late to avoid significant unnecessary expenditures. 
5.3.4.8 RThe perceived unstable project evolution is 
analogous to a flow condition moving fram steady state to a 
state of turbulence and ulttmately to a state of chaos as 
the flow rate is increased. R 
The aspects of perception, bifurcation, turbulence and 
chaos are the main issues addressed by this point and are 
central to this thesis. 
Many references refer to perception; it is becoming a 
central theme in the research. A model of "brain 
perception" has been devised(93, 105) and is adopted in 
this thesis. It fundamentally states that the brain will 
always relate every new or different perception to a 
previous experience even if the resulting relationship is 
not correct. It seems clear therefore that a bifurcation 
may, or may not, be recognised by someone or it may even be 
invented where it does not exist simply because experience 
in the brain does not exist to indicate otherwise. 
It has been well documented that the process of defining 
the nature of a problem is dependent upon the histories and 
backgrounds of those responsible for defining the problem. 
(42; plus, Bruner and Kresch 1950; Hayes and Simon 1977; 
Herden and Lyles 1981). 
Perception is affected by the presence of a distorting 
medium and is processed by something which has certain 
limited capabilities. A general uniformity of nature is 
both necessary and sufficient to justify inductive 
reasoning. (68) . 
From the work of W.J.Freeman et al(91) it is apparent that 
chaos exists in the brain, and in fact is an essential 
factor in enabling the brain to cope with the enormous 
amounts of information presented to, or perceived by, it. 
pe:ception is defined as NOT the copying of an incoming 
st1mulu~ BUT a step in a trajectory by which brains grow, 
reorgan1se themselves, and reach into their own environment 
tO,change it to their own advantage. This "own advantage" 
p01nt is important; it implies that the brain will 
"convince itself" in order to satisfy e.g. hunger, thirst, 
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sex .... which is clearly correct. The relationship between 
executives decision making and their "needs", from 
psychological, material, moral needs and conflicts, thus 
becomes clear{er). 
There is now an established scientifically accepted model 
of brain perception which involves experience and 
familiarity and a constant conflict between out of balances 
primarily due to the existence of experiencal knowledge 
resident in the brain. Therefore the brain will always 
relate every new or different perception to a previous 
experience; even if the relationship is not correct. In 
other words the reinforcement given by experience to a 
stimulus enables a selection and identification, of that 
particular stimulus to be made. In the absence of 
experience no selection is possible. 
The functioning of living systems according to the 
principles of chaos is documented, although not extensively 
proven, by numerous authors. (121, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 
137). The involvement of chaos in the functioning of the 
brain has been substantially commented in this thesis e.g. 
chapters 3.11, 3.14 and 5.44, with associated references to 
the literature. 
The concept of bifurcation whereby "changing one parameter 
can cause the system to move from steady state(equilibrium) 
to a point where the equilibrium splits in two, these 
bifurcations then come faster and faster, and then the 
system becomes chaotic (152, 153)" seems to fit the 
actuality of business, and project, behaviour very well. 
From the interviews, see annex 6, it is clear that project 
managers and project controllers have often experienced 
feelings that "things are speeding up", crises are 
increasing, and "there are so many problems on so many 
fronts that we really don't know what to do". This seems to 
indicate that the authors so-called transition from 
something resembling steady state through turbulence to a 
chaotic state does exist; at least in the perception of the 
main players. 
The observation has been made (152, 153) that "chaotic 
dynamics discovered that the disorderly behaviour of simple 
systems acted as a creative process. It generated 
complexity; richly organised patterns, sometimes stable and 
sometimes unstable, sometimes finite, but always with the 
fascination of living things." 
~he documented statement(152) that "dynamical instability 
1S ~he.average of a measure of the rate of growth of small 
dev1at1ons" seems to be very appropriate. 
The above, from the experience of this author, describes 
project situations. Life can be tranquil, steady state and 
apparently linearly extrapolatable for a certain period and 
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then suddenly, often from an lIapparently insignificant" 
source, everything becomes turmoil with "tiger teams" being 
formed to deal with potentially catastrophic problems. The 
situation has become non-linear. Panic situations 
frequently develop and managers "throw money at the 
problem", see annex 6 for interviewees affirmative 
comments, on the basis of "solve quickly now and thus avoid 
more serious impacts later in the programme". This approach 
can be very damaging since the turmoil may actually spread 
due to the predatorial effect of the "throw money at the 
problem" approach depriving other areas of necessary 
resources. 
For this author the science of chaos has provided the only 
realistic conceptualisation of project and business life as 
they really are; from his own experience, that of the 
interviewees, and from the project and case studies. 
The analyses of actual project data carried out in chapter 
5 are submitted as real evidence of the existence of steady 
state conditions evolving to turbulent and eventually to 
chaotic situations; and the presence of problem increase 
via bifurcation or IIdoubling" mechanisms. In particular 
Figs. 1 through 16 should be addressed. 
The notes 124 through 130 provide a summary of the status 
of the science of chaos at the time of writing this thesis. 
5.3.4.9 wThe movement fram steady state through turbulence 
to chaos occurs due to bifurcations which increasingly 
multiply if their reactions are allowed to proceed 
unhinderedw• 
The main issues involved here are: 
problems will occur and will multiply due to 
interaction effects, 
the problem evolution can only be stopped if 
intervention takes place. 
All of the projects studied commenced with turbulent 
periods relating to the political situation, the mission 
definition, the establishment of industrial consortia, and 
the agreement of contract conditions. With one exception, 
the projects studied then exhibited relatively steady state 
periods which every now and then erupted; usually due to 
tec~nol0S¥ developments going wrong. The further into the 
proJect 11fe cycle that these eruptions occurred the 
greater the proliferation, or bifurcation, of the effects. 
This is bound to be the case due to the increasing 
IIcloseness" and interdependency of all the project pieces 
as they approach the time when they are all integrated 
to~e~her. M~ny of the problems causing the eruptions 
or1gl.nated 1n "embedded research". Most of the latter were 
Page 163 
identified at the commencement of the project but were 
inadequately considered in the planning and costin~; 
usually due to political and company (future) surv1val 
pressures. In these latter cases the intervention and 
control, by the top management at ESA and industry working 
in league, seemed to be determined to formally commence the 
journey towards their strategic goals irrespective of the 
realism of the starting situation. This point is evidenced 
in the interviews where it has been conceded that a "dummy 
price" was used in order to be able to start the contract. 
Once the project was started, and ESA committed, the 
contractors worries were essentially over due to the 
softness of the ESA contract conditions; it was almost 
impossible for a contractor to lose money. He could only 
lose a proportion of the profit! Due to the annual 
budgeting situation on the ESA side it was essential to 
commit funds within the financial year; the alternative was 
to risk permanent loss of budget. Since the ESA project 
staff are paid out of the project cost to completion 
budgets the commencement of projects was also essential for 
the retention of ESA departmental staff; this eventually 
reflected the ESA top management survival and authority. 
The above thus indicates a rather vicious "catch 22" 
situation. It is however probably representative of 
industrial environments in general. The output of this 
thesis is thus considered to be applicable to more than 
just the ESA-European industry scenario. 
Certain aspects of these points from the hypothesis are 
therefore considered to be axiomatic due to the connection 
of practically everything with everything else in the total 
project planning. Therefore if, for example, a small design 
detail or the delivery of a small part is not completed on 
time then the complete project will suffer. The omission of 
those two completions will increasingly effect other tasks 
and procurement due the to synchronised and inter-dependent 
nature of the design, manufacturing, and build processes. 
5.3.4.10 "The high risk consequences can be avoided if the 
bifurcation patterns, involving both hard and soft aspects, 
can be initially identified, and maintained current, thus 
per.mitting restriction of excursions to the turbulent and 
chaotic states by utilising risk indicators and 
intervention". 
This point of the hypothesis considers the growth of small 
deviations, which generate dynamic instability (152) , as 
being similar to the bifurcations identified in the science 
of chaos. It is then considered that the increases in 
bifurcations form definite patterns that are identifiable; 
as the number of interacting bifurcations increase, the 
transition from a rather steady state situation to one of 
relative turbulence will be clear. 
The conclusions from the research that quantitative methods 
are not adequate is a solid foundation block for the 
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"direction" of this thesis i.e. the only valid approach 
that can be made to encompass programmatic d~namics, . 
non-linearities, and hard and soft aspects, 1S one Wh1Ch is 
qualitative. 
The following comments relate to the characteristics of 
organisations and indicate the dominant role of "soft" 
aspects: 
a) ideas can be interventions (34) ; 
b) a major reason for organisational failure is the 
isolation of R&D from the corporate functions (36) i 
c) cultural perceptions shape managers (115) ; 
d) successful organisations tend to have traceability 
"back" to previous work which had some similarity with 
the current work, monitoring and feedback must be 
built in(44)i 
e) organisations are political systems composed of 
constituencies of interest (75) . 
As with closed loop systems relating to complex systems, 
open loop systems have also not been directly mentioned. 
References in this research assessment again refer to the 
inadequateness of mathematical models. Most of the research 
on open loop systems deals with fuzzy mathematics, 
probability theory applications, and expert systems. There 
is a clear conclusion, made a number of times, that 
quantitative methods are inadequate. In fact, most of the 
open loop statements deal with definitions and the 
possibility of this or that method being applicable to 
different situations. In this area a significant amount of 
philosophical discussion is taking place and informatics 
modelling techniques using fuzzy algebra, subjective 
judgement etc. are under consideration. 
Fundamental to this hypothesis is the concept that 
organisations can be self organising i.e. the pattern 
relating to the control of the bifurcations can become more 
orderly and therefore certain developing risk situations 
could be averted. This apparent violation of the second law 
of thermodynamics is only possible with the injection of 
negative entropy. 
This thesis submits the achievement of a reducing entropy 
situation in the following manner. If data, hard or soft, 
received by a programme is valid and current i.e. relevant 
and timely, and the programme has, and uses, the capability 
to apply the data, then the programme problem solving 
a~ility will increase, the problems will decrease, the risk 
w1ll decrease, the orderliness will increase, the 
complexity will decrease ...... and therefore the entropy 
will decrease. 
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It is thus an essential feature of defining intervention 
that the entropy status, qualitatively and relatively, is 
known; an increasing or decreasing entropy can thus be 
deduced. The criticality of 'the right data at the right 
time" is thus paramount. 
The following points have been selected from the 
bibliographical reviews as key elements in support of the 
above statements. 
a) An open system is where the stability is in dynamic 
equilibrium; in which continuous change occurs yet 
relatively uniform conditions prevail, like the 
conditions in a pool beneath a waterfall. (63) 
b) Both negative & positive feedback, in the form of 
individual & species behavioural patterns, are 
involved in maintaining the overall dynamic 
equilibrium of the community. (63) . 
c) The objective of everything is survival; feedback is 
involved everywhere. (63) . 
d) Cognitive functions have to be learned. "Seeing" has 
to learned during a critical period of post natal 
development. (93) . 
e) The developing brain ought to be considered as a 
highly active and primarily self containing system 
which, when born, already possesses substantial 
knowledge about the structure of the world into which 
it is going to adapt itself. Thus when the brain is 
born and confronted with a dramatic expansion of 
accessible environment, it poses a number of precise 
questions to this environment with the purpose of 
optimising & adapting its internal structure to 
reality. (93) . 
f) The closed, highly interactive system. (93) 
g) The cause of developmental errors is suggested by the 
particularities of the self-organisation process.The 
possibility must be considered that the brain does not 
formulate the right questions or does not ask with 
sufficient insistency to obtain answers. (93) . 
h) The character of a sociobiophysical system may be 
strongly affected by sudden changes in its subsystems 
or the systems environment e.g. the advent of new 
technology. (65) . 
i) Self organising systems are concerned with 
circularity, recursiveness, & self-reference. (104) . 
j) Memory and consciousness can be readily 
separated. (138) . 
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k) Learning is not how people feel, but how they 
think. (139) . 
1) Information is not only produced by dissipating the 
degrees of freedom in a system, but also by increasing 
resolution in systems with few degrees of 
freedom. (138) . 
m) The large scale behaviour of complex systems, often 
hidden by fluctuations, can be interpretated in terms 
of an organisational scheme for all underlying 
events.(63). 
n) The presence of periodic solutions implies the 
presence of steady states. (180) . 
0) A chaotic system can be locally unpredictable, 
globally stable. (153) . 
p) A complex system can give rise to turbulence and 
coherence at the same time. (153) . 
The above statements clearly identify the predominating 
role of feedback, the learning process, the dynamics of the 
situation, and environmental interaction in the brain. 
These characteristics are key elements in the thesis. 
The subject of "risk indicators" as such has not been found 
in any of the research reviewed to date; it has been 
alluded to by implication. 
Risk is mentioned in various references, as indicated 
below, but the definitions are not clear and not 
standardised. 
The following points are presented as being particularly 
important to the validation of the thesis. 
a} Organisations tend to be blind to the importance of 
events that could signal disaster(36) . 
b) Subjects appear to reconstruct the meaning of 
inconsistent labels so that they fit the "learned" 
relations (50) . 
c) Behaviour in organisations was seen, by Checkland et 
al, as following from human intentions and only to be 
understood in terms of the perceptions and meanings 
that correspond to them. The interest of the 
intervenors was in the phenomenology of the situation; 
less in the cybernetics of control (103). 
d) Risk is known unknowns; uncertainty is about unknown 
unknowns (57) . 
It is recommended that some risk indicators are constructed 
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in the form of "trees"(see figs.O and 00, page 93); for 
example for the ITT, the Bid, and for the duration of the 
project. The trees should be based on: 
spacecraft functions such as guidance, 
navigation; 
interfacing hardware and software; 
contractually linked companies, with their 
products; 
financial aspects; essentially penalties & 
incentives. 
Each risk indicator node should also be identified 
according to: 
its location with respect to all influencing open 
loop systems; 
whether it has multiple interfaces, with other 
equipments for example; 
its consequences on the spacecraft mission, 
finances, schedule; 
the resources required to reduce or contain it. 
5.4 Conclusion. 
In section 5.3 the validity of the hypothesis has been 
examined in detail using all the knowledge and data 
collected in this research programme. 
It is submitted that the results of the data analysis in 
this thesis indicate that the hypothesis is valid. With 
such a small sample and lack of some detailed information 
it is not possible state more. 
The author is convinced that the science of chaos is 
applicable and this contention is supported by the limited 
data analysis provided in this thesis. It appears to be the 
only branch of science that can address, in an integrated 
fashion, deterministic and behavioural, linear and 
non-linear, aspects. 
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Chapter 6. The METHOD·. 
* To distinguish the "Method" proposed in this thesis from 
other methods it is always written with a capital "M" thus: 
Method. 
6.0 General 
This Method has been developed to facilitate the 
application of the results of this research. 
The basis of this Method is the thesis hypothesis and the 
results of the data analysis. 
It is pertinent to recall that the objective of the thesis, 
and therefore of the Method, is to enable the pragmatic 
definition of the role of intervention in strategic change. 
It is also important to restate that this thesis 
presupposes the existence of an a-priori statement that 
defines the risk that the project objectives will not be 
met. It is also assumed that the customer and contractor 
have accepted that "risk". 
This statement could take the form: 
"the probability of the space vehicle successfully 
completing its operational mission shall not be less than 
0.8{80%)". 
This implies that the customer accepts a 20% risk that the 
required performance, for the mission time specified, will 
not be met. 
A review of research to date indicates that a significant 
contributory cause of project failures is the absence of 
such statements or goals(88). 
The Method thus fundamentally addresses the identification 
and management of risk; strategically. 
A number of aspects of the Method have not been "proven" by 
the author but are used because they represent the only 
explanation known to the author that "fits" or "describes" 
certain "observed" circumstances. 
The invocation of the "science of chaos" and 
"non-linearities" are the prime candidates. It is noted 
however from the results of the data processing, see 
chapter 5, that a substantial amount of supportive research 
and field evidence exists. 
In this thesis the aspect of intervention relates only to 
the intervention in the project managers business, at all 
levels, by a separate authority. 
A conclusion of this research is that the intervention 
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function is considered essential in order that proper risk 
containment measures can be defined and implemented, and 
the dynamics of the business world can be accommodated 
during the project life cycle. The purpose of the Method is 
to define the role of the intervenor in the management 
structure of a development project. 
The intervenors role has direct and indirect aspects; it 
must never visibly usurp the authority or responsibility of 
the project manager. 
Prior to the commencement of a project it is the role of 
the intervenor to note the availability of all the 
necessary management tools, experienced people, established 
management methods and communication systems i.e. the 
means, methods and rules. 
The intervenor would attend all high level negotiations, 
strictly as an observer, and would have carte blanche 
authority to visit any co-contractor or vendor, or attend 
any meeting, at his discretion; prior to and during the 
project life cycle. These aspects of the intervenors role 
are termed indirect and would generate a form of 
psychological awareness of a possible direct 
accountability. 
It is important to appreciate that intervention can also be 
caused to happen by presenting information in such a way 
that it, the information itself, becomes the intervention 
function. It is part of the role of the intervenor to 
ensure that such "information initiated intervention" 
occurs where necessary. 
During the campilation of this thesis, twenty eight 
POSTULATES have been written down, they are listed in Annex 
1. These postulates are required to be used in the 
application of the Method as ·checkpoints· at each review, 
and particularly during the evaluation of the Bid. 
In a similar maDDer examples of fourteen RISK INDICATORS 
have been listed in Annex 3, they should be used as 
"guidelines· during the evaluation of project bids, 
reports, reviews etc. when defining risk indicators. 
Two fundamental issues define the role of the intervenor; 
they are: 
1) perception, and 
2) the incremental approach. 
These will now be discussed in more detail. 
Figures 25 through 27E present an overview and flow chart 
of the Method. 
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The figures show the current typical method of presentation 
of a Bidders proposals, consisting of segregated 
information in book form. The Method requires that this 
information is evaluated with respect to trajectories, 
project supports, open loops, negative entropy, and 
complexity. It is required that the resources, cost and 
manpower, are combined such that they can be assessed as a 
total entity. 
The Method then requires that all the above evaluated and 
combined data are integrated onto three-dimensional charts 
to enable judgement of proper resource provision for all 
areas of concern. Finally the Method requires the 
assessment of the dynamics of the project and the 
classification of activities as steady state, turbulent, or 
chaotic. 
The advantages to be gained by applying this Method over 
the current way of conducting business in development 
projects, are outlined in chapter 7. 
6.1 Perception. 
Perception covers such aspects as the availability and 
usability of information; and the distortion of information 
as it is "processed" by different individuals. Hence the 
Method requires that all information is presented such that 
the risk which it contains can be perceived by the project 
management. One of the clear conclusions of this research 
is that information seems to be presented, in many cases, 
such that the risk elements that it contains cannot be 
understood. 
The Method requires that all resource, cost, and schedule 
information, supplied by a bidder or a contractor, are 
presented in 3-dimensional(3-D) plots in an integrated and 
synchronised fashion. 
A flow chart of the main steps in the Method is shown in 
Fig.27 through 27E. 
The 3-D plots must be correlated with the perceived risk 
assessments, by the local technical and management staff, 
of the aspects of the project or product under their 
responsibility. 
In order to judge the value, or the existence of bias due 
for example to the lack of adequate experience, the 
personal and professional particulars of the top engineers 
and managers involved must be submitted and the 3-d plots 
annotated reference their impact. 
It is also necessary to evaluate the effects of cultural 
differences particularly at interfaces; this could have 
short and , long term effects. In this respect it may be 
problemat1c to have Jewish and Arabic persons interfacing 
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with each other. 
It is the intervenors responsibility to perceive the longer 
term strategic influences, both internal and external to 
the company, on the project. 
In order that the project can perform efficiently it must 
maintain the characteristics of an open system i.e. through 
the use of negative entropy it can establish increasing 
order with increasing complexity. As far as the intervenor 
is concerned this translates to the receipt of the right 
information at the right time such that the right staff are 
available to understand and implement the appropriate 
messages. Research and experience have shown that many 
development projects do not have this capability and hence 
the increase of complexity, amount of input data for 
example, causes crises to occur. 
The Method also requires that an open loop does not exist 
concerning the learning that may have occurred from 
previous work. Thus it is required to establish a "lessons 
learned" culture such that past experience is examined and 
any lessons learned are passed to the next project. 
6.2 The Incremental Approach. 
The ideal situation for the intervenor is where all new 
design and build activities, for example, can be directly 
correlated with previously successful work by the company 
and personnel now involved. 
Where such traceability cannot be established an open loop 
situation is considered to exist and an increased level of 
risk. 
The accurate prediction of the future is considered to be 
impossible; this statement is considered to be a postulate. 
Since the future cannot be accurately predicted and since 
the objective of this work is to minimise the escalation of 
risk in the "future" it is necessary to establish a method 
by which some confidence can be obtained of how problematic 
the future is likely to be. 
The approach adopted in this thesis is twofold. 
The primary method of assessing the future risk in a 
project is to review the planning for the onset of 
turbulence and chaos. Complimentary to this "pattern 
recognition" aspect is the incremental approach which 
entails proceeding forward in "small" increments such that 
the connections, or interfaces, between the succeeding 
increments have sufficient commonality to characterise, to 
the extent possible, the new increment in terms of the old 
(well understood) increment. This incremental approach 
should also enable the onset of non-linearities, leading to 
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turbulence and chaos, to be: 
a) assessed, during the project definition phase and, 
b) detected, during the project implementation phases. 
This "characterisation" process is essentially the 
identification of "delta" risk aspects of the new increment 
and establishing closed loop systems to enable those deltas 
to be contained. If a closed loop system cannot be defined, 
for example when a non-linear mode is encountered, then the 
particular aspect moves into the open loop system domain; 
see section 6.2.1, annex 9, and fig.34 (page 189) for the 
definition of open loop as used in this thesis. 
A number of researchers have reported on the importance of 
"previous familiarity with some aspects of a new 
situation". 
This point is particularly poignant with respect to 
software developments since the discipline itself is 
relatively new and it has an accelerating development 
epvironment. A researcher in this field (110) has stated 
that one of the main differences between successful and 
unsuccessful programmes is that the former had "done it, or 
something like it, before". 
The incremental part of the overall approach thus depends 
on the traceability of certain "risk sensitive" parameters, 
or attributes, from one increment to the next. 
The intervenor is very concerned about departures from the 
incremental approach and would label such aspects as high 
priority risk indicators. 
The overall incremental approach thus includes the 
following: 
risk dimensioned increments; 
transition from linear to non-linear modes; 
intervention definition, and rational for 
application including warning and control 
limits; 
static and dynamic risk indicators including 
project objectives and parametric 
sensitivity; 
positive and negative feedback including 
growth and decay aspects; 
human analogy concept. 
entropy and orderliness connections 
including the project-environment symbiosis 
that then becomes a natural consequence; 
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integrated application of the approach to 
the total system. 
definition of strategic change; 
6.2.1 Open Loops and Non-Linearities. 
As stated previously the entire project, or business, 
"universe" is considered to be controlled by human beings, 
and therefore by their "brains". The brain functions on the 
basis of perception and perception functions on the basis 
of feedback; see chapters 3.11, 3.13, 3.14 and 3.15. 
Therefore, since the actual project environment is 
"continuously dynamic", all aspects of a project, and its 
environment, are considered to consist of feedback systems 
i.e. closed and open loops. 
It therefore follows that if a particular system is not a 
closed loop system then it must be an open loop system. A 
closed loop system, as stated before, is linear and 
essentially everything is known about it such that reacting 
to the feedback information enables control adjustments to 
be made that will correct the detected deviations. 
It is considered axiomatic therefore that negative answers 
to those questions which would receive positive answers in 
the case of closed loop systems automatically identifies 
the system as being open loop. 
Of the following nine questions the first seven are 
considered in this category. The final two questions, i.e. 
questions 8 and 9, are included for completeness concerning 
possible interactions of interfacing systems. 
Hence in the Method, for all significant work activities of 
each phase, the following questions must be answered: 
question 1: 
question 2: 
question 3: 
question 4: 
question 5: 
has the activity been done before by the 
contractors who are scheduled to do it? 
is all the data needed to complete the 
activity available when needed; or is the 
outcome of the activity predictable? 
is all the knowledge needed to complete the 
activity available when needed; or is the 
outcome of the activity predictable? 
are all the interfaces defined when needed? 
(this includes interfaces between phases; 
see section 6.4). 
are all inputs, including other bits of HW 
and/or SW', available when needed. 
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their application is based on their gradual and predictable 
utilization with time. 
In order to evaluate the risk potential where such 
traceability does not exist the project planning must be 
prepared in such a way that all open loop situations can be 
identified and graded. 
Figures 28, 29 and 3D show the progressive modification of 
an example of a standard critical path network(CPN) to 
include open loops. The qualification test, failure 
analysis, life test and stress test are identified as open 
loops because the answers to questions 1, 2, 3, in section 
6.2.1, are "no". This fundamentally means that the outcome 
of these activities is not known; they could all produce 
failure situations which could have serious project 
consequences. It will be seen that the final version, 
Fig.3D, shows a completely different critical path than 
shown in with the conventional approach, Fig.28. 
6.3 Intervention 
The "overall management" of the project requires a 
synergistic co-operation between: 
the project manager 
the intervenor. 
Each of the above have separate but complimentary roles 
which must be clearly formalised. 
The project manager is hierarchically lower in the company 
than the intervenor. The project managers role is that of 
managing the day-to-day affairs of the project consortium. 
He is primarily responsible for the internal work of the 
consortium and for conducting the predictable or linear 
elements. He relates progress to the negotiated bid, 
including the resource profiles, as laid down in the 
project design and development plans; the latter constitute 
his strategic plan. The incentives and penalties relating 
to deliveries being on schedule, and milestone payments for 
"scheduled" reviews, are within the project managers 
responsibilities. The project manager is responsible for 
the design and development of the product itself. 
The intervenors role requires him to be cognisant of the 
strategic significance of the project to the company and of 
the interfaces between the company and the external 
environment. His special areas of interest are the "open 
loop"j "non-linear" aspects of the programme. He must try 
to anticipate whether resources will be adequate for these 
particular situations. 
~ area which is fundamentally the responsibility of the 
1ntervenor is that relating to perception. It is his job to 
H build flight unit (25) 
qualification test(15) 
C 0' 
(30) 
design 
(8) 
upame 
o 
qual. 
review 
s 
life test (27) 
N 
pare equip. 
(3) 
repare equip. 
(3) 
stress test (10) 
K -L 
uL-J V 
critical updates 
(4) 
review 
meetings 
(13) 
Q update R 
(8) 
Fig.28: An Example of a Critical Path Network 
NOTE: 
1) The numbers in parenthesisO indicate elapsed time, in days. 
2) THE FULL LINE INDICATES THE MAXIMUM TIME REQUIRED 
3) THE NETWORK IS NOT TO SCALE 
4) THE WORK PROGRESS FROM LEFT TO RIGHT 
5) B ----6l e.g. = THREE TASKS NEEDED TO BUILD THE FLIGHT UNIT 
(EACH TASK IS NOT IDENTIFIED SEPARATELy) 
6) THE NETWORK DOES NOT SHOW RESOURCES 
KEY: 
= Critical Planning Path 
QR = Qualification Review 
c.u. = critical(max.risk) updates 
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Fig.29: Open Loops Emphasised(from fig.28) 
NOTE: 
1) The numbers in parenthesisO indicate elapsed time, in days. 
2) THE FULL UNE INDICATES THE MAXIMUM TIME REQUIRED 
3) THE NElWORK IS NOT TO SCALE 
4) THE WORK PROGRESS FROM LEFT TO RIGHT 
5) THE NETWORK DOES NOT SHOW RESOURCES 
KEY: 
= Critical Planning Path 
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Fig.30: Open Loops Shown as Critical Paths(from fig.28) 
NOTE: 
1) The numbers in parenthesis 0 indicate elapsed time, in days. 
2) THE FULL UNE INDICATES THE MAXIMUM RISK PATHS 
3) THE NElWORK IS NOT TO SCALE 
4) THE WORK PROGRESS FROM LEFT TO RIGHT 
5) THE NElWORK OOES NOT SHOW RESOURCES 
KEY: 
= Critical Planning Path 
'0 = Open Loop Activity 
c.u. = critical ( max. risk) updates 
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assess whether there are perceptual biases present in the 
project consortia that could cause misinterpretation or 
incorrect judgement; this aspect includes the project 
manager and project team. 
When major problems occur or a non-linear part of the 
programme is reached the intervenor moves from a standby to 
active participation mode. He will thus be involved in risk 
initiated reviews. 
In assessing the bid the intervenor is responsible for 
agreeing the acceptability of the resources identified for 
the non-linear elements. The incentives and penalties 
relating to in-orbit performance are within the intervenors 
responsibility. 
The intervenor is responsible for assessing the perceptual 
"peculiarities" of the contractor management team and also 
his own project manager and team. 
In marine terms the project manager can be compared with 
the ships captain and the intervenor with the pilot; the 
latter to navigate the ship through difficult or badly 
charted waters. Clearly both are needed to accomplish the 
mission. 
6.4 Activity Phases. 
At all levels the project is assumed to be classifiable 
into the following four sequential "activity or process" 
phases: 
1) DESIGN 
2) MANUFACTURE (BUILD) 
3) VERIFICATION (TEST) 
4) OPERATION (USE) 
Qualification is accomplished during the design, build and 
test phases. 
The main outputs from the above phases are: 
1) Design: 
drawings; technology identification; parts definition; 
interface requirements; 
2) Manufacturing: 
the product itself; 
3) Verification: 
the product plus a test report; 
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4) Operation: 
the product plus a user manual, including 
contingency (back-up) methods, and a product 
performance output. 
The above outputs are transferred from one phase to the 
next. These transfer elements are discrete and are 
inspectable against "pass/ fail" criteria derived from the 
overall project objectives. At the end of each phase a 
scheduled "review" is required involving the project 
manager. 
Each phase and its related transfer element are mutually 
inclusive and all are functionally serial. Programmatically 
they usually overlap to some degree and this is often 
camouflages problems relating to the lack of functional 
definition. The writer describes this situation as an 
example of "embedded risk"; this would be a particular 
aspect to be addressed by the intervenor. 
Each phase requires its own specific types of resources. 
For example the design phase requires designers. There will 
be different types of designers; mechanical, electronic 
etc. 
The resources include materials, machines, people (brains) , 
data, knowledge, procedures, facilities. 
Figure 31 shows the ideal, incremental approach where the 
phases are sequential and closed out before proceeding to 
the next phase. The figure also shows a feed-forward 
"lessons learned" activity which is part of the overall 
incremental approach and ensures the maintenance of the 
negative entropy situation. An intervenor would be quite 
satisfied with these conditions. 
Figure 32 is representative of normal project conditions. 
Overlaps of the phases are shown with the consequence that, 
for example, the build of hardware and software commences 
before the designs are complete; hence open loops are 
generated. This situation makes the implementation of 
changes very difficult owing to the long processing times; 
due to the many contractual levels involved in the 
processing of change requests. There is also a tendency for 
problems to interact disadvantageously so that the actual 
design or build status at anyone time is almost impossible 
to determine. Engineers and their immediate supervision are 
the first to become aware of these problems and discussions 
and meetings are triggered. These meetings thus constitute 
a dynamic risk indicator; see section 6.8. 
The overlaps actually commence at the Bid and Bid 
Evaluation stages often initiating open loops which quickly 
multiply by interaction thus providing the onset of 
turbulent conditions. This is shown symbolically in Fig.33. 
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The project programme must be designed to enable the 
intervenor and project manager team to function 
efficiently. Adversial situations must be avoided hence a 
psychological contract, or partnership, must be established 
between the two elements. 
There must be an "upwards" accountability from equipment 
design through sub-system and system to concept definition. 
6.5 Project -Elements-
The elements which are considered to be the total 
constituents of the system, and supply inputs to the risk 
indicators, are defined in the following sections; they are 
either "hard" or "soft" as indicated. 
6.5.1 Living Systems (soft) . 
The majority of the research to date portrays the "company" 
as functioning within an "environment", see section 3.9; 
this concept is then usually drawn as hard-line diagrams. 
From these diagrams, with their precisely defined 
interfaces, many researchers have deduced specific 
interactive relationships between the company and its 
environment, or customer, which are then used to classify 
all "company/ contractor couples" and predict the salient 
points of their future performance. 
The author has not experienced the above characteristics 
and the data collected, albeit small, during this research 
does not evidence such precise classification. 
In an attempt to commence the analysis at the most 
fundamental stage the author has initiated the process with 
the following "postulates": 
- postulate a: 
- postulate b: 
- postulate c: 
- postulate d: 
- postulate e: 
all human beings are controlled by 
their brains; 
all companies consist of, and are 
controlled by, human beings; 
the environment consists of companies; 
and therefore human beings, and 
therefore brains; 
the "totality" of the business world 
consists of the companies and their 
environments, and therefore of human 
beings and ultimately of "brains"; 
the "knowledge" and "selection(decision 
making) process" of the brain is a 
function of the "perception" of the 
brain; 
- postulate f: 
- postulate g: 
- postulate h: 
Page 179 
a limit of "perception" exists for each 
brain; 
the limits of perception constitute the 
traditionally defined "company/ 
environment" boundaries; 
all companies contain, exhibit, and 
function according to, the 
characteristics of "living systems". 
It is thus considered that all companies are living 
systems, and within themselves and with their interfaces 
with other companies, will experience such attributes as 
ego, insecurity, greed, bias, territorial possessiveness 
etc. They are self organising and adaptive. It has also 
been observed that a company has as many facets which, 
often differently, indicate its characteristics as it has 
interfaces; both within and external to the company. The 
attributes mentioned above, ego etc., are thus exhibited by 
individuals and by groups. The significance of the 
attribute to the recipient is a function of the perceived 
power or authority of the transmitter. As an example, a 
company official,with a certain "company" profile, would 
have far more authority on a local contractor than the 
chief executive officer; the latter would also have a 
company profile that could be quite different than the 
local official. In both cases persons who interfaced with 
the two persons would describe the (same)company in terms 
of the two different profiles and hence would define the 
company in two different ways. 
It has been observed that companies exhibit "tribal" and 
"family" characteristics and that the strategy, campaign or 
"position" of a company will usually be defined and 
controlled by a very small number of persons; or even one! 
It has also been observed that personnel are, to a certain 
extent, stereotypes of the culture within which they have 
made their industrial evolution. For example, a German will 
usually do what the boss wants, because he is "the boss". 
Similarly, a French manager will expect loyalty, obedience 
and reporting from his staff simply because he is "the 
manager". In the latter case it is likely he will form a 
small circle of "confidantes" around him with whom he will 
discuss matters; and no-one else. Postulate "g" defines the 
"periphery" of the company; it clearly depends entirely on 
individual and collective perception and can vary from day 
to day. This is essentially the dynamics of the situation. 
The subject of perception is a major aspect of the model. 
Perception is defined as the result of the brains 
modification of the observed reality. 
The brain functions by comparing "sensed signals" with 
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experience derived knowledge and selecting or interpreting 
an output such that no survival, ego or institutional 
criteria are violated. This "filtering" of the data results 
in the perceived image which becomes the reality of the 
particular person. 
The inputs to the brain may be hard, soft, or a 
combination. Hard aspects refer to engineering rules, 
dimensions, quantities, laws, etc. and soft aspects refer 
to beliefs, culture, experience, personality traits, etc. 
Soft aspects also include "intentions" i.e. signals 
indicating an interest or intent by an enteral body but, as 
yet, nothing formal or defined. (see annex 2) . 
The following statements have been extracted from the work 
of De Bono and others: 
the history of experience gives us the boundaries of 
reasonableness; 
the purpose of the brain is to organise incoming 
information into a stream of steady state data; using 
patterns in a random manner. If something remotely 
resembles an existing pattern then the pattern will be 
used; even if it is actually not a good correlation; 
unstable states will be manipulated, manoeuvred, until 
they can be compared with a known pattern; 
perception works in an active information universe; 
provocation is necessary in self organising systems in 
order to temporarily move outside our experience. 
The Method isolates the project management from such 
influences; they become the territory and responsibility of 
the intervenor. The intervenor is thus responsible for 
assessing the relevance of internal, within the company, 
and external hard and soft data to the project risk 
profiles and intervening as necessary in order to preserve 
the equilibrium and convergence of risk. 
Strategic change can be linear or non-linear. The linear 
changes are often anticipated from extrapolations of 
baseline data. The non-linear changes are the real problem 
since they are not predictable, and can invalidate linear 
projections. 
6.5.2 Closed Loop Systems (hard) • 
The five senses of the brain viz. sight, hearing, taste, 
touch and smell, all depend on feedback to function; they 
are closed loop systems. In general, the author has 
observed that managers endeavour to establish closed loop 
systems; even where they do not exist. The open loop system 
seems to be such an imponderable, such an initiator of 
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insecurities and lack of control (not being "in charge") 
feelings, that it is avoided at (almost) all costs. 
Contractually there are, in principle, conventions which 
cover non-closed loop systems. For example "time & 
material" contracts, but these either have "cost ceilings" 
or they apply for limited periods of time or function; in 
both cases the loop is not open for very long and they are 
very often enveloped by other closed loop contractual 
activities. 
Notwithstanding the above, research activities are usually 
not governed by fixed price contracts. 
In spite of the above statements there remains an apparent 
paradox since the preference for a fixed price contract 
means a commitment to meet the contractual requirements on 
time irrespective of the problems encountered en route. 
This seems to indicate that companies are able to 
establish effective risk management systems and yet the 
authors experience is to the contrary. However this 
paradox dissolves when one realises that with the time and 
material contract each and every expenditure may have to be 
justified to the customer. The contractor is thus faced 
with a trade-off between exposing his in-house financial 
manoeuvres, or trying to define the total risk of a 
programme before it begins. The authors experience on these 
issues, both as a customer and a contractor, is that 
contractors repeatable "hope" that they have: 
a) put sufficient margin in the fixed price bid to 
cover all eventualities and, 
b) for those problem areas that arise which exceed 
the margins they will be able to demonstrate that 
the issue is "out of scope" and therefore the 
customer must pay. 
The alternative situation, with the time & materials or 
cost to completion contracts, is characterised by the 
exposure the contractor is compelled to make to afford the 
necessary visibility to the customer. 
The customer running a (apparently) open loop time and 
material contract will in fact establish frequent financial 
reviews which essentially form a series of closed loop 
controls. 
Of the two options, the fixed price contract is more often 
applied. 
The overwhelming advantage of the closed loop system to the 
manager is that margins can be allocated to the parameters 
involved and the erosion of those parameters monitored to 
indicate the likelihood that the system will be within 
specification. This system also enables judgement to be 
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made concerning the traceability and inter-dependence of 
the parameters and items involved and thus establish a 
heritage back to some known "defined risk" baseline. These 
advantages are registered here as being self-evident; they 
are, in the experience of the author, rarely applied 
completely. 
The Method herein presented utilises the closed loop 
concept together with the definition of warning and action 
limits to indicate the approach of risk divergence e.g. the 
onset of non-linearities. 
The difference between the Method being presented and 
current practise is that the Method requires the parametric 
margins include the resources they require in order that 
the margins converge to zero at contract completion. The 
Method also identifies the action limits, on the margins, 
as the warning limits for the intervenor; the latter would 
have additional action limits which could initiate the 
intervention function. 
In general, intervention will be necessary when positive 
feedback in the closed loop systems is inappropriate or 
fails, or indicates a tendency to fail, to maintain the 
prescribed system progress. 
Due to the empathy of human beings (brains) with, and the 
relative ease of managing, the closed loop system, a basic 
aspect of the model is that a careful analysis is initially 
carried out to identify, and where possible configure, 
closed loop systems. The remaining systems will thus be 
open loop which are much more difficult to control. 
6.5.3 Open Loop Systems(soft). 
Open loop systems in the context of this thesis relate to 
those areas where the solution to a problem cannot be 
defined. The main culprit in this respect is a 
non-linearity, for example "embedded research"; refer to 
section 4.2.2 for an explanation of this issue. In many 
cases other, apparently closed loop, systems interface with 
open loop systems thus causing the intervener to increase 
the criticality rating of a system. 
Subjective judgement is usually used to "define" the risk. 
Unfortunately few rigorously defined systems exist; 
prestige, ego, and career considerations can bias the 
outcome to such an extent that the results are very 
questionable. 
~his thesis considers as "open loop" any system that 
l.nvolves a departure from the concepts of "traceability and 
incrementalism". (see #5.3 & annex 2). If, for example, a 
~ew.technology is to be utilised then the system in which 
l.t 1S to be used would be considered to be: 
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closed loop, if its evolution could be directly traced 
to technology which has given satisfactory service; 
open loop, if a "jump" or "gap" in the technology 
evolutionary path has occurred. 
Margins and feedback cannot be applied to open loop 
systems. A programme which expects to reduce, or contain, 
its risk should include closed loop contingency plans or 
complimentary development activities to enable the 
convergency or divergency of the "problem" to be monitored 
by the intervener. 
Since margins cannot be defined neither can the resources; 
hence the problem. 
Many "soft aspects" tend to generate open loop problems. 
Providing the soft problem can be "sized" then a "closed 
loop surrogate" may be definable and an approximation to 
the incremental approach realised. For example the risk 
divergency caused by key staff departing at a critical 
programme time could be contained by organisational 
manipulations e.g. 
1} duplicate staff, 
2} financial or promotion award immediately prior to 
critical event, 
3} sub-contracting with high incentives and severe 
penalties. 
In each case the intervenor would need to be aware of the 
elements that would be needed to establish a closed loop; 
and then to be convinced that they could be implemented. 
6.5.4 Open Systems (soft with hard aspects). 
The subject of open systems is introduced and explained via 
a description of the functioning of the brain. This 
hopefully also clarifies the brain and living system 
concept with respect to the functioning of organisations. 
The brain essentially functions by selecting from chaotic 
data based on experiential criteria; the output from this 
process is a convergence leading to a decision. The 
accumulation of experience generates progressively changing 
selection criteria; a growth trajectory takes place. As an 
example of the latter, a child is initially fire seeking 
but becomes fire avoiding after the experience of burning. 
If directly relevant experience is not available to the 
brain it will iterate its existing experiential data until 
an approximate "fit" is found and then select accordingly 
e.g. the first UFOs were selected as being "flying 
saucers" . 
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Individual brains will try to make data sets converge using 
criteria which that brain understands i.e. has experienced; 
pattern recognition is involved. 
The brain however has certain priorities which, if seeming 
to be degraded, will result in "intervention" and a 
probable change to the on-going event(s). Such priorities 
relate to thirst, hunger, sex, possession, security, etc. 
There seems to be a direct correlation on this aspect with 
organisational behaviour. The brain is self protecting, 
self surviving and ego-centric. The brain will distort the 
selection process to ensure that ITS perception of what it 
wants, it gets. This constitutes an intervention 
characteristic and "can" relate to the brains strategic 
objectives; one of which is surely to survive. 
It is considered that organisations will be subjected to 
similar distortions by the "managing brains"*; conflict may 
well result from some of the distortion parameters and 
criteria. 
The brain, and life itself, function as a self organising, 
OPEN SYSTEM. 
* The implication of this statement is that the "managing 
brains" will be transmitting information which is tagged 
"this information is "hard" information due to my 
positional authority which is contained in company 
regulation "xyz", if the receiver of this information is 
"under my authority" then this information will override 
other data" ..... etc. 
An open system is characterised by equifinality i.e. in 
contrast to equilibrium states in closed systems, which are 
determined by initial conditions, the open system may 
attain a time- independent state; independent of initial 
conditions and determined only by system parameters. In 
open systems, with transfer of matter e.g. people, 
materials, and energy e.g. data and knowledge, import of 
"negative entropy" is possible. Hence such systems can 
maintain themselves at a high level, and even evolve toward 
an increase of order and complexity; one of the most 
important characteristics of life processes. Open systems 
are particularly applicable to phenomena showing 
non-structural life interaction of processes. Living 
systems can be defined as hierarchically organised open 
systems, maintaining themselves or developing a steady 
state.(63). 
It is considered that organisations consist of open, and 
open and closed loop, systems; linear and non-linear 
events. It is further considered that most organisations 
are not aware, or do not react, to these aspects. The "mix" 
of open and closed systems, their juxtaposition, and the 
'.'am~unt of openness" are judged to be a significant risk 
l.ndl.cators. 
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For an organisation to be self organising, it must be 
coupled to another organisation i.e. the output is not a 
function of the original state or input but due to the 
action of some external factor which acts during the 
process of the system. Systems organising themselves by way 
of progressive differentiation evolve from states of lower 
complexity to states of higher complexity. Self 
differentiating systems that evolve towards higher 
complexity (decreasing entropy) are for thermodynamic 
reasons possible only as open systems i.e systems importing 
matter containing free energy to an amount 
over-compensating the increase in entropy due to 
irreversible processes within the system (import of 
negative entropy). However we cannot say that this change 
comes only from some outside agent, an input; the 
differentiation within a developing organisation is due to 
its "internal laws of organisation AND the input-. 
Quantitative and qualitative data are also included in the 
model; the latter as subjective data being rendered into a 
quantitative equivalent using expert judgement techniques. 
It is considered that an increasing dependency on 
qualitative data will develop and hence the urgent need to 
understand how to utilise this data such that its entropic 
contribution is negative. 
6.5.5 Complexity(soft). 
On the subject of complexity, see also sections 6.6. and 
6.7, it is the authors experience that initially, in a 
project life cycle (another reference to living systemsl), 
the complexity is low; it then rises to a maximum at some 
point before design freeze (probably during the intense 
trade-off activity phase), and then gradually decreases. 
The problem with this general statement is that the 
complexity in the technical area probably does not coincide 
with the complexity maxima in the managerial, contractual 
and financial phases. 
It is necessary in the above to differentiate between the 
complexity of soft and hard aspects and the inter-action 
between them. The actual existence of this point is shown 
in the analysis of the project data charts in section 
5.2.5. It is considered that complexity is proportional to 
non-linearity. 
6.5.6 Trajectories (soft) • 
Trajectories embrace aspects which: 
change as the project advances in time, 
represent the dynamic nature of the project, 
and 
can indicate an actual or potential 
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strategic change or increase or decrease in 
risk. 
The main trajectories are defined as follows. 
1) The progress of the project item along the 
"route" of the strategic plan. 
This trajectory can be defined in terms 
of milestones reached or passed, 
resources consumed, elapsed time etc. 
2) The changes to the various margins. 
For example, erosion of the power, 
mass, and schedule margins. 
3) The growth of brain selectivity. 
This trajectory can be defined in terms 
of the increase in knowledge 
(experience, training, lessons learned, 
new subject awareness, improvement of 
techniques e.g. man-management, 
decision making, time management etc.) 
obtained by individuals as they 
progress in and adjacent to the 
project; and the consequent broadening 
and increase in depth of expertise thus 
enabling "better"(more informed/less 
risky!) decisions to be made. 
4) The changing perception of the "environment" 
(brain locii) . 
This trajectory relates to the: 
inter-personal contacts that are made, 
inputs from media, libraries etc. 
awareness of other strategic plans 
assessment of the effects of 
inventions, discoveries, 
cultural adjustments, etc. 
6.5.7 Decision making processes(soft with hard aspects). 
This point particularly relates to the consideration that 
decision making processes involve exchange of significant 
information, often in an informal mode, between the 
executives of companies. This point essentially calls into 
question the Core-Boundary model concepts mentioned in the 
literature; (see ref.ll0 et al.) 
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The author believes, from 20 years working in business, 
that a company as such does not have a characteristic 
personality or even a particular attitude for a significant 
period of time. However the persons working for a company, 
and representing it, do have a definite position and 
depending on their authority this "position or image" can 
be construed as the "position or image" of the company. 
Ones judgement of a company thus tends to be a function of 
the particular interfacing person. 
6.5.8. Interventions(soft with bard aspeets). 
Interventions are considered to be either; 
- direct, or 
- indirect 
Indirect interventions refer to those forces, pressures or 
influences that impose on our thinking processes from a 
myriad of sources; ranging from casual conversation to text 
book reading. 
They often raise the spectre of something which could 
happen. As an example, suppose a British cake manufacturer 
"heard" that his nearest, but lower market share, 
competitor was about to be taken over by Sony, an 
electronics company with no apparent knowledge or interest 
in cakes. He would, nevertheless, probably be concerned and 
may start to consider what the new intentions of his 
competitor might be, before he is even sure that a merger, 
or an effect on his cake business, will take place. The 
gossip has thus created an intention, by someone, in the 
brain of the manufacturer who then treats it as an 
intervention; possibly effecting his strategic thinking and 
planning. (see annex 2) . 
6.S.9.Infor.mation(soft) • 
It is considered that information relates in its totality 
to either hard or soft aspects; examples of the former are 
laws of physics, dimensional measurements, hard line forms 
and shapes, etc. whilst examples of the latter are beliefs, 
culture, personality, experience, judgement, etc. 
Information is something which is "perceived"; it is 
therefore a variable. Not only is it a variable because of 
the effects of the perception process but, due also to the 
perception effects of "others", information can be 
significantly changed when it is transitioning. 
6.6 Turbulence, crisis, chaos. 
The real problem with the existence of open loops and 
non-linearities is that if they interface, and inter-react, 
with each other then very complex situations can occur. The 
problems can then cross contractual boundaries, involve a 
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number of different companies possibly of different 
nationalities, involve different elements of the overall 
project thus impeding good work which is being done 
elsewhere, and so on. Some of the problems can cause design 
changes to be carried out elsewhere in order to protect the 
overall system "functional" objectives. 
This situation is represented, via the science of chaos, by 
the movement from a steady state(equilibrium) through a 
state of increasing -bifurcation-, or branching, to a 
condition of chaos. In the latter condition systematic 
elements do exist but it is extremely difficult to discern 
what they are. The existence of chaos will be entirely 
subjective i.e. perceptual. The movement from a steady, 
linear, controlled status through the onset of turbulence, 
which could be the result of anxiety, frustration, 
disappointment or discomfort, etc., to chaos could be a 
psychological or perceptual mechanism. One might say that 
turbulence and chaos exists, for a person e.g. a manager, 
if the questions are being asked: 
what should we do next? 
what is happening over there? 
if that fails, what then? 
is there anyone who really understands how 
this thing works? 
Circumstances during which such questions as the above were 
asked actually occurred on project C; see section 5.2.5.4. 
The circumstances are analogous to water flowing from a 
tap. As the flow rate is increased the water stream changes 
from laminar through turbulent to completely chaotic. In 
the turbulent condition it impossible to predict what will 
happen at any particular time in the future. 
Hence during the Bid evaluation it is important to identify 
where the onset of bifurcation type activities could occur 
and then to prevent or avoid their occurrence. Once they 
occur the drain on resources to recover could well be 
disastrous. To meet this "avoidance" requirement the model 
requires the use of risk indicators; see chapters 3.6, 
5.3.4.7, and 6.9. 
6.7 Orderliness with Increasing Complexity 
The method is based on the premise that since all companies 
are composed of human beings then the companies themselves 
behave in a similar manner to living, open, systems. This 
means that they have the capability to actually increase 
their orderliness as the complexity of their activities 
increases i.e. they are adaptive and self organising. This 
reduction in disorder, or entropy, is only possible if 
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negative entropy is injected into the system. The latter is 
only possible, without contravening the second law of 
thermodynamics, if it occurs locally whilst maintaining an 
increase of entropy at the overall system level. The model 
establishes this status by requiring that data and 
knowledge are supplied to the project in a very easily 
assimilateable form. This means that the right data and 
knowledge must be available at the right time and in a form 
that is understandable and useable by the persons who need 
it. This applies as much to basic design data as it does to 
data packages supporting design reviews. 
6.8 Risk Indicators 
Risk indicators inform the project manager and the 
intervenor whether their initially defined risk, that the 
project will not be successful, is likely to be exceeded. 
They should thus form the most important content of 
progress reports and reviews. 
Risk indicators are defined as inputs to the project 
manager and intervenor which inform them whether their 
initially defined risk, that the project objectives will 
not be met, is likely to be exceeded. These inputs are 
related to the structure or pattern of events as they seem 
to be evolving in the project. Thus if two or more open 
loop, or non-linear, activities are inter-dependent then 
this would be an area where bifurcation could occur and 
hence would be nominated a risk indicator. Examples of 
risk indicators are the existence of embedded research, 
qualification activities, and perceptual biases. 
The Method utilises warning and control ltmits associated 
with each risk indicator; these are established according 
to the rate of increase of the parameter being monitored 
and the criticality of the technology, equipment etc. 
within the overall project. 
Risk indicators constitute a fundamental aspect of the 
model. 
Risk indicators can be static or dynamic. 
A static risk indicator is based purely on static or 
"snapshot" data; it provides a single picture of the flow 
status of the project at a particular time. An example of a 
static risk indicator is a PERT chart. 
A dynamic risk indicator(see fig.33A} contains information 
on the increase or decrease of the flow rate(s} within the 
project. An example of a dynamic risk indicator would be a 
plot of the rate at which manpower is being used versus the 
rate by which a test is being successfully completed. 
The message here is that risk monitoring must be 
"continuous" to enable assessment of the "continuously" 
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changing project dynamics. This is supported fr?m the 
research by the Law of Requisite ~ariety(S9) wh7ch states that "only variety can absorb var~ety"; the var~ety of the 
controller must match the variety of the controlled. 
In the model the risk indicators receive inputs from the 
project in its operational mode. 
These inputs to the risk indicators emanate from the total 
system* which itself is considered to consist only of the 
project elements; these are described and listed in section 
6.5. 
* The total system consists of the project and its so 
called environment. A project typically consists of a 
number of companies in the form of a consortium with a 
lead (prime) contractor, sub-contractors, vendors, and a 
customer. The companies are formally bound together with 
the intent of achieving contractually defined outputs; the 
overall project goal is usually only the 
concern (responsibility) of the prime contractor; the latter 
is the only company with a direct interface with the 
customer. 
6.9 Margins. 
Margins are typically used on technical parameters i.e. 
measurable outputs from system equipments, and schedule. An 
"industrial risk" fund is often implemented. 
A general rational for the definition and "permitted 
erosion" of margins is not known to the author. In his 
experience the margins are placed and their degradation 
monitored according to experience; they are often truncated 
when difficult situations arise. 
In the method margins are only permitted on linear 
activities. 
The "risk indicator - intervener" concept in this thesis 
depends on, and requires that, ALL margins relate directly 
to the resources required to fulfil the particular function 
concerned. This naturally requires an a-priori assessment 
of all problems likely to be encountered with an associated 
assessment of the resources to solve those problems. 
The above concept also requires that "warning" and "action" 
limits are placed on the margins; the overall margins would 
thus be split into two parts. The intervener would only 
consider executive action when the control limit was 
reached, or tending to be reached. The project manager and 
the intervener would thus monitor the project according to 
the warning and action limits respectively. 
This method of working would dimension every problem in 
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terms of the resources required to solve it. This in turn 
would indicate the status of overall resource consumption 
and availability; and also the effect of lateral resource 
cannibalization. The moving averages of these values, and 
their extrapolations, would give a clear indication of the 
real risk; this is thus a priority risk indicator. 
6.10 Criteria for Application of the Method. 
6.10.1 General Comments 
The following criteria must be applied to the project 
situation being examined in order to adduce the required 
outputs for application of the overall Method. 
Perception would figure in this part of the Method. 
6.10.2 Living Systems, inc. Perception and Environment, 
criteria. 
1) Characterise each company, the combination of the 
prime contractor together with the consortium, and the 
customer, in terms of their dominant "human" 
attributes e.g. aggressiveness, defensiveness, etc. 
Consider the national characterisations that have been 
concluded by some researchers e.g. the French are 
predominantly thinkers, the British primarily people 
of action, and the Spanish primarily emotive. 
2) Identify if companies are dominated by one or two 
persons and what their perception is likely to be; 
take their education and experience into account. 
3) Assess the likelihood that key managers will put their 
personal aspirations before that of the project or 
company and the interface perception effect this will 
have. 
4) List companies in the environment of each company and 
of the consortium; also other environmental influences 
and organisations both national and international inc. 
government. 
5) Assess the probable interaction with, and perception 
of, that environment by the decision making perceivers 
in the companies, projects, and the customers; thus 
establishing the boundaries of the perceptions of the 
perceivers and what those environments "look like" to 
the perceivers. Hence certain salient points in the 
contractors and customers camps should be 
identifiable. This criterium includes the assessment 
of "how" the main players communicate; and how they 
obtain the information they believe in, and actually 
use. 
6) Identify what the main dynamic aspects of the 
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environment are likely to be, as perceived by the main 
players, for the duration of the project. Rate of 
change of the environment, and distance of the 
technology being advocated from the state of the art, 
must be considered. Also consider the companies life 
cycles reference, for example, where they are in the 
communication satellite "product class" life 
cycle .... if at all? Construct a trajectory of these 
aspects for the duration of the project. 
6.10.3 Complexity criteria. 
1) Identify the number of project interfaces. 
2) Identify the number of different types of technology 
involved e.g. electronic, hydraulic, mechanical, etc. 
3) Identify the number of different procurements i.e. 
using different suppliers. 
4) Identify the number of state of the art, or "to be 
qualified" technologies. 
5) Identify the number of specifications(requirement 
documents) . 
6) Estimate the total amount of data that has to 
addressed; and the likely effectiveness of the 
systems, inc. reviews, to assess it. 
7) Identify the number of managers and engineers per 1) 
through 5) above. 
8) Identify amount and availability of test facilities 
9) Produce a "complexity against project time" profile 
based on estimates concerning the increase or decrease 
of complexity. 
10) Identify the systems which are present in the 
project(s) to manage items 1) through 8) above. 
Failure and resource conflict situations should be 
considered. 
11) Assess the maturity of the various companies 
concerning the work to be done and in particular the 
higher complexity aspects. 
12) Asses the increase in maturity over the project life 
cycle. 
13) Identify the number of different interfacing languages 
particularly where the interfacing language is not the 
mother tongue and where the internal language will be 
different than the interface, spoken and written, 
language. 
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14) Identify the different cultures involved. 
15) Group all non-linearities. 
6.10.4 Open System criteria. 
Examine the self-organising (equi-finality) aspects of the 
companies and consortia i.e. the ability to achieve, or 
have already achieved, states which are not connected with 
the initial conditions and are determined only by system 
parameters. The objective here is to check that the 
"stability" of the project is in "dynamic equilibrium". If 
a project has the characteristics of dynamic equilibrium it 
means that as problems occur it is able to organise its 
resources in such a way that it can accommodate and solve 
or work around those problems whilst still maintaining its 
mainstream (strategic) activities. In other words the 
problems it encounters during its life cycle, which will 
usually be due to an interaction between sub- or 
co-contractors i.e. systems interacting with systems, can 
be solved using the organisational mechanisms and resources 
that it has at the time of the occurrence of the problems. 
This requires analysis of the extent by which the companies 
are connected to other organisations which interact with 
them during the project. The interaction of the input 
data*, thus obtained, with the internal laws and 
characteristics of the company and whether the company is 
evolving to higher levels of complexity by making the 
"correct" differentiation between the two aspects, i.e. the 
input data and the internal laws, must be considered. 
CUltural aspects will be involved. 
If the result is that the company is evolving to higher 
complexity and higher order, then the risk should be 
reducing and intervention is less likely. If more disorder, 
i.e. an increasing inability to cope with increasing 
complexity, is apparent then the likelihood of error will 
increase(risk indicator). An assessment of previous 
projects performance should provide most of the above 
information. 
* The input data is very important. If it is clear that it 
directly relates to the project and is used to reduce 
problems, and therefore to reduce the disorder of the 
unsolved or unknown(open loops!), then it constitutes 
"negative entropy". Under these conditions the order of the 
project will increase even though the complexity will also 
be increasing. If such a system does not exist then the 
project disorder will increase, and also the risk; even 
with decreasing complexity. This is a major Risk Indicator 
and requires intervention. Warning and control limits can 
be applied to this risk indicator and implemented by 
examining the appropriateness, the useability(before the 
fact), and the effectiveness of use(after the fact) of the 
data inputs. 
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6.10.5 Closed & Open Loop criteria. 
6.10.5.1 General: loop definition & criteria. 
The definition of "loop" used in the context of this thesis 
is as follows: 
" a loop relates to the resource flow(manpower and time) 
estimated as being necessary to "successfully" complete one 
or all of the following activities at any level i.e. from 
technology to system: 
- selection (trade-off) , 
- design, 
- manufacture, 
- qualification, 
- test, 
- acceptance, 
- assembly into the space vehicle, 
- testing at system level. 
The above constitutes a "loop" in the following manner. 
For each of the above activities specific resource flows 
have been estimated; these flows are checked at certain 
points and the values thus obtained compared with the 
estimated value at that time; this feedback completes the 
loop. Clearly the resource flow estimates are rather 
meaningless if they are based on significant assumptions 
due to the successful outcome of the activity being 
undefinable. 
It is submitted, as mentioned elsewhere in this thesis, 
that the resource utilisation is something that occurs with 
respect to time and therefore has a "rate" and is a 
"flow"(see also the definition of "flow" in annex 9}. 
The combined flows of all activities in, for example, an 
equipment development programme are termed a "stream"; see 
section 5.2.5.1.2.4} 
Loop Definition criteria: 
Group all aspects of the project into "common loops" for 
evaluation as closed or open loop systems. 
Examples are the "flows" associated with the design, build, 
verification and operational phases. If the "AOCS flow" is 
taken as an example then the first loop to consider is the 
AOCS design loop which consists of requiring a "yes" or 
"no" answer to the question, "is it certain that an AOeS 
sUb-system can be designed, within all the constraints, to 
satisfy the specification requirements?". If the answer is 
positive then the process can be commenced; see Fig.34. 
6.10.5.2 Closed loop criteria. 
flOW PROCESS CANNOT PROCEED 
UNT1L INTERVENOR APPROVES 
STATIC & DYNAMIC 
RISK INDICATORS. , '> 
---
PLAN or CHANGE 
OF TOTAL 
FLOW or STREAM inc. 
ALL DESIGN. DEV .• 
BUILD. TEST & 
OPERATING DETAILS. ..-
I YES I 
6 
c::J 
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+ ALL RESOURCES NEEDED 
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OR CONTINUE FOLLOWING A CHANGE? D 6 
D 
o 
c::J 
<== 
ACTMTES WITH DOUBTFUL 
OUTCOMES ARE NON-lJNEAR 
OPEN LOOP ACTMTlES 
6 
O CANNOT BE USED 
ARE THERE ANY ACTIVITIES THE 
THE OUTCOME OF WHICH IS DOUBTFUL? 
e.g. ACTMTIES IN WHICH 
NEW TECHNOLOGY MUST BE DEVELOPED 
or THE EXPERIENCE IS NOT AVAILABLE 
IN THE EXISTING WORKFORCE 
or CLOSE COORDINATION WILL BE NEEDED 
WITH A COMPANY WITH WHOM 
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BEEN CONDUCTED. ETC. 
D 
t 
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OR CONTINUE FOLLOWING A CHANGE? 
t 
ALL ACTIVITIES ARE 
REASONABLY WELL DEFINED 
& HENCE THEY ARE 
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Fig.34: MODEL of OPEN and CLOSED LOOPS. 
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1) Identify, from the total list of IIcommon loops", those 
loops for which the resources can be estimated with a 
high degree of certainty; these are classified as 
linear loops. Plot resources against project timescale 
(trajectory) . 
2) identify all loops for which margins have been 
allocated; plot margins as a function of project 
timescale; (trajectory). 
3) Identify all feedback loops. 
4) Identify warning and control limits for each closed 
loop; the warnings and controls relate to the 
possibility that the estimated resources will be 
exceeded before the final phase of that loop is 
completed. For all closed loops it must be possible to 
incorporate margins. Plot warning and control limits 
versus project timescale; (trajectory) . 
5) Overlay the closed loops for the duration of the 
project. (trajectory) . 
6.10.5.3 Open Loop criteria. 
1) Identify, from the total list of IIdefined loops", 
those loops for which the resources cannot be 
estimated with a high degree of certainty. 
If, for a particular phase of the loop, there is a N\* 
or more doubt that the phase will be completed "free 
of significant problems", and those problems cannot be 
defined, then it must be classified as an open loop. 
Embedded research and qualification activities are 
automatic classification as an open loops. 
* The size of the number N depends on the criticality 
of the loop subject and would have to be agreed, with 
a rationalle, prior to ITT release. 
2) Identify the type(s) of expertise needed to track and 
advise on the progress of the "unknowns"; all of which 
must be labelled "Risk Indicators". 
3) Overlay the open loops for the duration of the project 
(trajectory) . 
6.10.6 Decision Making Processes criteria. 
1) Identify main decision makers at project and corporate 
level, their qualifications & experience; also 
identify their main technical and contractual 
advisors. 
2) Identify methods of making decisions; inc. extent of 
delegation, utilisation and sources of hard & soft 
Page 196 
data. Consider the different perceptions involved. 
Include resource allocation logic. 
3) Identify critical project supports. 
4) Identify incremental and non-incremental aspects. 
5) Identify Risk Indicators. 
6) Plot risk indicators for the duration of the project. 
(trajectory) . 
7) Plot major decision points during life of project and 
risk profile (trajectory). 
6.10.7 Intervention criteria 
1) Identify interveners, by hierarchy; also their 
qualifications, experience, and relationship with the 
project manager. 
2) Identify strategic plan, and objectives. 
3) Identify interveners risk indicators; static and 
dynamic. 
4) Identify critical project supports, for intervener. 
5) Identify interveners warning and control limits. The 
interveners warning limits are the project managers 
control limits. 
6) Identify interveners environment; and perception 
biases. 
7) Identify interveners rational for intervention. 
8) Identify resource allocation logic. This must include 
the various types of resource and the "learning curve" 
involved before new resources of a particular type can 
actually be utilised.; this aspect tends to make 
existing resources unique. 
6.10.8 Utilisation of Trajectories. 
The trajectories portray the expected dynamics of the 
project life cycle in terms of the various parameters 
considered. 
As an example a rather unexpected trajectory was discovered 
during the project case studies. For one of the projects it 
was discovered that for the first eight years, of fourteen 
years in total, the procurement of components was not 
inc~uded in the main project planning. Hence the "planning 
traJectory" was missing possibly the most critical item and 
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therefore did not portray the actual progress dynamics of 
the project. 
6.10.9 Calibration. 
The Method must be calibrated before initial use and 
recalibrates after every intervention. 
Calibration points relate to the identification and 
definition of the "elements" for that particular project 
and the verification that after an intervention the element 
definitions are still appropriate. 
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Chapter 7. ADVANTAGES GAINED by USING the METHOD. 
7.1 General. 
This chapter outlines the advantages to be gained, and the 
currently experienced problems which can be avoided, if the 
Method is applied. The model outline and overview are shown 
in figs.19 and 20, chapter 6.1. 
The outline follows the chronological course of a project 
from phase A to operation. 
7.2 Statement of Strategic Objective and Risk. 
At the conceptual definition point of the project an 
unambiguous statement defining the strategic objectives of 
the mission, the mission priorities, and the risk the 
customer is prepared to accept that the mission will not be 
successful, must be written down. 
The intervenor must ensure that this is done in a complete 
and unambiguous manner, and understood by the main players. 
This is almost never done and has been well documented, and 
experienced by the author, to be a major and increasing 
cause of problems. 
7.3 Phase Close Out. 
All outstanding items at the end of phases A and B must be 
clearly defined as open loops and integrated as such into 
the planning of the succeeding phase. Resources 
commensurate with the open loops must be included and areas 
of turbulence and possible chaos identified. All departures 
from an incremental approach must be defined; see figures 
31, 32 and 33, chapter 6.4. 
It is the responsibility of the intervenor to ensure that a 
succeeding phase is not commenced until the above has been 
established. 
This aspect has never been applied in the experience of the 
author and has been shown in this thesis to be the cause of 
many problems that continued through the entire project 
life cycle. The problems from previous phases have often 
been short listed as being capable of resolution within the 
"next three months" with no additional resources. 
7.4 Integration of Resources and Schedule. 
The current methods of presenting vast amounts of 
segregated data render an understanding of the real risk 
situations almost impossible. 
The manpower and cost data must be presented in an 
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integrated manner with the schedule. Fig.36 shows an 
example of such a chart concerning manpower and schedule 
for the prime contractor and some sub-contractors. Such a 
chart would instantly inform management of high resource 
utilisation areas 
The intervenor would use a chart such as Fig.36 and 37 as 
his first assessment of the viability of the project; this 
is a static risk indicator. 
7.5 Trajectories. 
Trajectories consist of aspects which change as the project 
advances and thus are indicators of some dynamic aspects. 
In general they are identified from static analyses of, for 
example, a companies previous record and then monitored to 
assess whether expected extrapolations are actually 
occurring. In this respect they are dynamic risk 
indicators. 
By assessing, for example, the: 
maturity of the company e.g. its areas of proven 
experience; 
the companies utilisation of incremental approaches in 
its development activities e.g. does it have a lessons 
learned culture; 
the success and failures of the company including its 
market penetration, by its own efforts, product 
diversification, growth etc.; 
the propagation potential of problems across project 
phases, between equipment and sub-systems and system, 
and, possibly in camouflaged form, across contractual 
boundaries; 
the complete incorporation of all elements in each 
status reporting function e.g. the inclusion of all 
elements that have to be procured in the planning, and 
the inclusion of the "results" of all activities in 
the project reports; 
the "learning" that the project personnel are likely 
to obtain during the project life cycle thus 
increasing their ability to support the project and 
avoid the development of turbulent conditions etc.; 
the rate at which it replaces staff; 
a better understanding will be obtained, before the project 
commences, of problematic interactions that might occur. 
This constitutes a static assessment of dynamic mechanisms 
which could influence, or be directly involved in. the 
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actual project life cycle. 
7.6 Project Supports. 
This aspect relates to the key persons across the project. 
The Method requires that not only the experience and 
knowledge of the key persons are determined but also their 
ability to work together; to communicate, share problems, 
and motivate their staff etc. 
The Method also requires that cultural aspects are 
carefully considered and inappropriate criteria are not 
applied. For example the Swedish and Italian cultures are 
quite different and cannot be judged using the same 
criteria. 
Other aspects which have to be considered relate to 
language, vertical and lateral communication within 
companies, and familiarity with the standards and 
management methods being used in the overall project. 
It is submitted that the application of "trajectory" and 
"project support" aspects would avoid many of the 
mis-understanding and false expectation problems that seem 
almost to dominate project life. The initial establishment 
of an accord between the main players in a project must 
realise a synergy which should avoid, or allow the early 
resolution of, many of the problems that occur today. The 
intention is to achieve something of a "family atmosphere"; 
this point is mentioned in several of the interviews. 
7.7 Negative Entropy. 
This point addresses the availability of data to all 
parties such that the necessary judgements and decisions 
can be made at the optimal times. This means that an 
essentially steady state level of order, communication, 
data collection and processing, and decision making must be 
maintained even though the complexity of the situation on 
many fronts will increase in a non-systematic fashion; 
tending to produce turbulence and eventually chaos. 
Currently: 
reviews are often held with obsolete data, 
system information is restricted to upper levels of 
contractors, and 
the reporting of status is incomplete and, therefore, 
biased. 
The unfortunate result is that the "steady state" outcomes 
are usually only cosmetic and camouflage increasing 
turbulence that suddenly erupts as chaos. 
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Application of the intervention Method should avoid these 
experiences. 
This aspect is of paramount concern to the intervenor who 
would independently assess the data and knowledge sources, 
definition, flow, utilisation and control across the entire 
project. This activity together with the trajectories and 
project supports definition constitutes a major activated 
and responsibility of the intervenor during the bid 
evaluation and on-going project phases. The intervenor 
would not permit the proposal to be accepted, or major to 
take place, until he was satisfied in this area. 
7.8 Open loops. 
The identification of all open loops, on a continuous 
basis, together with their impact on resources is 
fundamental for the prevention of many of the currently 
experienced problems; many of which lead to strategic 
change due, for example, to their impact on schedule. The 
latter can be compared with the delivery time of a 
commercial product and the consequences of late delivery. 
Project C was "delivered" approximately four years late! 
The definition of open loops, see section 6.2.1, and their 
utilisation has been explained in detail in the thesis and 
will not be repeated here. Open loops must be identified 
from the planning, CPN charts, and from the technical, 
organisation and management inputs. 
Fig.35 shows a presentation of the open loops which have 
been identified from a review of the technical 
documentation of the project C proposal. The height of the 
histogram bars is proportional to the number and 
criticality of open loops in the various sub-systems; 
criticality relates to the system level consequences of an 
open loop. 
Fig.37 presents the manpower profiles that the open loops 
shown in Fig.35 would require. 
It will be seen that the manpower profiles originally 
submitted, see Fig. 36, would not envelope the manpower 
requirements ascertained from the technical evaluations 
shown in Fig.37. The bid would thus be defined as high risk 
in this respect. 
Three aspects are mentioned here as specific examples of 
areas where open loop analysis would provide major 
dividends; they are: 
1) embedded research: these are areas that are close to 
the state of the art and are non-linear concerning the 
prediction of time and resources needed to resolve the 
attendant problems; 
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2) embedded risk: these are areas where the risk involved 
is not obvious e.g. the risk involved in the timewise 
staggering of the design and manufacturing phases 
across a project of: 
a) many of the equipments, 
b) many of the subsystems, 
c) associated hardware and software activities. 
This includes "negative entropy" related problems which 
thus tend to provoke the onset of turbulent conditions. 
The replacement of key personnel is included in this 
category; the resolution of which, as required in the 
Method under the "project support" label, would be to 
arrange individual contractual, financial and career 
commitments to ensure that they remained with the project 
for as long as necessary. This latter aspect requires a new 
approach by companies to their staff recruitment and career 
policies. 
3) Open Loop Planning. 
This aspect represents a new method of risk presentation in 
the planning domain. 
It is required by the Method, as an essential input for the 
intervenor, that a unique planning chart is constructed of 
all the identified open loops. 
Hence it would then be immediately apparent where open 
loops interfaced with other open loops and the dependencies 
and consequences of those interfaces. 
The development of such an "open loop" CPM is shown in 
Figs. 38, 39 and 40. It will be noticed that the final 
"open loop" plan is quite different than the plan that 
would be prepared using conventional methods. 
Thus using the Critical Planning Network(CPM) technique 
which is used by many companies world wide, a static risk 
indicator is instantly available. It is vulnerable to 
negative entropy aspects. 
From the project ground and orbit failure analysis, 
ref.section 5.2.4, the following specific open loop causes 
were derived: 
1) undetected or ignored quality trends; 
2) qualification invalidated; 
3) inadequate failure mode consideration; 
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4) inability to test or simulate; 
5) failure scenarios poorly understood. 
For different industries, other than the ESA-European 
industry business, specific open loop causes would have to 
be defined based on analysis of operational use, for 
example. 
7.9 Integration of Resources, Schedule and Open Loops. 
Having applied the above aspects of the Method it is then 
necessary that the intervenor and the project management 
obtain an integrated picture of all these aspects. 
It is necessary to integrate the manpower profiles 
submitted in the Bid with the manpower profiles which have 
been deduced from an analysis of the technical 
documentation submitted separately in the Bid. With this 
sort of presentation a static risk indication is given of 
the capability and vulnerability of the project to the 
problems which are likely to occur. Thus, instead of the 
adequacy of the resources being a major concern and having 
to be supplemented between one and two years after the 
project begins, the whole business could be realistically 
assessed, and adjusted or cancelled, before contractual 
commitments are made. The intervenor would not permit a 
contract to be let until coherence had been achieved on the 
elements contained in this type of presentation. 
7.10 The Dynamic Domain. 
Once the project has commenced the intervenor must monitor 
the tendency of the situation to deteriorate and thus risk 
failure to achieve the originally specified strategic 
objectives. 
The intervenor must use dynamic risk indicators in 
conjunction with static risk indicators for this function. 
A number of dynamic risk indicators exist and will vary for 
the different types of development projects. The project is 
considered to essentially consist of flows of data and 
knowledge. A hardware item is covered by this definition 
since if it has not been defined in the project 
documentation then, as far as the project is formally 
concerned, it does not exist. Behavioural aspects are 
covered by knowledge flows; for example trajectory and 
project support aspects. When these data and knowledge 
flows are generally of a constant nature or velocity then 
conditions can be said to be relatively steady. 
If the flow rates increase, accelerate, then there is a 
possibility for the onset of turbulence with the attendant 
increase of risk. 
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The intervenor is thus concerned with identifying those 
flows which could be measured and which could be used as 
dynamic risk indicators. 
This research has identified a number of such indicators 
and they are listed below: 
a) the frequency of meetings on specific subjects; 
b) the rate by which parametric margins are used; 
c) the rate by which financial reserves are used; 
d) the rate at which schedule slack is used; 
e) the rate by which invoices are submitted late to the 
payments authority. 
It is shown, in annex 8 and figs.7 through 24A in chapter 
5.2.5, that the frequency of meetings per subject indicates 
the dynamics of the situation and, with knowledge of the 
technical and contractual links and interfaces, interactive 
or bifurcative deteriorations can be assessed. 
The model thus requires that different data and knowledge 
sets are submitted to the intervenors, at all levels, such 
that the frequency of meetings can be charted. 
Rence the initial project conditions and the real ttme 
dynamics can be used to continuously assess the likelihood 
of the onset of turbulent conditions and the consequent 
departure from the strategic objectives. 
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Chapter 8. SUMMARY and CONCLOSIONS(DRAFT/15 Auq.1994l 
8 • 1 Summa ry 
8.1.1 General 
The background to this research is the large number of 
development projects which have significantly exceeded 
their originally predicted budgets and schedules; even 
though specific and expert monitoring organisations have 
been established which have carried out extensive bid 
evaluations, programme reviews, and continuous "watch-dog" 
activities during the running of these projects. 
This research, which was prompted by the above conundrum, 
commenced with the postulate that the future is 
unpredictable and converged to investigating whether 
intervention in development projects could ameliorate the 
risk, failure, and loss situations, both at the project and 
corporate levels, and if so what form it should take. 
It became necessary in the research thus initiated to 
address the integrated deterministic and behaviouralistic 
aspects of organisations and to try to define a management 
system which would enable the dynamics of complex project 
situations to be pragmatically examined; and controlled on 
the basis of minimising the risk of schedule and cost 
overruns. 
Following a bibliographical review of approximately two 
hundred references, it became apparent that classical 
methods which often assumed linear, and predictable, 
relationships between the dynamic elements in a project 
were not appropriate. 
The only sector of knowledge that seemed to encompass the 
complex situations being examined, without making 
assumptions which were unacceptable in this research, was 
the relatively new "science of chaos"(152,153}. The 
analogues that have been constructed in this research to 
represent, in a simplistic fashion, the project scenarios 
have drawn from the theory of chaos. 
The conclusions which have finally been derived involve the 
use of dynamic and static risk indicators, the 
identification of open and closed loop systems, the need to 
establish a negative entropy situation as the project 
advances, and the understanding and utilisation of a number 
of patterns relating to the dynamic evolution and 
propagation of problems. 
The dynamic risk indicators may be likened to the 
meteorological practise of "taking soundings" to determine 
what is actually happening in a complex storm front. 
Hence the dynamic risk indicators have been based on, for 
example, the frequency with which certain problems or 
issues have been discussed at the various contractor levels 
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in an industrial project consortium; the latter typically 
consisting of eighty or more companies. 
The concept of open loops is based on the fact that the 
outcome of many project tasks is not known, a priori, and 
cannot be predicted. An example is a qualification test 
which may result in complete failure of the article under 
test or design modifications that will require additional, 
unpredictable, time and resources. 
This research has established that such events must be 
identified as critical and the currently used 
project (schedule) control systems modified accordingly. 
The open loop concept is shown in figure 41. 
As the project advances its complexity usually increases 
with a high magnitude. It is essential that the initial 
state of order of the project is maintained even with the 
increasing complexity in order to preserve the 
characteristics of an open system. This is only possible 
if, locally, the entropy decreases since if it does not 
then increasing randomness will result per the third law of 
thermodynamics. The local decrease is possible, without 
violating the third law, since at the general or system 
level the entropy must still increase. This point relates 
to the research by requiring that information inputs to the 
project must be of the right type, at the right time, and 
to personnel who have the immediate ability to use the 
information; both deterministic(hard) and behavioural (soft) 
aspects are involved. 
In conjunction with the risk indicators the research has 
identified four main types of patterns that exist in 
project environments and which must be used by the 
intervenor and project management, as relevant. 
The four patterns are: 
- pattern 1: 
- pattern 2: 
- pattern 3: 
the increase of the density and of 
peaks of the dynamic risk 
indicator "frequency of meetings" 
variable when plotted 
3-dimensionally, with respect to 
"critical items" and "project time 
scale" on the other two axes. (see 
figure 43) . 
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and in tacitly accepting risk 
sharing; 
the structure of the growth of 
problems producing a progressive 
splitting, or bifurcation, of the 
flows involved in the overall 
route of the project business. 
Finally a method has been developed, termed the Dynamic 
Risk Management method, to enable a company to implement 
the results of this research. It embodies an "Intervenor" 
role with specific responsibilities and authorities at the 
project and corporate levels. 
The above points will now be addressed in more detail under 
the following headings: 
- complex projects; 
- project turbulence; 
- problem propagation; 
- project chaos; 
- the Dynamic Risk Management Method (DRMM) ; 
- application of the DRMM; 
- advantages of using the DRMM. 
8.1.2 Complex Projects. 
This research has basically addressed development projects 
which are characterised by the simultaneous interaction of 
a number of deterministic and behaviouralistic aspects. 
These interactions, due to their multiplicity and 
quantitative and qualitative nature, create other 
interactions which are not pre-determinate and which 
increase with time. The projects are thus, by definition, 
complex (104, 62). 
Examples of deterministic aspects are quantitative 
technical and contractual requirements, costs per hour or 
per product, and schedule milestones. 
Examples of behaviouralistic aspects are qualitative 
technical and contractual requirements since they require 
subjective judgement for their assessment, cultural and 
personality attributes, and educational and political 
biases. 
The main characteristics of complex projects are that they 
are unpredictable and dynamic, with periods of great 
volatility; these aspects being the fundamental reasons why 
conventional project management methods are inadequate. 
Page 208 
Conventional project management is essentially based on the 
following rather limited techniques: 
- static snapshots of the overall project status which are 
usually: 
obsolete when presented due to the length of time 
required to prepare them, and 
- inaccurate due to contractor "screening" of 
information before issue of the related reports 
at the various contractual levels; (see figure 53) . 
status reports, and projections, of resource, cost and 
time expenditures versus performance and achievements in 
which the various functions are presented separately; 
- schedule management prioritising on time-to-complete 
rather than an identification of "open loop" situations due 
to the unpredictability of the results of critical tasks; 
- a lack of lessons learned feedback to minimize repetition 
of previous, and current, mistakes; 
- dictatorial "egoistic" project managers who make many 
decisions based on "gut feeling" and the inputs from a few 
close colleagues, rather than being accountable within an 
established system with agreed criteria and roles; and, 
- significant transgression of contractor and customer 
roles by the customer and higher tier contractors thus 
reducing the effectiveness of contractual penalties and 
jeopardising project and corporate strategic objectives. 
8.1.3 Project Turbulence. 
To investigate the dynamic aspects of complex projects four 
ESA development projects were examined in detail with 
respect to problems which had caused schedule delays and/or 
increased resource and cost utilisation; an examination of 
major decisions was involved in this investigation. 
The objective of this investigation was also to expose, and 
hopefully identify means of rectification of, the problems 
of conventional project management methods. 
In order to address the overall project dynamics it was 
necessary to identify attributes which contained accurate 
information of the actual project dynamics and which could 
be used in as near as possible a real-time mode. 
The attribute finally chosen was: 
" the number of times a particular issue was discussed at 
meetings at the various contractual levels". 
Depending on the contractual level, from the lowest sub-
contractor through the co-contractors to the prime 
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contractor, then the number of times an issue was discussed 
was artificially increased, according to an arbritrary 
scale, to indicate that the issue was considered more 
serious as the contractor level increased. 
For each of the four projects between 10 and 20 major 
problems were identified and the attributes relating to 
those problems plotted as points on two dimensional 
presentaion and as graphs on a three dimensional plot. 
examples of these plots, for project A, are shown as 
figures 42 and 43. 
A total of over 2000 data points were plotted for the four 
projects. 
Examination of the above figures indicates a disorderly 
picture of both clustering, in time, and height of peaks of 
the plotted attributes. 
The general characteristic is of a "turbulent" nature with 
no obvious linearities or relationships being present. 
This presentation of turbulent flows, with time, initiated 
the formulation of a general hypothesis concerning what 
actually happens to the various attributes in a complex 
project. 
It was also considered necessary to write down a number of 
postulates which formed the basis of what we know, or 
assume, to be truisms of the project management scenario. 
The hypothesis and postulates are contained in the next 
section. 
In addition to the detailed examination of the four ESA 
projects a number of customer and contractor managers and 
directors were interviewed to obtain subjective judgements 
of the value of conventional management techniques and how 
they actually operated with respect to information inputs 
and decision making. 
From these interviews it was clear that project managers 
relied on a few colleagues as their main technical and 
administrative "project supports". It also became clear 
that cost and technical data were rarely presented in a 
truly integrated format and the concepts of risk indicators 
and open loops did not exist. 
The analysis of the total data collected during this 
research also showed that systems for learning from the 
problems of previous projects are sparse. It also showed 
that although there was an awareness that certain problems 
could assume very damaging trajectories which would 
traverse the entire project life cycle, the usual action 
was to "throw money and resources" at the problem in the 
hope of an early solution with little regard for the longer 
term or strategic impact. 
These aspects provoked the onset of turbulence and the 
escalation from turbulence to chaos. 
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8.1.4 Problem propagation. 
8.1.4.1 The Hypothesis 
The following hypothesis, which has been validated in the 
thesis, outlines the definition and functioning of a 
complex project with an emphsis on the manner in which 
problems commence and propagate. 
HYPOTHESIS: 
" A development project, which is a complex, open system, 
commences from a perceived steady state, equilibrium 
condition. The planning representation of this condition, 
as used typically in industry, consists of a number of 
interfacing static diagrams. Strategic objectives are shown 
to be achievable within stated cost and schedule 
constraints; with margins in the technical domain and 
reserves in the cost area. An essentially closed loop 
situation is thus assumed as reflected by the majority of 
contracts being fixed price. Even the cost reimbursement 
and cost plus contracts have a maximum ceiling price so 
nothing is really considered to be open loop. As activity 
increases, the steady state is upset by problems which 
occur, unpredictably, here and there; their origins are 
primarily within, but some are external to, the project 
authority and responsibility boundaries. An interplay of 
hard and soft aspects exists within these scenarios. Due to 
the multiple, complex, and many common, interfaces, and the 
different perceptions by the involved parties, the problems 
generate other problems in a dynamic but still 
unpredictable fashion. The steady state condition thus 
becomes non-linear and many open loop situations begin to 
cause major deviations from the planned utilisation of 
resources. 
Without risk indicators and intervention the project 
objectives will become increasingly vulnerable to the 
proliferation of problems; with resources being used in a 
fire-fighting mode but the basic causes of the problems 
will remain obscure. The time and resources required to 
achieve the strategic objectives are not then definable nor 
predictable; the project is going out of control and 
constitutes an increasing risk element. The above 
"perceived" increasingly unstable evolution is analogous to 
a flow condition moving from steady state to a state of 
turbulence and ultimately to a state of chaos, as the flow 
rate is increased. 
The inter-state movement takes place due to bifurcations 
which increasingly multiply if their reactions are allowed 
to proceed unhindered. 
As an example, it is sometimes the case that a single 
problem at a low technical, functional, level can effect 
the entire project. 
The high risk consequences can be avoided if the 
bifurcation patterns, involving both hard and soft aspects, 
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can be continuously identified; thus permitting restriction 
of excursions to the turbulent and chaotic states by 
utilising risk indicators and intervention. This 
constitutes the role of intervention in strategic change" 
8.1.4.2 The Postulates 
The following postulates are considered to be truisms that 
apply to the management of complex projects and are thus 
considered as not requiring proof or validation. 
POSTULATE 1: The degree by which the reliability and 
safety and hazard analyses are not 
concurrently used in the design process 
needs to be represented by a risk indicator. 
POSTULATE 2: Soft aspects can constitute major potential 
risk generators and must be assigned risk 
indicators. 
POSTULATE 3: The terminology generalisations 
progressively being used are considered to 
be significant contributors to the 
difficulties concerning the definition and 
control of risk. 
POSTULATE 4: The use of technology which has been 
developed in well defined, and traceable, 
incrementally advancing steps would avoid 
the inherent risk of the "quantum jump" 
approach. 
POSTULATE 5: The failure to identify, and the lack of 
proper definition of, embedded research, in 
development programmes is a major risk 
contribution. 
POSTULATE 6: The outputs of "failure mode and hazard 
analyses" constitute risk indicators. 
POSTULATE 7: The non-utilisation, or utilisation in a 
non-timely manner, of failure mode & hazard 
analyses can be the cause of major risk. 
POSTULATE 8: the definition and implementation of a 
"ranking" system for critical items would 
enable them to be used effectively as risk 
indicators. 
POSTULATE 9: A properly structured problem definition 
system requiring intervention when problem 
consequences reach a certain, a-priori 
defined, magnitude would enable risk 
profiles to be defined; and, with additional 
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measures, to be controlled. 
POSTULATE 10: The ability of the panel members and panels 
chairmen to become familiar with the review 
material is critical to defining programme 
risk. 
POSTULATE 11: An assessment of the risk involved in the 
progressive loss of the vehicle performance 
would enable a better cost/ schedule 
optimisation during the design and 
operational phases and more realistic risk 
management to be implemented. 
POSTULATE 12: If the total resources are calculated on the 
basis of producing parametric 
performance (inc. the associated margins) and 
similar relationships are established 
relating to performance and profit 
(including incentive/ penalty effects) then 
the parametric margins could be used as risk 
indicators. It should be noted that the 
"resources/ parameter calculation" would 
involve ALL contributing activities to the 
achievement of the performance e.g. design, 
qualification, testing, etc.; hard and soft 
aspects and the interactive effects of 
different margins would also have to be 
included. 
POSTULATE 13: If the strategic plans of the product user 
community and the technology developers are 
monitored by the related corporate 
management 
AND, 
the project is designed for technology 
insertion, and a wide range of possible 
applications of the product are kept open as 
long as possible 
AND, 
the "project supports"(see section 7.6) are 
established and maintained for the project 
life cycle, 
THEN, 
risk in this area would be minimised. 
POSTULATE 14: If political and economic trends, at the 
macro level, are monitored and utilised in 
the compilation and update of Space 
strategic plans then overall risk will be 
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reduced. 
POSTULATE 15: The absence of the opportunity to exercise 
direct executive authority, on the project, 
by an intervenor using the design review 
board recommendations is considered to 
seriously diminish the effectiveness of the 
design review. 
POSTULATE 16: The characteristics of the reactions of a 
company or a project are analogous to those 
of human being(s)i some correlation exists 
with equivalent phases of their respective 
life cycles." 
POSTULATE 17: The primary strategic decision making 
processes in companies and projects involves 
exchange of significant information, often 
in an informal mode, between the executive 
core elements of companies. 
POSTULATE 18: All interventions can be defined as being: 
direct or indirect. 
POSTULATE 19: The significance of the environment to the 
company/ project is due to its, the 
companies, perception of the environment as 
consisting only of intentions and 
interventions. 
POSTULATE 20: A strategic change occurs when, in the 
absence of an intervention the continuing 
application of a positive feedback control 
mechanism fails to maintain the 
strategically predicted growth. 
POSTULATE 21: Unrealistic perceptions, and consequent 
implementation and intervention, will 
produce an unpredictable effect on the 
situation. Realistic perception will produce 
a predictable effect. The former will tend 
to instability, waste, randomness; the 
latter to equilibrium, efficiency and 
growth. 
POSTULATE 22: Intervention re-establishes realistic 
perception i.e. to define the 
characteristics of an intervention, negative 
feedback must be applied until positive 
feedback can maintain growth to achieve the 
objectives. 
POSTULATE 23: OBSERVATION is a function of: 
focus 
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visibility 
view angle 
scan rate.etc. 
POSTULATE 24: The observed or sensed information is 
subjected to processing within the 
perceivers reference frame in order to 
produce perceived information. The reference 
frame contains hard and soft references. 
Examples of the former are company and 
national laws; examples of the latter are 
retained knowledge, educated techniques, 
beliefs, morals, intelligence. 
POSTULATE 25: Reference frames constantly change. 
POSTULATE 26: All reference frames tend to be different; 
to some degree. 
POSTULATE 27: Reference frames can be biased, skewed, 
forced or constrained to produce perceived 
information with certain predominating 
characteristics; e.g. fear, objectives, 
reward, penalties can provide such bias. 
POSTULATE 28: Organisation are dynamic to varying degrees 
and consist only of open and closed loop 
systems. 
8.1.5 Project Chaos 
Even a cursory examination of the the variables and forces 
which exist in a large industrial development project 
creates the impression of a myriad of "things that can go 
wrong"; many of which, it would seem, could seriously 
reduce the prospect of the project being successfully 
concluded. It is also clear, even from this brief 
inspection, that many of the elements are unpredictable and 
are likely to occur in an apparently random fashion. 
The science of chaos attempts to deal with just such 
imponderables. It has established that situations which 
appear to be completely random may in fact not be random 
but may possess an underlying pattern or shape. This latter 
condition is termed chaos. Chaos can be thought of as 
pulling apparently random data into visible shapes whereas 
truly random data remains spread out in an undefined mess. 
Hiding within a particular chaotic system could be more 
than one stable solution. 
A chaotic system can be locally unpredictable but globally 
stable. Changing one parameter can cause a system to move 
from steady state to a point where this equilibrium 
condition splits in two; these bifurcations then become 
faster and faster and cause the system to become turbulent 
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and eventually chaotic. This "bifurcation" phenomenon was 
discovered by the American physicist, Mitchel Feigenbaum, 
to obey certain universal laws under particular conditions; 
these are represented by the so-called Feigenbaum 
diagram. (153). (see figure 44) . 
The above aspects of the theories of chaos seem to fit the 
project scenarios very well and have been used in this 
research. 
Following the realisation that classical concepts were 
inappropriate for this research it was decided to commence 
the research at the basic element involved in the whole 
business i.e. man. 
More specifically the functioning of the human brain was 
used as the starting point and then extrapolated to 
projects and organisations as the inter-functioning of a 
number of human brains. 
The latest theories of the functioning of the human brain 
are based on it processing data according to the theory of 
chaos(93, 140). 
The brain functions as a self organising, open system, and 
selects from inputs of chaotic data based on experiential 
criteria. However the brain will prioritise on survival 
factors even to the extent of distorting inputs and will 
always endeavour to "fit" an input with what exists in its 
experiential knowledge base, even if the "fit" is rather 
obscure or even totally incorrect in absolute terms, e,g, 
UFOs are "flying" "saucers". (63,93,97 ,153, ) . 
The assessment of the functioning of organisations in terms 
of the interactions of "brains" which function as mentioned 
above has been used in constructing the behaviouralistic 
aspects of the Dynamic Risk Management Method which is 
outlined in chapter 8.1.6. 
From the detailed analysis of the four ESA projects, 
covering the past twenty years, it has been found that 
steady state, turbulent and chaotic periods exist per 
project and that the trans-periodic excursions can be 
initiated via bifurcations of the project "data and 
knowledge streams" or "flows". 
Symbolic representations of these bifurcation processes, 
based on the Feigenbaum Diagram concept, and covering the 
development of technology and systems are shown in figures 
44 through 49. 
These bifurcation relationships constitute an important 
pattern for the understanding and control, or minimization, 
of the development of turbulence and chaos in a project. In 
the thesis a connection has been established with the 
latest research work on decision making and the initiation 
and generation of problems. (197 through 203, 208,211,212, 
220, 221). 
Figures 50 and 51 show how the bifurcations have occured on 
an actual project at various stages during the project life 
cycle and the corresponding development of turbulence and 
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chaos. Figure 52 contains information of the specific 
technical problems which "bifurcated" and also the 
interventions by the customer in order to increase 
resources, or schedule, to return the project to a (quasi-) 
steady state. 
8.1.6 The Dynamic Risk Management Method(DRMM) 
From the analysis of data and knowledge collected during 
this research the DRMM has been defined. The DRMM requires 
the presence of an "intervenor" in the overall project-
company corporate infra-structure with specifically defined 
reporting and decision making responsibilities with respect 
to both the project manager and the company corporate 
director(s) . 
The fundamental objective of the DRMM is to identify and 
control those dynamic entities that could cause the project 
to move from steady state to turbulence. The prevention of 
such excursions should minimize the cost and schedule 
overruns and enable a more realistic assessment of the 
impact of changing strategic issues. This objective is 
achieved by ensuring that relatively accurate data on all 
critical problems is available in almost real time to the 
appropriate management authorities, see figure 53; under 
the watchful eye of an active and authoritative ombudsman 
type intervenor who is indigenous to both the project and 
corporate organisations. 
A major outcome from this research is the creation of 
static and dynamic risk indicators; they are briefly 
defined as follows. An example of a risk indicator in a 
spacecraft functions tree is shown in figure 54. 
Dynamic risk indicators must give information of the actual 
dynamics of the various variables which are operating 
within the project. Their selection requires expert 
knowledge of the particular project subject matter 
concerned and they must be continually monitored by the 
project manager and the intervenor during the project life 
cycle. It is also concluded that when all open loops are 
identified prior to the start of a contract they can be 
compared with the actual open loop situation which develops 
as the project proceeds and rectification action can then 
be optimised across the whole system. This would avoid the 
"fire-fighting" management tactics so often practised at 
this time. 
Examples of such dynamic risk indicators are: 
the frequencies of meetings on particular subjects; 
the rate by which parametric margins and financial 
reserves are used; 
the rate by which schedule slack is used; 
the rate and trend of the lateness of arrival of 
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invoices, for payment, at the customer. 
Static risk indicators are composed of data giving 
snapshots of the dynamic project conditions. They are 
limited in usefulness because they are usually obsolete 
before issued, because the compilation time tends to be 
disproportionately long.They also usually contain data 
which is inconsistent; either in extent, accuracy, 
currency, detail or objectiveness. 
Examples of static risk indicators are; 
- standard CPM schedule charts; 
- project status reports; 
- design, qualification and test review proceedings and 
reports; 
- trend analyses. 
An overview of the DRMM is shown in figure 55; the DRMM 
itself is defined in figures 56 through 62. 
The Method focuses primarily on the following aspects: 
1) the agreement of a statement of the projects mission and 
acceptable project risk, by the customer and contractor; 
2) cost, resources and performance data being presented and 
monitored in an integrated fashion; 
3) evaluation of the project documentation and plans, at 
project commencement and during the project life cycle, in 
such a way that open loop and negative entropy situations 
and static and dynamic risk indicators can be defined; 
4) characterisation of key project personnel for 
perceptual bias; 
5) identification of hard and soft aspects; 
6) definition of the role of intervention utilizing the 
four patterns that have been identified during this 
research. 
B.l.7 Application of the Dynamic Risk Management 
Method(DRMK) . 
It is very important that the DRMM is applied at the 
commencement of a project i.e at the initial conceptual 
phase and that, at that time, the role of the intervenor is 
fully understood and agreed, and the dynamic and static 
risk indicators identified. 
The application of the DRMM represents a cultural change 
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for customer and contractor management by requ1r1ng project 
managers to establish a contract with their respective 
intervenors, under the aegis of the relevant Directors, 
involving the sharing of the decision making, the adoption 
of the data integration, open loop, and risk indicator 
concepts and the implementation of the DRMM itself. 
The execution of such a contract would require that every 
contractor feeds information on all problems and issues, as 
they occur and then as they are discussed at meetings, 
directly into a computer network according a contractually 
binding format; see figure 53. Such "open house" data and 
knowledge transfer would be new in the formal sense but not 
new in actuality; it already exists in cost plus contracts 
as an auditable activity. 
Contractual terms and conditions would have to be redrafted 
with the emphsis on penalisation of contractors for not 
properly implementing the DRMM rather than on deliveries 
and performance achievements five to ten years after award 
of contract. 
The accent with this new system is that information on 
problems and issues is available to the project managers 
and intervenors authorities as it is generated and hence 
the developing "storm fronts" can be charted during their 
evolution rather than after they have done their damage. 
The basic elements that application of the DRMM is seeking 
to remove are those associated with information distortion 
and cover-up to protect careers and contracts, and the 
expensive, and sometimes irreversible, erosion caused by 
late attention to problems by the proper persons. 
In the DRMM environment the project would be controlled by 
the DRMM rather than by the whims of a few "key" 
individuals. This does not mean that a mechanistic system 
would be in control but simply that everyone "could" be 
accountable, to the intervenor, and the rules of the DRMM 
would have to be applied. The latter cover such aspects as 
presenting all open loops on the planning, preparing data 
in an integrated form, not proceeding from one project 
phase to another with non-permitted open loops, monitoring 
all risk indicators for the possible onset of turbulence, 
etc. One method that could be used, at all contractor 
levels, is the risk Indicator fault Tree; an example is 
shown as figure 62. 
The adoption of such a system releases more time to be 
available for consideration of the actual problems 
themselves. 
Current methods of identifying where the main risk areas 
are in a project are characterised by conflict between the 
various.groups involved in the assessment of, for example, 
the reV1ew data packages. These conflicts are often caused 
by varied and ambiguous presentations of data and an 
inability, or even a prohibition, to correlate 
c~st,resource,schedule, and technical performance inputs. 
W1th the DRMM approach these problems are, by definition, 
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avoided; the intervenor would not permit the review to 
commence or continue under such circumstances. 
Hence the main areas of risk would become self evident when 
the 3-dimensional presentations,of resources, schedule and 
performance, from the contractor were compared with similar 
presentations prepared by the project and review teams. 
Figure 63 contains such a plot showing the contractors 
assessment of the manpower needed over the project lifetime 
for each of the major technical subsystems for a space 
vehicle project. Figure 64 shows the same project but with 
the manpower needed according to the opinions of the 
customer review team; this plot includes open loop effects 
and subjective(experiential) judgement by the review team 
members. A comparison of figures 63 and 64 reveals a number 
of areas of concern which would immediatley be apportioned 
dynamic risk indicators. 
The vulnerability of the DRMM to creating tensions and 
conflicts between the project manager and the intervenor is 
largely dependent on the terms of reference for both 
positions being written in a complimentary fashion clearly 
identifying project success as the goal for both; the 
latter is interpreted as performance and deliveries on-
time and on-cost. Personalities would be very important but 
the "perceptual/behavioural" arm of the DRMM should 
accomodate that aspect. 
However, the effect of implementing the DRMM would require 
a particular type of organisation. 
In order that the DRMM could be implemented efficiently the 
organisation in which it resided should have the following 
characteristics. It should be function and goal oriented 
with command by respect and achievement rather than by 
hierarchy and positional authority; and it should have a 
lessons learned, open information availability and debate, 
and self (positively) critique type culture. Information 
technology would contribute significantly to enable the 
contractor networking of dynamic risk indicators and 
effective use of lessons learned to be established. In 
general the organisation would be based on the team 
approach with the attendent synergy enabling frank exposure 
of concerns and hence security to those members who made 
mistakes. 
8.1.8 Advantages 
In industry and commerce at this time one of the greatest 
demotivators is that of frustration caused by lack of 
proper data sets at the right time to the right persons. 
This frustration escalates into the management domains as 
decisons are h~ving to be made with very inadequate inputs. 
These frustrat~ons and incorrect decisons occur in 
atmospheres of conflict, miscommunication and distrust due 
to ~e7sonal~ty, CUltural, educational, corporate and 
pol~t~cal.d~fferences. All of this is happening within a 
technolog~cal revolution in which complete societies are in 
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danger of being isolated simply because they do not have an 
adequate level of computer technology in order to be able 
to properly interface with their more advanced peers. 
Hence the complexities AND the, hard and soft, dynamics are 
increasing; rapidly. 
The DRMM is an attempt to establish some coherency into the 
above scenario by dealing with the dynamics as they 
actually exist. 
The main advantages of the DRMM will be that the players in 
the complex projects will be able, for possibly the first 
time, to avoid many of the frustrations, conflicts and 
wrong decisons mentioned above. 
If todays meteorolgists attempted to forecast our weather 
using current project management methods, which are based 
on static presentations and models, then we would have to 
be "all-weather" equipped every time we left our habitats. 
In terms of assessing the real cost and time overruns that 
would result from the use of the DRMM the following comment 
is made. 
Utilisation of the DRMM approach would make the estimation 
of project costs and timescales more realistic. Also more 
time could be spent addressing the really important issues; 
in a timely manner. 
In the authors opinion, using the DRMM approach, the 
timescales for projects A, B, and C would have been 
extended by approximately one, one, and two years 
respectively and each of those projects could then have 
been completed for the updated pro rata costs. Similarly, 
project D would never have been started. 
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8.2 Conclusions. 
8.2.1 Boundary Conditions. 
The author's review of the state of knowledge, involving 
approximately 200 references, has revealed that many 
separate avenues have been researched but very little 
integrated systems analysis has been done. The result is 
that the behavioural aspects seem to have received 
relatively little attention but, from the results of this 
research, they seem to be prime, and probably the 
dominating, elements. The situation today seems to be 
rather fragmented with no clear direction in which to 
proceed. 
This particular research has utilised the results of the 
above review together with an analysis of experiential 
data, involving over 1200 data points covering a 20 year 
time frame, and an analysis of the operational environment, 
involving over 900 data points. 
From this research, which involved the complete system of 
man, machines and environment, it is submitted that the 
hypothesis, see section 8.1 above, has been validated; see 
sections 5.2 and 5.3. 
It is also submitted that a purely quantitative approach to 
the subject matter is inappropriate and that the 
significance of "assumptions" must be more clearly defined. 
It is felt to be particularly tmportant that unrealistic 
assumptions are Dot made concerning: 
the availability of data and computational systems to 
the average industrial manager; 
the correlation of small sample research results to 
management and risk situations in general; 
interface effects; 
the absence of positive feedback mechanisms and hence 
the apparent insignificance of small problems. 
It is also considered to be very important that more 
·systems level- field research is done by actual managers 
i.e. by persons who have lived through the agonies, 
frustrations and glories of real bUSiness, and not mainly 
by disinterested observers. 
8.2.2 Specific Results of this Research. 
The final conclusion of this research is that it is 
essential to incorporate an intervention system as part of 
the overall management structure of a project. 
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The fundamental reason is to ensure a disinterested 
identification and implementation of static and dynamic 
risk indicators in order to avoid, or minimize, turbulent 
and chaotic conditions. Turbulent and chaotic conditions 
usually consume resources at very high rates thus directly 
threatening the achievement of strategic objectives. 
The intervenor would be organisationally positioned between 
the project management and the company corporate management 
and would hence be sensitive to both company and project 
strategic issues. These strategic issues would be included 
in the definition and utilisation of the risk indicators. 
The specific role of intervention is: 
1) to ensure that a statement of risk relating to company 
and project strategic objectives, for the project, has 
been properly defined, understood and accepted by the 
contractor and the customer; 
2) to ensure that sufficient and properly defined dynamic 
and static risk indicators, and the related pattern 
assessments, are being implemented, see chapter 5.2.5; 
3) to ensure that cost, schedule, manpower and resource 
utilisation data is presented in an integrated manner 
incorporating open loop and negative entropy effects, 
and is adequate; 
4) to executively intervene, via the project manager, if 
he considers that turbulent situations will evolve to 
chaos instead of being resolved to steady state 
conditions; 
5) to refuse contract commencement, or continuation from 
one phase to another, if unacceptable open loop 
situations exist or proper open loop analysis has not 
been done and implemented; 
6) to ensure that project supports are adequate and 
deleterious interaction is minimal; 
7) to identify, from inputs from company level risk 
indicators, changing strategic aspects that impact on 
the project statement of risk and objectives. 
The research results that have led to the above conclusions 
will now be outlined. A Method for implementing 
intervention in the overall situation is given in chapter 
6; advantages to be gained by applying the Method are 
addressed in chapter 7. 
The results outlined in this section have been obtained 
from the analysis of data which has been collected by the 
author whilst he was immersed, and executively involved, in 
the environment wherein the data was created. Risk was a 
major issue, see chapter 2. The author thus felt the 
pressures which certain events produced, experienced, with 
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fellow managers, losing control of situations due to 
insufficient, inaccurate or too much data and knowledge, 
and suffered the helplessness of not being able to 
understand certain situations because they were so complex; 
and therefore not really knowing what to do next. These 
subjective experiences were real and certainly contributed 
significantly to the decision making processes. 
This research has collected field data in the European 
Space business environment and particularly involving the 
programmes of the European Space Agency (ESA), a multi-
government organisation; see chapter 4. 
This environment is not representative of purely commercial 
business, where market forces dominate. However, due to ESA 
striving to enhance the competitiveness of European 
industry in the international "open" markets, competitive 
and non-competitive industries do exist in the ESA domain. 
Hence the results of this data analysis in conjunction with 
the assessment of the current state of knowledge, see 
chapter 3, are considered to be applicable to business in 
general. 
It has been concluded that subjective, personnel and 
management issues rather than technical issues dominate a 
project life cycle although they are often triggered by 
events that occur in the technical domain; see chapter 5. 
The author has found no research to date which 
realistically represents the above actual life scenarios in 
their totality; see chapter 3. 
So many assumptions, idealizations, static representations 
of complex dynamic situations, and general extrapolations 
from specific experiences have been made that the results 
bear little relationship to real life. 
The scepticism which many managers levy at much of the 
management and risk "river of knowledge" mainly relates to 
their inability to correlate it with, and therefore use it 
in, the ruthless commercial project environments wherein 
they succeed and are promoted, or fail and become 
non-entities. The existence of these threats can encourage 
a project manager to conceal,or not to expose which is 
rather less negative, the increase of problems and 
"temporary" loss of control. This is a good reason for 
establishing some form of intervention. 
This research has extracted from mans current learning 
those areas of knowledge which seem to "most realistically 
fit" the.actual experiences, scenarios and results which 
constitute project life. Assumptions have been made and the 
phrase "this has been the experience of the author" has 
been used once or twice as the only real justification for 
proceeding in a certain direction. 
The lack of rigour of this small subjective sample approach 
is clear. However, it is also clear that hypothesis must 
start somewhere and at the moment more data of the type 
presented in this research does not seem to exist. 
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It has been concluded that the business environment is 
totally dynamic and consists of "flows of things which 
require the expenditure of resources"; the latter embraces 
money, manpower and time. 
The identification and analysis of these "flows" a::e 
fundamental to this research. The flows have veloc1ty and 
force, or influence, and they can be linear or non-linear; 
the latter cannot be predicted. Most flows are, or become, 
non-linear. The non-linearities may not be immediately 
self-evident since they may take the form of second or 
third order effects. In the presence of positive feedback 
even third order effects can grow to become dominating 
issues. It has been shown in the analysis of the four 
projects that positive feedback mechanisms frequently 
exist; this has been evidenced by the persistence and 
growth of "low-level" technology problems, such that they 
have eventually threatened the success of the entire 
system. A non-linear flow means that the successful outcome 
of that flow cannot be stated with any degree of certainty. 
Hence if such a flow is presented, in a form recognisable 
as such, to a commercial customer by a potential 
contractor, then the customer would probably not approve 
its commencement due to the uncertainty that the product 
thus produced would function properly. 
This assessment of the output and then using it at the 
input to decide whether or not to start the flow, or 
continue if used during the flow process, thus constitutes 
a loop with a feedback mechanism. Hence the non-linear flow 
represents an open loop process and an area of relatively 
undefined risk. In the context of feedback, it is noted 
that an apparently small problem can grow, due to positive 
feedback activity, and ultimately dominate, or even 
destroy, a project. It is desirable, for the intervenor, 
that negative feedback mechanisms exist in problem 
situations so that the problems will eventually just die 
out. 
An important conclusion from this is that the extensively 
practised management method of apportioning "margins" to 
certain parameters at the beginning of a project and then 
monitoring the reduction of those margins as an indicator 
that the project is proceeding satisfactorily, or not, is 
valid only for linear, closed loop systems. Currently this 
method does not discriminate between linear and non-linear 
systems. In fact the margins are usually defined in a 
completely arbitrary manner, see chapter 5, and can be so 
large that they force non-optimal design and manufacturing 
and can actually increase project risk i.e. cause 
turbulence to occur earlier. 
The flows within the project are initially in a relatively 
steadr state. This means that events are occurring and 
behav1ng more or less as expected and are considered as 
being under control and predictable. At certain times 
problems occur and the flow in one area may slow down, with 
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respect to other flows, or interact with them; the planning 
is upset and management insecuriti7s increase: When the problem occurs a work-around plan 1S usually 1mplemented; 
the flows have now been split, since the work-around plan 
will consume resources in order to solve the problem, 
whilst, at the same time, attempts will be made to maintain 
the primary flow on schedule. 
This simple model of 
"flow/problem/work-around-plan/restructuring of the primary 
flow" seems, in the experience of the author, to apply 
extensively to the business world. Furthermore, if a 
problem develops in the work-around plan, then another 
work-around plan will be implemented; and so on. In a large 
project with many contractual layers, a number of advanced 
technologies, culturally different persons involved, and 
several procurement phases, this "flow doubling" process 
occurring in many areas can be very extensive and quickly 
generate confused situations. This subject is discussed in 
detail in section 5.2.5. 
AS demonstrated in project C, the use of advanced 
technology which carries out many functions autonomously 
can become so complex that no one person really understands 
how the complete system works under all operating 
conditions. This situation is an invitation for problem 
bifurcation and open loop propagation under positive 
feedback conditions. 
The above problem proliferation changes the steady state 
project scenario to one in which it is very difficult to 
define and control the various open loop situations which 
may develop. An additional problem is that some managers 
perceive the seriousness of the different problems quite 
differently, or even disagree that some issues are problems 
at all. A turbulent situation has then developed and there 
is a danger that it will continue or even worsen if 
decisive action is not taken. 
This can be due to the persons involved in the work-around 
plans being in tunnel vision and thus tending to apply the 
same rationale which originally initiated the problem; 
instead of using lateral thinking to cover new ground. It 
can also be due to so many problems occurring at the same 
time, and the actual or potential schedule and resource 
depletion pressures being so great, that the managers 
brains experience overload and thus the control and 
executive elements of the project develop their own 
turbulence. 
The situation will now be perceived by many of the managers 
as chaotic; they really do not know what to do because they 
do not understand the fundamental problems. 
This research has shown, see chapter 5, that in order to 
curtail the evolution of turbulence and the continuation of 
chaos it is necessary that intervention in the day-to-day 
project business takes place. 
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It has also been shown that if the subject matter of a 
project has evolved from previously relevant and successful 
work in an incremental fashion, such that each interfacing 
increment preserves an essentially closed loop status, then 
the chance of turbulence occurring is low. On the other 
hand if quanta jumps are made in a project's subject 
matter, compared with what has happened previously, then 
the chance of turbulence occurring is high, due to open 
loop effects. 
The basic differences between the incremental and quanta jump approaches are that in the latter: 
1) the flow rates may have to achieve high 
velocities thus preventing proper interface 
control, verification, establishment of adequate 
margins, and close-out of problems; 
2) the flows will probably experience significant 
doubling; 
3) the flow rates may become very slow or even stop. 
It is submitted that the above characterisation of project 
and business scenarios is realistic and can be represented 
using the science of chaos. It is hypothesised that 
representations and predictions can be made using period 
doubling and Feigenbaum diagrams; see section 5.2.5 and 
Figs. 1 through 19. This means that the onset of conditions 
which will be very difficult to manage, and will certainly 
increase project risk, can be modelled and are, to a 
certain extent, predictable. 
These representations and predictions are only possible 
providing ·specific project information- is collected in a 
particular manner to provide "dynamic and static risk 
indicators". The latter are essential to define the role of 
intervention in strategic change, pragmatically. 
The identification and definition of risk indicators is 
submitted as a fundamental contribution of this research 
and will now be discussed prior to continuing with a 
description of the above mentioned specific project 
information. 
It was hypothesised earlier that since the flows within a 
project can become so complex, for example unpredictable 
non-linear flow interactions being interpreted in various 
and unpredictable ways by managers due to the different 
experiential development of their brains, it is necessary 
to obtain information from these complex flows themselves 
as they develop. In other words, it is necessary to probe 
the flows themselves and obtain the outputs from the brains 
involved in trying to control those flows. Probes must be 
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established which travel with the flows to provide 
information on the local circumstances and at higher levels 
to cover wider interactions; the global dynamics of the 
situation would thus be covered. The manner in which the 
above has been accomplished in this research has been by 
examining the minutes of meetings involving engineers/ 
lower management, middle management and top management for 
four projects. The number of times particular items have 
been discussed, noting the salient points addressed in each 
case, have been recorded on a spreadsheet with 5:3:1 
scaling factors to differentiate the importance, in terms 
of perceived risk impact, of whether it was discussed at 
top, middle or lower management level. Hence, if a certain 
issue was discussed once at each of the three levels it 
would receive a rating of nine. This would indicate that 
the perceptions of the complexities, or risk, involved were 
such that it was immediately referred up to top management 
after only one discussion at the lower and middle 
management levels; a very unusual situation. The content of 
the spreadsheet has then been plotted using a three 
dimensional (3-D) graphics presentation to indicate any 
patterns or clustering etc.; see chapter 5, Figs.7, 12, 17 
and 22. Further analysis of the 3-D plots, and related 
notes, has enabled areas of turbulence and chaos to be 
identified; see chapter 5, Figs.8,9,13,14,18, and 19. 
From the above, and a validation of the thesis hypothesis, 
see chapter 5.3, it is submitted that the "probe 
information" described above constitutes dynamic risk 
indicators and, when selected and presented appropriately, 
will give warning of the onset of turbulent conditions. 
Dynamic risk indicators must give information of the actual 
dynamics. Their selection requires expert knowledge of the 
particular project subject matter concerned. It is also 
concluded that when all open loops are identified prior to 
the start of a contract they can be compared with the 
actual open loop situation which develops as the project 
proceeds and rectification action can then be optimised 
across the whole system. This would avoid the 
"fire-fighting" management tactics so often practised at 
this time. 
Examples of such dynamic risk indicators are: 
frequencies of meetings on particular subjects; 
the rate by which parametric margins and financial 
reserves are used; 
the rate by which schedule slack is used; 
the lateness of arrival of invoices, for payment, at 
the customer; 
Static risk indicators are composed of data giving 
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snapshots of the dynamic project conditions. They are 
limited in usefulness because they are usually obsolete 
before issued, since the compilation time tends to be 
long.They also usually contain data which is inconsistent; 
either in extent, accuracy, currency, detail or 
objectiveness. 
One of the problems with business today is that it is 
almost exclusively based on static risk indicators, without 
taking into account their limitations and underlying 
assumptions. Also, internationally used planning techniques 
do not usually identify open loop activities and link them 
together to produce a project-wide open loop activity 
scenario; see chapter 6, Figs.26,29,30, and chapter 7, 
Figs. 38, 39, 40. 
In conjunction with the risk indicators the research has 
identified four main types of patterns, see chapter 
5.2.5.1, that exist in project environments and which must 
be used by the intervenor and project management, as 
necessary. 
The four patterns are: 
- pattern 1: the increase of the density and 
heights of the dynamic risk 
indicator "frequency of meetings" 
when plotted 3-dimensionally with 
"critical items" and "project time 
scale" on the other two axes. 
- pattern 2: the continuation of certain 
problems throughout the project 
life cycle; 
- pattern 3: the reduction of turbulence due to 
customer intervention by either 
increasing resources, increasing 
expertise available, agreeing 
schedule delays or cost overruns 
and in tacitly accepting risk 
sharing; 
- pattern 4: the structure of the growth of 
problems producing a progressive 
splitting of the flows involved in 
the overall route of the project 
business. 
The "specific project information" mentioned above relates 
to ~he ~e~inition.of the :nvironment, perception, the 
ava1lab1l1ty and 1ntegrat1on of data, and project supports. 
These aspects will now be addressed. 
Many management treatises define companies and their 
environments in the form of hard line diagrams with, for 
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example, circles representing companies and larger circles 
representing the environment. The circles often overlap to 
varying degrees indicating cooperative or adversarial 
relationships between companies and/or the environments. 
This research has not substantiated the above approach but 
has concluded that the environment of a company is a 
function of the perception by the authorities within the 
company of what is going on around them and whether they 
are able, or feel inclined, to use that "awareness". The 
environment is concluded to be dynamic and a perception of 
it may change from one moment to the next. 
The effective or interactive environment of a company is 
thus defined as the "the locus of perception" of the 
authoritative managers of the company; the latter are those 
who have signature authority concerning "flows", and senior 
strategic advisors. 
Every aspect of the project life cycle, and indeed a 
persons life cycle, is dominated by "perception". When 
situations are assessed, trade-offs considered, work-around 
plans constructed or decisions made they are all dependent 
of how the involved persons perceive the information 
available to them. It is submitted that perception is an 
intermediate, or end, point of communication. A person's 
perception of the information of which he becomes aware is 
a function of, for example, his ambitions, relationships 
and competition with colleagues, culture, religion, 
education, family status, personal feelings of security 
and competence, and state of health etc. In other words the 
data received by a persons sensors, e.g. eyes, ears and 
nose, will be processed in a brain which has been 
"conditioned" by its experiential development based on the 
above attributes. In fact the brain seeks information 
mainly by directing the individual to look, listen and 
sniff(183). The brain will then assess the information 
presented to it giving priority to familiar and 
non-threatening data. Based on the particular conclusions 
the brain will direct the person to react in this way or 
that. It is interesting to note that the latest theories 
identify the functioning of the brain as chaotic, and 
perception as a step in a trajectory by which brains grow, 
reorganise themselves and reach into their own environment 
to change it to their own advantage (183) . 
This research has concluded that perceptual biases, which 
could develop or exacerbate risk situations, must be 
avoided. It is proposed that the historical and 
psychological profiles of the interfacing project 
authorities are compared with each other and with the 
project objectives and life cycle characteristics at the 
co~encem~nt of the project; and monitored during the 
proJect l1fe cycle. Related problem preventative action can 
then be taken to reduce the probability of it transitioning 
steady state flow into the turbulence domain. 
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Since the assessment and decision making elements of 
projects are the brains of the people involved it is 
submitted that projects are essentially living organisms. 
Also since a unique characteristic of living organisms is 
that they are capable of creating more order from less 
order it is submitted that projects intrinsically also have 
this property. It is further submitted that projects are 
open systems since information, energy and materials can be 
exchanged with adjacent projects or environments. An open 
system also has the characteristic that its stability is in 
dynamic equilibrium; in which continuous change occurs yet 
relatively uniform conditions prevail. 
In order that the above can occur it is necessary that the 
project must receive negative entropy; how else can 
expanding and increasingly complex conditions become more 
orderly! The answer to this paradox - in order that the 
third law of thermodynamics is not contravened - is that 
entropy can decrease locally but the overall system entropy 
must still increase. 
It is submitted that a negative entropy adjustment can 
occur if a project receives exactly the data it needs when 
it is needed and has the resources, including 
persons (brains) , available to process and implement it as 
required to prevent turbulence developing. 
Hence a project development plan can be scrutinised, both 
prior to and during its implementation, to identify when 
negative entropy adjustments will probably have to be made, 
and their definition. 
Furthermore, entropy increases i.e. increases of disorder, 
can only be realistically assessed if data is presented in 
the same mode that it occurs in the project life cycle. For 
instance it is self evident that during the project life 
cycle manpower, resources and money are utilised, 
approximately, at the same time i.e in an integrated mode. 
In most contractor Bids these three elements are usually 
presented separately and in such a voluminous and 
inconsistent manner that correlation is impossible; see 
section 5.2.2, It is thus not possible to determine the 
credibility of possibly the most critical aspect of a Bid; 
nor to monitor it. 
It is concluded that an intervention must occur if negative 
entropy and data mode correlation aspects are not present 
in a project protocol. 
From the interviews, the documentation reviews, the review 
of current research and the author's experience there has 
been almost unanimous agreement that the main supports in a 
project ar~ the key persons i.e. the persons who form part 
of the proJect management team plus individual experts with 
whom those persons are familiar and on whom they rely for 
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specific expertise. 
This aspect emphasises, once again, the importance of 
perception and subjective judgement; and the necessity for 
a formally defined role for intervention. 
8.2.3 The basic contributions of this research are 
considered to be: 
the consideration of hard and soft aspects in an 
unpredictable environment which can result in chaotic 
consequences i.e. where non-linear, often 
irreversible, modes predominate; 
the identification that all companies function 
primarily as open systems and that they therefore have 
the ability to increase the degree of orderliness in 
the company even though the complexity of its work is 
increasing; 
the utilisation of the concept of negative entropy in 
the form of "the right data, at the right time, to the 
right people" with an appropriate feedback to 
establish a closed loop; 
the identification that differences in perception by 
the key players in a project are a prime element in 
the vulnerability of a project to increasing risk; it 
is concluded to be an essential aspect of the role of 
the intervenor; 
the definition of the environment as the perceptual 
limits of individuals; 
the definition and utilisation of static and dynamic 
risk indicators and related patterns with their 
supporting infra-structure of open and closed loops, 
key persons as project supports, and trajectories; the 
latter relating to such aspects as increasing 
personnel and company maturity, increasing company 
market share and product range; 
the limitation of parametric margins to linear, closed 
loop activities; and their definition in terms of 
resources; 
the combining of the project manager and intervenor 
roles in a partially separate and partially combined 
manner to realise an essential synergy of these two 
functions; 
the utilisation of the "growth of turbulence and 
chaos" patterns to predict and monitor project 
activities; 
the identification that embedded research often exists 
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and is a cause of serious open loop situations; 
the discovery that certain entities in the project 
flow, have a certain velocity, and their acceleration 
indicates an increasing risk situation. 
the definition of criteria to enable the 
identification of when the project work situation is 
likely to move from a steady, manageable state to a 
fragmented, bifurcative state and eventually to a 
state of chaos. 
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ANNEX 1 
POSTULATES. 
Page 234 
The following postulates were formulated during the 
research associated with this thesis. 
POSTULATE 1: The degree by which the reliability and 
safety and hazard analyses are not 
concurrently used in the design process 
needs to be represented by a risk indicator. 
POSTULATE 2: Soft aspects can constitute major potential 
risk generators and must be assigned risk 
indicators. 
POSTULATE 3: The terminology generalisations 
progressively being used are considered to 
be significant contributors to the 
difficulties concerning the definition and 
control of risk. 
POSTULATE 4: The use of technology which has been 
developed in well defined, and traceable, 
incrementally advancing steps would avoid 
the inherent risk of the "quantum jump" 
approach. 
POSTULATE 5: The failure to identify, and the lack of 
proper definition of, embedded research, in 
development programmes is a major risk 
contribution. 
POSTULATE 6: The outputs of "failure mode and hazard 
analyses" constitute risk indicators. 
POSTULATE 7: The non-utilisation, or utilisation in a 
non-timely manner, of failure mode & hazard 
analyses can be the cause of major risk. 
POSTULATE 8: the definition and implementation of a 
"ranking" system for critical items would 
enable them to be used effectively as risk 
indicators. 
POSTULATE 9: A properly structured problem definition 
system requiring intervention when problem 
consequences reach a certain, a-priori 
defined, magnitude would enable risk 
profiles to be defined; and, with additional 
measures, to be controlled. 
POSTULATE 10: The ability of the panel members and panels 
chairmen to become familiar with the review 
material is critical to defining programme 
risk. 
POSTULATE 11: An assessment of the risk involved in the 
progressive loss of the vehicle performance 
would enable a better cost/ schedule 
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optimisation during the design and 
operational phases and more realistic risk 
management to be implemented. 
POSTULATE 12: If the total resources are calculated on the 
basis of producing parametric 
performance (inc. the associated margins) and 
similar relationships are established 
relating to performance and profit 
(including incentive/ penalty effects) then 
the parametric margins could be used as risk 
indicators. It should be noted that the 
"resources/ parameter calculation" would 
involve ALL contributing activities to the 
achievement of the performance e.g. design, 
qualification, testing, etc.; hard and soft 
aspects and the interactive effects of 
different margins would also have to be 
included. 
POSTULATE 13: If the strategic plans of the product user 
community and the technology developers are 
monitored by the related corporate 
management 
AND, 
the project is designed for technology 
insertion, and a wide range of possible 
applications of the product are kept open as 
long as possible 
AND, 
the "project supports"(see section 7.6) are 
established and maintained for the project 
life cycle, 
THEN, 
risk in this area would be minimised. 
POSTULATE 14: If political and economic trends, at the 
macro level, are monitored and utilised in 
the compilation and update of Space 
strategic plans then overall risk will be 
reduced. 
POSTULATE 15: The absence of the opportunity to exercise 
direct executive authority, on the project, 
by an intervenor using the design review 
board recommendations is considered to 
seriously diminish the effectiveness of the 
design review. 
POSTULATE 16: The characteristics of the reactions of a 
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company or a project are analogous to those 
of human being(s); some correlation exists 
with equivalent phases of their respective 
life cycles." 
POSTULATE 17: The primary strategic decision making 
processes in companies and projects involves 
exchange of significant information, often 
in an informal mode, between the executive 
core elements of companies. 
POSTULATE 18: All interventions can be defined as being: 
direct or indirect. 
POSTULATE 19: The significance of the environment to the 
company/ project is due to its, the 
companies, perception of the environment as 
consisting only of intentions and 
interventions. 
POSTULATE 20: A strategic change occurs when, in the 
absence of an intervention the continuing 
application of a positive feedback control 
mechanism fails to maintain the 
strategically predicted growth. 
POSTULATE 21: Unrealistic perceptions, and consequent 
implementation and intervention, will 
produce an unpredictable effect on the 
situation. Realistic perception will produce 
a predictable effect. The former will tend 
to instability, waste, randomness; the 
latter to equilibrium, efficiency and 
growth. 
POSTULATE 22: Intervention re-establishes realistic 
perception i.e. to define the 
characteristics of an intervention, negative 
feedback must be applied until positive 
feedback can maintain growth to achieve the 
objectives. 
POSTULATE 23: OBSERVATION is a function of: 
focus 
visibility 
view angle 
scan rate.etc. 
POSTULATE 24: The observed or sensed information is 
subjected to processing within the 
perceivers reference frame in order to 
produce perceived information. The reference 
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frame contains hard and soft references. 
Examples of the former are company and 
national laws; examples of the latter are 
retained knowledge, educated techniques, 
beliefs, morals, intelligence. 
POSTULATE 25: Reference frames constantly change. 
POSTULATE 26: All reference frames tend to be different; 
to some degree. 
POSTULATE 27: Reference frames can be biased, skewed, 
forced or constrained to produce perceived 
information with certain predominating 
characteristics; e.g. fear, objectives, 
reward, penalties can provide such bias. 
POSTULATE 28: Organisation are dynamic to varying degrees 
and consist only of open and closed loop 
systems. 
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ANNEX 2. 
INTERVENTION, "SOFT" ASPECTS & INCREMENTALISM. 
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The following notes were made following a period of 
reflection on the nature of intervention. They are included 
to hopefully clarify a number of aspects which are more 
briefly covered in the main body of the thesis. 
a) Intervention. 
There seem to be two types of intervention; the EXECUTIVE & 
NON-EXECUTIVE types. 
Intervention is also either "DIRECT" (company/ man 
initiated) or "INDIRECT" ( environmentally/ external- to-
the- company initiated). Hence a 2 * 2 matrix should make 
it possible to classify all types of intervention. 
The executive type consists of an actual activity such as a 
policemen holding up his hand to stop the traffic. 
The non - executive type is an implication that an 
executive intervention MAY take place. For example, the 
policeman standing in the middle of the road about to raise 
his hand when HE JUDGES the time for intervention to be 
appropriate. 
In both the above instances a motorist would feel an 
effect; in the latter he mayor may not take some kind of 
action. Consider also your reaction when you are driving in 
a very tranquil, relaxed fashion and you "see" ( perceive) 
a police car, or an accident on the other side of the road, 
or an ambulance overtakes you ... with or without its siren 
going! Whatever happens you have been subjected to an 
intervention. 
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Similarly the traffic situation could intervene on the 
strategic plan of the policeman e.g. a car could breakdown 
thus preventing the policeman from controlling the 
situation, or he could suddenly develop a very bad 
migraine, etc. 
c) Incrementalism. 
The policeman model also permits an analogy with 
"INCREMENTALISM". 
It would be impossible for any of the drivers to predict 
exactly when the policeman will intervene. It is important 
to realise that in a connected ("dependent") configuration 
of roads the intervention by a policeman at any location 
will effect the overall traffic "environment". A prediction 
of the optimal strategy to use to get from A to B quickest 
thus becomes practically impossible even for this very 
simple model. 
" An Intervention ANYWHERE, will cause a strategic change 
SOMEWHERE. II 
The INCREMENTAL concept requires that the driver concerned 
(lithe company under consideration") establish indicators 
before he starts the journey which will enable him to make 
decisions as the journey proceeds such that he will get to 
his rendezvous on time e.g. he may have to park the car and 
take a train or walk in order to achieve his objectives. 
The incremental approach would also not permit him to use a 
relatively untried vehicle e.g. Sinclairs electric town 
car, due to the lack of traceability to a vehicle that has 
been proven, with an acceptable risk, to be capable of 
completing that particular journey. His progress would be 
monitored by his "chiefs" via the risk indicators and they 
may decide to intervene because their perception of the 
hazards indicated a higher risk than that of the driver. He 
may thus be required, by car radio, to leave the car and 
catch a bus ..... etc. 
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ANNEX 3 
RISK INDICATORS. 
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The following are examples of risk indicators; they have 
been extracted from the thesis. 
RI 1: The degree by which the reliability and 
safety/hazard analyses are NOT CONCURRENTLY USED 
in the design process. 
RI 2: Soft aspects because they can constitute major 
potential RISK GENERATORS. The hard/ soft 
interface must be addressed in the definition of 
the risk indicator. 
RI 3: The terminology generalisations progressively 
being used because they are considered to be 
significant CONTRIBUTORS to the difficulties 
concerning the definition and control of RISK. 
RI 4: The use of technology which has been developed in 
well defined, and traceable, incrementally 
advancing steps would avoid the inherent risk of 
the "quantum jump" approach. The lack of such an 
approach, even by degree, is a significant RISK 
INDICATOR. 
RI 5: The failure to identify, and the lack of proper 
definition of, EMBEDDED RESEARCH in development 
programmes. 
RI 6: The outputs of "failure mode and hazard 
analyses". 
RI 7: The non-utilisation, or utilisation in a 
non-timely manner, of failure mode & hazard 
analyses. 
RI 8: the lack of a "RANKING" system for critical 
items; which would enable all critical items to 
be sequentially listed according to their 
critical consequences 
RI 9: The lack of a properly structured PROBLEM 
definition system which would require 
intervention when problem consequences reach a 
certain, a-priori defined, magnitude thus 
enabling risk profiles to be defined, AND, with 
additional measures, to be controlled. 
RI 10: The degree by which panel members and panel 
chairmen are unable to become familiar with the 
review material. This is critical to defining 
programme risk. 
RI 11: The absence of a system which permits an 
assessment of the risk involved in the 
progressive loss of the vehicle performance thus 
enabling a better cost/ schedule optimisation 
RI 12: 
RI 13: 
RI 14: 
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during the design and operational phases and the 
implementation of more realistic RISK MANAGEMENT. 
PARAMETRIC MARGINS provided that a system exists 
which requires that the total resources are 
calculated on the BASIS of producing parametric 
performance (inc. the associated margins); and 
that similar relationships are established 
relating to performance and profit (including 
incentive/ penalty effects). It should be noted 
that the "resources/ parameter calculation" would 
involve ALL contributing ACTIVITIES to the 
achievement of the performance e.g. design, 
qualification, testing, etc.; hard and soft 
aspects and the interactive effects of different 
margins would also have to be included. 
The absence, or degree of absence, of the 
following system: 
The monitoring of the strategic plans of the 
product user community and the technology 
developers by the related corporate management 
AND, 
the definition of the project for technology 
insertion, and a wide range of possible 
applications of the product are kept open as 
long as possible 
AND, 
the "critical supports"(see section 5.1) are 
established and maintained for the project 
life cycle, 
THEN, 
risk in this area would be minimised. 
The monitoring and utilisation of political and 
economic trends, at the macro level, in the 
compilation and update of strategic plans. 
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Notes from Interview with Contractor Project Hanager 
Qu; 
Ans: 
Qu. : 
Ans: 
Qu. : 
did any of the major experiences of your life, 
education, religion etc. have any effect on how 
you conducted your management? 
management style is whether yo~ ar~ ~utocratic, 
discussing out the issues, or 1ntu1t1ve, etc. I 
think that every manager you work for has some 
impact on how you actually manage. the other . 
thing that had a big impact on me was when I d1d 
a DMS in the early 1970s; this was very useful 
particularly after some years of industrial 
experience. I found it useful to stand back and 
look at the general management manner of the 
managers I worked for. At the end of it all I 
find I tend to rather analytical, a little bit 
intuitive, I tend to be very discussive with the 
members of the team; one has to take the team 
along with you to get the issues out, air the 
issues, rather than be autocratic. The team must 
be behind what you intend to do. I think the 
university system should teach you to be fairly 
logical in thought; I think that often splits out 
people who are able to manage and those who are 
not. A lot of engineers have very confused 
thinking; they will not take a problem and look 
at it from all sides and also accept other 
peoples views apart from their own. They seem to 
have a very confused view of life, are unable to 
break a problem down, probably because they were 
never taught to break things down. I don't know 
whether its something I inherited but I think 
universities should teach you do much more 
thinking. 
to what extent do you rely on experts? 
I would trust some more than others; based on the 
results they had produced before. 
would you trust an expert you knew more than one 
you didn't know? 
Ans: I would not necessarily not trust one that I 
didn't know but I would be slightly more wary but 
I might give him the benefit of the doubt; if 
thin~s did not work out I would then be very 
caut10US. 
Qu.: you often cannot wait until you have experience 
of the work of an expert. Many of the projects 
had embedded research; how did you handle that. 
Ans: quite frankly one often did not have much room 
Qu: 
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for manoeuvre in decision taking in such 
programmes (ESA programmes). ESA had decided on 
certain development directions and one would have 
to move half a mountain to change their minds; 
even if you thought it was really wrong. 
and now, in private industry, do you have the 
same limited decision making? If not, how do 
handle it, because now you are in very 
hi-tech .... ref. experts etc. 
Ans: far wider now. Well, I'm now in the microwave 
business but I'm not a microwave engineer. But I 
think you can pick up sufficient information over 
a period of time to be able to ask hopefully 
intelligent & searching questions to draw out 
whether somebody is trying to deceive you. At the 
end of the day, with apparently equally well 
presented but different expert arguments you have 
to trust your own judgement. For the projects A 
and B the changes made were quite small, in my 
view; your ability to make fundamental changes is 
very limited. One was very limited in moving a 
company in the consortium; their were certain 
commercial and contractual leverages but their 
was so much going on through the back door, 
politically and ESA involvement that its not like 
a commercial programme where there is much 
greater freedom, more scope for error, and more 
opportunity to make a profit. The fact that one 
has more scope does not necessarily mean their is 
more risk but more opportunity. The risk is 
opportunist. One of the things we have realised 
is that we must look at the subject of risk, 
particularly at the start of a programme and 
sometimes going down two sometimes three parallel 
paths. You will have a baseline and you will have 
two or three alternatives; but the time when you 
can afford to do that is at the beginning of the 
programme. Usually the problem is that if you go 
down one path" hang your hat on it, and 
something fundamental happens such that it 
doesn't work then the programme really slips and 
its too late; you're down the chute. So what 
we're trying to now is to say well what are the 
risk areas in the programme particularly the 
perceptions/ protection because that is the 
direction we want go. We define risk as those 
areas that are undefined, things we haven't done 
before, we're not quite sure what the output is 
going to be, we think its going to work but their 
is a risk until you've actually done it, new 
process to qualify ... and is there anything else 
we can do to back up that risk. On ESA programmes 
this is quite difficult to do because of the 
other constraints. Its a very conservative 
Qu: 
Ans: 
Qu: 
Ans: 
Qu: 
Ans: 
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approach and one gets into the sort of situation 
where company X has been involved in the 
development, or the qualification on a previous 
programme, and they will therefore do the work on 
this programme BUT they may NOT be the best 
company the new programme. You often give way 
because you think you cannot fight the politics 
etc; but I think some of that is fundamental rot. 
I remember the day when the prime contractor 
accepted a company to integrate all the payloads, 
at a meeting at ESA HQ involving corporate 
management etc., which I was very much against 
but there was some very high powered poker being 
played by the company concerned, contractors & 
delegates. I then had to work like hell to try to 
make it work and we changed the prime contract to 
be on a cost reimbursement basis. 
did you try to put people on the spot in order to 
obtain their commitments to the bid etc? 
the bids were usually not cos ted out but 
addressed in terms of the technical options to 
meet the requirements; looking several different 
configurations, taking inputs from several 
different technical people, to look at seberal 
different technical solutions. We would then look 
at it financially and schedule-wise but in those 
days these aspects were secondary. 
how did you interpret technical risk in terms of 
cost & schedule? 
it was not very scientifically looked at. At 
programme management level all you could be 
concerned about was overall concepts, like the 
overall AOCS, TT & C, power concepts, I had to 
rely on the subsystem managers to look into 
individual areas of risk in the equipments etc. 
Putting the lower level managers on the spot ref. 
their tech. & cost & sched. inputs was relatively 
soft in those days (TM note: this illustrates a 
completely different perception by the contractor 
corporate manager) but much harder now. 
Financial aspects did not figure as high as they 
should have done, it was very much technically 
driven. 
Do you feel ESA have a lot answer for; were we 
properly preparing European space industry for 
international competition. 
Yes and No to those two questions. In my current 
job where I am involved at two levels lower down 
providing equipments for comsat my experience is 
completely different; and we also bid in to all 
Qu: 
Ans: 
Qu: 
Ans: 
Qu: 
Ans: 
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the major prime contractors. Nowadays, my 
engineers are on the line reference the 
identification of the risks and then when 
considering the price we have to balance the risk 
against the competition; and make a profit. 
Starting at a lower level one is able to assess 
the technical risk in more detail. The penalties 
on thee company can be very high e.g. 10% of the 
price for 30 days lateness. Slight technical 
problems can usually be negotiated with the 
customer but schedule is very important; we 
usually have a good control/ understanding of the 
technical issues. Lateness on schedule also ties 
up the team for longer than bid and this costs a 
lot of money; lateness is a good way to lose 
money. The later you solve problems, particularly 
with nothing in parallel, the closer you are to 
really serious situations. Time was invariably 
lost at the beginning of programmes; "we've won 
the programme, relax ..... " ... noting really done 
for six months. 
did you have a strategic plan? 
we certainly have a SP now; going out for 5 years 
but is updated every year; we were to it. It 
focuses the R&D and investment. At the space 
prime contractor it was not obvious, at the 
project manager level, that there was a strategic 
plan. In order, now, to assess risk in R&D we 
look at what the potential market is we're aiming 
for & what % we think we can get. In the near 
term the market is defined by the programmes we 
can see coming up, or trends that we see 
changing. In the long term it is often an act of 
faith e.g. with SAW filters we started the R&D 
in the early 1980s & have just landed the first 
contracts on Inmarsat; we were the only people 
too have the available technology. The returns in 
our business are definitely 5 to 10 years. 
how did you initially size the margins (technical) 
that were used on our satellites? 
they were sized to be the sort of margins you 
could live with throughout a programme of that 
nature; previous'programmes were used. for a new 
programme we would say that margin looked about 
right based on very limited experience. the local 
managers probably tracked the margins. 
how did you decide the resources necessary for a 
particular programme. 
Difficult; you spoke to individuals with 
experience and finally decided this is the size 
Qu: 
Ans: 
Qu: 
Ans: 
Qu: 
Ans: 
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of team to do the job. We don't do that now. On 
projects where we have a lot of experience we 
know from our cost/ price base the resources 
needed to make a similar type of equipment; we 
now what our bottom line is. We try for max. 
profit. The above is based on similarity; the 
first time one does something is more difficult 
then you have to do a bottoms up. You have to 
build it up from detail inputs. The difficulty is 
when you come to negotiate the price with the 
customer to KNOW what margins are in there, & 
what risk. 
do you relate the strategic plan with margins? 
use feedback etc? 
yes; its much more basic than using feedback etc. 
The whole business was developed by identifying 
niche areas where we think we have good margins 
and high return. We do not e.g. consider types of 
business for which we feel we are not suited e.g. 
high vol, low marginal profits. 
if you compared a successful with an unsuccessful 
first time product what main characteristic 
differences would you identify? 
it comes down to the quality of a few 
individual(TM comment: similarity here with the 
contractor corporate managers comments on project 
supports being key people") and trust/ knowledge 
of those individuals by management. There are 
other areas where things were not successful, we 
kept trying things again & again but they kept 
failing and again I think it comes down to the 
policy and quality of a few individuals. The old 
cliche " your people are your main resource" is 
very true so the lesson to learn is to choose the 
right people. 
what are critical supports to a project? 
in many cases its attention to detail in the type 
of business we're in; small community, problems 
become common knowledge very quickly. One cannot 
therefore afford to have area disaster. We must 
make sure the building blocks are very controlled 
such as the processes, the materials, the bits & 
pieces that go into the equipments etc. If you 
lose that control, through lack of attention to 
detail, you will have a lot of grief. You must 
not overdo it; you must not inhibit the 
innovative spirit to get the job done on time & 
ship it out. Striking this balance is difficult. 
You must keep the right people in the right 
areas; very important. I'm a strong believer in 
Qu: 
Ans: 
Qu: 
Ans: 
Qu: 
Ans: 
Qu: 
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PA/quality control but it must itself be 
controlled. It must be applied sensibly. 
when did you decide to intervene? 
usually via a general review of progress when one 
picked out an area as significantly diverging 
from what had been anticipated. The review which 
has been convened due to the occurrence of a 
problem is, by definition, an intervention. The 
problem was often because something was NOT 
happening. 
at intervention your information set & level were 
different than the local sub-system{project) 
managers; did this cause problems, confrontation? 
yes; sometimes it was necessary to inVOlve the 
line department managers {the sub-system people 
usually had two bosses, project & line). A 
classic case of intervention where I arrived late 
with my expert; there were about 30 other experts 
around the table who agreed nothing was wrong but 
we think otherwise. We required a retest and the 
product failed. {TM comment: this manager 
believed his expert out of 30 others .... why did 
the others not see the problem (ref.MAGE). Quite 
frightening that all these guys around the table, 
costing vast amounts of money to be there etc., 
were not asking the right questions or doing the 
right sorts of things. One wonders therefore if 
part of the problem in a large organisation is 
INERTIA. 
how do you take the environment, which is 
changing all the time, into account. 
the information I use in decision making depends 
on the problem to be solved; quite often it comes 
from outside the company. Intelligence for new 
bids usually comes from outside; you build a 
picture of the environment. You tap into as many 
sources as possible to maintain the picture. You 
have to decide when you have to make irrevocable 
decisions. We would probably bid to all primes in 
a commercial competition; with the bids tailored 
for the different nuances of the different 
primes. We also have to take the changing world 
situation into account; maybe we should team with 
people or continue our normal approach. One must 
not take too hasty a decision but you must not 
miss the boat. 
did you measure the performance of the managers 
who worked for you. 
Ans: 
Qu: 
Ans: 
QU: 
Ans: 
Qu: 
Ans: 
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historically in the prime contractor it was 
limited to annual reviews. Now its more frequent; 
assessment should be continuous ... cannot wait a 
year. Historically, we found there was too much 
emphasis on individual work-package level; too 
much emphasis on financial aspects to the 
engineer can be too distracting .. hels more 
interested in being hit over the head afterwards. 
He had the authority to spend but the controls 
were not, at the prime contractor, really there. 
There was great emphasis hitting the overspenders 
over the head but it didnlt aChieve very much. 
There was no external-to-the-project group 
auditing finances. Too much control does not 
achieve very much. 
do you consider an organisation has certain 
characteristics/ behavioural modes? 
yes; for example the Germans & Swedes were tough 
to negotiate a reasonable price but once done 
they would then get on and do the job, & were 
then easy to manage. The Italians however 
apparently readily agreed to a price but then 
debated it for evermore; very difficult to 
manage. 
could one compare the functioning of an 
organisation with that of a human being? 
Yes, partially but in a strong organisation the 
individuals grow into the company culture; the 
latter is quite a strong driving force in the 
company. The people have to buy into the 
fundamental culture of the company or they will 
leave or not be very happy; all dipoles are 
pointing in the same direction(TM comment; an 
interesting usage of microwave terminology when 
discussing organisations; see brain notes). But 
people may achieve the company objectives in 
quite different ways. My company has a real 
culture; we tried to write it down at one stage 
but found it too difficult. We really must 
believe we are the best. In large organisations 
there is a certain amount of fear; more than in 
small companies. People should feel free to 
express themselves; many people were afraid to 
talk freely. A big company like the prime 
contractor had many cultures, some local to 
personalities in charge of divisions for example. 
do you think an incremental approach is 
important? 
an organisation can only grow to a certain extent 
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by evolution, entrepreurial jumps give real 
growth. A solid feeling will be achieved before 
the jump; maybe a company using a technology 
developed somewhere else; no jumps without some 
foundation. We found the most efficient R&D is 
done on the projects due to the pressure of 
meeting the deadlines. An achievement on a 
prograrmne is worth infinitely more than "having 
something running in R&D". The driving factor 
to force the minds to focus to achieve the R&D 
result during the prograrmne is the fact that the 
company may lose a lot money, and the 
individuals their jobs, if they are not 
successful; fear could come into it. The other 
problem is that R&D tends to put to one side 
because people are so busy on other things. 
managing R&D is extremely difficult. What we 
try to do now is organise things such that R&D 
is considered as an outside project & hence it 
has to meet milestones and will not just be put 
to one side under pressure from other areas. 
Qu: did you get adequate feedback from all areas; 
Ans: residents can help but are very difficult to 
manage. The real method to make sure you get the 
truth is to have a meeting and look into the 
"whites of their eyes"; with different cultures 
this can be difficult .. British dealing with 
Italians is bad enough; Scandinavians & Italians 
are worse. I think the problem with the prime 
contractor was that they didn't know where they 
wanted to go or what they wanted to be; the 
vision was missing. They seem to be getting it a 
little now; too late. The French are different; 
they set out and go for it. Sometimes they get it 
right, sometimes wrong; like Ariane 5 & Hermes 
etc. I work for personal satisfaction; this was 
most realised when I became project manager. What 
gave me most satisfaction was when I had control 
of project and brought it in on time. 
Qu: what are the significant differences between 
Japan, France etc. 
Ans: the main problem with UK has been the lack of 
money. Hughes is very successful because it has a 
very successful marketing machine and good 
technology; with good strategic planning. For 
example, the flip from spin stabilised to 3-axis 
stabilised; an overnight flip. Also big companies 
can get cheaper loan. I am surprised at how slow 
the Japanese have been; they are still only at 
the equipment level. 
The trick is to be able to allocate the right resources up 
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front to avoid fire fighting at the end. The big programmes 
fail because they don't do proper risk assessment at the 
front end. The difficulty of R&D is getting the right 
relative priorities for the various projects. 
********************************************* 
Notes from Interview with Customer Project Manaqer(CPM). 
A major experience that really effected how I thought about 
things afterwards was attendance at a management course 
when I was a graduate engineer working on a design project. 
This course was an "absolute revelation" and the I have 
applied the principles I learnt, since that time ..... with, 
in my opinion, great success. My educational background was 
physics which I feel gave me an advantage over engineers, 
in the engineering field, due to the wider and deeper 
appreciation of the principles involved. 
Question related to "what CPM wanted to put in the ECS ITT; 
the main subjects". I had noticed, as a member of industry 
and then of ESA, that previous ESA ITTs had the major fault 
of over specification which cost industry a great deal of 
time & money without any additional benefit to anyone. I 
was responsible for putting the project B ITT together in 
ESA so I sat back & formulated my own guidelines; there 
were no written ESA guidelines. So I asked myself what do 
we want the contractor to tell us so that we can assess his 
ability to do what we want. The first fundamental was to 
specify clearly & precisely & concisely exactly what we 
wanted, technically. We were buying goods & services from 
the contractor and this had to be specified precisely; this 
had not been done before. Previously ITTs had been grossly 
over-specified even down to nuts & bolts level; this was 
very improper. Also the contractual and product assurance 
area need to be defined; in a precise and simple manner 
which had not been done previously. I thus established the 
SP(system performance) specification which contained all 
the top level technical requirements; this system is now 
generally used. 
The main Reviews were part of the management plan. I had 
the feeling that previously there had been too much control 
of the contractor at the working level and what we wanted 
to know was "when it came to paying him money, had he done 
the job sufficiently well to justify that payment". This 
needed key milestones and at those points we assessed his 
qualification for payment. These reviews must be 
pre-defined because they are part of his contract and the 
contractor relies on getting money at a review. In an ideal 
world one would like to have a contractor who would deliver 
what one had asked for in orbit, functioning perfectly, and 
Page 10 
then payment would be made. This is clearly not possible 
with current European industry, the politics get in the 
way, and such aspects as ESA supplying the launch vehicle 
make it impossible to implement. Hence ESA has to satisfy 
itself before launch that the satellite is fit for launch. 
So political & logistical reasons prevent the ideal system 
being implemented. The actual number of reviews was reduced 
from previous arrangements. These reviews were "key 
reviews" for ESA because we had committed a launch date to 
our customer (Eutelsat) & key for the contractor because he 
need to know he would get money at a particular point in 
time. 
I saw the role of ESA as "acceptance, or not, of the 
contractors status as presented at reviews; the release of 
funds for payment". The word acceptance carries 
responsibility with it; if ESA accepted something at a 
review then as far as I am concerned ESA had made a 
contractual acceptance. ( TM note: in fact the ESA legal 
dept. do not accept this; they state that such ESA 
acceptance constitutes only "permission to proceed".). 
Ees was not competitive. The ITT was only discussed 
superficially with BAe before issue. The ITT was for a 
fixed price contract; BAe had to tell ESA how much it would 
cost but I am sure they knew the ESA budget available for 
this work. 
When I reviewed the bid I was basically checking whether he 
was responsive to our requirements. In some areas this is 
easy for example in agreeing the review timescale. For 
other areas it is more difficult and the contractor can 
only say I can meet your requirements by using these 
techniques or methods. In other words work has to be done 
to establish whether a requirement can be met. It is then 
up to ESA to assess the validity of these statements and 
this is often not easy; leading to a lot of negotiation. 
ESA has to make judgements; for example will a particular 
antenna achieve the gain stated by the contractor. We rely 
on experts for much of this judgemental work. 
Assessment of the Bid to establish whether the contractor 
had defined his role to be complimentary to our as customer 
revealed that in some areas this had not been achieved. The 
contractor stated that he did not agree with some of the 
things ESA proposed and wanted them differently. This was 
then negotiated. After evaluation of the bid it was decided 
that the price was too high; certain areas must be cut. 
Difficult to identify any criteria that were used to 
structure the price cutting. The basic requirements 
reference Review milestones were kept. 
The risk to the agency that we would not get what was 
required in the ITT was carried out using experts in each 
technical area. I listened to the experts and then stated 
whether I agreed but I made the final decision. A joint 
-
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decision was really made. I trust more the expert whose 
judgements have previously been proved to be correct; 
therefore I trust more the expert I know. I cannot comment 
about two experts I do not know; this never occurred. (TM: 
perhaps, sub-consciously, only known people were reattained 
or consulted as experts ... perhaps it was even a 
condition?) . 
NSSK (north-south station keeping)was discussed in the bid 
but not implemented due to no firm requirement from 
Eutelsat and the need to have maximum communications 
capability on board(NSSK needs more fuel); also ECS was to 
be used for TDMA broadcasts, no direct broadcasts. Both 
requirements needed large ground stations with tracking 
antennas and hence the need for NSSK goes away. Then 
Eutelsat became more knowledgeable & organised as a 
customer to us (TM: environmental perception change) and 
realised the ECS may not be limited to TDMA. In addition 
Arianespace was moving along the development line and was 
able to allow more ECS mass. This scenario convinced us 
that NSSK was possible and very desirable; hence we 
introduced the change. 
There were a number of reasons why the project ended up 
being approx. 18 months late and significantly overcost. 
The environmental specification gave a lot of problems on 
project A(the previous, and first, ESA communication 
satellite). The technical envelope that we required the 
contractor to meet, as defined in the ITT, did not have the 
support of the ESA technical directorate nor the project 
technical engineers. Part of the reason for this was that 
Ariane had not flown to demonstrate the environment it 
would produce. Thus, in the ITT, we knew the environment 
was not adequately defined; we realised this was a risk but 
we took no steps to compensate for it. We took the position 
that these were the requirements against which the 
contractors price was a commitment. We knew there would be 
a problem if we changed it; we did change it, and there was 
a problem. There were also other problems but it is a great 
truism that if the customer changes his requirements then 
the contractor will try to take advantage of the situation 
to "justify" any delinquencies. 
The term "risk indicator" is knew to me and a bit difficult 
to understand. I would prefer the term "unforeseen problem 
area" . 
An example of an unforeseen problem area is the following. 
Because of delayed budgetary release some equipment design 
was not left to the contractors choice; ESA imposed certain 
contractors on the prime to do ceratin work. This was in 
the ITT. For example, this company is developing a decoder, 
you will use it. This brought us into a risk loop with the 
contractor; the contractor said OK I'll use it provided 
the equipment works properly and delivery is on time, etc. 
ESA then has a shared responsibility. A different situation 
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existed for those equipments which were selected by ESA and 
those which were unilaterly selected by the prime 
contractor even though they had very similar fixed price 
contracts. For the former when a problem occurred the prime 
came to ESA with his begging bowl and often received a 
sympathetic response. For the latter this practically never 
happened and a good management job was done. (TM: open 
loops! !) 
Reference the "soft" and "hard" aspects, for example 
whether the management team would do a good job, we did 
think about and there is no difference basically between 
the two. The hard data is based on experience; whether what 
someone is proposing is feasible. For soft data its the 
same; a number of persons selected by the contractor were 
rejected by the agency because we, or our consultants, 
thought they would not be adequate .. based on previous 
experience. One of the big criticisms of the project B 
programme was the changing of personnel; there was a lack 
of continuity. A number of people who learnt the project B 
business very well, were then presumably considered 
excellent persons by their management and moved off ECS. 
This was a clear increase in risk to ESA. In one case a 
proposal for a project manager was refused by me; I 
declared that if this person was appointed I did not want 
anything more to do with the project. The project manager 
was not appointed. A factor in this is the weak penalty 
clause in ESA contracts; the "other" contract with more 
severe penalties will take the best people in view of 
increased risk to the contractor. 
On the subject of margins for example for mass, TT & C. 
These margins were defined based on experience. The 
contractor on project B tended to make larger than 
necessary margins, probably to protect himself more. The 
mass margins were tracked at the monthly progress meetings 
and at the major reviews; I consider that this was 
successfully managed for project B. We must realise that at 
the end of the day industry wants to make a profit and 
there are a lot of people in ESA who have not had 
industrial commercial experience and who tend not to 
appreciate the industrial commercial problems. Life would 
be a lot easier if everyone started from that premise. 
Reference the intervention by corporate management during 
the phase C/D, e.g. because the project was not proceeding 
to the strategic plan, I do not recall any direct 
interventions. I did discuss a number of issues with 
corporate management. 
Reference the definition of parametric margins in terms 
resources, this was never considered. I do not consider 
slack in the planning PERT as a margin. In fact there was 
no slack on the critical path for project B and therefore 
there was no "margin" on schedule.(TM: this is true 
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because, by definition, the critical path is the listing of 
all tasks, and only tasks, which have to completed in order 
to reach the declared end point. Slack does exist however 
in the other task paths.). 
If a qualification activity was not on the critical path 
then it would contain slack; this slack was judged to be 
correct based almost entirely on subjective 
judgement .. experts, discussion and so on. 
I considered certain key experts to be critical supports to 
the project. 
My dealings with companies were with teams within the 
companies and certain individuals often tended to dominate; 
therefore an analogy with human behaviour is possible. 
There were definite cultural differences e.g. Italian 
companies we dealt with were known to be susceptible to 
strikes and the prime contractor often asked our support at 
meetings concerning Italian problems; the French were very 
difficult politically but technically very confident; 
Swedish & German were difficult during negotiations but 
then fairly straight forward. 
In terms of the extent of influence of the corporate 
management on the team it seemed that the Italians were 
answerable directly if anything went wrong. 
The QPRs(quarterly progress reports) were in the nature of 
something that had to written; people had to commit what 
was happening to paper. They were mainly for corporate use. 
The main information sources however were the co- & 
sub-contractor meetings which were attended by ESA as 
observers. The value of this knowledge was that we could 
say a-priori that an intended move by the prime contractor 
would or would not be endorsed by ESA when it was tabled at 
the formal level. For example, if you the prime present 
this at the next Review then we will reject it, so you 
might as well change now. It was of course up to the prime 
contractor whether he heeded that advice or not; there were 
a number of instances where he did. Although the contractor 
could have used this a-priori involvement of ESA to his 
advantage by refusing to be penalised if things went wrong, 
it being a joint responsibility due to the pre-involvement, 
he never did.(TM comment:PH & BE thought otherwise). (TM 
comment: A discussion on whether the prime contractors 
resource management was monitored by ESA did not produce 
much comment; it seemed to be a new subject. It seems to be 
clear that the ESA project management is primarily 
technical and schedule; one must recall that they are 
primarily fixed price contracts which do not require 
resource expenditure disclosures.) 
The relationship between ESA and the prime was very smooth 
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at the beginning of the project but not so good at the end; 
this could have reflected increasing scarcity of resources 
due to management problems, or other reasons. 
During the Bid evaluation I had visibility of the cost, 
management and technical panel outputs. At this time, and 
only at this time, was an assessment of the adequacy of the 
resources made. We were however very sensitive the fact 
that the contractor had committed to put "adequate" 
resources on the project to make it successful, not to put 
so many men for so many years. We could jump up and down if 
we thought the resources were inadequate but we couldn't 
really do much about it. 
**************************************************** 
Notes for.m Interview with Prime Contractor Co~orate 
Manager. 
STRATEGY was determined by contracts from ESA; they were 
extremely important in providing prior technical 
background; R&D supported technical decisions which had 
to be defined in financial terms. 
Technical people tend to be optimistic and so a very 
thorough confrontation review was necessary to try to put 
those technical people "on the spot" by saying to them "do 
you bet your commitment to delivering this product to the 
right technical standard at the right time?". This is not 
enough of course because the product has to be made for the 
right price. There is a FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM of MAKING 
PEOPLE ACCO~ABLE for their actions; at a price & time 
which is acceptable to the customer. Accountability was 
established right at the beginning of the project; in the 
bid phase during the completion of the ESA cost/resource 
forms, for example. Try to make the work package managers 
entirely responsible for their workpackages. In the 
negotiation stage between the general management and the 
performing departments one runs into the difficulty of, on 
the one hand, of their being willing to be accountable to 
certain budgets (both cost & time) and meet customer 
requirements. The INCLINATION IS TO WIN PROJECTS BY 
IMPOSING ( inviting people to accept .. ) RATHER ARBRITARY 
CUTS, particularly in price; a BOGEY PRICE is thus created. 
This decision making(arbritary) by the CEO etc. is later 
discovered to have meant to the local workpackage manager 
that he IS OFF THE HOOK. The next stage was then to get the 
European members of the consortium around the table and 
then so-called "management cuts", aga.in rather arbritary, 
Page 15 
were made. These CUTS ARE BASED ON EXTERNAL DATA to the 
extent possible e.g. previous bids, parametric cost models; 
but its all now related to the bogey price. In the case of 
a private initiative project {multi-company but privately 
funded) we looked at the market and decided a mid-range 
satellite was needed and with our partner we proceeded; 
probably involving $40m from each partner plus government 
inputs. The price was built on previous satellite models 
(TM note: none of which were PV!!). This PV venture turned 
out to be quite successful. All the bids include a basic 
company profit. 
I considered the ENVIRONMENT to be an international one. 
The data of the environment came from: 
reading previous bids; 
ESA inputs; valuable because it "represented European 
industryll{TM note: only the ESA perception of European 
industry) ; 
conversations; not that important but more important 
when they concerned the U.S.; 
discussions with US partners/ consultants (e.g. what 
chance os success did they think the bid had; what do 
you think Hughes are bidding ). 
In terms of establishing TARGETS or bogey prices most of 
the DATA CAME FROM EXTERNAL COMPANY SOURCES i.e. the 
external data was deemed to be more important BUT you have 
to believe your own people since they constructed their own 
prices against the bogeys; and you cannot check everything. 
The bids by the internal people have either implicit or 
explicit SAFETY FACTORS reference TECHNICAL RISK and one 
then has to try to reconcile these costs with what the 
market is saying is the market price. In the case of HIGH 
TECHNOLOGY (advanced, state-of-the-art) one tried to 
establish a fixed price contract with the sub-contractor. 
However since at least one sub. was half government owned 
the risk aspect was rather artificial. 
The main RISK INDICATORS were the major milestones, and 
meeting the ESA requirements. In some programmes with high 
interest rates in operation, CASH FLOW became a major 
consideration. Also whether overrun on the total cost is 
likely. People are kept on programmes to safeguard and 
retain accountability. If running behind milestones then 
massive resources are poured in, in the belief that such 
action will avoid bigger problems later on. Hit the 
technical problems as quickly as possible. Hughes are very 
good at doing this(TM comment: Hughes are the most 
successful satellite company world wide and have PhD teams 
to "throw at problems") . 
Apart from :egular reviews INTERVENTION by myself (PH) was 
at regular 1nternal company reviews; initially monthly & 
then fortnightly. It was probably an error that I 
participated instead of observing since by participating 
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many people considered that the CEO had assumed 
responsibility and therefore their accountability was 
ended ... they were no longer responsible. Contrasted with 
the captain of a ship where the captain has the 
responsibility in the final analysis. Very easy to make 
such a mistake i.e. participate instead of observe. 
If a customer directs you he assumes financial 
RESPONSIBILITY. In many cases whether the customer comments 
are taken as advice or contractual direction/ 
responsibility depends on many things: chemistry, trust, 
working togetherness. ESA had the definition of 
"acceptance" as "permission to proceed" without assuming 
any responsibility. 
Concerning financial analysis the approach was rather 
INCREMENTAL in as much that previous projects costs were 
considered; LEARNING was thus involved. Unbiased people 
were imported to assess the realism of the cost estimating. 
Also one must do better second time around; great pressure 
in bidding phase. 
CRITICAL SUPPORTS in the project were often PEOPLE. Some 
people fight like hell for you; they drive but they also 
lead. Local leaders will fight; you can depend on them. 
Some technical aspects are very critical. 
SOFT & HARD data. There were always frictions between the 
forward line depts. and projects; continuous problems 
getting the line depts. & projects to work 
together ... in-fighting. One was always trying to obtain a 
balance and making explicit changes to maintain that 
balance. The projects often milked the line depts. for good 
staff. 
This manager was very keen on the TM concept of defining 
MARGINS in terms of resources. 
When there is a particular problem then the man-hours must 
be worked out, at the project meetings, to get back on 
schedule; the Hughes system once again. It was done but to 
a limited extent. There was, & is, a severe lack of 
resources in Europe. Value of work done has to be assessed 
by the contactor; good for controlling the project. 
Ref. OPEN LOOPS; in the contract between the contractor & 
customer one tries to arrange for as few open loop systems 
as po~sible. When they are present they should be time & 
mater1al contracts etc. In defense & national projects a 
deal can usually be made with the govt. ref. open loop 
aspects i.e. when a problem occurs which was not foreseen. 
This is not the case with international projects. 
Organisations are like FAMILIES. The CEO & his mates are 
the heads of the family; the performing depts. are the 
teenagers, they have to kicked back into line every now & 
then. Leadership, forgiving, understanding, accountability, 
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are all present. 
****************************************************** 
Notes from Interview with Customer PrQject xanaqer(2) , 
This project manager is British with a degree in physic~ 
and industrial experience in the UK and in the USA. Dur1ng 
his term of office on this project his age was in the late 
50's. 
Qu. 
Can you tell me, first of all, how useful, really useful, 
did you find PERT for assessing future risks. 
Response. 
It is useful and perhaps that's the best way of describing 
its usefulness, assessing future risk. PERT: I was in~olved 
in one of the first projects to ever try to use PERT 1n 
aerospace and that was in 1976. PERT has been evolved, as 
you know, on Polaris and it has done a very great job for 
the U.S. Government and so we were doing a project for the 
U.s. airforce at that time, and they said, we are going to 
start to use PERT, please apply PERT to your communication 
satellite project, and I was working with two project 
engineers. I was the technical guy because nobody at that 
time knew quite how to represent the flow of hardware 
through engineering, through manufacturing, production 
control.We thus developed ways which are certainly what 
General Electric Company have been using ever since. The 
idea of PERT and of course at that time, that was PERT 
Time and there was also a thing called PERT Costs which I 
don't believe has been used very extensively. By that time 
PERT Time was seen as an absolute way of controlling, 
managing, predicting day to day activities on the project, 
and when I took over Olympus the PERT charts had been laid 
out by subsystem with that end in view; and I would have to 
say that as a means of controlling and managing day to day 
activities, I don't think it is very good because things 
happen too fast on a project, and you maintain a staff of 
six guys who are trying to update these charts all the 
time. By the time they get them updated and give them to 
the engineers, they say, that's old hat, that was last 
week, now its changed. So day to day was not a terrible 
amount of use but much longer term as you said, assessing 
future risk I think it is very good, because it is a 
disciplined way of putting together all the key activities 
that have to happen, the inter-dependencies in the long 
term, and it can show you a few things which you hadn't 
perhaps expected. Although, I have always maintained that 
the longer term PERT chart is really nothing more than the 
rather complex bar charts that we used prior to that time. 
An~ bar charts with inter-dependencies was what we were 
uS1ng before they invented PERT and that does really tend 
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to show you the same kind of thing. But anyway not to knock 
it I would say PERT in the long term, yes, can be very 
us~ful and as you may know when I took over project C, t~e 
PERT slacks in the activities against the build state wh1ch 
had slipped from one year was showed as minus fifty two 
weeks. 
Qu. 
Did you establish to your satisfaction, or rather how did 
you establish, that sufficient resources when you took over 
were available i.e. manpower and costs, actual manpower, 
were available to bring the project in on time and on 
performance. 
Response. 
Well, there is no very simple way to do that. It took a 
long time, probably about six months, during which I 
visited a large number of the key companies looking at what 
was happening. And when something is not happening in time 
you have to decide whether it is due to lack of resources 
or lack of understanding what they ought to be doing. 
Basically it was visiting the companies, reviewing the 
tasks, looking at the plans and going down to real detail 
how many people you've got on this job, how many people 
you've got on that, and this we did over a period, as I 
say, maybe it was six to nine months. At that time there 
were sixty companies working on project C outside part 
suppliers. The task of the prime contractor in trying to 
manage a project like that as prime contractor was huge, 
and one of the biggest lack of resources that we identified 
very quickly was in the prime contractor. They had a 
totally inadequate project team. They had under estimated 
the management task of managing all these companies in 
eight different countries. As I say the answer to the 
question is, there is no very simple way to find out if 
resources are short, other than actually going to the 
companies reviewing in detail what's going on first, versus 
the plan. 
Qu. 
Do you feel that ESA exceeds its role as customer, that 
does it abrogate the role of the contractor. 
Response. 
Abrogate is probably the wrong word. I believe that BSA 
frequently does the role of the contractor, yes, but they 
do it virtually by default because as you well know BSA 
programmes are set up on the basis of contributions from 
countries. A certain company has to be the prime contractor 
because that's the only country that's prepared to put up 
the money. Another company has to be the payload 
contractor, because once again, that's the only country 
prepared to put up the money. This is regardless of whether 
that particular company has sufficient experience to do the 
job. So frequently, ESA as sure you well know steps in and 
does the job. Provides a tremendous amount of assistance to 
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the company. But again I am not sure this wrong. I have had 
these discussions with the Italian delegations over of 
course of the project C programme and they regard this as 
the role of ESA. Its .a training role, so they are quite 
happy that the Agency has to move in and sometimes do the 
job. 
Qu. 
Do you think that makes a mockery of our bid system. 
Response. 
If you were to look at things in a totally black and white 
sense, yes, I suppose it does. If ESA were some agency in 
the United States placing a contract with a company like 
British Aerospace and if that company had performed like 
British Aerospace in the United States the contract would 
undoubtedly have been cancelled very quickly. But once 
again I come back to the role of ESA in Europe. We are not 
here to put companies out of business; our role is to 
assist European companies, and European countries in 
becoming competent and trained in space. So, although I 
used to get very angry about the fact, coming from the US 
as I did, that companies had taken and signed contracts 
with us to do jobs they were not doing properly. 
Nevertheless I understood and was informed and accepted 
that it was our role to assist them and in many cases as 
you well know we were actually forced to send teams of 
engineers to companies to actually do the work. Now that's 
a bit extreme but most of the time it was a question of 
management assistance but sometimes we actually sent 
engineers to do the work that they were unable to do. 
Qu. 
Do you think that has a positive "knock-on" effect for the 
next project. 
Response. 
You mean does the company become more competent? I think 
so, I am sure of it. I would have to look at the prime 
contractor, project A and project B satellites, we perhaps 
didn't have a very great visibility of the benefit they got 
from it. But they did, as you know, Skynet satellites for 
example and other derivatives of ECS for other customers. 
As I question that they were using management techniques 
that they had applied successfully on projects A and B. The 
project A/B series in the prime contractor was a success 
story. The company built a large number of satellites, far 
more than the project A/B series based on that, and I think 
based on the management technique they picked up. 
Qu. 
So you don't feel then that the role of ESA is similar to, 
for example the US company you worked for, reference its 
contractors. 
Response. 
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Oh, its totally different, chalk and cheese. My old US 
company, for example is a totally commercial company and so 
as for any such company, it places sub-contract and the 
guy has to deliver. If he doesn't that's tough; they have 
got some pretty tough penalty clauses in their contract. I 
thought you were going to say NASA because NASA is a 
similar agency perhaps in the U.S. to ESA in Europe. Except 
that NASA again very largely would be far more commercial 
but I think they are far more inclined to assist a 
contractor in difficulty than just to simply cancel because 
the contractor that cannot do his job and the contract has 
to be cancelled, it reflects on the agency. 
Qu. 
You mean on the bid system of the agency. 
Response. 
Yes indeed, on the selection system, because if NASA places 
a contract and half way through the guy obviously can't do 
the job not only does the whole programme suddenly slip or 
maybe collapse but it reflects on the fact that NASA 
selected that company in the first place. So NASA will 
undoubtly give some assistance to U.S. companies but it 
probably only happens once. And after that they don't get a 
chance to bid again. In the commercial world I think both 
in Europe and U.S. its totally commercial. If you sign a 
contract you have got to deliver; if you don't, that's it. 
Qu. 
Could you give me some comments about predicting the future 
and so on. Could you give me some general comments on 
thoughts on dealing in a complex system such as project C 
with the unanticipated. I mean there is always the 
unpredicted, the unanticipated. Now we have got our static 
planning; as you have pointed out reference our PERTS and 
so on. When you went around, when you took over for 
example, there may have been a project manager before you 
who had certain ideas. Now you took over and found all the 
schedule slack. You said alright I'm going to do this, I'm 
going to go round and look at all this. In general do think 
the future is unpredictable? Can you give me some general 
thoughts on how you deal or think or say manage the 
unpredictable. 
Response. 
You're saying, how you manage in that situation? A 
prerequisite for being able to do anything really is to 
make sure that you have a highly competent team of your 
own. ,When things are going smoothly the project team really 
can Just coast along just doing their job attending 
progress meetings and everything's hunky dory. But the 
reason you need to have such competent and experienced 
people on standby is for the inevitable problems. So as I 
say you need the team for when something unexpected happens 
and then you have to move very quickly. You have to have 
the ability to create a task force within the project team. 
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If it is a payload problem you put a payload manager in 
there. You immediately make sure he's got three or four 
guys with the knowledge of the technical area that's in 
difficulty. And you just write out to the company and you 
immediately find out what the story is. If it's design then 
you have to put design people on the job immediately; what 
we did was have ESA engineers practically living at the 
plant for maybe a few days, maybe a week, maybe sometimes 
longer than that. If its a production problem as it more 
usually was on Olympus we would have product assurance 
people there and we would get the prime contractor to put a 
resident team in. You are on a daily teleconference 
situation, daily faxes, daily teleconferences but you have 
got to get that team of the best possible technical people, 
you have got right on the job very, very quickly. That's 
why, as I say, its no good just having a competent project 
team of experienced project managers, project engineers, 
you must have senior technical people available instantly. 
This is not always going to work if you have to rely on a 
functional organisation to provide the technical people; 
they always will get involved but very often the guy you 
want is on leave for a week, he's on mission, or he's tied 
up with another project. So the project team must have its 
own competence to cope with situations like this. 
Qu. 
In other words for the unpredictable things in the future 
you have this stand-by reservoir, the technical aid. So are 
you saying there is no other way, that you see, of dealing 
with it? 
Response. 
Concerning predicting; we cannot. I mean the future is 
unpredictable, of course. Well, I described the classic 
situation when something goes wrong, when something fails a 
qualification test or something of that description and you 
immediately got to take action because without a doubt that 
particular equipment is on a critical path. Naturally 
everything you do in planning a project is to try to 
prevent situations like that happening. Everything you do 
in reviewing the design is to try to anticipate or prevent 
a serious problem developing in tests or in product 
assurance or whatever. So you are working all the time to 
try to solve a situation like that. I described what 
happens when it happens, when everything you've done has 
failed and somebodies gone wrong. Then you've got to get 
the team involved very quickly but of course it doesn't 
always mean that you can solve it with your own engineers. 
We've had problems of that nature on Olympus where what we 
had to immediately do was get another contractor involved. 
There are certain technologies which are very unique to 
certain companies and of course different types of 
travelling wave tubes on project C and we had problems with 
at least three of them. Then we had to place backup 
contracts for two of them and the original ones never flew. 
So that's a very specialized technology and what we had to 
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do in the case of one contractor, we immediately got to 
their top management and said the agencies got a serious 
problem on this project can we have your cooperation in 
setting up a backup contract. And we immediately got it. So 
you start at the top management level, they give you the 
green light to send a team out there, negotiate a 
specification very quickly, try to negotiate the schedule 
very quickly and come up with a replacement equipment and 
of course we had to do that on several occasions. 
Qu. 
Do you feel this, that's a very interesting point you 
mentioned, that you went out to get the green light as it 
were. We do have a corporate management. Do you feel that 
we should always have a layer of management above project 
management which can intervene at any point in time. 
Either, a) when it feels like it, or B according to a firm 
set of criteria i.e. agreed with the project manager 
a-priori. 
Response. 
No, I disagree totally with that idea. The project manager 
in the agency is given total responsibility and he must 
have total authority; the two have to go together. And I 
have got to say that in working for my Head of Department, 
with a few exceptions, I had that total authority. What is 
needed is for the layer of management above the project 
manager to be totally ready to jump in at the request of 
the project manager, to support him with the top management 
of the company and help him wherever possible. As I say 
although there have been a few exceptions generally my 
director did play that role and it does not work if he's 
there as it were taking action even against a pre-arranged 
criteria as it were over your head. You must call him in to 
support you rather than have him take independent action. 
Qu. 
I would now like to consider the scenario between yourself 
and the industrial project manager. How do you feel that 
should work, the intervention aspect. 
Response. 
Sorry, explain the intervention aspect. 
Interviewer response When the project manager in industry 
is driving his consortium as you say. Now on top of him, if 
you like, you've got you with your team. Now at certain 
points in time you decided "I'm going to intervene". You 
have perceived that "there's a problem", you don't think 
they're doing it properly", whatever. So ESA(you) 
intervenes. How in general do you think that should be 
handled. 
Response. 
I always did it with, or through, or in conjunction with 
the project manager because in carrying the same argument 
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forward, he's in charge, we've delegated responsibilities 
to that company and he must be seen to be charge of his 
project. You must not under any circumstances bypass him or 
second guess him. This means of course, if he doesn't 
happen to agree with the course of action that you want to 
take, that you're going to have a lot of very hot meetings 
and a lot of hot discussions. Which we did on project C. 
Sometimes it involved actually involving his senior 
management not to bypass the guy but to get another level 
of judgement and experience onto the job. Once again we 
always managed to do it. It was sometimes rather stressful 
and of course you're terribly dependent on the experience 
of the project manager involved. If he's perhaps a little 
bit limited in experience, then you are going to fight a 
lot of battles, but then that's what we're paid for. 
Qu. 
I think you are in, as I've said before, a unique position, 
possibly in ESA, because you have all this industrial 
experience and many ESA project managers haven't had that; 
at least industrial managerial experience. So one could, 
and I think we often have, had a situation when the role is 
reversed where in industry you have a very experienced guy 
and a much less experienced guy in ESA. Now how would you 
see that situation? 
Response. 
That is bad news; for both parties. 
Its a point I made several years ago when the recruiting 
policy of the agency topped at grade A2 engineers(junior 
grade; maximum age 35 years.). I made the point, it was in 
a presentation to Professor Lust (ESA DG at that time), "our 
job is to manage industry and we must be at least as 
competent as the people we manage". I have seen situations 
where a industrial manager in a meeting made an agency 
manager which much less experience look rather foolish 
because the agency manager did not understand what went on 
in manufacturing. He didn't understand the functions of 
product control inspection, the parts screening, the day to 
day management and manufacturing activities, process 
control. He didn't understand this task and he didn't 
really know what he was saying when he asked them to do 
something. This of course, immediately detracts from his 
image and it undermines his authority because industry 
realises that theY've got more experience than he has and 
they can to some extent pull the strings but they don't 
respect him. Its highly important that in managing 
projects, and the programme directorate must basically do 
that, that you have people who have got a lot of experience 
and must have a lot of "industrial" experience. One of the 
problems in the agency in my view is that a lot of the most 
senior people in the agency don't have industrial 
experience. They have never functioned and succeeded as 
industrial managers. This is a handicap for them also. But 
nevertheless it certainly works at project level and you 
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must have people who can manage. They are after all 
managing industry; they must be able to manage the guy they 
are talking to across the table. 
Qu. 
An old friend of mine, he left ESA sometime ago, he has now 
come back as a project manager in science. I had lunch with 
him the day before yesterday. He said, well, my first 
problem is dealing with all these people in ESA; they all 
think they're gods, each and every one of them. How 
important to the success of the project do you think this 
perception of respect is. The perception by the people 
working on the project; that here we have someone we can 
respect. Its a perception. You've mentioned cases where 
that respect is not there and in cases where it is. This is 
a soft aspect; its not something you can put on a PERT plan 
but possibly it could have as big an impact as, for 
example, somebody putting the wrong diode in, or soldering 
something incorrectly etc .. Do you feel that this is an 
important aspect, for a successful project? 
Response. 
Yes, it is important. 
Two aspects; the first one is a sort of, as you might say, 
a soft aspect. It means that if you're respected by the 
contractor then your day to day contact with and your 
progress meetings will be smoother, more pleasant and more 
honest. That's a fairly simple thing. But the second aspect 
of it is far more fundamental, I think if you are seen as 
somebody less experienced than themselves, somebody who's judgement they don't want. Somebody where they feel their 
own judgement is better than yours, they are going to 
present you situations in which they have already analyzed 
the situation, analyzed the problem, decided on a course of 
action and they will present it as the only course of 
action they can take. In fact by the time they present it 
to you it probably is the only course of action they can 
take. On the other hand if they respect you they will want 
to have your opinion, they will want to get you involved 
earlier in their problems. So in a sense you'll know about 
things earlier, there will be a more open dialogue because 
they want your judgement. So that's very important. 
Qu. 
So lets assume now you are the director of the programme or 
programmes; I am going to introduce a term called risk 
indicators. We have indicators for all sorts of things in 
life but for possibly the most important thing, risk, we 
don't use that term. Its a fairly new term. The risk 
indicator simply means something that indicates if the risk 
is increasing; its something that I should look at in order 
to try to get a handle on the risk I am about to encounter. 
So lets assume that you are the director of a number of 
programmes, would you consider this respect aspect as being 
a significant risk indicator? If your appointed project 
manager was marginal in experience would you treat this as 
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a risk indicator? 
Response. 
Of yes, I would feel immediately that I'm going to have to 
spend an awful lot of my own time watching over his 
shoulder because I couldn't really trust him to know what 
he was being told. When somebody's describing a problem 
that they have encountered in, sayan engineering model 
test or some equipment. He's got the viewgraphs out on the 
board and he's telling you what they did and what didn't 
work, the theories they got, why it didn't work, a course 
of actions that they are proposing to take. You very 
quickly develop an instinct for how serious it is, simply 
by studying the guy and his understanding of what he is 
doing and his attitude. There is a lot of psychology 
management. So if I'm a director and I've got a project 
manager without the adequate experience. I know he's not 
going to be able to do that or only in some instances. He 
might be able to do for some technologies but not others. 
He might be a babe in the woods when it comes to thermal or 
something else. So its going to constitute a risk in such a 
situation. You've got various things you can do I suppose; 
you can surround the guy with a lot of technical experts. 
You can say, tell me if something's going wrong and the 
project manager doesn't recognise it but I mean this is not 
a way to manage, its going behind the guys back. In fact 
the director doesn't have the time to do this, its 
management. Its a very significant problem I think. 
Qu. 
So, staying with this risk indicator thing for the moment. 
Can you think of anything else that you would put under 
that general heading of risk indicators. You've got a 
program starting right at the beginning. You're looking for 
things downstream that will indicate to you in advance, 
even the unpredictability of things happening. Now we've 
got one risk indicator which relates to the respect, which 
is a very good point. Can you think of anything else that 
you would use. Possibly the PERT diagram is something you 
would use as a risk indicator. 
Qu. 
I assume you are not talking about technical risks; or are 
you talking also about the maturity of technology and all 
that stuff. 
Yes. 
When you start any project you can break the whole thing 
down into subsystems and equipments. Very quickly, I think, 
most people would be able to identify just where the 
critical technologies are going to be. In other words where 
the difficult technology problems are going to be. You can 
probably identify 90% of them before you start the project. 
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You know that certain equipments are going to be tough. For 
example you are trying to build a frequency generator at 
some particular frequency that's known to be touchy. Later 
on there will be 10% of problems that emerge simply because 
of equipments trying to interface with each other and there 
will always be the unexpected. So technology risk I think 
is something that we probably do pretty well in the agency. 
I don't think we have ever really been surprised. I'm 
talking about project C. I think that technology problems 
we had were fairly predictable. O.K. I can think of some. I 
remember the tank design programme. There are unexpected 
things but the technology risk is generally fairly well 
identifiable at that time. 
Qu. 
How did you establish that technological risk? How did you 
establish in the bid phase that the resources where 
adequate? In the bid we have the PERT diagrams, the cost 
analysis computer print-outs, and then the man-power 
charts. Then you have the CVs(curriculum vitae) of the 
people. How do you establish that the resources, in total, 
are sufficient? 
Response. 
Well, you can only do it the hard way. I have to say I was 
not around when this was done on project C. Presumably we 
didn't dig deep enough because quite clearly the resources 
were not adequate. I think that to be fair technical 
resources were probably pretty good. What was missing and 
is frequently the case was the management abilities at the 
first, second, and third levels of management; immediate 
technical supervision, middle management, project 
management, I think there were just not enough experienced 
people in there, driving the resources. 
Qu. 
Could we detect that from CVs? 
Response. 
You can. It depends but you"ve got to know what to look for 
you in a CV. A guy might look great. He might have a first 
class honours degree and five years experience in some 
technology. He looks great but he's probably never ever got 
a piece of equipment through qualification and into a 
satellite. 
~. 
Should all these people be interviewed by ESA the bid 
phase; at least by the team? 
Response. 
Well, I don't think so. Certainly some key people should 
be. For example some of the sub-contractors managers don't 
have to be interviewed because they are already known. I 
think they should be, there are some certain key people but 
I'm not suggesting to interview every single engineer. But 
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the managers should be known. Oh yes, they definitely 
should be known and they should have a good track record. 
As I say its knowing what to look for in the CV ~nd I think 
this was particularly true in the case of a part~cular 
contractor where they do have some very good engineers and 
very poor management. A solution there was to put in a 
bunch of very experienced people. The agency paid for some 
of them and we recruited a total of seven, very senior, 
highly paid technical, consultants as they are called 
today. They were of course, job shoppers way back. Five out 
of the seven were Americans from TRW. These were put into 
the one of our contractors teams. One of them for example 
was totally responsible for the one of the sub-contracts to 
the co-contractor, for one of the payloads. Another one was 
responsible for another payload. This was the level of the 
newly introduced people. 
Qu. 
They did a good job? 
Response. 
If they hadn't we would never have got project C built. So 
what was missing; the technical management aspect in that 
particular case. Many payload engineers did a pretty good 
job and the final performance of the payloads has been very 
good. We had some travelling wave tube failures which I 
don't believe we can blame on Alenia but the payload for 
example gave a higher performance than required by the 
specification. This was one of the reasons when we lost one 
of the solar rays and had to operate 3dB down the customers 
never noticed, because the performance of the payload was 
so much higher than the specification. So the engineers in 
Alenia are very good. That's true I think of most European 
companies the technical standard of engineering is very 
high. 
QU. 
SO under this risk indicator you see the maturity of the 
technology in which we discussed, the competence, 
experience of the management at various levels. Anything 
else that you feel is not in those two areas. 
Response. 
Well, one obvious one of course is what else is the company 
doing because it doesn't matter that they've got enough 
resources, enough managers. They will always trot them out 
when they want the contract. Six months later when they win 
some other contract they might take them off the project. 
So you've got to look at what their commitments are to 
other customers and other projects. You will always 
throughout a project fight the resource battle. You will 
always suddenly decide you are going to have a meeting with 
the top manager because they have put a whole lot of people 
onto some other project and you are starting to 
suffer. There is a constant battle watching over the company 
to make sure that they keep the right people on the job 
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once they put them there. That's a big risk. 
Qu. 
Going to back to something you said just now. You started 
saying something about when the project is running 
smoothly, the project meetings happen and that's O.K. Then 
we might get a problem and we put a tiger team in or 
something. Do you feel that, or how do you feel, if I can 
use the term that a project moves from a smooth, steady 
state condition? Do you feel it goes through phases such as 
first of all its smooth then it becomes a bit turbulent and 
then it becomes really turbulent, chaotic? Then something 
happens: you return it maybe to that stable position and 
then the whole thing happens again. Do you feel that sort 
of thing happens? 
Response. 
It does but the cycle is fairly rapid or it was fairly 
rapid in the case of project C. 
Qu. 
From steady state to chaos? 
Response. 
Yes, simply because there were major technical problems at 
one point in time that lasted for quite a long time during 
the development. So you might get one area under control 
but not the others and then other problems developed. It 
was rather like the Hydra and cutting off their heads; as 
soon as you cut one off another one grows. It was a little 
bit like that so there wasn't any very long periods of time 
when things were going smoothly. 
Qu. 
In one area you mean; or it affected all areas? 
Response. 
You mean subsystems; probably no. There were some technical 
subsystem areas that went along pretty smoothly but again 
not many. I remember TT & C (Telemetry and TeleCommand), 
which is one of the most mundane subsystems in most 
satellites. I remember a major crisis because we couldn't 
get the heat out one particular power transistor and the 
thing failed qualification. Then it failed again; it went 
on, on and on. And that was a subsystem that was supposed 
to be absolutely mundane and normal and we went to the 
States to buy the equipment simply because they had the 
technology and we didn't want problems. You can't ever 
quite say that things will settle down into a routine way. 
In fact if they do you are probably missing something. The 
cycle is very short, its a sort of monthly thing almost. I 
remember at one point the prime contractor management 
approached my director and said we want a meeting between 
the prime contractor team and ESA team because we've got so 
many major technical problems we actually can't handle them 
ourselves we want to form a joint approach with the agency. 
Page 29 
They came to ESTEC with their project manager and his team. 
I had my team there with our director. They went through 13 
major problems, which they described in detail, that they 
had on the project that they felt that were too much for 
them and they appealed for agency help because they did not 
feel that without the agency help that they could solve 
them in a sensible time. So given that kind of background I 
don't think there were many times on project C when things 
really settled down. Now if you are talking chaos which I 
think you are I wouldn't say we were in a chaotic situation 
all the time but we were certainly in a very highly 
stressed risk situation in many, many technical areas at 
the same time. Pretty well throughout the project and of 
course, continuing to include Kourou for the launch 
campaign. It never quite stopped on project C which was 
probably what made it quite unique. 
Qu. 
Do you feel that this, if I can stay with this, this 
movement, do you feel that it all starts at a certain point 
which is quite low in the overall organisation. You 
mentioned a power transistor; which is located in an 
equipment which, in turn, is located in a subsystem, which 
is part of the system. Do you feel that in most cases it 
starts at a very low level and you get a sort of branching 
that effects something else and then those things effect 
something else and it grows like a tree. Or do think there 
is some other mechanism or some other structure at work? 
Response. 
Its hard to see that but I know it would seem to be that 
way. The problems. I guess you could say we had two 
categories of problems on project C. One was basic deSign, 
coming up with a design that worked. Coming up a design 
that would survive in the environments. I think that the 
tank design was definitely in that category because the 
design that had been proposed and reviewed and accepted 
didn't work. They had to go back and start again. There 
were one or two areas like that. The other area was very 
much an environmental one and you could say this maybe 
supports your theory that it starts at a low level but the 
environments that all equipments that had to be qualified 
to were pretty severe and the acoustics were the worse. So 
the problem when it showed up in trying to get through 
qualification was always at a part level. Some part broke 
off or whatever. So you could say yes, in that sense it 
started at a small level and then of course the thing 
multiplies because suddenly you've got to try change the 
design in some way. Its no good putting the part back in 
just like it was before because its going to fail again. So 
you hav7 to change the design again. You've got to build 
the equ1pment again or modify it and then you've got to 
test again and certainly that of course starts to ripple 
through the whole system. As any PERT network will tell 
you. Everything is on a critical path suddenly. So yes, 
that does certainly multiply in that sense but that's a 
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well known phenomenon. 
QU. 
Let me go back to the things we have been saying. At a 
point in time BAe came here with 13 major problems. How can 
this happen with such an experienced team? They had by that 
time a lot of experience. A major established outfit like 
the prime contractor with experienced established codes. 
Most of the codes were established; we built them up every 
year from project A. How can it happen, we spent all that 
money on reviewing the bids; we spent weeks and weeks, 
months and months. We think we have nailed every problem 
and suddenly as you say, there's this enormous catastrophic 
situation as far as they are concerned; they can't handle 
it. How does that happen? What is the reason? 
Qu. 
I think I can describe how it happened but its hard to, not 
to get into politics and all sorts of company interplay. My 
own view is that the prime contractor was taken by 
surprise. They never and I have to deviate Tom at this 
point to something I don't think is really at all bad here 
but I have to tell why I think it happened. The prime 
contractor needed the project C programme; it was a large 
programme. Their project team alone was over 140 people for 
years. Now that's a very major injection of money into a 
company. It enabled them to maintain a very high base of 
engineering on a programme. It was a very expensive 
programme and at the same time they were making bids for 
Skynet, and Intelsat. It was a great prop for the company 
but they looked at the job that payload contractor had in 
managing four separate communication payloads, all of them 
fairly challenging. They had assessed in my view the 
payload contractor would not be able to cope and they were 
quite right. So all of the PERT charts that they told you 
about that showed minus 52 weeks slack were based on 
payload problems. And always whenever we said why are you 
not doing something on time it was always the payload 
contractor that was blamed: it was always the payloads. Now 
I have told you also that what we did then was to turn 
right around and we made sure that the payload contractor 
could do their job. We sent teams of engineers out to the 
payload contractor to write specifications and to write 
test requirements. We injected 7 very senior people into 
the payload contractor team and suddenly the prime 
contractor found that the payload programme was going along 
pretty well. They were late compared to the original dates 
but they were obviously going to make it; they were going 
to get there because we were forcing them to get there. 
Suddenly the prime contractor could no longer shelter 
behind the payload contractors slack. That's when they came 
to us, they realised they hadn't been paying enough 
attention to their own major problems and suddenly they 
were in trouble. I think the fundamental reason is that 
European Industry see's ESA as a very benevolent customer 
and when a 700 million dollar programme like project C 
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comes along they are only just to delighted to have it. 
That's how it happened. Now you could say why didn't we see 
it was happening. Well, we did see it happening but there 
is a certain amount of perception of what's going on; it 
happens in many of the project meetings. One of the fixes 
we made to project C in Kourou was to put in a safenet 
switch because something we had proposed three years 
previously. This was because we believed that the central 
electronics unit on project C was so complex that we could 
never quite guarantee that we wouldn't find ourselves in a 
situation where the satellite got locked up in orbit. The 
prime contractor assured us by repeated assertions that 
this could not happen. Finally they had a change of 
management in the prime contractor, and one of the 
engineers in the prime contractor went to the guy and said 
there is a mode of operation in which a failure could put 
us into a mode which we cannot get out off. We can't 
command it, that manager said. What can we do about it? He 
said we can do this. He said, its what ESA suggested three 
years ago. Why didn't we do it, the manager asked. He said, 
because we thought we were smart enough not to do it. The 
manager responded: what you have been guilty of is 
technical arrogance. The prime contractor management 
approached us and admitted it, they said we were guilty of 
technical arrogance, we can get into such a mode, which we 
can't get out off, we acknowledge that we have got to do 
something about it; they would make a maximum effort to 
come up with a design. They did that, the modification was 
incorporated in Kourou. 
Qu. 
I'd like to address the subject of perception. Do you feel 
that, in your life, your education, your past life and so 
on there are maybe one, two or three things that really 
effect your judgement when you make a decision? Let me give 
you an example for a moment. Lets say, you are you and I'm 
an Israeli and an Arab guy walks by the window, I could 
perceive enemy, as Arabs and Israeli's are always fighting. 
You see rather an attractive nice looking dark skinned guy. 
Now I perceive that because of my experience on the planet, 
that is the nature of the question. Do you feel for 
yourself there are any major issues that formed a very, 
very useful education, experience or something. You may 
have said to yourself "I'm going to keep that in my mind, 
and whenever I do something in future I'm going to relate 
to it". This could relate to good or bad experiences. 
Response. 
I think the thing that comes to mind most frequently in 
trying to manage a project is what I was talking about 
earlier; the psychology of listening to an engineer 
explaining a problem. I have a bit of a concern about 
engineers who are what I call paper engineers. As I say, 
they've got a first class honours degree, they've got five 
or six or seven years performing designs and very cleaver 
deSigns. They may have several patents to their credit. But 
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the only engineer who's word you can rely on, in my view 
and this is something that has conditioned me, is somebody 
who has actually been through the hardware programme. He's 
had on equipment, that he's had to get qualified. Design 
first of course and then qualified into a flight satellite. 
To the greatest extent possible "hands on experience". 
These guys I feel I can trust because they have done it. 
They know what happens. They know the problems of suddenly 
having to get purchasing, to going out to get new parts, 
production control has started into manufacturing, to get 
the box modified, to get it re-tested, to get it into the 
satellite, they have done all this stuff. The guy who 
hasn't will say, well we will do that in a week, the other 
guy will say, well it took us four months last time. These 
are the guys who really know how project works. So I had a 
lot of hands on hardware experience myself in my 
engineering background and worked guys in other disciplines 
who had the same thing. My manager at that time, this was 
in the General Electric Company was very, very insistent on 
not believing the paper engineers necessarily, he always 
wanted to back up from a guy who had done it, who knows 
what it took. So I developed that kind of feeling for an 
engineer. 
Qu. 
For a manager as well? 
Response. 
Absolutely, When I say engineer, I mean engineer at all 
levels. So you could say if I see a paper engineer walk 
past the window that's my enemy. Its not my enemy, the guys 
very good. 
Qu. 
But not the guy you preferentially want? 
Response. 
Well, he's got a role to play but when you are assessing 
risk which is what you are doing, then you are making a 
judgement on what you are being told all the time. So I 
trust the guy who's got the hardware background. Its what I 
say. 
Qu. 
I want to talk a little bit about the environment. When you 
were at working in the USA, and now that you are here. What 
do you consider your professional environment to be? 
Response. 
Definitely management. 
Qu. 
Do you feel for example that the science satellites are 
part of your environment. Or that there is a prioritisation 
when you look at things. There is information; your brain 
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is rece1v1ng information. You are g1v1ng information or 
making contact with various things on the planet etc. How 
would you define this environment that you move around in? 
Response. 
Well, that's a very general question, I suppose I would 
have to say my environment is very general. You have to 
realise that my personal experience is perhaps rather odd 
because I was in Aerospace for, shall we say, the majority 
of the time. I was only with the US company Headquarters 
for a couple of years. I was with the US company in the 
U.S. and there my role was totally different. I was totally 
involved in industrial management issues. Management of a 
international organisation which had several locations, 
four in the United States, three in Europe. I was on the 
staff of the president of the group and the job was solving 
management problems and working with organisations in 
Holland and vice versa. So at the same time product 
selection was a problem. Product planning was done by 
commercial companies and they have to decide if its going 
to sell. So product planning is a major function before 
they ever undertake any kind of development. The difference 
in environment between the U.S. and Europe was such that 
Europe says the products that are good for the U.S. are not 
good for Europe, so there's product planning problems and 
my job as a staffer was to try to solve all of these 
things; work with the senior vice presidents in all areas. 
So for ten years I had a very different environment. I was 
working with very senior managers, I was exposed to all the 
senior management problems of a highly commercial company. 
Then I came back into Aerospace and I have been here now 
for eight/nine years. But that background is always with 
me, when I deal with some of these big industrial companies 
like the payload contractor. So I don't know whether I am 
answering your question but I see my environment far 
broader than engineering management. I don't particularly 
want to, its just there. I think once you've got knowledge 
you can't forget it. So I know what's going on in the halls 
of the company and sometimes it can be of assistance. It 
means that basically, as I say, the environment I suppose I 
feel I'm in is very much management and when I read 
aviation week and can see what's happening in some company 
I know very much what's go on. You can read between the 
lines very often. 
Qu. 
Where did the really good, what you consider to be really 
good, information come from. Did it come from the 
QPR(Quarterly Progress Report), did it come from the 
PPR(Project Progress Report), did it come from discussions 
with the project manager, did it corne from discussions from 
your own team, did it come from their penetration of the 
sub-contractors, etc. The real information, that you really 
acted on. You really believed; what was its source? 
Response. 
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The latter two that you just mentioned. The progress 
meetings with the companies and the information from my own 
team coming directly from the sub-contractors, that's where 
my information came from. The regular prime contra~t?r 
reporting was by comparison very glossy and superf1c1al. It 
was useful but it was not the fundamental source of 
information from which I managed. It was my personal 
penetration into the companies they were managing and 
visiting and having progress meetings with there 
contractors. That's undoubtedly where the key information 
came from and I just have to mention that very often it 
would not even be known to the prime contractor; and then I 
always bought the prime contractor into it. 
Qu. 
Do you feel, if we put the PERT on the table, one could 
identify a lot of the tasks as being open loop. By open 
loop I mean they are non linear. One could say, well I know 
that task is going to start there but I am really not sure 
about the outcome, I am really not sure, for example, about 
the result of a qualification. But do you feel, that if one 
took a total programme plan, one could mark everything on 
there in terms of closed and open loops. Open loop by 
definition being non-linear and the closed loop being 
linear. That is, if you are half way through a project and 
you had used half the resources, then for a closed loop 
situation you'd say, I'm pretty sure that the end is in 
sight I don't need to ~orry about that any more. In fact 
one wouldn't worry as much about the closed loops as the 
open loops anyway. But do you agree with that concept? 
Qu. 
I guess I would have to say no because I think if there was 
something open loop I would worry a lot about it. By 
definition a PERT chart has to show a coming together of a 
vast number of activities to a end point and show in the 
end that its on time. So everything really by definition is 
closed loop because everything you are taking into account 
must be completed before the project gets delivered, that's 
the idea. So something that's open loop means that there's 
an uncertainty there, which could place the whole project 
at risk. In practice you could probably be right there may 
be a lot of those activities that tend to be open loop but 
what your job as project manager is to make them closed 
loop. You've got to make them come to a termination, at a 
time when you need them. 
Qu. 
Could you develop that just a bit more. We have on our 
satellite projects margins and really we're talking about 
linear margins, We have mass, we have power; these are 
parametric margins. We say we are going to build a 
satellite for three tons; we have a capability for three 
tons from the launcher. So we stipulate, for example, a 
margin of half a ton and hence we must build the satellite 
with a target of two and a half tons. So when we go through 
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the programme we track it, we start off at the beginning 
with the half ton and we hope that by the end all the 
modification etc. will have exactly have consumed all the 
half ton; but not more. If of course there is some mass 
left over, that's a bit embarrassing as well. So that 
implies linearity because if we are half way through the 
project and we have used a quarter of a ton, half the 
resources, then we think fine we are on the ball. Do you 
feel that this utilisation of margins in a linear sense is 
really a rational management tool for the avoidance of 
risk? 
Response. 
No, I don't think so and I don't want to disagree with you 
but I don't feel that I ever applied linearity to those 
margins anyway. Because if you are talking mass margin for 
example, you make all sort of predications on what its 
going to be, based on experience. You generate a margin 
which you think you need based on experience. Then you 
start performing but the big steps come of course when you 
build something and after you've tested it and see what 
modifications you have to make. So the margin gets consumed 
in steps, it gets consumed when you have completed the 
Engineering model. It gets consumed then at the next stage 
at the flight hardware qualification. So by time you get by 
through qualification with that equipment you are probably 
just about there and there is maybe another year or two 
before you ever fly the thing. So its not linear its a step 
function. Certain steps which I think engineers recognised. 
***************************************** 
7.6 Customer Project Controller(l) 
This project controller is Swedish with an industrial 
background in Swedish aerospace; his age at the time of 
this work was early 40's. 
The following notes were made from extensive discussions; 
no tape recordings were made. 
The projects were underpriced from the outset. This was 
realised but the detail was not available to enable firm 
definition. 
The planning documents do not indicate risk; an engineering 
assessment is needed for that aspect. This was not 
available at the customer nor the Bidder. 
In the Bid the technical content was not correlated to 
cost. Very much engineering experience and commercial 
knowledge is needed to assess the viability of the 
planning; and time and resources. 
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In general many organisations seem to be ill-equipped to 
evaluate proposals. 
There does seem to be a pattern in the evolution of 
problems roughly resembling the transition from some sort 
of steady state through a turbulent/crisis regime to panic/ 
chaos. 
Too much intervention can cause crisis to continue. 
Many customers intervene in a very detailed manner; this is 
counter productive. 
The responsibility of the prime is "watered down" by 
excessive customer involvement. In the customer there is 
often a "jockeying for Brownie Points" by obtaining 
information by this or that "intervention" means. In the 
excessive intervention environment many contractors are 
submitting CCNs(contract change notices) continuously thus 
resulting in cost overruns. 
Contract must be static to provide a baseline; things must 
start, and be correlatable to, somewhere. 
Risk cannot be judged "looking" at a plan. 
In many instances situations are approved at the project 
level with the intention to look at problems later. 
When many young people are introduced into a project the 
thinking is freer, more open and more lateral; less 
intervention from the experienced older persons . However, 
the experience is missing; this could prove expensive. 
Margins are attractive mainly because they are so simple 
and everyone thinks they understand them. 
Rate of disappearance os planning "slack" is important but 
is rarely plotted. 
Open loops cannot be identified incurrent planning methods 
and is rarely considered as such. 
In project evaluation exercises a liaison between planning 
and engineering etc. is essential but is really done. 
On the subject of intervention and strategy it may be 
interesting to note that Brown Boveri is run from a small 
Swiss village by six executives and seven secretaries! 
*************************************** 
7.7 Customer Project Controller (2) • 
This project controller is Italian with an administration 
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background; his age was mid '40s at the time ~f this . 
activity. At one stage he was located a~ a maJor Ita11a~ 
co-contractor to properly implement proJect control. Th1s 
involved long sessions with the engineers concerned. The 
following notes were compiled from several discussions. 
Planning presents the size of the project; it provides an 
envelope of time and resources. 
Planners are usually detached from the engineers. 
Planning must be "lived with". Planning is a growing living 
thing that cannot be randomly accessed; it is important to 
know what went before in order to be able to 
"realistically" interpret what the current planning 
presentation means. 
Planners must be technically qualified or technically 
knowledgeable in order to be able to communicate with 
engineers and senior managers. 
Culture is an important aspect and is almost never 
addressed. (TM note: should Italians therefore evaluate 
Italian inputs, and so on ??) . 
The Bid evaluations are restricted to Master bar charts and 
sUb-system reviews; this is insufficient. 
Companies think in terms of targets; money. Engineers think 
in terms of manipulating test programmes etc. 
The pressure generated by fixed price contracts within a 
company are very important vis-a-vis the risk aspect. Some 
of the major programmes have very substantial cost 
reimbursement elements i.e. non-fixed price. very often the 
contracts are cost reimbursement with a ceiling price. When 
the ceiling is reached. the company stops work. 
It is necessary to have a planner plus engineer discussion 
for every task; margins and risk can then be properly 
communicated. 
On the project in question there were a constant sequence 
of problems; and a number of industrial disputes. 
*********************************** 
7.8 Customer Project Controller(3). 
This project controller is German with an engineering 
technician background; this means he is familiar with 
manufacturing methods and factory routines. His age at the 
time of the work was early '40s. 
Many planning etc. inputsare received from contractors just 
to satisfy the customers requirements; not to really 
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contribute to the project success. 
Contracts are often quickly signed by contractors because 
they know they are in an environment whereby they can 
obtain additional monies from contract change notices (CCN) . 
It has occurred that ccns have been written BEFORE the 
contract has been signed! 
A major cause of phase C/D problems are the mistakes and 
incompletions that occur in phase B. 
Many contractors have knowledge of the overall money 
available by the customer well before they start bidding. 
The Bid therefore often reflects what is available rather 
than what is required. The deficit will hopefully be "made 
up" via CCNs. 
The above customer assessments of the money needed for a 
project are often arrived at very arbritarily; often by 
persons without real commercial knowledge. 
A "lessons learned" culture is essential; with data and 
knowledge bases. 
The ESA ECOS system contains a lot of data but is not 
implementable for project work. It has some usefulness for 
Bids but is labour intensive to load and expensive; in 
terms of time and money. 
At the moment very few industrial planning and management 
tools are integrateable. 
Most problems can be isolated except those with multiple 
interfaces. 
A major problem can be that the top (driving) custom 
specifications are "full of holes". This has caused a 
number of projects to rapidly increase in risk for the 
customer i.e. large payments to the contractor to cover the 
additional requirements as the requirements are completed. 
Contracts have been in which additional senior staff were 
employed BY THE CUSTOMER to run some of the co-contractor 
areas. 
A major "risk indicator" appears to be that of the customer 
project personnel, or even the contractor project staff, 
being too far away from the action. 
Good contract negotiators are very rare. 
*********************************** 
7.9 Customer Project Controller(4). 
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This senior project controller is British with a civil 
service accountancy background; his age at the time of 
project involvement was early '40s. 
The following notes were made from a short interview. 
By experience, it is considered that payloads are more 
risky. 
Risk cannot be assessed from PERTs and DCPs(cost planning). 
It is essential to identify key equipments. 
ESA ECOS never used extensively. 
Customer role now that of supplementing lack of contractor 
expertise and resources; very little monitoring now. 
The superposition of manpower and cost on the PERT would be 
very useful. 
A good "risk indicator" is monitoring the invoices that are 
sent to the customer by the contractor. When the contractor 
fails to send invoices on time i.e at the pre-agreed 
points, then it can be confidently predicted that the 
related co- and sub- contractors are late and hence a risk 
rea has been identified. This relates particularly to fixed 
price contracts. 
Page 271 
ANNEX 7 
ORBIT FAILURE, ACCIDENT, and NON-CONFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
Orbit Failure, Accident, and Non-Conformance Analysis. 
This annex (7) contains computerised presentations of the outputs 
from a database I outline designed by the author,· which contains 
world-wide failure and accident information appertaining to space 
vehicles. The information covers ground(e.g. test) and space 
occurring incidents and applies approximately to the past decade. 
The presentations have been designed to be self-explanatory and 
each 3-d histogram contains explanations of the variables being 
correlated. 
The results of an analysis of this data is contained in chapter 
5.2.4 of volume 1 of this thesis. 
The term "FANC" is an abbreviation of "Failures, Accidents, and 
Non-Conformances". This term embraces everything that "went 
wrong" with the space vehicle. Those FANes that could have 
resulted from managerial, etc., errors during the project have 
been identified in the analysis. A major aspect that has been 
examined has been the extent by which the evolution and growth 
of problems which were initiated during the project, and in some 
cases caused turbulence and chaos to develop, continued to be 
present during the operational phase i.e. in orbit. 
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CORRELATION: 3D graph from two selected fields 
This graph shows how FANC's applicable to two User-Selected fields 
(for example Phase against Consequential Loss) are distributed. 
The vertical axis shows the number of applicable FANC's (Count of 
FANC's). The other two axes display the values which can be taken 
by each of the selected fields. 
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FIELD IN GRAPH: Human Life Impact 
The following values can be taken for Human Life Impact: 
o Unknown 
1 None 
2 At Risk 
3 Minor Injury 
4 Major Injury 
5 Death 
6 Multiple Deaths 
I 
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FIELD IN GRAPH: Preventability 
Preventability is a measure of how readily the particular FANC should 
have been prevented. The assurance environment at the time and place 
where the FANC occurred is compared with ESA practices now. 
The following values can be taken by Preventability: 
o Unknown 
1 Lack of Competence 
2 Misfortune 
3 Preventable with Present Practices 
4 Preventable with Improved Practices 
5 Preventable at Prohibitive cost 
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FIELD IN GRAPH: Phase 
The following values can be taken for Phase: 
o Conceptual Phase 
A System definition - Trade-off Studies 
B Subsystem Definition - Qualification Definition 
C Equipment Definition - Design Freeze 
D Assembly Integration & Verification 
E Launch Preparation, Launch & Commissioning 
F Operations and In-Orbit Maintenance 
G Recovery / Landing / De-Orbit 
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FIELD IN GRAPH: Mission Loss Actual/Mission Loss Unrectified 
The Mission Loss Actual indicates the proportion of the Mission 
that has been lost by the presence of the FANe after any recovery 
action has been implemented. A FANe occurring late in a mission has 
little impact. A FANe occurring early can have a large mission loss 
only if recovery action is ineffective. 
Mission Loss unrectified is the proportion of mission that would 
be lost by the presence of the FANC, assuming no recovery action 
took place (irrespective of whether recovery was possible). It is 
useful to compare this with Actual Mission Loss to gauge the 
benefits which recovery achieves. 
The following values can be taken for Mission Loss: 
a Unknown 
1 None 
2 Up to 25% 
3 Up to 50% 
4 Up to 75% 
5 Up to 100% 
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FIELD IN GRAPH: Direct Loss / Consequential Loss 
Direct Loss measures the Financial (Asset) loss sustained within the 
Product in which the FANC occurred. It does not include any losses 
occurring to third parties or other parts of an overall system. 
Consequential Loss is a measure of the Financial loss sustained by 
products and third parties other than the Product affected by the 
FANC itself. It includes revenue loss and is the counterpart of the 
Direct Loss. 
The following values can be taken for Direct Loss / consequential Loss: 
a 
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4 
5 
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ANNEX 8 
Daily Record Analysis Details of Four Projects. 
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ANNEX 9 
DEPINITIONS 
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The following definitions are given to provide a specific 
interpretation of these often rather generally used words 
in the understanding of the model. Where a reference is 
provided the definition is taken from the literature; 
otherwise they have been defined for this research. 
An ATTRACTOR is the trajectory towards which all other 
trajectories try to converge. (125) . 
CHAOS is persistent instability; it is a dynamic 
phenomenum. (123) . 
In pragmatic terms, critical support items are those 
aspects of the project that are essential in order that the 
main objectives are achieved; hence some degradation could 
occur but not to the fundamental objectives. This, once 
again(see ref.106), stresses the need to prioritise the 
aims of a project i.e. NOT to state that they are equally 
important and therefore "everything" must be successfully 
achieved "all" the time. 
Thus, those risk indicators that apply to critical support 
items would be of paramount concern to the intervener. 
DYNAMIC INSTABILITY is defined as the average of a measure 
of the rate of growth of small deviations(Kovalevskaya-
Liapunov,152) 
The term KLIMENT is defined as "a datum or value necessary 
to be taken into consideration in making a calculation or 
coming to a conclusion; as an example the elements of an 
orbit, in astronomy, are the quantities whose determination 
defines the path of a planet or celestial body, and enables 
us to compute the place of such a body at any past or 
future epoch."(206). 
PLOWS are defined as any activity which requires the 
expenditure of resources; the latter covers money, 
manpower, time and procurement. 
INTERVENTION is defined as the temporary application of 
INFLUENCE or CONTROL to a project by a third party, for 
example a manager(s) other than the project manager who is 
normally responsible for the day-to-day management of the 
project. (Annex 2 contains an explanation of the 
intervention concept by using a traffic control example.). 
A LOOP is described and defined as follows: 
" a loop relates to the resource flow(manpower and time) 
estimated as being necessary to "successfully" complete the 
following phase., 
- selection (trade-off) , 
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- design, 
- manufacture, 
- qualification, 
- test, 
- acceptance, 
- assembly into the space vehicle, 
- testing at system level, 
- operation 
of a system, or part thereof. 
The above constitutes a "loop" in the following manner. For 
each of the above phases specific resource flows have been 
estimated; these flows are checked at certain points and 
the values thus obtained compared with the estimated value 
at that time; this feedback completes the loop. Clearly the 
resource flow estimates are rather meaningless if the 
successful outcome of the "phase" is undefinable i.e an 
open loop(see below); feedback becomes irrelevant. 
NEGATIVE ENTROPY is the result of an adjustment to the 
system that results in a reduction of the prevailing 
entropy. 
The second law of thermodynamics can be extended to open 
systems that eXChange energy and matter with their 
surroundings e.g. a project. The two entropy components 
involved are 1), the transfer of entropy across the 
boundaries of the open system, and 2), the total entropy 
produced within the overall system. According to the second 
law the rate of generation of entropy inside the system is 
always positive; and only irreversible processes contribute 
to the production of this increasing entropy. Most 
quantities in the physical world can increase or decrease 
with time, but entropy must always increase with time. The 
entropy can however decrease locally during a given 
interval, but only at the expense of a larger increase of 
entropy in the environment so that it results in a nett 
increase,in the global entropy; the mechanism of negative 
entropy ~s thus valid. Entropy is "times arrow", in the 
words of Eddington. It gives the direction in which time 
flows but it does not provide the rate at which time is 
increasing, so it cannot be used as a clock. Sometimes 
entropy increases more rapidly, and sometimes more slowly; 
only rarely does it remain constant. The second law does 
not provide the speed of degradation (180) . 
An OPIR LOOP STSTIM is defined as: 
a system in which the meaning or outcome of any of its 
elements either, 
1) cannot be completely defined, or, 
2) cannot be directly linked with a previously 
experienced "similar" item which had a 
successful result. 
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In more detail an activity is defined as being open loop if 
the answers to the questions 1 through 8 are either "no" 
or "partially"; and "yes" or "partially" to question 9: 
question 1: 
question 2: 
question 3: 
question 4: 
question 5: 
question 6: 
question 7: 
question 8: 
question 9: 
has the activity been done before by the 
contractors who are scheduled to do it? 
is all the data needed to complete the 
activity available when needed; or is the 
outcome of the activity predictable? 
is all the knowledge needed to complete the 
activity available when needed; or is the 
outcome of the activity predictable? 
are all the interfaces defined when needed? 
(this includes interfaces between phases; 
see section 6.4). 
are all inputs, including other bits of HW 
and/or SW, available when needed. 
are perceptual and behavioural aspects 
addressed? 
have the negative entropy injections, in 
order to maintain orderliness with 
increasing complexity, been identified, 
defined and planned? 
is the activity reversable*. 
do any of the answers to questions 2, 3, 5 
and 6 depend on the outcome of an open loop 
activity? 
* For the purpose of this thesis a hardware activity, for 
example, is classified as irreversible because it is 
normally not possible to "uncut" or "unmachine" a piece of 
material. 
An OPEN SYSTBI is where the stability is in dynamic 
equilibrium; in which continuous change occurs yet 
relatively uniform conditions prevail, like the conditions 
in a pool beneath a waterfall. (102). See also the 
application of "negative entropy" in open systems above. An 
open system has the property of being able to exchange 
information, matter and energy across the boundary with its 
environment. 
PROJICT SupPORTS are used here in the manner of supports to 
a building or superstructure. When prefaced with the word 
"critical" it refers to those supporting items that are 
absolutely essential in order to carry, and balance, the 
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overall load. In other words the ediface(project) would 
collapse, or weaken beyond certain limits of 
acceptability(risk or confidence), if one of the critical 
support items failed. It has already been stated that 
companies are, in fact, Open systems. It is in the context 
of the "stability of the dynamic equilibrium of the open 
system" that the critical support items are so important. 
This applies particularly in transitioning from linear to, 
and through, non-linear regimes. 
RISK is defined as being a function of the perceived 
probability of the occurrence of a hazard(s), the perceived 
severity of the consequence(s) of that hazard, and the 
associated uncertainties. 
RISK INDICATORS, can be static or dynamic. A static risk 
indicator is based purely on static or "snapshot" data; it 
provides a single picture of the flow status of the project 
at a particular time. An example of a static risk indicator 
is a PERT or CPN chart. 
A dynamic risk indicator contains information concerning 
the increase or decrease of the flow rate(s) within the 
project. An example of a dynamic risk indicator would be a 
plot of the rate at which manpower is being used versus the 
rate by which a test is being successfully completed. 
STRATEGIC CHANGB is defined in a bipolar manner; to be used 
in conjunction with the definition of strategy, given 
below: 
1) primarily, as an actual, or potential, departure 
of the project operations from those delineated 
in the project strategic plan; 
2) secondarily, when it appears that the strategic 
plan has not adequately accommodated the 
environmental effects such that there is a 
significant likelihood that the project will not 
meet the stated objectives 
STRATEGIC PLANNING is defined as a journey that probes the 
need for change; it relates to the socio-political nature 
of the organisation, to perception , and to upper level 
management interpreting unanticipated environmental events. 
StRATEGY is defined as the means of coping with both the 
external and internal changes; the path charted for the 
or~anisation being linked to the organisational goals and 
obJectives which are to be achieved. 
TOPOLQGX is defined as a sort of geometry that deals with 
continuities and connections among varying 
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quantities (Poincare;152) 
TURBULENCE is defined as the increase, or decrease, of 
dynamic instability from, or towards, steady state 
conditions. 
TRAJECTORIES embrace aspects which: 
change as the project advances in time, 
represent the dynamic nature of the project, 
and 
can indicate an actual or potential 
strategic change or increase or decrease in 
risk. 
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ANNEX 10 
ABBREVIATIONS 
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The following abbreviations have been used in this thesis. 
- ASm: Ariane 5 common bulkhead(a launch vehicle fuel 
tank bulkhead) ; 
- ABM: Apogee Boost Motor; 
- Aer: Aerothermodynamics; 
- AI: Artificial Intelligence; 
- Ant: Antenna; 
- AOCS: Attitude and Orbit Control; 
- Bap: Bearing and Power Transfer Assembly; 
- Bcl: Battery thin wall Cells; 
- BDR: Baseline Design Review; 
- C/D: Phase C/D(assembly, integration and test phase); 
- CDR: Critical Design Review; 
- CEO: Chief Executive Officer; 
- CEU: Central Electronics Unit; 
- CPN: Critical Path Network; 
- C-W: Caution and Warning; 
- Des: Design; 
- DG: Director General; 
- DGa: Dual Gate Amplifier; 
- e.g.: for example; 
- EPC: Electronic Power Conditioner; 
- E & R: Escape and Rescue; 
- ESA: European Space Agency; 
- ESD: Electro Static Discharge; 
- ESS: Electrical Sub-System; 
- FMECA: Failure Mode and Criticality Analysis; 
- FMW: Fixed Momentum Wheel; 
- Hex: 
- i. e. : 
- ITT: 
- PA: 
- PERT: 
- PRR; 
- QER: 
- manP: 
- Mar: 
- Mat: 
- MIC: 
- Mis: 
- OBDH: 
- O-M: 
Hexfet; 
that is; 
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Invitation To Tender; 
Product assurance; 
Probabilistic Evaluation of Resources and Time; 
project Requirements Review; 
Quarterly Executive Report; 
Manpower; 
Manpower and Resources; 
Materials; 
Microwave Integrated Circuit; 
Mission; 
On Board Data handling sub system; 
Organisation and Management; 
- PIa: Planning; 
- PP: Parts Procurement; 
- Pro.Sup: Project Support; 
- PSS: Propulsion Sub- System; 
- Rad: 
- R: 
- RFQ: 
- RI: 
- Rqt: 
- Saf: 
- Sched: 
- SFr: 
- TEB: 
- The: 
Radiation; 
Resources; 
Request For Quotation; 
Risk Indicator; 
Requirement; 
Safety 
Schedule; 
Sfernice Resistor; 
Technical Evaluation Board; 
Thermal; 
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- Tht: Tayco Heater; 
- TT & C: Telemetry and Telecommand; 
- TWT: Travelling Wave Tube; 
- Uni: Unitrode Diode; 
- Var: Varactor Diode; 
- VSM: Variable System Model; 
- WD: a "WATCH DOG" DG Committee. 
